Vincent Colapietro

This contribution aims at discussing the agonistic dimension of John Dewey’s pragmatism. The paper starts by reconstructing Dewey’s influence on Albert Meyer, a leading figure of 20th-century American psychiatry. This comparison will shed light on Dewey’s influence on Meyer, focusing on some core psychological notions such as mental health and growth. Moreover, it will show the key role played by the category of conflict in Dewey’s pragmatism, and how the latter can account for the darker and more problematic sides of human life. The paper ends with a quick elaboration on the notion of survivance, which denotes the ability to “go on” – both as individuals and as societies – in the face of conflict and devastation.

ABSTRACT Short of the universe in its entirety, there is not any whole that is not also a part, frequently in a dynamic, integral sense. Arthur Koestler coined the word holon to designate any part-whole. Even those parts that are seemingly mere constituents of some whole are themselves wholes to some extent. They have an integrity and identity of their own, even if their existence is apparently reducible to that of a constituent of a whole. If we take the multicellular organism as a paradigm of a dynamic holon, it seems obvious and undeniable that it is a whole as well as a part of any number of more encompassing wholes. But what is equally evident is that such a holon is self-assembling. Moreover, the processes of self-assemblage by which cells, organisms, entire populations, and countless other “beings” secure their existence are ones in which a logic of immanent dynamism and a logic of “external” support are both responsible for what is actually taking place.

Habit plays a central role in Peirce's pragmatic account of human signification. What he means by meaning is, hence, fully intelligible only in reference to the role he accords to habit in this account. While the main focus of Peirce's critical attention is, especially in the mature articulation of his thoroughgoing pragmatism, upon deliberately acquired habits, it is reasonable to suggest that often his concern is actually with something broader in one sense and narrower in another than individual or isolated habits. Any given disposition to act in certain ways in certain circumstances is taken by him to be an integral part of more or less integrated dispositions to act, feel, and even imagine: it is not taken to be operative apart from these other habits. In this sense, then, his concern is primarily with such integrated dispositions, not isolated habits. Thus, it is broader than the inattentive reader is likely to suspect. But, since those deliberately cultivated dispositions of rational agents that are at the center of Peirce's concerns are ones specifiable only in reference to some human practice such as experimental inquiry or everyday conversations, religious worship or artistic innovation, these dispositions are appropriately taken to be not simply habits in any way whatsoever but primarily habits to act in a competent or expert manner. More simply put, these deliberately cultivated dispositions are, in many instances, best conceived as competencies or expertise. While not all habits equip agents with expert or even competent ways of addressing the shifting demands of experiential situations (that is, while not all habits are instances of competence or expertise), all cases of competence and expertise are, at bottom, more or less harmoniously integrated clusters of flexible, nuanced, and alterable habits. Accordingly, any account of Peirce's conception of habit, especially as it pertains to his pragmatic theory of meaning, must bring into sharper focus the complex relationship among habits, competence, and expertise than Peirce and even his most imaginative expositors have done thus far. The aim of this paper is to push our investigation of the Peircean notion of human habituation in precisely this direction. Against an evolutionary background, the historical foreground of historically evolved and evolving practices will be sketched. Habits in their guise as competencies and expertise will then be seen in the context of such practices, with equal emphasis on initiation into a practice and the open-ended process of acquiring ever more refined expertise.

This essay seeks a philosophical understanding of the nature of kairos that, in turn, discloses the nature of philosophizing. This essay claims that the kairos of philosophy is dialogue, and that dialogue is kairological in two ways: (1) Dialogue is not just a phenomenon that occurs in chronological time but, rather, imposes its own time in order to see how life (or being) itself is disclosed to us; (2) dialogue is kairological because it denotes a moment in which we are pushed into the open, which demands our receptivity and response. Section I explains kairos as “circumstance” in Aristotle, as a required point of view in Heidegger, and as related to the beginning of creation in Schelling. Section II understands dialogue, as the kairos of philosophy, as a crisis—a breaking away from an ordinary understanding of and experience in the world. This destabilizing experience resonates with the untimeliness of philosophizing.

