•  559
    Wittgenstein, Seeing-As, and Novelty
    In Michael Beaney, Brendan Harrington & Dominic Shaw (eds.), Aspect Perception After Wittgenstein: Seeing-as and Novelty, Routledge. pp. 29-48. 2015.
    It is natural to say that when we acquire a new concept or concepts, or grasp a new theory, or master a new practice, we come to see things in a new way: we perceive phenomena that we were not previously aware of; we come to see patterns or connections that we did not previously see. That natural idea has been applied in many areas, including the philosophy of science, the philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. And, in reflecting on the character of philosophy itself, Wittgens…Read more
  •  422
    Wittgenstein, Scientism, and Anti-Scientism in the Philosophy of Mind
    In Jonathan Beale & Ian James Kidd (eds.), Wittgenstein and Scientism, Routledge. pp. 81-100. 2017.
    Part 1 of this paper sketches Wittgenstein’s opposition to scientism in general. Part 2 explores his opposition to scientism in philosophy focusing, in particular, on philosophy of mind; how must philosophy of mind proceed if it is to avoid the kind of scientism that Wittgenstein complains about? Part 3 examines a central anti-scientistic strand in Wittgenstein’s Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology volume II: his treatment of the ‘uncertainty’ of the relation between ‘outer’ behaviour …Read more
  •  414
    “‘We Can Go No Further’: Meaning, Use, and the Limits of Language”
    In Hanne Appelqvist (ed.), Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language, Cambridge University Press. pp. 93-114. 2020.
    A central theme in Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus remarks on the limits of language is that we ‘cannot use language to get outside language’. One illustration of that idea is his comment that, once we have described the procedure of teaching and learning a rule, we have ‘said everything that can be said about acting correctly according to the rule’; ‘we can go no further’. That, it is argued, is an expression of anti-reductionism about meaning and rules. A framework is presented for assessin…Read more
  •  383
    Meaning, Use, and Supervenience
    In James Conant & Sebastian Sunday (eds.), Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning, Cambridge University Press. pp. 211-230. 2019.
    What is the relation between meaning and use? This chapter first defends a non-reductionist understanding of Wittgenstein’s suggestion that ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the language’; facts about meaning cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, facts about use, characterized non-semantically. Nonetheless, it is contended, facts about meaning do supervene on non-semantic facts about use. That supervenience thesis is suggested by comments of Wittgenstein’s and is consistent with his…Read more
  •  343
    The paper discusses two aspects of Wittgenstein’s middle-period discussions of the self and the use of ‘I’. First, it considers the distinction Wittgenstein draws in his 1933 Cambridge lectures between two ‘utterly different’ uses of the word ‘I’. It is shown that Wittgenstein’s discussion describes a number of different and non-equivalent distinctions between uses of ‘I’. It is argued that his claims about some of these distinctions are defensible but that his reasoning in other cases is unc…Read more
  •  323
    Economics, Agency, and Causal Explanation
    In Peter Róna & László Zsolnai (eds.), Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics, Springer Verlag. pp. 53-67. 2019.
    The paper considers three questions. First, what is the connection between economics and agency? It is argued that causation and explanation in economics fundamentally depend on agency. So a philosophical understanding of economic explanation must be sensitive to an understanding of agency. Second, what is the connection between agency and causation? A causal view of agency-involving explanation is defended against a number of arguments from the resurgent noncausalist tradition in the literature…Read more
  •  303
    Sensations, Natural Properties, and the Private Language Argument
    In Kevin M. Cahill & Thomas Raleigh (eds.), Wittgenstein and Naturalism, Routledge. pp. 79-95. 2017.
    Wittgenstein’s philosophy involves a general anti-platonism about properties or standards of similarity. On his view, what it is for one thing to have the same property as another is not dictated by reality itself; it depends on our classificatory practices and the standards of similarity they embody. Wittgenstein’s anti-platonism plays an important role in the private language sections and in his discussion of the conceptual problem of other minds. In sharp contrast to Wittgenstein’s views s…Read more
  •  204
    Does the Tractatus Contain a Private Language Argument?
    In Peter Sullivan Michael Potter (ed.), Wittgenstein's Tractatus. History and Interpretation, Oxford University Press. pp. 143-169. 2013.
    Cora Diamond has claimed that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus contains an early ‘private language argument’: an argument that private objects in other people’s minds can play no role in the language I use for talking about their sensations. She further claims that the Tractatus contains an early version of the later idea that an inner process stands in need of outward criteria. The paper argues against these claims, on the grounds that they depend on an unwarranted construal of the Tractatus’s notion…Read more
  •  138
    Causality, interpretation, and the mind
    Oxford University Press. 1994.
