•  107
    Traditional theory of mind (ToM) accounts for social cognition have been at the basis of most studies in the social cognitive neurosciences. However, in recent years, the need to go beyond traditional ToM accounts for understanding real life social interactions has become all the more pressing. At the same time it remains unclear whether alternative accounts, such as interactionism, can yield a sufficient description and explanation of social interactions. We argue that instead of considering To…Read more
  •  100
    We read minds to shape relationships
    Philosophical Psychology 28 (5): 674-694. 2015.
    Mindreading is often considered to be the most important human social cognitive skill, and over the past three decades, several theories of the cognitive mechanisms for mindreading have been proposed. But why do we read minds? According to the standard view, we attribute mental states to individuals to predict and explain their behavior. I argue that the standard view is too general to capture the distinctive function of mindreading, and that it does not explain what motivates people to read min…Read more
  •  16
    Milleks on sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisvaldkonnas tarvis filosoofiat?
    Studia Philosophica Estonica 4 (1): 20-51. 2011.
    Käesoleva artikli eesmärgiks on selgitada, milline on ja peaks olema filosoofia panus sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisvaldkonnas. Vastustades kolme populaarset väidet, mille kohaselt filosoofiat ei ole teaduse tegemiseks tarvis, selgitan, kuidas filosoofid panustavad ning peaksid jätkuvalt panustama sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisse. Eraldi käsitlen mõtteliste eksperimentide rolli sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisel ning väidan, et kuigi klassikalised filosoofilised mõttelised eksperimendid ei sobi sotsiaal…Read more
  •  5
    Maurice Merleau-Ponty
    In Annus Epp (ed.), 20. sajandi mõttevoolud, University of Tartu Press. pp. 263-286. 2009.
  •  15
    No Joint Ownership! Shared Emotions Are Social-relational Emotions
    Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1): 111-135. 2016.
    There are cases of emotion that we readily describe as 'sharing emotions with other people.' How should we understand such cases? Joel Krueger has proposed the Joint Ownership Thesis : the view that two or more people can literally share the same emotional episode. His view is partly inspired by his reading of Merleau-Ponty -- arguably Merleau-Ponty advocates a version of JOT in his "The child's relations with others." My critical analysis demonstrates that JOT is flawed in several respects: 1) …Read more
  •  2
    Sotsiaalne tunnetus kui hübriidelevant
    In Bruno Mölder & Jaan Kangilaski (eds.), Filosoofia ja analüüs: analüütilise filosoofia seminar 20, Eys Veljesto Kirjastus. pp. 219-258. 2011.
  •  108
    Theory of mind and the unobservability of other minds
    Philosophical Explorations 17 (2): 203-222. 2014.
    The theory of mind (ToM) framework has been criticised by emerging alternative accounts. Each alternative begins with the accusation that ToM's validity as a research paradigm rests on the assumption of the ‘unobservability’ of other minds. We argue that the critics' discussion of the unobservability assumption (UA) targets a straw man. We discuss metaphysical, phenomenological, epistemological, and psychological readings of UA and demonstrate that it is not the case that ToM assumes the metaphy…Read more
  •  53
    This commentary argues that Gallagher's account of direct social perception has remained underdeveloped in several respects. Gallagher has not provided convincing evidence to support his claim that mindreading is rare in social situations. He and other direct perception theorists have not offered a substantive critique of standard theories of mindreading because they have attacked a much stronger claim about the putative unobservability of mental states than most theories of mindreading imply. T…Read more