The author presents John Dewey’s mature account of temporal continuity, showing how Dewey’s position can be identified as a form of radical temporalism. Even at the most elemental level (that of subatomic particles), natural existence is for such a temporalist an irreducibly temporal affair. While he focuses primarily on Dewey’s “Time and Individuality” (1940), the author supplements his account by drawing upon Experience and Nature (1925), “Events and the Future” (1926), and to a lesser extent, other texts. In his magnum opus, Dewey draws a crucial distinction between temporal quality and temporal seriality. In an essay published the following year, he insists, contra C. D. Broad, on qualitative heterogeneity being an intrinsic trait of even the thinnest slice of the tem-poral continuum. The most elemental units of the temporal flux are neither “eternal and immu-table”, nor qualitatively homogenous. They also exhibit a from-to-through structure, with the dimensions of time being defined by these terms (pastness as from which, futurity as toward which, and presentness as through which). By relating the distinction between temporal quality and temporal seriality as well as the central claims made in “Events and the Future” to “Time and Individuality”, the author brings into clear focus the contours of Dewey’s radical temporalism.

ABSTRACT The author frames his exploration in terms of Michel Foucault’s distinction between the practice of emancipation in the strict sense and practices of freedom. He proposes to treat rituals of attention as examples of practices of freedom. Before doing so, however, he considers the socioeconomic contexts in which such rituals must be situated. Then, he sketches what such rituals involve. In a sense, this article is a reflection on a claim put forth by one of the characters in Toni Morrison’s Beloved: “Freeing yourself was one thing; claiming ownership of that freed self was another.” Insights from William James and John Dewey in addition to those from Foucault are deployed to illuminate what is involved in claiming ownership of one’s freed self.

The author contextualizes C. S. Peirce’s exploration of rhetoric and methodeutic in reference to the inevitably incomplete work of a radical experimentalist such as Peirce. He tries to show how even in the inaugural stage of semeiotic inquiry “rhetorical” considerations are not entirely absent. Moreover, he attends to some of the most important moments when Peirce re-visited the topic of rhetoric. Finally, he muses about both how Peirce re-imagined rhetoric as methodeutic and how we might ourselves re-imagine yet other possibilities. The essay is written as an invitation to join Peirce’s efforts as co-inquirers, providing near its conclusion a series of “notes” or suggestions for how to carry Peirce’s project forward.

Questo articolo si sofferma su una curiosa lacuna nella tradizione pragmatista. Negli scritti dei pragmatisti americani classici (Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead e Lewis) pochissima attenzione è dedicata all'articolazione di una concezione delle pratiche e, più in generale, dei _pragmata_. L'autore offre uno schizzo di quella che egli ritiene essere una descrizione pragmatista delle pratiche umane. Sottolinea come per i pragmatisti stessi la teoria sia una pratica o, più precisamente, una famiglia allargata di pratiche in evoluzione, che intrattengono relazioni complesse con altre pratiche. Inoltre, ritiene che una tale prospettiva sulle pratiche sia fondamentalmente in opposizione ai vari tentativi di fornire una giustificazione trascendentale per qualsiasi pratica umana. L'autore prende spunto da una breve ma suggestiva discussione sul linguaggio, la legge e la verità contenuta nel _Pragmatismo_ di William James e sviluppa le implicazioni della trattazione jamesiana di questi temi. Nel corso di questo lavoro, l'autore propone di comprendere un'opera _classica_ (come un testo filosofico o una composizione musicale) in una prospettiva strettamente storicista. L'articolo si conclude con una riflessione su quanto l'intelligenza creativa sia stata 'coscritta' dall'agenda bellicosa dei regimi nazionali o imperialistici, pur nutrendo la speranza che l'intelligenza creativa possa liberarsi in qualche misura dalla macchina bellica degli stati nazionali.

Among his other contributions to advancing our understanding of classical American pragmatism and, in particular, Charles S. Peirce, none is more worthy of our attention than Richard S. Robin's characteristically painstaking attempt to address the puzzle of Peirce's "Proof" of pragmaticism.1 In this as in so many other respects,2 he shows himself to be, in effect, the student of Max H. Fisch (see especially 1986, chapter 19).3 There are hermeneutical traditions as well as philosophical ones and often the former are integral parts of the latter. This is certainly the case regarding pragmatism. A deeper or better understanding of the inaugural figures in this philosophical movement is taken, by the interpreters of..

