•  418
    How to be a compatibilist in metaphysics: The epistemic strategy
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1-25. forthcoming.
    Conflicts between our best philosophical theories (BPTs) and our common beliefs are widespread. For example, if eliminativism is our BPT, then our BPT conflicts with common beliefs about the existence of middle-sized composite artifacts. “Compatibilism” is the name usually given to a theoretical attitude, according to which, in the case of a conflict between BPT and a common belief P, we should try to find a reconciliation. The two major variants of compatibilism are “semantic compatibilism” (SC…Read more
  •  263
    Validity and actuality
    Logique Et Analyse 227 379-405. 2014.
    The notion of validity for modal languages could be defined in two slightly different ways. The first is the original definition given by S. Kripke, for which a formula φ of a modal language L is valid if and only if it is true in every actual world of every interpretation of L. The second is the definition that has become standard in most textbook presentations of modal logic, for which a formula φ of L is valid if and only if it is true in every world in every interpretation of L. For simple m…Read more
  •  222
    How to reject a counterfactual
    Logique Et Analyse 239 317-335. 2017.
    Aaccording to D. K. lewis (1973), would-couterfactuals and might-counterfactuals are duals. from this, it follows that the negation of a would-counterfactual is equiv- alent to the corresponding “might-not”-counterfactual and that the negation of a might-counterfactual is equivalent to the corresponding “would-not”- counterfactual. there are cases, however, where we seem to be entitled to accept the would- counterfactual and we are also equally entitled to accept the corresponding might-not-coun…Read more
  •  222
    In this paper, I claim that two ways of defining validity for modal languages (“real-world” and “general” validity), corresponding to distinction between a correct and an incorrect way of defining modal valid- ity, correspond instead to two substantive ways of conceiving modal truth. At the same time, I claim that the major logical manifestation of the real- world/general validity distinction in modal propositional languages with the actuality operator should not be taken seriously, but simply a…Read more
  •  86
    Propositions and necessary existence
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1): 211-231. 2006.
    Timothy Williamson in his article "Necessary Existents" presents a proof of the claim that everything necessarily exists using just three seemingly uncontroversial principles relating the notions of proposition with those of truth and existence. The argument, however, may be easily blocked once the distinction, introduced by R. M. Adams, between the notions of a proposition being true in a world and of (or at) a world is introduced. In this paper I defend the plausibility of the notion of a prop…Read more
  •  75
    Can we explain why some propositions are necessary? Blackburn (Fact, science, and value. Blackwell, Oxford, 1987) has presented a dilemma aimed at showing that the necessity of a proposition cannot be explained either in the case where the explanans is another necessary proposition (necessity horn) or in the case where the explanans is a contingent proposition (contingency horn). Blackburn’s dilemma is intended to show that necessary truth is an explanatorily irreducible kind of truth: there is …Read more
  •  73
    Commonsense ontology often conflicts with the ontology of our best scientific and philosophical theories. However, commonsense ontology, and commonsense belief systems in general, seems to be remarkably efficient and cognitively fundamental. In cases of contrast, it is better to find a way to reconcile commonsense and ”theoretical” ontologies. Given that commonsense ontologies are typically expressed within natural language, a classical procedure of reconciliation is semantical. The strategy is …Read more
  •  59
    According to Williamson, our knowledge of metaphysical necessities and possibilities is just a “special case” of our knowledge of counterfactual conditionals. This subsumption of modal under counterfactual thinking mainly serves a methodological role: to sign the end of “philosophical exceptionalism” in modal epistemology, namely the view that our knowledge of metaphysical modalities is obtained by means of a special, dedicated, possibly a priori, capacity. In this paper, I show that a counterfa…Read more
  •  45
    World-stories and maximality
    Argumenta 2 (2). 2017.
    According to many actualist theories of modality, possible worlds should be identified with maximal and consistent sets of actually existing propositions called "world-stories". A set of propositions is said to be maximal if and only if for every (actually existing) proposition P , either P or its negation belongs to the set. In my talk, I will claim that this conception of maximality is problematic in case what has to be represented by a world-story is the possible non existence of an actual in…Read more
  •  33
    Ridurre i mondi possibili al linguaggio
    Annali Del Dipartimento di Filosofia 12 195-213. 2006.
    Aim of this paper is to present and evaluate linguistic ersatzism, an actualist metaphysics of modality according to which possible worlds are maximal and consistent sets of sentences. In the first section, I make some general considerations about reductive theories of modality and the relation between modality and possible worlds, in the second I present a specific version of linguistic ersatzism and in the last section I present what I take to be the major problem for this kind of theories, na…Read more
  •  14
    The entailment connective is introduced by Priest (2006b). It aims to capture, in a dialetheically acceptable way, the informal notion of logical consequence. This connective does not “fall foul” of Curry’s Paradox by invalidating an inference rule called “Absorption” (or “Contraction”) and the classical logical theorem called “Assertion”. In this paper we show that the semantics of entailment, given by Priest in terms of possible worlds, is inadequate. In particular, we will argue that Priest’s…Read more
  •  7
    Kripkean conceivability and epistemic modalities
    Analytic Philosophy. forthcoming.
    In this article, I show that (i) from what I call a “Kripkean” account of the relations between conceivability and metaphysical necessities, (ii) an apparently plausible principle relating conceivability and epistemic modality, and (iii) the duality of epistemic modalities, one can show the utterly anti-Kripkean result that every metaphysical necessity is an epistemic necessity. My aim is to present and diagnose the problem and evaluate the costs of some possible Kripkean reactions. In particula…Read more
  •  4
    Possibilita, possibilia ed essenze individuali
    Rivista di Estetica 26 (2): 105-118. 2004.
  •  4
    The key-terms "language," "knowledge" and "metaphysics" arguably shape most of the recent researches in analytic philosophy. This volume aim to address some of the currently debated issues revolving around these three fundamental areas and, in particular: can the notion of "descriptive name" be extended to names of natural kinds? What does it mean for a belief to be justified? Is there a principled way to draw the distinction between causal and non causal relations? Do future contingent claims r…Read more
  • Mondi possibili
    In Maurizio Ferraris (ed.), Storia Dell'ontologia, Bompiani. pp. 646--659. 2008.
  • Do we need haecceitates to be haecceitists?
    Documenti E Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 18 573-586. 2007.
  • Conterfactuals: David Lewis (review)
    Humana Mente 4 (19). 2011.