•  13
    Making moral principles suit yourself
    with Matthew Stanley, Paul Henne, Laura Niemi, and Felipe De Brigard
    Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 1. 2021.
    Normative ethical theories and religious traditions offer general moral principles for people to follow. These moral principles are typically meant to be fixed and rigid, offering reliable guides for moral judgment and decision-making. In two preregistered studies, we found consistent evidence that agreement with general moral principles shifted depending upon events recently accessed in memory. After recalling their own personal violations of moral principles, participants agreed less strongly …Read more
  •  17
    Valence framing effects on moral judgments: A meta-analysis
    with Kelsey McDonald, Rose Graves, Siyuan Yin, and Tara Weese
    Cognition 212 104703. 2021.
  • Scrupulosity and Moral Responsibility
    In Matt King & Joshua May (eds.), Agency in Mental Disorder: Philosophical Dimensions, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    Scrupulosity is a form of OCD where patients obsess about morality and sometimes compulsively confess or atone. It involves chronic doubt and anxiety as well as deviant moral judgments. This chapter argues that Scrupulosity is a mental illness and that its distortion of moral judgments undermines, or at least reduces, patients’ moral responsibility. The authors go on to argue that this condition challenges popular deep-self theories of responsibility, which assert that one is only blameworthy or…Read more
  •  6
    Summary
    Philosophical Books 49 (3): 193-196. 2008.
  •  83
    How AI can AID bioethics
    Journal of Practical Ethics. forthcoming.
    This paper explores some ways in which artificial intelligence (AI) could be used to improve human moral judgments in bioethics by avoiding some of the most common sources of error in moral judgment, including ignorance, confusion, and bias. It surveys three existing proposals for building human morality into AI: Top-down, bottom-up, and hybrid approaches. Then it proposes a multi-step, hybrid method, using the example of kidney allocations for transplants as a test case. The paper concludes wit…Read more
  •  43
    The truth of performatives
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (1). 1994.
    No abstract
  •  9
    Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values
    with Rachel Freedman, Jana Schaich Borg, John P. Dickerson, and Vincent Conitzer
    Artificial Intelligence 283 103261. 2020.
  •  68
    Partisanship, Humility, and Epistemic Polarization
    with Thomas Nadelhoffer, Rose Graves, Gus Skorburg, and Mark Leary
    In Michael Lynch & Alessandra Tanesini (eds.), Arrogance and Polarization (. pp. 175-192. forthcoming.
    Much of the literature from political psychology has focused on the negative traits that are positively associated with affective polarization—e.g., animus, arrogance, distrust, hostility, and outrage. Not as much attention has been focused on the positive traits that might be negatively associated with polarization. For instance, given that people who are intellectually humble display greater openness and less hostility towards conflicting viewpoints (Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016; Hopkin et al…Read more
  •  16
    How does inequality affect our sense of moral obligation?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43. 2020.
    Tomasello's novel and insightful theory of obligation explains why we sometimes sense an obligation to treat each other equally, but he has not yet explained why human morality also allows and enables much inequality in wealth and power. Ullman-Margalit's account of norms of partiality suggested a different source and kind of norms that might help to fill out Tomasello's picture.
  •  1
    Neuroscience & Philosophy (edited book)
    MIT Press. forthcoming.
  •  165
    AI Methods in Bioethics
    with Joshua August Skorburg and Vincent Conitzer
    American Journal of Bioethics: Empirical Bioethics 1 (11): 37-39. 2020.
    Commentary about the role of AI in bioethics for the 10th anniversary issue of AJOB: Empirical Bioethics
  •  219
    Some ethics of deep brain stimulation
    In Dan Stein & Ilina Singh (eds.), Global Mental Health and Neuroethics, . pp. 117-132. 2020.
    Case reports about patients undergoing Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) for various motor and psychiatric disorders - including Parkinson’s Disease, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, and Treatment Resistant Depression - have sparked a vast literature in neuroethics. Questions about whether and how DBS changes the self have been at the fore. The present chapter brings these neuroethical debates into conversation with recent research in moral psychology. We begin in Section 1 by reviewing the recent clin…Read more
  •  18
    Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1): 163-166. 1987.
  •  22
    Moral conformity and its philosophical lessons
    with Vladimir Chituc
    Philosophical Psychology 33 (2): 262-282. 2020.