    Philosophers of mind have long been interested in the relation between two ideas: that causality plays an essential role in our understanding of the mental; and that we can gain an understanding of belief and desire by considering the ascription of attitudes to people on the basis of what they say and do. Many have thought that those ideas are incompatible. William Child argues that there is in fact no tension between them, and that we should accept both. He shows how we can have a causal unders…Read more
  •  138
    Anomalism, uncodifiability, and psychophysical relations
    Philosophical Review 102 (2): 215-245. 1993.
  •  120
    On the Dualism of Scheme and Content
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 53-71. 19934.
    William Child; IV*—On the Dualism of Scheme and Content, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, Pages 53–72, https://doi.org/
  •  111
    Triangulation: Davidson, Realism and Natural Kinds
    Dialectica 55 (1): 29-50. 2001.
    Is there a plausible middle position in the debate between realists and constructivists about categories or kinds? Such a position may seem to be contained in the account of triangulation that Donald Davidson develops in recent writings. On this account, the kinds we pick out are determined by an interaction between our shared similarity responses and causal relations between us and things in our environment. So kinds and categories are neither imposed on us by the nature of the world, nor impos…Read more
  •  107
    For the anti-realist, the truth about a subject's past thoughts and attitudes is determined by what he is subsequently disposed to judge about them. The argument for an anti-realist interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of past-tense statements seems plausible in three cases: dreams, calculating in the head, and thinking. Wittgenstein is indeed an anti-realist about dreaming. His account of calculating in the head suggests anti-realism about the past, but turns out to be essentially realistic. H…Read more
  •  94
    Memory, expression, and past-tense self-knowledge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1). 2006.
    How should we understand our capacity to remember our past intentional states? And what can we learn from Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic? Three questions are considered. First, what is the relation between our past attitudes and our present beliefs about them? Realism about past attitudes is defended. Second, how should we understand Wittgenstein's view that self-ascriptions of past attitudes are a kind of "response" and that the "language-game" of reporting past attitudes is "the primar…Read more
  •  90
    Wittgenstein, dreaming and anti-realism: A reply to Richard Scheer
    Philosophical Investigations 32 (4): 329-337. 2009.
    I have argued that Wittgenstein's treatment of dreaming involves a kind of anti-realism about the past: what makes "I dreamed p " true is, roughly, that I wake with the feeling or impression of having dreamed p . Richard Scheer raises three objections. First, that the texts do not support my interpretation. Second, that the anti-realist view of dreaming does not make sense, so cannot be Wittgenstein's view. Third, that the anti-realist view leaves it a mystery why someone who reports having drea…Read more
  •  82
    Vision and causation: Reply to Hyman
    Philosophical Quarterly 44 (176): 361-369. 1994.
  •  76
    Wittgensteinian themes: essays in honour of David Pears (edited book)
    with David Pears and David Charles
    Oxford University Press. 2001.
    A stellar group of philosophers offer new works on themes from the great philosophy of Wittgenstein, honoring one of his most eminent interpreters David Pears. This collection covers both the early and the later work of Wittgenstein, relating it to current debates in philosophy. Topics discussed include solipsism, ostension, rules, necessity, privacy, and consciousness.
  •  56
    Interpreting people and interpreting texts
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3). 2006.
    What is the relation between interpreting a person's speech and actions, on the one hand, and interpreting a written text, on the other? That question is considered in connection with the theories of interpretation offered by Donald Davidson and Paul Ricoeur. There are some important similarities between those theories. However, it is argued that Davidson and Ricoeur are divided on fundamental questions about the relation between meaning and intention, about the reference of texts, about the rel…Read more
  •  55
    Solipsism and First Person/Third Person Asymmetries
    European Journal of Philosophy 4 (2): 137-154. 1996.
  •  51
    Crane on mental causation
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1): 97-102. 1997.
    William Child; Discussions: Crane on Mental Causation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 97, Issue 1, 1 June 1997, Pages 97–102, https://doi.org/1.
  •  38
    Reply to Alvin I. Goldman
    In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. pp. 45--21. 2002.
  •  28
    Wittgenstein
    Routledge. 2011.
    Life and works -- The Tractatus, language and logic -- The Tractatus, reality and the limits of language -- From the Tractatus to philosophical investigations -- Intentionality and rule-following -- Mind and psychology -- Knowledge and certainty -- Religion and anthropology -- Legacy and influence.
  •  25
    Problems of Vision (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3): 729-731. 2000.
    Gerald Vision describes and defends a view of visual perception that combines a causal theory of vision with direct realism, and offers novel solutions to a number of traditional puzzles for causal theories. The book contains extensive discussions of the views of many writers—predominantly from the tradition of philosophical work on vision inaugurated by Grice and Strawson. The principal subjects of critical discussion include Searle, Sellars, Peacocke, Lewis, Jackson, Dretske, Armstrong, Heil a…Read more
  •  24
    Problems of Vision: Rethinking the Causal Theory of Perception
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (3): 729-731. 1997.
  •  22