Tyndale University College
  • On Jesus, Derrida, and Dawkins
    with Richard B. Davis
    Philosophia Christi 16 (1): 185-191. 2014.
  • Explaining Evil: Four Views (edited book)
    Bloomsbury Academic. forthcoming.
    In this book four prominent philosophers (Richard Davis, Paul Helm, Michael Ruse, and Erik Wielenberg) present their own account of why evil exists and respond to objections from fellow contributors.
  • What Place, then, for Rational Apologetics?
    with Richard Brian Davis
    In Paul Gould & Richard Brian Davis (eds.), Loving God with Your Mind: Essays in Honor of J. P. Moreland, Moody Publishers. 2014.
    In this chapter, we attempt to show that J.P. Moreland's understanding of apologetics is beautifully positioned to counter resistance to a rationally defensible Christianity—resistance arising from the mistaken idea that any rational defense will fail to support or even undermine relationship. We look first at Paul Moser's complaint that since rational apologetics doesn’t prove the God of Christianity, it falls short of delivering what matters most—a personal agent worthy of worship and relation…Read more
  • On Jesus, Derrida, and Dawkins: Rejoinder to Joshua Harris
    with Richard Brian Davis
    Philosophia Christi 14. 2014.
    In this paper we respond to three objections raised by Joshua Harris to our article, “Against a Postmodern Pentecostal Epistemology,” in which we express misgivings about the conjunction of Pentecostalism with James K. A. Smith’s postmodern, story-based epistemolo- gy. According to Harris, our critique: 1) problematically assumes a correspondence theory of truth, 2) invalidly concludes that “Derrida’s Axiom” conflicts with “Peter’s Axiom,” and 3) fails to consider an alternative account of the u…Read more
  • In this paper, we attempt to show that if Plantinga’s free will defence succeeds, his O Felix Culpa theodicy fails. For if every creaturely essence suffers from transworld depravity, then given that Jesus has a creaturely essence (as we attempt to show), it follows that Incarnation and Atonement worlds cannot be actualized by God, in which case we have anything but a felix culpa.
  • Against a Postmodern Pentecostal Epistemology
    with Richard Brian Davis
    Philosophia Christi 15 (2): 383-399. 2013.
    In this paper we explore the idea that Pentecostalism is best supported by conjoining it to a postmodern, narrative epistemology in which everything is a text requiring interpretation. On this view, truth doesn’t consist in a set of uninterpreted facts that make the claims of Christianity true; rather, as James K. A. Smith says, truth emerges when there is a “fit” or proportionality between the Christian story and one’s affective and emotional life. We argue that Pentecostals should reject this …Read more
  • Divine Freedom and Free Will Defenses
    Heythrop Journal 56 (1): 108-119. 2015.
    This paper considers a problem that arises for free will defenses when considering the nature of God's own will. If God is perfectly good and performs praiseworthy actions, but is unable to do evil, then why must humans have the ability to do evil in order to perform such actions? This problem has been addressed by Theodore Guleserian, but at the expense of denying God's essential goodness. I examine and critique his argument and provide a solution to the initial problem that does not require ab…Read more
  • Original Sin and a Broad Free Will Defense
    Philosophia Christi 14 (2). 2012.
    I begin with a distinction between narrow and broad defenses to the logical problem of evil. The former is simply an attempt to show that God and evil are not logically incompat-ible whereas the latter attempts the same, but only by appealing to beliefs one takes to be true in the actual world. I then argue that while recent accounts of original sin may be consistent with a broad defense, they are also logically incoherent. After considering potential replies, I conclude by proposing an account …Read more
  • In a previous issue of this journal Michael Veber argued that God could not answer certain prayers because doing so would be immoral. In this article I attempt to demonstrate that Veber’s argument is simply the logical problem of evil applied to a possible world. Because of this, his argument is susceptible to a Plantinga-style defense.
  • Counterpossibles and the ‘terrible’ divine command deity
    with Richard Brian Davis
    Religious Studies 51 (1): 1-19. 2015.
    In a series of articles, Wes Morriston has launched what can only be considered a full-scale assault on the divine command theory (DCT) of morality. According to Morriston, proponents of this theory are committed to an alarming counterpossible: that if God did command an annual human sacrifice, it would be morally obligatory. Since only a ‘terrible’ deity would do such a ‘terrible’ thing, we should reject DCT. Indeed, if there were such a deity, the world would be a terrible place—certainly far …Read more
  • Layman’s Lapse: On an Incomplete Moral Argument for Theism
    with Richard Brian Davis
    Philo 16 (2): 170-179. 2013.
    C. Stephen Layman contends that an argument supporting theism over naturalism can be constructed based on three defensible, non–question-begging premises about the moral order. Previous critics of Layman’s argument have challenged the truth of these premises. We stipulate them arguendo but go on to show that there is a deeper problem: a fourth premise introduced to complete the argument—the “completion premise,” as we call it—is true only if we assume that God exists or we concede that there is …Read more