•  37
    Thinking Outside the Circle: The Place of Kierkegaard in Stern's Understanding Moral Obligation
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (6): 606-621. 2012.
    In Understanding Moral Obligation, Robert Stern presents an interesting account of the history of ethics from Kant through Hegel and Kierkegaard. I argue that Stern in this account misinterprets Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling and Works of Love by reading them as presenting a Divine Command Theory of moral obligation, as a philosophical account meant to compete with those of Kant and Hegel. It mistakes, indeed subverts, Kierkegaard's purposes to read him as engaging in a philosophical dialectic…Read more
  •  136
    Are Kant’s Categories Subjective?
    Review of Metaphysics 55 (3): 551-580. 2002.
    Argues that there is a significant respect in which Kant's categories are to be understood as subjective, namely, in the sense that they are to be understood as the self-legislated rules of our understanding. Argues that the subjectivism of Kant's idealism, by which is meant the relativization of knowledge of objects to our standpoint, is a consequence of the subjectivity of the categories, on this interpretation of their subjectivity. On the reading opposed here, Kant's subjectivism is strictly…Read more
  •  50
    Enlightenment
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. forthcoming.
  •  9
    Kant and the demands of self-consciousness
    Philosophical Review 110 (2): 272-275. 2001.
    In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes the interesting, but obscure claim that the normative constraints that constitute the objectivity of our representations have their source ultimately in transcendental apperception. Keller focuses on this claim. He interprets Kant’s condition of transcendental apperception as the claim that I must represent myself in an impersonal way, and he argues that impersonal self-consciousness is a necessary condition under which I can distinguish my particular t…Read more
  •  17
    Rousseau and German Idealism: Freedom, Dependence and Necessity
    In Sally Sedgwick & Dina Emundts (eds.), Bewusstsein/Consciousness, De Gruyter. pp. 275-280. 2016.
  •  69
    Hegel's objection -- Is Kant's idealism subjective? -- An ambiguity in 'subjectivism' -- The epistemological problem -- The transcendental deduction of the categories and subjectivism -- Are Kant's categories subjective? -- Hegel's suspicion : Kantian critique and subjectivism -- What is kantian philosophical criticism? -- Hegel's suspicion : initial formulation -- A shallow suspicion? -- Deepening the suspicion : criticism, autonomy, and subjectivism -- Directions of response -- Critique and s…Read more
  •  76
    Self‐Consciousness, Normativity and Abysmal Freedom
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (6). 2006.
    This article critically examines Christine Korsgaard's claim in her Tanner Lectures to find in self-consciousness itself the norms that would answer our need for practical reasons, insofar as that need is constituted through our capacity for reflection. It shows that the way in which Korsgaard sees “the need for a reason” as arising out of self-consciousness implies a dilemma: on the one hand, we want as the ultimate source of our reasons an authority of which we cannot coherently demand legitim…Read more
  •  50
    Review: Keller, Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness (review)
    Philosophical Review 110 (2): 272-275. 2001.
    In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes the interesting, but obscure claim that the normative constraints that constitute the objectivity of our representations have their source ultimately in transcendental apperception. Keller focuses on this claim. He interprets Kant’s condition of transcendental apperception as the claim that I must represent myself in an impersonal way, and he argues that impersonal self-consciousness is a necessary condition under which I can distinguish my particular t…Read more
  •  2
    Bildung and the Critique of Modern Skepticism in McDowell and Hegel
    Internationales Jahrbuck des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism 3 179-207. 2005.
  •  84
    Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness
    Philosophical Review 110 (2): 272. 2001.
    In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes the interesting, but obscure claim that the normative constraints that constitute the objectivity of our representations have their source ultimately in transcendental apperception. Keller focuses on this claim. He interprets Kant’s condition of transcendental apperception as the claim that I must represent myself in an impersonal way, and he argues that impersonal self-consciousness is a necessary condition under which I can distinguish my particular t…Read more