•  479
    We use evidence from cognitive psychology and the history of science to examine the issue of the theory-ladenness of perceptual observation. This evidence shows that perception is theory-laden, but that it is only strongly theory-laden when the perceptual evidence is ambiguous or degraded, or when it requires a difficult perceptual judgment. We argue that debates about the theory-ladenness issue have focused too narrowly on the issue of perceptual experience, and that a full account of the scien…Read more
  •  84
    Perception is Theory Laden: The Naturalized Evidence and Philosophical Implications
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1): 121-138. 2015.
    This paper proposes a set of criteria for an appropriate experiment on the issue of the theory ladenness of perception. These criteria are used to select a number of experiments that use: belief-based ambiguous figures, fragmented figures, or memory color. Crucially, the data in experiments of this type are based on the participant’s qualitative visual experience. Across many different types of experimental designs, different types of stimuli, and different types of belief manipulation, these ex…Read more
  •  63
    Explanation in scientists and children
    Minds and Machines 8 (1): 119-136. 1998.
    In this paper we provide a psychological account of the nature and development of explanation. We propose that an explanation is an account that provides a conceptual framework for a phenomenon that leads to a feeling of understanding in the reader/hearer. The explanatory conceptual framework goes beyond the original phenomenon, integrates diverse aspects of the world, and shows how the original phenomenon follows from the framework. We propose that explanations in everyday life are judged on th…Read more
  •  62
    Scientists' Responses to Anomalous Data: Evidence from Psychology, History, and Philosophy of Science
    with Clark A. Chinn
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994. 1994.
    This paper presents an analysis of the forms of response that scientists make when confronted with anomalous data. We postulate that there are seven ways in which an individual who currently holds a theory can respond to anomalous data: (1) ignore the data; (2) reject the data; (3) exclude the data from the domain of the current theory; (4) hold the data in abeyance; (5) reinterpret the data; (6) make peripheral changes to the current theory; or (7) change the theory. We analyze psychological ex…Read more
  •  62
    The perceptual symbol approach to knowledge representation combines structured frames and dynamic imagery. The perceptual symbol approach provides a good account of the representation of scientific models, of some types of naive theories held by children and adults, and of certain reconstructive memory phenomena. The ontological status of perceptual symbols is unclear and this form of representation does not succeed in accounting for all forms of human knowledge.
  •  58
    This paper examines the form of mental representation of scientific theories in scientists and nonscientists. It concludes that images and schemas are not the appropriate form of mental representation for scientific theories but that mental models and perceptual symbols do seem appropriate for representing physical/mechanical phenomena. These forms of mental representation are postulated to have an analogical relation with the world and it is this relationship that gives them strong explanatory …Read more
  •  53
    Mental models in data interpretation
    Philosophy of Science 63 (3): 219. 1996.
    This paper presents a cognitive account of the process of evaluating scientific data. Our account assumes that when individuals evaluate data, they construct a mental model of a data-interpretation package, in which the data and theoretical interpretations of the data are integrated. We propose that individuals attempt to discount data by seeking alternative explanations for events within the mental model; data-interpretation packages are accepted when the individual cannot find alternative acco…Read more
  •  31
    Most philosophers of science now believe that scientific data are theory laden, i.e., the evaluation of data is influenced by prior theoretical beliefs. Although there is historical and psychological evidence that is consistent with the theory-laden position, experimental evidence is needed to directly test whether prior beliefs influence the evaluation of scientific data. In a fully counterbalanced design, one group of subjects received evidence that dinosaurs were cold-blooded, and another g…Read more
  •  22
    Reconstructive recall in sentences with alternative surface structures
    with J. Kathryn Bock
    Journal of Experimental Psychology 103 (5): 837. 1974.
  •  22
    Reports of Mental Imagery in Retrieval from Long-Term Memory
    with John R. Pani
    Consciousness and Cognition 5 (3): 265-287. 1996.
    Phenomenal reports were obtained immediately after participants retrieved information from long-term memory. Data were gathered for six basic forms of memory and for three forms of memory that asked for declarative information about procedural tasks . The data show consistent reports of mental imagery during retrieval of information from the generic perceptual, recollective, motor—declarative, rote—declarative, and cognitive—declarative categories; much less imagery was reported for the semantic…Read more
  •  19
    Mental Models of the Day/Night Cycle
    Cognitive Science 18 (1): 123-183. 1994.
