My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Lean toward: no
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: idealism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Lean toward: compatibilism
God: theism and atheism Agnostic/undecided
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept an intermediate view
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Skip
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Lean toward: Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Lean toward: classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Lean toward: internalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Lean toward: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: non-physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Lean toward: virtue ethics
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Skip
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Accept: further-fact view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: communitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Skip
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death There is no fact of the matter
Time: A-theory and B-theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Skip
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: metaphysically possible