•  17
    Experience in Descartes
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (2): 196-201. 2023.
    In her book Experience Embodied (Waldow 2020), Anik Waldow explains the relevant notion of experience as follows: ‘key to understanding experience as a phenomenon that requires a human body is the...
  •  242
    Consciousness in Early Modern Philosophy and Science
    Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences. 2020.
    It is plausible to think that before the emergence of terms like “consciousness” and “Bewusstsein,” philosophers and scientists relied on intuitions about phenomena of subjective experience that we would now classify as “conscious.” In other words, pre-modern thinkers availed themselves of one or another concept of consciousness as they developed their theories of mind, perception, representation, the self, etc., although they did not attend to consciousness in its own right. In the early modern…Read more
  •  18
    Locke on Memory
    In Jessica Gordon-Roth & Shelley Weinberg (eds.), The Lockean Mind, Routledge. 2021.
    This chapter charts Locke's commitments about memory and remembering through observing a range of phenomena of memory that Locke relies on in his discussion of the human mind. This chapter investigates Locke's notions of contemplation and implicit memory, the role of the first-person perspective, and conditions of possibility for veridical remembering.
  •  1
    Descartes on Subjects and Selves
    In The Self: A History, Oxford University Press. pp. 99-117. 2021.
    Descartes makes a double commitment about selves. While he argues that the ‘I’ is nothing but a thinking thing he also identifies it with the union of the mind and body. This chapter explores this tension by analyzing Descartes’ account of our experience of ourselves and argues that in the background of Descartes’ usage of ‘I’ in reference to both the mind and the union is an idea of a subject of experience taking herself in one or the other way. When a subject refers to herself with ‘I’, the ‘I…Read more
  •  16
    L’attention dans la philosophie de l’esprit de John Locke
    Les Etudes Philosophiques 120 (1): 73-86. 2017.
    Dans cet article, j’examine la nature et le rôle de l’attention dans le cadre du parallélisme que Locke établit entre la sensation et la réflexion en tant qu’origines des idées. Je montre que le caractère volontaire n’est pas un élément nécessaire de l’attention pour Locke, et que porter attention à quelque chose n’est pas la même chose qu’en être conscient puisque la conscience d’une idée doit en précéder l’attention. Afin de pouvoir rendre compte des manières différentes dont les idées interne…Read more
  •  6
    Subjectivity as a Non-Textual Standard of Interpretation in the History of Philosophical Psychology
    with Jari Kaukua
    Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 38 41-47. 2008.
    Contemporary caution of anachronism in intellectual history on the one hand, and currently momentous theoretical emphasis on subjectivity on the other, are two prevailing circumstances that set puzzling constraints for studies in the history of philosophical psychology. Together these circumstances call for heightened awareness of our own interpretive presuppositions as historians: the former urges against assuming ideas, motives, and concepts that may be alien in the historical intellectual set…Read more
  •  23
    On the Standards of Conceptual Change
    Journal of the Philosophy of History 14 (2): 183-204. 2019.
    It is a necessary condition for recognising change that there is a yardstick against which the change can be perceived. The same applies to changes that philosophical concepts undergo. This paper delineates standards for recognising conceptual change that meet the requirements of conscientious history of philosophy. More particularly, we want to argue for the need of what we will call non-textual standards. These are features of the world of experience that must be assumed to be shared between u…Read more
  •  79
    Anthony Collins on the Status of Consciousness
    Vivarium 52 (3-4): 315-332. 2014.
    Anthony Collins (1676-1729) maintains that consciousness might be a material process or result from material processes. On the one hand, Collins accepts Locke’s view that from consciousness, i.e., the activity of thinking, we acquire no knowledge about the nature of the thinking substance. On the other, he takes seriously Samuel Clarke’s challenge that the thinking substance must be suitably unified because consciousness is unified. In this paper, I argue that, throughout his correspondence with…Read more
  •  237
    Locke endorses a distinction between passive reflection and voluntary attentive reflection, which he occasionally labels contemplation. Failure to recognize this distinction properly has had an effect on interpretations of Locke’s theory of reflection, and caused puzzlement about the relation between reflection and consciousness. In particular, the function of reflection as a passive internal sense that produces simple ideas of mental operations has been downplayed in favour of the view that ref…Read more
  •  63
    Contemporary caution against anachronism in intellectual history, and the currently momentous theoretical emphasis on subjectivity in the philosophy of mind, are two prevailing conditions that set puzzling constraints for studies in the history of philosophical psychology. The former urges against assuming ideas, motives, and concepts that are alien to the historical intellectual setting under study, and combined with the latter suggests caution in relying on our intuitions regarding subjectivit…Read more
  •  217
    Cudworth on Types of Consciousness
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (1): 9-34. 2010.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  40
    Contemporary caution of anachronism in intellectual history on the one hand, and currently momentous theoretical emphasis on subjectivity on the other, are two prevailing circumstances that set puzzling constraints for studies in the history of philosophical psychology. Together these circumstances call for heightened awareness of our own interpretive presuppositions as historians: the former urges against assuming ideas, motives, and concepts that may be alien in the historical intellectual set…Read more
  •  469
    Orders of Consciousness and Forms of Reflexivity in Descartes
    In Sara Heinämaa, Vili Lähteenmäki & Pauliina Remes (eds.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy, Springer. pp. 177-201. 2007.
    Descartes affords several notions of consciousness as he explains the characteristics of the diverse features of human thought from infancy to adulthood and from dreaming to attentive wakefulness. The paper argues that Descartes has a rich and coherent view of conscious mentality from rudimentary consciousness through reflexive consciousness to consciousness achieved by deliberate, attentive reflection.
  •  216
    Locke on Consciousness and What it is About
    Studia Leibnitiana 43 (2): 160-178. 2011.
    As Locke claims that consciousness of our being is involved in all thought and perception, he treats all consciousness as some type of self-consciousness. I examine how consciousness relates to what it is about by inquiring into the intimate relations between consciousness and mental acts and consciousness and the self.
  •  119
    This collection represents the first historical survey focusing on the notion of consciousness. It approaches consciousness through its constitutive aspects, such as subjectivity, reflexivity, intentionality and selfhood. Covering discussions from ancient philosophy all the way to contemporary debates, the book enriches current systematic debates by uncovering historical roots of the notion of consciousness.