Viktor Ilievski

The main objectives that this chapter aims to accomplish are to demonstrate, as clearly and conclusively as possible, that Plato in the Timaeus posited Necessity, or ἀνάγκη, as the component which contributed the physical aspect of the creation, and that the Timaean Space, or χώρα, was not conceived of as some kind of Aristotelian ὑποκείμενον, but solely as a neutral spatial recipient of the world of Becoming. The chapter aspires to provide a consistent account that will unproblematically accommodate both above cosmogonic factors. While pursuing these principal objectives, it will also be argued that Plato envisioned what we would call “matter” through the notion of corporeality—constituted of the four elements and nondifferent from Necessity; that Necessity proper, in its causally potent state, arose only after the demiurgic ordering of the primordial traces; that the Platonic Space is not sheer expanse, but a full-fledged entity in the form of a plastic medium in which the creation takes place.

This book focuses on two central topics. The first one is the Platonic concept of time. What is it, how is it defined, what is it not, and how does it help us describe the changing realities surrounding us? The second one is Plato’s understanding of the perceptible world. How is it related to Forms, and how exactly does it work? These are central, wide-ranging, and highly contested questions that have been garnering attention in recent Platonic scholarship. We have ensembled an international team that aims to offer bold, innovative, and thought-provoking answers to these questions. The contributions represent a diverse range of starting points, methodologies, and interpretative traditions whose collective aim is to challenge your assumptions about Plato’s philosophy and help you rethink and revisit the Platonic corpus with fresh eyes.

This book focuses on two central topics that could help us answer how Plato conceives of the physical world and its relationship to Forms. The first one is the Platonic concept of time. What is it, how is it defined, what is it not, and how does it help us describe the changing realities surrounding us? The second one is Plato’s understanding of the perceptible world. How is it related to Forms, and how exactly does it work? These are central, wide-ranging, and highly contested questions garnering attention in recent Platonic scholarship. We have ensembled an international team that aims to offer bold, innovative, and thought-provoking answers to these questions. The nine contributions in this book represent a diverse range of starting points, methodologies, and interpretative traditions whose collective aim is to challenge your assumptions about Plato’s philosophy and help you rethink and revisit the Platonic corpus with fresh eyes.

The purpose of this article is to offer analysis of the passage on evil in the Theaetetus 176a4-8. I submit that it stands in anticipatory relation to Plato’s mature theory of evil, as it can be deduced from the Timaeus. My assumption is that in the Theaetetus passage two contrary principles are postulated, one of which is the cause of good, while the other is the cause of evil. In order to support that assumption, I shall argue that a) Plato’s doctrine of the Forms is present in the Theaetetus Digression; b) the word ‘good’ at 176a6 refers to Plato’s highest entity – αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν; c) τὰ κακά of 176a5 are not to be identified with the opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν mentioned in the same line; d) the ὑπεναντίον of 176a6, the subordinated opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν, and the second ἀνάγκη in the passage could denote the same entity, i.e. the Timaean Necessity.