Walter Schaller

I consider three questions concerning the relation of the good will to the moral worth of actions. (1) Does a good will consist simply in acting from the motive of duty? (2) Does acting from the motive of duty presuppose that one has a good will? (3) Does the fact that one has a good wilI entail that all of one’s duty-fulfilling actions have moral worth, even if they are not (directly) motivated by duty? I argue that while only persons with a good will are capable of acting from the motive of duty, it does not follow either that a good will consists in acting from duty or that if one has a good will, all of one’s dutiful actions will be motivated by duty. Whereas the good will is constituted by the agent’s highest-order maxim (the moral law itself), moral worth is a function of the agent’s first-order maxims.

Rawls’s theory of justice has been criticized for allowing individuals by their own voluntary choice to make themselves members of the ‘least advantaged’ class and thereby eligible, albeit undeservedly, for the benefits mandated by the Difference Principle. I argue, first, that this criticism overlooks the fact that the Difference Principle applies only to the lifetime expectations of representative persons and, second, that it is possible to implement the Difference Principle (and the social minimum) through policies that do not create work disincentives or require making objectionable moral judgments about who is and who is not deserving of assistance.

Virtues are standardly understood as (1) essentially dispositions to perform certain actions and (2) having only instrumental value as motives to fulfill moral duties which can be fulfilled by persons lacking the virtue because the duties mandate only certain act-types. The argument of this article is that the duties of beneficence, gratitude and self-respect cannot be stated in terms of obligatory act-types because they cannot be fulfilled (except in deficient form) by persons lacking the appropriate virtue; they are, rather, duties to cultivate specific virtues which therefore cannot themselves be defined in terms of obligatory actions

I consider three questions concerning the relation of the good will to the moral worth of actions. (1) Does a good will consist simply in acting from the motive of duty? (2) Does acting from the motive of duty presuppose that one has a good will? (3) Does the fact that one has a good wilI entail that all of one’s duty-fulfilling actions have moral worth, even if they are not (directly) motivated by duty? I argue that while only persons with a good will are capable of acting from the motive of duty, it does not follow either that a good will consists in acting from duty or that if one has a good will, all of one’s dutiful actions will be motivated by duty. Whereas the good will is constituted by the agent’s highest-order maxim (the moral law itself), moral worth is a function of the agent’s first-order maxims.

My dissertation examines Kant's theory of virtue. It is in the first instance an analysis of Kant's two accounts of virtue for the purpose of formulating a unified Kantian theory of virtue. My intention, however, is not simply to argue for a particular interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy but also to present a credible theory of virtue grounded in Kant's ethical theory without treating the Kantian text as inviolable. My dissertation is thus not only an interpretation of Kant's ethics from an unusual perspective but also an exposition of a Kantian theory of virtue that avoids certain of the weaknesses I find in Kant's ethical theory as it is usually understood. ;Kant's moral familiar account of virtue is located in the discussion of the moral worth of actions in the Groundwork. The second account appears primarily in the Doctrine of Virtue. On this latter account, one acts virtuously by fulfilling the duties of virtue . But it is questionable whether duty is the appropriate motive for acts of beneficence, gratitude, etc. The problem, then, is to reconcile Kant's claim that morally worthy actions are done from the motive of duty with his account of duties that are properly done only from some altruistic emotion like sympathy or gratitude. ;Drawing on Kant's account of virtue found in the Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, I argue that virtuous persons are willing to fulfill all of their juridical duties simply because they are duties, but they will also have developed certain virtuous character traits which will motivate them to fulfill the duties of virtue. It is therefore possible to be both conscientious and also benevolent, sympathetic, etc. ;Finally, I argue that the principle of humanity requires us to respect the autonomy of persons and that it is possible to use this principle to derive the duties of love as well as the juridical duties and the specific duties of respect