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44Affording Affordance Moral RealismBiological Theory 16 (1): 30-48. 2020.In this article I elaborate a scientifically based moral realism that I call affordance moral realism, and I offer a promissory note that affordance moral realism is the best current explanation of morality. Affordance moral realism maintains that morality is constituted by the interaction of moral agents and moral affordances. The latter are the natural and social environments in which moral agents’ activities take place and contain the objects of moral agents’ activities whose actualizations a…Read more
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18Moral Learning and Moral RealismThe Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 12 37-43. 1998.Although scientific naturalistic philosophers have been concerned with the role of scientific psychology in illuminating problems in moral psychology, they have paid less attention to the contributions that it might make to issues of moral ontology. In this paper, I illustrate how findings in moral developmental psychology illuminate and advance the discussion of a long-standing issue in moral ontology, that of moral realism. To do this, I examine Gilbert Harman and Nicholas Sturgeon's discussio…Read more
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26Wilfrid Sellars and the Foundations of Normativity by Peter OleJournal of the History of Philosophy 55 (4): 745-746. 2017.In this very informative volume, Peter Olen addresses questions that are of interest both to philosophers generally and to students of Sellars's thought in particular. Do philosophers have a job that is distinct from the scientists'? Yes. What is the nature of normativity and how is it discerned? Roughly, normativity is connected with the extra-conceptual content that normative language adds to factual content. Do Wilfrid Sellars's career-long efforts to account for the nature of both philosophy…Read more
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21No Messages Without a SenderPhilo 4 (1): 38-53. 2001.In his recent Gifford Lectures, Holmes Rolston argues that the informational character of biological phenomena is better explained by a theistic God of the process variety than by appealing to naturalistic biological explanations. In this paper, I assess Rolston’s argument by examining current biological and philosophical interpretations of the role of the theoretical concept of information in the description and explanation of biological phenomena. I find that none of these understandings of th…Read more
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11Verbal Behaviorism and Theoretical MentalismPhilosophy Research Archives 9 511-533. 1983.Sellars’ verbal behaviorism demands that linguistic episodes be conceptual in an underivative sense and his theoretical mentalism that thoughts as postulated theoretical entities be modelled on linguistic behaviors. Marras has contended that Sellars’ own methodology requires that semantic categories be theoretical. Thus linguistic behaviors can be conceptual in only a derivative sense. Further he claims that overt linguistic behaviors cannot serve as a model for all thought because thought is pr…Read more
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Ordinary Knowledge in the Scientific Realism of Wilfrid SellarsDissertation, Boston University Graduate School. 1973.
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53Is the science of positive intentional change a science of objective moral values?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (4): 435-436. 2014.I examine whether Wilson et al.'s argument for a science of positive intentional change constitutes an argument for a science of objective moral values. Drawing from their discussion, I present four reasons for thinking that it may be and some considerations on why it may not be. Concluding, I seek help from the authors. [Open Peer Commentary on a BBS article.]
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33The Biology and Psychology of Moral AgencyCambridge University Press. 1997.This important book brings findings and theories in biology and psychology to bear on the fundamental question in ethics of what it means to behave morally. It explains how we acquire and put to work our capacities to act morally and how these capacities are reliable means to achieving true moral beliefs, proper moral motivations, and successful moral actions. By presenting a complete model of moral agency based on contemporary evolutionary theory, developmental biology and psychology, and socia…Read more
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22Naturalizing Or Demythologizing Scientific Inquiry: Kitcher’s: Science, Truth and DemocracyPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (3): 408-422. 2004.In Science, Truth and Democracy, Philip Kitcher has argued that science ought to meet both the epistemic goals of significant truth and the nonepistemic goals of serving the interests of a democratic society. He opposes this science as servant model to both the theology of science as source of salvific truth and the theology of science as anti-Christ. In a recent critical comment, Paul A. Roth argues that Kitcher remains entangled in the theology of salvific truth, not realizing that its goal is…Read more
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58. Using as a model contemporary analyses of scientific cognition, Ian Harbour has claimed that religious cognition is neither immediate nor inferential but has the structure of interpreted experience. Although I contend that Barbour has failed to establish his claim, I believe his views about the similarities between scientific and religious cognition are well founded. Thus on that basis I offer an alternative proposal that theistic religious cognition is essentially inferential and that religio…Read more
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88Naturalizing or demythologizing scientific inquiry: Kitcher’s: Science, truth and democracyPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (3): 408-422. 2004., Philip Kitcher has argued that science ought to meet both the epistemic goals of significant truth and the nonepistemic goals of serving the interests of a democratic society. He opposes this science as servant model to both the theology of science as source of salvific truth and the theology of science as anti-Christ. In a recent critical comment, Paul A. Roth argues that Kitcher remains entangled in the theology of salvific truth, not realizing that its goal is either vacuous or unattainable…Read more
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32Why Wilfrid Sellars Is Right (and Right-Wing)Journal of Philosophical Research 36 291-325. 2011.Scholars of Wilfrid Sellars’s thought split into Right- and Left-wing Sellarsians. Right-wing Sellarsians urge Sellars’s scientific realism and the prominence of the scientific image of man in the synoptic vision. Left-wing Sellarsians emphasize the prominence of the logical space of reasons over that of causes, rejecting Sellars’s scientism. In his recent book James O’Shea attempts to reconcile these Sellarsian images, arguing that one best understands the Sellarsian synoptic image in terms of …Read more
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23It's been a pleasure, but that's not why I did it. Are Sober and Wilson too generous toward their selfish brethren?Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2): 1-2. 2000.Sober and Wilson demonstrate convincingly the fallacies of arguments for fundamental biological and psychological selfishness and establish the plausibility of both biological and psychological altruism. However, I suggest that they are more generous to proponents of fundamental selfishness than they need be and that morality is closer to our evolved and learned capacities than they suggest. I am less generous toward advocates of fundamental selfishness than are our altruistic authors.