    This article presents the results of an experiment which investigated elementary school children's explanations of the day/night cycle. First, third, and fifth grade children were asked to explain certain phenomena, such as the disappearance of the sun during the night, the disappearance of stars during the day, the apparent movement of the moon, and the alteration of day and night. The results showed that the majority of the children in our sample used in a consistent fashion a small number of …Read more
  •  16
    Mental Models in Data Interpretation
    Philosophy of Science 63 (5). 1996.
    This paper presents a cognitive account of the process of evaluating scientific data. Our account assumes that when individuals evaluate data, they construct a mental model of a data-interpretation package, in which the data and theoretical interpretations of the data are integrated. We propose that individuals attempt to discount data by seeking alternative explanations for events within the mental model; data-interpretation packages are accepted when the individual cannot find alternative acco…Read more
  •  8
    This paper analyzes recent work in psychology on the nature of the representation of complex forms of knowledge with the goal of understanding how theories are represented. The analysis suggests that, as a psychological form of representation, theories are mental structures that include theoretical entities (usually nonobservable), relationships among the theoretical entities, and relationships of the theoretical entities to the phenomena of some domain. A theory explains the phenomena in its d…Read more
  •  6
    Reports of Mental Imagery in Retrieval from Long-Term Memory
    with John Pani
    Consciousness and Cognition 5 (3): 25-287. 1995.
    Phenomenal reports were obtained immediately after participants retrieved information from long-term memory. Data were gathered for six basic forms of memory and for three forms of memory that asked for declarative information about procedural tasks. The data show consistent reports of mental imagery during retrieval of information from the generic perceptual, recollective, motor—declarative, rote—declarative, and cognitive—declarative categories; much less imagery was reported for the semantic,…Read more
  •  4
    What is recollective memory?
    In David C. Rubin (ed.), Remembering Our Past: Studies in Autobiographical Memory, Cambridge University Press. 1996.
    The goal of this chapter is to describe recollective memory and give an account of some of the characteristics of this form of human memory. I take recollective memory to be the type of memory that occurs when an individual recalls a specific episode from their past experience. I start with this very loose definition because a large part of this chapter consists of an attempt to work out a more detailed and analytic description of this form of memory.
  •  2
    Science
    with Punyashloke Mishra
    In William Bechtel & George Graham (eds.), A Companion to Cognitive Science, Blackwell. 2017.
    The cognitive science of science studies the cognitive processes involved in carrying out science: How do scientists reason? How do scientists develop new theories? How do scientists deal with data that are inconsistent with their theories? How do scientists choose between competing theories? Research on these issues has been carried out by investigators in a number of cognitive science disciplines, particularly psychology, philosophy, and artificial intelligence. More detailed accounts of work …Read more
  • The metamemory approach to confidence: A test using semantic memory
    with Cristina Sampaio
    Journal of Memory and Language 59-77. 2012.
    The metamemory approach to memory confidence was extended and elaborated to deal with semantic memory tasks. The metamemory approach assumes that memory confidence is based on the products and processes of a completed memory task, as well as metamemory beliefs that individuals have about how their memory products and processes relate to memory accuracy. In two experiments participants were asked deceptive and nondeceptive questions involving geographical information. In both experiments, as pred…Read more
  • Memory permanence versus memory replacement in sentence recall
    with Stacy Lynette Birch
    Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 28 (6): 526-526. 1990.
  • Scientists are not deficient in mental imagery: Galton revised
    with Marlene Schommer-Aikins
    Review of General Psychology 10 130-146. 2006.
    In 1880, Galton carried out an investigation of imagery in a sample of distinguished men and a sample of nonscientists (adolescent male students). He concluded that scientists were either totally lacking in visual imagery or had “feeble” powers of mental imagery. This finding has been widely accepted in the secondary literature in psychology. A replication of Galton’s study with modern scientists and modern university undergraduates found no scientists totally lacking in visual imagery and very …Read more