William Seager

The ability to observe is the ability to reliably detect, but that is not all observation is. A thermometer reliably detects temperature yet does not observe the temperature, whereas I do, even though in terms of reliability I cannot match the thermometer. An observation is detection accompanied by active classification and, typically, the subsequent formation of opinion. Even when we say of an animal that it can see something we mean more than that it reliably detects things of a certain sort but also that it deals with such things as objects, gauging their usefulness or lack thereof in relation to its interests and to other aspects of the world. This crucial addendum to the notion of observation can be enshrined in slogan: observers are potential believers. This marks the difference between mere detecting mechanisms and observers.The contemporary scientific anti-realism of one such as van Fraassen, which is developed in detail under the label of “constructive empiricism” in van Fraassen (1980), can be characterized in terms of detecting mechanisms.

The crudest formulation of physicalism is simply the claim that everything is physical, and perhaps that is all physicalism ought to imply. But in fact a large number of distinct versions of physicalism are currently in play, with very different commitments and implications. There is no agreement about the detailed formulation of the doctrine, even though a majority of philosophers would claim to be physicalists, and a vast majority of them are physicalists of one sort or another. There are several reasons for this lack of agreement: deep and imponderable questions about realism and the legitimacy of a narrowly defined notion of reality, questions about the scope of the term “physical,” issues about explanation and reduction, and worries about the proper range of physicalism, particularly with respect to so‐called abstract objects such as numbers, sets, or properties. And while the traditional challenge of psychological dualism poses a live threat only to a few iconoclasts, the project of specifying a physicalism which plausibly integrates mind into the physical world remains unfinished, despite the huge number and diversity of attempts.

Modern representationalism about consciousness (MR) is often conflated with classical representationalism (CR). This chapter discusses CR first in order to highlight the contrast between old and new representationalism and bring out some of the strengths of the latter. It discerns three key projects related to MR. The first is that of determining whether its defining claim, the exhaustion thesis, is true. The second is that of explicating the fundamental difference between phenomenal and nonphenomenal states. The third project is that of developing a theory of representation strong and stable enough to support MR. MR naturally bifurcates into externalist and internalist versions, depending upon the favored theory of mental representation. Many proponents of MR endorse the externalist view. MR is compatible with a range of theories of introspection. Introspection requires a special and sophisticated way of thinking about conscious experience.

Although one of the most important and prolific thinkers of all time, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) spent his life as a courtier, wasting time in diplomatic business or preparing documents to shore up claims of lineage or territory for his patrons. He also spent a good deal of time on practical matters of engineering, such as his dreams of a system of windmills that would have ameliorated the chronic flooding of the Harz silver mines, and on his visionary mechanical calculators. Most of his working life was spent in Hannover, pursuing philosophy when he could spare the time from his professional activities, but nonetheless maintaining an astonishing pace of philosophical, mathematical, and scientific writing (of which very little was published in his own lifetime), as well as a relentless correspondence with all the important intellectual figures of his day. When Leibniz died in 1716, his funeral was scandalously insignificant, but time's revenge has been sweet.

In the mid‐part of the twentieth century, the union of youthful science and the ancient philosophical dream of metaphysical completion begot a visionary doctrine known as the unity of science (see unity of science). This view of the relationship among scientific theories maintained that any theory aspiring to be truly “scientific” must fit into a hierarchy in which every theory was reducible to the theory immediately below it, save for the foundational theory of physics. Reduction would be accomplished by establishing relations of coextension between the predicates of the reduced theory, T1, and the reducing theory, T2, sufficient to allow the mathematical deduction of the laws of T1 expressed entirely in terms drawn from T2 (see reductionism). The classic example is the reduction of phenomenological to statistical thermodynamics. The example suffers from the apparently serious defects of not meeting the conditions laid down by the unity of science and of being pretty much unique in achieving the degree of approximation to these conditions which it enjoys. It has become clear in the later stages of the century that despite the rich and complex interrelationships that prevail among scientific theories, there is little or no prospect of even roughly fulfilling the dream of the grand unification of all theories into a complete hierarchy of reduction. (One philosopher of science, Ian Hacking, bluntly assesses unity of science to be just another of philosophy's “idle pipedreams.”)

We must begin with the admission that the term “metaphysics” does not have a very precise or agreed upon meaning (no more does “science”). In current philosophy of science, “metaphysics” is, by and large, a pejorative term applied to whatever is regarded as illicitly nonempirical. Traditionally, metaphysics is regarded as the study of what lies behind the world of appearance ‐ perhaps constitutes that world, but is itself the only true reality. Obviously, a great many people would regard science, or at least the more basic sciences such as physics, chemistry, and perhaps astronomy, as fitting this description. Consider, for instance, Eddington's famous description of the scientific as opposed to the “commonsense” table.