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122Willard A. Young, Fallacies of Creationism Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 6 (8): 411-412. 1986.Review Article
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65The insufficience of supervenient explanations of moral actions: Really taking Darwin and the naturalistic fallacy seriously (review)Biology and Philosophy 6 (4): 439-445. 1991.In a recent paper in this journal (Rottschaefer and Martinsen 1990) we have proposed a view of Darwinian evolutionary metaethics that we believe improves upon Michael Ruse's (e.g., Ruse 1986) proposals by claiming that there are evolutionary based objective moral values and that a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness can be given that avoids the naturalistic fallacy in both its definitional and derivational forms while providing genuine, even if limited, jus…Read more
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47Discerning the Limits of Religious NaturalismZygon 36 (3): 467-475. 2001.In response to my “How to Make Naturalism Safe for Supernaturalism: An Evaluation of Willem Drees's Supernaturalistic Naturalism” (Rottschaefer 2001), Willem Drees maintains that I have misunderstood his purpose and views and have failed to make the case against his view that naturalism is intrinsically limited. In this response, I comment on these concerns.
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38Social Learning Theories of Moral AgencyBehavior and Philosophy 19 (1). 1991.An important question for a naturalized philosophical psychology is what constitutes moral agency (MA). The two prominent scientific theories to which such a philosophical approach might appeal, those of cognitive developmental theory (CDT) and social learning theory (SLT), currently face an investigative dilemma: The better theories of the acquisition of beliefs and the performance of action based on them, the SLTs, seem to be irrelevant to the phenomenon of MA and the theories that seem to be …Read more
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48Philosophical and religious implications of cognitive social learning theories of personalityZygon 26 (1): 137-148. 1991.This paper sketches an alternative answer to James Jones's recent attempt to explore the implications of cognitive social learning theories of personality for issues in epistemology, philosophy of science, and religious studies. Since the 1960s, two cognitive revolutions have taken place in scientific psychology: the first made cognition central to theories of perception, memory, problem solving, and so on; the second made cognition central to theories of learning and behavior, among others. Cog…Read more
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47Moral Learning and Moral Realism: How Empirical Psychology Illuminates Issues in Moral OntologyBehavior and Philosophy 27 (1). 1999.Although scientific naturalistic philosophers have been concerned with the role of scientific psychology in illuminating problems in moral psychology, they have paid less attention to the contributions that it might make to issues of moral ontology. In this paper, I illustrate how findings in moral developmental psychology illuminate and advance the discussion of a long-standing issue in moral ontology, that of moral realism. To do this, I examine Gilbert Harman and Nicholas Sturgeon's discussio…Read more
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18Why Wilfrid Sellars Is Right (and Right-Wing)Journal of Philosophical Research 36 291-325. 2011.Scholars of Wilfrid Sellars’s thought split into Right- and Left-wing Sellarsians. Right-wing Sellarsians urge Sellars’s scientific realism and the prominence of the scientific image of man in the synoptic vision. Left-wing Sellarsians emphasize the prominence of the logical space of reasons over that of causes, rejecting Sellars’s scientism. In his recent book James O’Shea attempts to reconcile these Sellarsian images, arguing that one best understands the Sellarsian synoptic image in terms of …Read more
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55B.f. Skinner and the grand inquisitorZygon 30 (3): 407-433. 1995.B.F. Skinner allures us with the possibilities of turning the stones of materialistic rewards into the bread of human values. He tempts us by assuring success in achieving our goals through behavioral science, if only we give up our autonomy. He offers the power of complete control over our behaviors, on condition that we relinquish responsibility for our lives to a technological elite. Is B. F. Skinner a flesh‐and‐blood Grand Inquisitor? This essay tries to persuade the reader that Skinner's of…Read more
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30Religion's evolutionary landscape needs pruning with ockham's razorBehavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6): 747-748. 2004.Atran & Norenzayan (A&N) have not adequately supported the epistemic component of their proposal, namely, that God does not exist. A weaker, more probable hypothesis, not requiring that component – that the benefits of religious belief outweigh those of disbelief, even though we do not know whether or not God exists – is available. I counsel them to use Ockham's razor, eliminate their negative epistemic thesis, and accept the weaker hypothesis.
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17Adaptational functional ascriptions in evolutionary biology: A critique of Schaffner's viewsPhilosophy of Science 64 (4): 698-713. 1997.Kenneth Schaffner has argued that evolutionary theory, strictly understood, cannot support the functional ascriptions used in adaptational functional explanations. Although the causal ascription clause in these ascriptions is supported, the goal-ascription clause cannot be, since it imports anthropocentric features deriving from a vulgar understanding of evolutionary theory. I argue that an etiological interpretation of selectional explanations sanctions both the causal and goal-ascription claus…Read more
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42Ordinary Knowledge and Scientific RealismIn Joseph Pitt (ed.), The Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and Extensions, D. Reidel. pp. 135--161. 1978.