Vinodh Prabhu

Rorty has been criticized for his pragmatic rationality by different thinkers like Stout, Steven carter. Here in this article our main focus is Novoa's criticism of Rorty's solution to the challenges of evidentialism (Novoa in Rorty’s Demands on Religious Belief: Looking for a Pragmatic Rationality. Retrieved October 20, 2019, from Researchgate. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321729830_rorty's_demands_on_religious_belief_looking_for_a_pragmatic_rationality, 2017). Novoa feels that religion needs not be conversation stopper as long as it does not compromise on capabilities (Novoa, 2017). This is what he calls pragmatic rationality. He takes pragmatic rationality based on capabilities. So in this article we argue against Novoa saying that capabilities are not clearly defined and hence the criteria set forth by Novoa have to be revised. The criteria set forth by him are too general, for instance world relationships, etc. The reasons for revising the criteria are too general, no unanimity in what are capabilities and even the specified capabilities are not precise.

The judgment of Aruna Shanbaug case in the Supreme Court of India suggests that passive euthanasia can be considered legal, whereas active euthanasia may not be. In this paper, we try to explore why active euthanasia can also be considered legal. The paper takes the help of the judgment on Aruna Shanbaug’s case on euthanasia. Active euthanasia can be as much ethical as passive euthanasia. In this paper we try to address this issue by giving arguments for and against active euthanasia and conclude that arguments against active euthanasia can be refuted and subsequently one can think of accepting active euthanasia as well within the fold of legalized euthanasia