The author of this paper explores a central strand in the complex relationship between Peirce and Kant. He argues, against Kant (especially as reconstructed by Christine Korsgaard), that the practical identity of the self-critical agent who undertakes a Critic of reason (as Peirce insisted upon translating this expression) needs to be conceived in substantive, not purely formal, terms. Thus, insofar as there is a reflexive turn in Peirce, it is quite far from the transcendental turn taken by Immanuel Kant. The identity of the being devoted to redefining the bounds of reason (for the drawing of such bounds is always a historically situated and motivated undertaking) is not that of a disembodied, rational will giving laws to itself. Nor is it that of a being whose passions and especially sentiments are heteronomous determinations of the deliberative agency in question. Rather the identity of this being is that of a somatic, social, and historical agent whose very autonomy not only traces its origin to heteronomy but also ineluctably involves an identification with what, time and again, emerges as other than this agent. A strong claim is made regarding human identity being practical identity (practical identity being understood here as the singular shape acquired by a human being in the complex course of its practical involvements, its participation in the array of practices in and through which such a being carries out its life). An equally strong claim is made regarding the upshot of Peirce's decisive movement beyond Kant's transcendental project: this movement unquestionably drives toward a compelling account of human agency.

The author argues that Peirce, James, and Dewey propose a version of emotional cognitivism. He goes on to highlight certain features of human emotions, conceived in this light, above all emotional reflexivity. Given the highly fallible character of our emotional judgments, the reference to the “I,” in addition to that to the object, can hardly be overlooked. Deliberative agents are wise to confess, “I am angry,” without eliminating what James identifies as “the intensely objective reference” of such feelings as fear, anger, and rapture.

[W]e might despair of despair itself, rather than of life, and cast that off, and begin, and so reverse our direction.This is a finely conceived, elegantly written, and exquisitely executed work. At its center, there is Naoko Saito ’s creative appropriation of one of Cavell’s most fecund suggestions—philosophy is first and foremost an activity and, as such, it is either akin to or, more strongly, identifiable with practices of translation.1 Everything I have to say concerns translation, if only implicitly. Moreover, I offer everything as a friendly amendment. That is, I take my reflections on her book to be in accord with both the spirit and, in most instances, even the letter of her texts. Whether or not she...

No âmago deste artigo há uma comparação entre a investigação sobre o entendimento de Peirce o relato de interpretação de Royce. Estrutura-se por uma consideração do desentendimento de si e, ligada a esta discussão do desentendimento de si, uma consideração sobre o próprio entendimento. Para Peirce, em razão de sua abordagem da investigação e Royce em sua meta-interpretação alguma forma de entendimento está em jogo. Por exemplo, a tarefa do investigador científico é inacabada se ela para na descoberta de fatos nus. Enquanto para ambos os pensadores, as ciências não um corpo de conhecimento seguro, mas uma forma de investigação contínua, ela visa principalmente o entendimento. Tanto Peirce quanto Royce estão animados por um compromisso com a inteligibilidade do cosmos em sua varredura plena e nos mínimos detalhes. A abordagem de Peirce sobre a investigação e a concepção de interpretação de Royce são esforços para detalhar como os atores humanos tornam cada vez mais profunda e amplamente inteligível o mundo de sua experiência. Muito pode ser aprendido comparando-os a este respeito.

A materialidade, ou o que alguns teóricos preferem identificar como materiais, vem sendo cada vez mais assunto de discussão e investigação. Embora esses autores sejam muito cuidadosos em especificar o que querem dizer com tais termos, o assunto exige maior esclarecimento do que recebera até agora. Isso faz com que seja um candidato ideal para o tríplice-escalonado esclarecimento proposto por C. S. Peirce em “Como tornar nossas ideias claras” e que daí em diante foi utilizado por ele para, diante do propósito em questão, tornar adequadamente claras suas próprias ideias. Assim como considerava inatingível a certeza absoluta, ele julgava também a clareza absoluta estar fora de alcance. Mesmo assim, ele ofereceu sua máxima pragmática como o nível mais alto de esclarecimento conceitual. Para inúmeros fins, aderir a essa máxima nos permite esclarecer nossas ideias de forma adequada. Embora ele seja enfático em sublinhar as limitações de definições abstratas, ele aprecia o valor de tais definições, das quais são na maior parte do tempo definições verbais. Se tomarmos as práticas bem-sucedidas do investigador experimental, porém, subitamente vemos a necessidade de traduzir nossas palavras não em outras palavras, mas sim, em hábitos de ação. Além do mais, o primeiro nível de clareza é muitas vezes menosprezado ou ignorado. Este grau de clareza é, no entanto, de uma importância muito maior do que lhe é atribuído pelos comentadores, e por vezes, pelo próprio Peirce. Este artigo, portanto, é uma busca de esclarecer o significado de materialidade e termos cognatos, usando as sugestões de Peirce para cumprir esta tarefa. Destaca-se a necessidade de esclarecimento pragmático, sem denegrir, porém, o valor de familiaridade tácita ou definições abstratas. Espero mostrar, de uma só vez, a força das sugestões metodológicas de Peirce e o significado de alguns termos elusivos.

