•  104
  •  100
    Triangulation: Davidson, Realism and Natural Kinds
    Dialectica 55 (1): 29-50. 2001.
    Is there a plausible middle position in the debate between realists and constructivists about categories or kinds? Such a position may seem to be contained in the account of triangulation that Donald Davidson develops in recent writings. On this account, the kinds we pick out are determined by an interaction between our shared similarity responses and causal relations between us and things in our environment. So kinds and categories are neither imposed on us by the nature of the world, nor impos…Read more
  •  93
    Anomalism, uncodifiability, and psychophysical relations
    Philosophical Review 102 (2): 215-245. 1993.
  •  91
    Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind
    Oxford University Press. 1994.
    Philosophers of mind have long been interested in the relation between two ideas: that causality plays an essential role in our understanding of the mental; and that we can gain an understanding of belief and desire by considering the ascription of attitudes to people on the basis of what they say and do. Many have thought that those ideas are incompatible. William Child argues that there is in fact no tension between them, and that we should accept both. He shows how we can have a causal unders…Read more
  •  87
    For the anti-realist, the truth about a subject's past thoughts and attitudes is determined by what he is subsequently disposed to judge about them. The argument for an anti-realist interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of past-tense statements seems plausible in three cases: dreams, calculating in the head, and thinking. Wittgenstein is indeed an anti-realist about dreaming. His account of calculating in the head suggests anti-realism about the past, but turns out to be essentially realistic. H…Read more
  •  77
    Wittgenstein, dreaming and anti-realism: A reply to Richard Scheer
    Philosophical Investigations 32 (4): 329-337. 2009.
    I have argued that Wittgenstein's treatment of dreaming involves a kind of anti-realism about the past: what makes "I dreamed p " true is, roughly, that I wake with the feeling or impression of having dreamed p . Richard Scheer raises three objections. First, that the texts do not support my interpretation. Second, that the anti-realist view of dreaming does not make sense, so cannot be Wittgenstein's view. Third, that the anti-realist view leaves it a mystery why someone who reports having drea…Read more
  •  69
    Memory, expression, and past-tense self-knowledge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1). 2006.
    How should we understand our capacity to remember our past intentional states? And what can we learn from Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic? Three questions are considered. First, what is the relation between our past attitudes and our present beliefs about them? Realism about past attitudes is defended. Second, how should we understand Wittgenstein's view that self-ascriptions of past attitudes are a kind of "response" and that the "language-game" of reporting past attitudes is "the primar…Read more
  •  50
    Vision and causation: Reply to Hyman
    Philosophical Quarterly 44 (176): 361-369. 1994.
  •  49
    Wittgensteinian Themes: Essays in Honour of David Pears (edited book)
    with David Francis Pears and David Charles
    Oxford University Press. 2001.
    A stellar group of philosophers offer new works on themes from the great philosophy of Wittgenstein, honoring one of his most eminent interpreters David Pears. This collection covers both the early and the later work of Wittgenstein, relating it to current debates in philosophy. Topics discussed include solipsism, ostension, rules, necessity, privacy, and consciousness.
  •  42
    Solipsism and First Person/Third Person Asymmetries
    European Journal of Philosophy 4 (2): 137-154. 1996.
  •  39
    Interpreting people and interpreting texts
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3). 2006.
    What is the relation between interpreting a person's speech and actions, on the one hand, and interpreting a written text, on the other? That question is considered in connection with the theories of interpretation offered by Donald Davidson and Paul Ricoeur. There are some important similarities between those theories. However, it is argued that Davidson and Ricoeur are divided on fundamental questions about the relation between meaning and intention, about the reference of texts, about the rel…Read more
  •  37
    Crane on mental causation
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1): 97-102. 1997.
  •  35
    Reply to Alvin I. Goldman
    In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. pp. 45--21. 2002.
  •  20
    Problems of Vision: Rethinking the Causal Theory of Perception
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3): 729-731. 2000.
    Gerald Vision describes and defends a view of visual perception that combines a causal theory of vision with direct realism, and offers novel solutions to a number of traditional puzzles for causal theories. The book contains extensive discussions of the views of many writers—predominantly from the tradition of philosophical work on vision inaugurated by Grice and Strawson. The principal subjects of critical discussion include Searle, Sellars, Peacocke, Lewis, Jackson, Dretske, Armstrong, Heil a…Read more
  •  18
  •  17
    Wittgenstein on Meaning by Colin McGinn (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 85 (5): 271-277. 1988.
  •  16
    Book reviews (review)
    Mind 103 (410): 162-171. 1994.
  •  8
    Language argument?
    In Peter Sullivan Michael Potter (ed.), Wittgenstein's Tractatus. History and Interpretation, Oxford University Press. pp. 143. 2013.
  •  7
    Memory, Expression, and Past-Tense Self-Knowledge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1): 54-76. 2006.
    How should we understand our capacity to remember our past intentional states? And what can we learn from Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic? Three questions are considered. First, what is the relation between our past attitudes and our present beliefs about them? Realism about past attitudes is defended. Second, how should we understand Wittgenstein's view that self-ascriptions of past attitudes are a kind of "response" and that the "language-game" of reporting past attitudes is "the primar…Read more
  •  5
    Book Reviews (review)
    Mind 103 (410): 223-229. 1994.
  •  5
    Book-Reviews (review)
    Mind 100 (397): 162-171. 1991.
  •  3
    Critical Notice
    Mind 96 (384). 1987.
    Book reviewed in this article:F.H. Bradley, Collected Works Volumes 1–5
  •  3
    Wittgenstein
    Routledge. 2002.
    Life and works -- The Tractatus, language and logic -- The Tractatus, reality and the limits of language -- From the Tractatus to philosophical investigations -- Intentionality and rule-following -- Mind and psychology -- Knowledge and certainty -- Religion and anthropology -- Legacy and influence.