• The sole aim of this paper is to approach Benoists conception of realism in his latest work Éléments de philosophie réaliste by analysing his sharp criticism of the phenomenological concept of -givenness. If it is true that we ‘have’ reality – i.e. if reality is always already present to us – why should we have to ask how it is given to us? givenness is nothing more than a vestige of representationalism, i.e. a mere epistemological form of access to reality that is not relevant from the point of…Read more
  • The sole aim of this paper is to approach Benoists conception of realism in his latest work Éléments de philosophie réaliste by analysing his sharp criticism of the phenomenological concept of -givenness. If it is true that we ‘have’ reality – i.e. if reality is always already present to us – why should we have to ask how it is given to us? givenness is nothing more than a vestige of representationalism, i.e. a mere epistemological form of access to reality that is not relevant from the point of…Read more
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    Dans la Construction logique du monde publiée en 1928, Rudolf Carnap se réclame de la conception de la philosophie défendue par Paul Natorp dans la Psychologie générale en affirmant qu’elle est « apparentée » à la sienne propre. Même lorsque l’on sait que le jeune Carnap a de fait côtoyé de près le néokantisme, comme c’est aussi le cas d’autres membres du Cercle de Vienne tels que Reichenbach...