Investigadores científicos no sentido moderno, aqueles pensadores com os quais C.S. Peirce identificava-se mais profundamente, “têm sido bem-sucedidos pois eles passaram suas vidas não em suas bibliotecas ou museus, mas em seus laboratórios e no campo”. De fato, Peirce gastou incontáveis horas envolvido em uma atividade na qual ele parece menosprezar nesta e em outras passagens. Aliás, ele parece ter interpretado incorretamente sua vida como leitor. O autor oferece um retrato de Peirce como leitor, mesmo quando de maior importância ele se vale de Georges Poulet para delinear uma fenomenologia de leitura e sobre Elaine Scarry para oferecer um relato de leitura como uma forma de devaneio. Além, disso, ele mostra como o pensamento de Peirce garante ambos esforços, acompanhando de perto a consideração peirciana sinequista da mente, consciência e subjetividade, mas também, a consideração às categorias semióticas de diagrama, símbolo e para ícones de graus menores.Investigadores científicos no sentido moderno, aqueles pensadores com os quais C.S. Peirce identificava-se mais profundamente, “têm sido bem-sucedidos pois eles passaram suas vidas não em suas bibliotecas ou museus, mas em seus laboratórios e no campo”. De fato, Peirce gastou incontáveis horas envolvido em uma atividade na qual ele parece menosprezar nesta e em outras passagens. Aliás, ele parece ter interpretado incorretamente sua vida como leitor. O autor oferece um retrato de Peirce como leitor, mesmo quando de maior importância ele se vale de Georges Poulet para delinear uma fenomenologia de leitura e sobre Elaine Scarry para oferecer um relato de leitura como uma forma de devaneio. Além, disso, ele mostra como o pensamento de Peirce garante ambos esforços, acompanhando de perto a consideração peirciana sinequista da mente, consciência e subjetividade, mas também, a consideração às categorias semióticas de diagrama, símbolo e para ícones de graus menores.

Meu propósito abrangente é oferecer um esboço pragmatista da racionalidade deliberativa derivada dos textos coligidos no volumoso conjunto de C. S. Peirce. Embora em alguns casos, as formulações sejam minhas, e não de Peirce. Porém, isso não torna meu esforço um caso de ventriloquismo : a posição em relação à racionalidade é dele, e não minha. Minha tese é que, para Peirce, a razão é no fundo, um conjunto mais ou menos integrado de hábitos, possibilitando aos agentes serem deliberativos. Ou seja, para ele, a deliberação é o cerne da racionalidade. Esta é, fundamentalmente, uma capacidade agencial: aplica-se primordialmente a agentes, sendo conhecedores teóricos um papel importante desempenhado por agentes deliberativos. O que espero demonstrar neste trabalho é a razão pela qual este retrato da razão é distintamente pragmático e verdadeiramente peirciano. O que também espero demonstrar é como a posição de Peirce implica o que, na filosofia contemporânea, é identificado por Christine Korsgaard como autoconstituição, por Sabrina Lovibond como autoformação e por outros teóricos com designações outras. Agentes deliberativos são, segundo Peirce, agentes radicalmente responsáveis. São responsáveis pelos verdadeiros critérios nos quais razoabilidade e responsabilidade são definidas e desenvolvidas. A questão de maturidade e a relação entre ser moral e ser maduro são essenciais à explicação de Peirce de racionalidade. Seu retrato pragmatista da racionalidade deliberativa é, a meu ver, não só sustentável quanto convincente. Acima de tudo, isto é o que espero demonstrar neste ensaio.

This paper offers an overview of Joseph Margolis’s philosophy of culture, highlighting how Margolis’s radical historicism is not inconsistent with our realistic intuitions regrading facts and objectivity. While Margolis identifies interpretation as the work of culture, the paper suggests that a much more basic sense of human labor needs to be thematized more fully than Margolis does in any defensible account of culture. Margolis of course appreciates work in this sense, but he does not consistently make it integral to his conception of culture. Even so, what he so forcefully defends is, as one commentator has put it, “beautiful. It’s also erudite, elegant, and insightful (and frightfully, dialectically intricate).”