My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept: no
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Reject both Abstract objects are creatures of reason.
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept another alternative I believe that the source of both meaning and truth is the world which we use language to reflect.
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Insufficiently familiar with the issue
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept an intermediate view
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Accept: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: non-Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept: non-classical Non-classical in that (A) identity is a partial equivalence relation--reflexive for existents but irreflexive for non-existents, over both of which the universal and particular quantifiers are assumed to range; and (B) the identity-relation is not simple (as in classical FOL=) but complex (see "A Theory of Complexes", Epistemologia, 1996, html version on-line).
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Lean toward: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism The question is too unclear to answer
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Reject all realism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Accept: communitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Accept an intermediate view 1) The meaning of a proper name is exhausted by its reference (Mill). 2) The reference of a proper name is *logically complex*. (neither Fregean nor Millian) 3) The reference of "_b_" is an entity, _b_ (a 'thick' particular), whose components are B (a 'thisness': the property of being _b_) and b (a 'thin' particular: the 'support' of B): taking B to be a Fregean sense (Plantinga, Burge, and Salmon), the thrust of (3) is Fregean (see "The Paradox of Identity", Epistemologia, 1996; html version online, for details).
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Lean toward: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Time: A-theory and B-theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept: correspondence Wish to know more about identity-theory of truth
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Insufficiently familiar with the issue