W. Scott Clifton

Noël Carroll’s (“Moderate Moralism”) conceptual framework includes four positions: radical autonomism, moderate autonomism, moderate moralism, and radical moralism. Alessandro Giovanelli (“The Ethical Criticism of Art: A New Mapping of the Territory”) argues that the radical positions, as Carroll defines them, have no modern day adherents. Therefore, the framework should be adapted such that we can see interestingly new distinctions. On Giovanelli’s new framework Carroll’s account is a moderate autonomist view. In this paper I adopt Giovanelli’s framework and raise a different objection to Carroll’s account. I argue that Carroll’s account possesses a branching structure, since on this account moral and aesthetic criticism are not linearly related. Because of this structure, Carroll’s theory faces a dilemma: it’s either self-undermining or consistent with moderate autonomism, even in his own framework. Drawing on Kendall Walton’s (“Categories of Art”) notion of categories of art, I provide an account that is both non-branching and moderate moralist in Giovanelli’s framework. It’s non-branching because moral criticism bears a linear causal relation to aesthetic criticism.

In the opening episode of season four of the AMC network’s television show Breaking Bad, the attentive viewer reaches a point at which it’s difficult to see how the show’s heroes, Walter White and Jesse Pinkman, will escape death. The two are chemists and manufacturers of crystal methamphetamine for drug kingpin Gus Fring. At the end of the previous season they had picked up on Fring’s plans to kill them and replace them with another chemist, Gale Boetticher, who by then had learned their development technique and could presumably produce the same high quality of drug. In response, Walt had Jesse race to Gale’s apartment and kill him, thus rendering Gus’s plan ineffective.The fourth season begins with Walt and...

Because learning is a biological process, pedagogical approaches should conform to the ways the brain learns. One of the findings of brain-based pedagogical research is that context matters to learning. More specifically, the order of learning must be preserved: content should be introduced in a concrete context, followed by attempts to isolate abstract elements found in the case. There are better and worse strategies to preserve this order. In this paper I discuss the research and provide what I have found to be a very successful way to preserve the natural order of learning: online discussion board assignments.

In this paper, I construct an ethical-aesthetic account based on the work of Arthur Schopenhauer and Iris Murdoch, centered on the claims that motive matters to morality and that, specifically, acting from compassion—understood as a combination of cognitive empathy and concern—is necessary for making moral decisions. I present empirical evidence that we are naturally inaccurate when it comes to cognitive empathy, suggesting that many of our moral decisions are made in ignorance of the interests of others. We can improve our empathic accuracy by becoming more adept at decentering on our own perspective and recentering on those of others. My account holds that aesthetic experience often requires us to decenter and that we can acquire what I have called imaginative flexibility through our engagement with certain kinds of art. Finally, I provide evidence supporting my claims that art has this value.

There has been a recent surge of interest in the moral philosophy of Iris Murdoch. One issue that has arisen is whether her view advocates a form of moral perception. In this paper I argue that her view does indeed advocate for a form of moral perception—what I call weak moral perception. In the process of moral reasoning weak moral perception plays a preparatory role for moral judgment, which means that moral judgment isn’t simply a matter of seeing what action to perform, but that the right kind of perception is crucial to being able to make good moral decisions. One aspect of Murdoch’s account that has aroused special interest is her suggestion that the right kind of perception relies on the agent’s being in a state of love. I give what I think is the correct account of Murdochian love, which then allows me to defend her view against red herring-type objections raised recently by David Velleman and Charles Starkey.

The act of mindreading has been recognized to have great moral and epistemic value. Unfortunately, psychological research has shown that we are naturally inaccurate at mindreading, which should worry us quite a bit. It has also been shown that when motivated to mindread well, subjects become more accurate. In this paper I argue that some kinds of artwork—specifically, those utilizing dramatic irony—can educate us as to how valuable accurate mindreading is and motivate us to try to mindread well. The primary example I discuss is Alfred Hitchcock’s film Notorious.