This thesis divides into two main sections. The first is an attempt to show that the Psycho-physical Identity Theory is false, and is so even if we grant that human behaviour is in principle completely explicable in purely physical terms . This section is a sustained criticism of a staight-forward argument in favour of the Identity Theory, namely: Mental items cause behaviour. All behaviour is caused by physical items. So mental items are physical items. ;This section is also divisible into two main parts, both of which present arugments against the Identity Theory. ;The first argument presented is originally from Davidson's paper "Mental Events" . The claim I am interested in is that no systematic correlations can be found between mental and physical events. I explicate and defend this claim which is based, roughly, on the contrast between the conditions of ascription of mental states such as belief and physical states. The former are ascribed so as to form a system within which behaviour appears rational, the latter are not. Since certain forms of the identity theory demand such correlations they are undercut by Davidson's claim. ;The second argument presented is that the Identity Theory fails because of the content of our concepts of the mental. The problem here is that of identifying entities from different theories for I take our common sense mentalistic explanations to be part of a theory. If both theories say a lot about what sort of thing the entities they mention are identification across the theories will be impossible, even if the entities in question are thought to play similar causal roles. For example, the content of "phlogiston theory" and "oxygen theory" is sufficient to preclude identifying phlogiston and oxygen despite the basically similar role they are supposed to play. I bring forth several features of our mentalistic explanations in an attempt to show the extensiveness of the content of our mentalistic theory. ;The failure of the Identity Theory does not imply the failure of Materialism, for one can still espouse an "eliminative" form of Materialism. This doctrine has appeared implausible, though, because of the seemingly direct or immediate awareness we have of at least some mental items. I believe this appearance can be removed only by developing a materialistically acceptable theory of behaviour in which the phenomena of direct awareness can be explained. ;The second half of the thesis is thus devoted to outlining such a theory. The central notion deployed is that of an "internal representation" of the world which guides behaviour. The representational nature of internal states arises solely from their place in the logical structure of these states and their role in the production of behaviour. Beginning with extremely simple behaviour I investigate the additional capabilities which the representational system must have to explain such activities as perception, goal seeking, the representation of causal and/or logical sequences, and the representation of the entity's own abilities to alter the world around it. ;The basic theory of internal representation is then applied to the problem of introspection and direct awareness. I argue that any complex conceptualization of aspects of the world demands a representational medium in which to be carried out. Our so-called direct awareness is in fact the application of a complicated representational schema. As such it is in essence no more priveleged than any other schema which could be applied to these phenomena. Thus our direct awareness cannot be taken as an infallible guide to the nature or existence of the phenomenal qualities of mental states, and this in turn leaves the door open for some sort of eliminative materialism.

Leibniz argumentiert in der Monadologie, daß das Bewußtsein nicht auf rein mechanische und materielle Prozesse reduziert werden kann. Diesem wohlbekannten Argument wird bisweilen ein elementarer Trugschluß der Zusammensetzung vorgeworfen. Meiner Meinung nach hingegen weist dieses Argument eher auf ein grundlegendes Problem in unserem physikalischen Verständnis des menschlichen Geistes hin, einem Verständnis, das auch heute noch akzeptiert wird. Ich zeige jedoch weiterhin, daß Leibniz nicht erkannt hat, daß sein Argument die Möglichkeit offen läßt, daß es unsere begrifflichen Grenzen sind, die uns daran hindern, das Bewußtsein durch materielle Prozesse zu verstehen

Reception of the Bohm-Hiley interpretation of quantum mechanics has a curiously Janus faced quality. On the one hand, it is frequently derided as a conservative throwback to outdated classical patterns of thought. On the other hand, it is equally often taken to task for encouraging a wild quantum mysticism, often regarded as anti-scientific. I will argue that there are reasons for this reception, but that a proper appreciation of the dual scientific and philosophical aspects of the view reveals a powerful and extremely interesting metaphysical view of the world. This view is akin to that of Russellian Monism, in which the empirical world studied by science is restricted to relational features that stand in need of some background intrinsic properties to ground their reality. This allows for a theory that can embrace a world which exhibits a reasonable and plausible sort of emergence (especially of domains that fall under classical concepts) while also making room for distinctive and scientifically intransigent properties such as consciousness

Charles Siewert presents a series of thought experiment based arguments against a wide range of current theories of phenomenal consciousness which I believe achieves a considerable measure of success. One topic which I think gets insufficient attention is the discussion of functionalism and I address this here. Before that I consider the intriguing issue, which is seldom considered but figures prominently at the close of Siewert's book, of the value of consciousness. In particular, I broach the question of whether the value of consciousness has any impact on our theoretical understanding of consciousness

A paradox is a situation in which two seemingly equally rational lines of thought lead to contradictory conclusions. A moral paradox is a situation where the employment of diverse moral principles, each of which is at least intuitively acceptable to roughly the same degree, leads to radically different moral assessments of one and the same action. In his “Some Paradoxes of Deterrence” Gregory Kavka argues that such moral paradoxes lurk in the concept of deterrence and further that the present world situation of mutual nuclear deterrence may well provide a concrete illustration of these paradoxes. That deterrence can involve paradox may well be true, but what I wish to consider here is whether the case of nuclear deterrence is in fact an instance of “paradoxical deterrence”.

The spectacular success of the scientific enterprise over the last four hundred years has led to the promise of an all encompassing vision of the natural world. In this elegant picture, everything we observe is based upon just a few fundamental processes and entities. The almost infinite variety and complexity of the world is thus the product of emergence. But the concept of emergence is fraught with controversy and confusion. This book ponders the question of how emergence should be understood within the scientific picture, and whether a complete vision of the world can be attained that includes consciousness.