    ABSTRACTThe psychological and philosophical literature exploring the role of social influence in moral judgments suggests that conformity in moral judgments is common and, in many cases, seems to b...
  •  4
    The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (2): 185-187. 1998.
  •  4
    Contrastive mental causation
    Synthese 198 (Suppl 3): 861-883. 2019.
    Any theory of mind needs to explain mental causation. Kim’s exclusion argument concludes that non-reductive physicalism cannot meet this challenge. One classic reply is that mental properties capture the causally relevant level of generality, because they are insensitive to physical realization. However, this reply suggests downward exclusion, contrary to physicalism’s assumption of closure. This paper shows how non-reductive physicalists can solve this problem by introducing a contrastive accou…Read more
  •  18
    Contrastive mental causation
    Synthese 198 (Suppl 3): 861-883. 2019.
    Any theory of mind needs to explain mental causation. Kim’s exclusion argument concludes that non-reductive physicalism cannot meet this challenge. One classic reply is that mental properties capture the causally relevant level of generality, because they are insensitive to physical realization. However, this reply suggests downward exclusion, contrary to physicalism’s assumption of closure. This paper shows how non-reductive physicalists can solve this problem by introducing a contrastive accou…Read more
  •  17
    Contrastive mental causation
    Synthese 198 (Suppl 3): 861-883. 2019.
    Any theory of mind needs to explain mental causation. Kim’s exclusion argument concludes that non-reductive physicalism cannot meet this challenge. One classic reply is that mental properties capture the causally relevant level of generality, because they are insensitive to physical realization. However, this reply suggests downward exclusion, contrary to physicalism’s assumption of closure. This paper shows how non-reductive physicalists can solve this problem by introducing a contrastive accou…Read more
  •  1
    Anthology of Neuroscience and Philosophy (edited book)
    with Felipe De Brigard
  •  17
    People with Scrupulosity have rigorous, obsessive moral beliefs that lead to extreme and compulsive moral acts. These fascinating outliers raise profound questions about human nature, mental illness, moral belief, responsibility, and psychiatric treatment. Clean Hands? Uses a range of case studies to examine this condition and its philosophical implications.
  •  2
    Philosophy of Neuroscience (edited book)
    with Felipe De Brigard
    MIT Press. forthcoming.
  •  32
    Responsibility Without Freedom? Folk Judgements About Deliberate Actions
    with Tillmann Vierkant, Robert Deutschländer, and John-Dylan Haynes
    Frontiers in Psychology 10 (1133): 1--6. 2019.
    A long-standing position in philosophy, law, and theology is that a person can be held morally responsible for an action only if they had the freedom to choose and to act otherwise. Thus, many philosophers consider freedom to be a necessary condition for moral responsibility. However, empirical findings suggest that this assumption might not be in line with common sense thinking. For example, in a recent study we used surveys to show that – counter to positions held by many philosophers – lay pe…Read more
  •  1
    A resolution of a paradox of promising
    Philosophia 17 (1): 77-82. 1987.
  •  10
    Robert Card criticises our proposal for managing some conscientious objections in medicine. Unfortunately, he severely mischaracterises the nature of our proposal, its scope and its implications. He also overlooks the fact that our proposal is a compromise designed for a particular political context. We correct Card’s mischaracterisations, explain why we believe compromise is necessary and explain how we think proposed compromises should be evaluated.
  •  25
    Moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments
    Cognition 108 (1): 281-289. 2008.
  •  20
    Are Proselfs More Deceptive and Hypocritical? Social Image Concerns in Appearing Fair
    with Honghong Tang, Shun Wang, Zilu Liang, Song Su, and Chao Liu
    Frontiers in Psychology 9. 2018.
  •  594
    I’m not the person I used to be: The self and autobiographical memories of immoral actions
    with Matthew L. Stanley, Paul Henne, Vijeth Iyengar, and Felipe De Brigard
    Journal of Experimental Psychology. General 146 (6): 884-895. 2017.
    People maintain a positive identity in at least two ways: They evaluate themselves more favorably than other people, and they judge themselves to be better now than they were in the past. Both strategies rely on autobiographical memories. The authors investigate the role of autobiographical memories of lying and emotional harm in maintaining a positive identity. For memories of lying to or emotionally harming others, participants judge their own actions as less morally wrong and less negative th…Read more