•  4
    Transitivity, Introspection, and Conceptuality
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (11-12): 31-50. 2013.
  • Panpsychism
    In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.
  •  39
    Reduction and Emergence in Philosophy and Science
    Analysis 78 (3): 552-557. 2018.
    This book sets the standard, and a very high one at that, for the ongoing discussion of emergence in philosophy and science.1 1 Engaging but rigorous in argumentation, comprehensive but attentive to detail, it is a model of philosophical writing.
  • The Handbook of Panpsychism (edited book)
    Routledge. forthcoming.
  •  86
    Reply to Forbes
    with Alonso Church
    Analysis 42 (4): 224. 1982.
  •  4
    The Anomalousness of the Mental
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (3): 389-401. 1981.
  • Materialism and the Foundations of Representation
    Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada). 1981.
    This thesis divides into two main sections. The first is an attempt to show that the Psycho-physical Identity Theory is false, and is so even if we grant that human behaviour is in principle completely explicable in purely physical terms . This section is a sustained criticism of a staight-forward argument in favour of the Identity Theory, namely: Mental items cause behaviour. All behaviour is caused by physical items. So mental items are physical items. ;This section is also divisible into two …Read more
  •  1
    The Worm in the Cheese Leibniz, Consciousness and Matter
    Studia Leibnitiana 23 (1): 79-91. 1991.
    Leibniz argumentiert in der Monadologie, daß das Bewußtsein nicht auf rein mechanische und materielle Prozesse reduziert werden kann. Diesem wohlbekannten Argument wird bisweilen ein elementarer Trugschluß der Zusammensetzung vorgeworfen. Meiner Meinung nach hingegen weist dieses Argument eher auf ein grundlegendes Problem in unserem physikalischen Verständnis des menschlichen Geistes hin, einem Verständnis, das auch heute noch akzeptiert wird. Ich zeige jedoch weiterhin, daß Leibniz nicht erkan…Read more
  • Beyond theories: Cartwright and Hacking
    In James R. Brown (ed.), Philosophy of Science: The Key Thinkers, Continuum Books. pp. 213. 2012.
  •  77
    Classical Levels, Russellian Monism and the Implicate Order
    Foundations of Physics 43 (4): 548-567. 2013.
    Reception of the Bohm-Hiley interpretation of quantum mechanics has a curiously Janus faced quality. On the one hand, it is frequently derided as a conservative throwback to outdated classical patterns of thought. On the other hand, it is equally often taken to task for encouraging a wild quantum mysticism, often regarded as anti-scientific. I will argue that there are reasons for this reception, but that a proper appreciation of the dual scientific and philosophical aspects of the view reveals …Read more
  •  50
    Review of John Foster, A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4). 2009.
  •  36
    Consciousness, value and functionalism
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7. 2001.
    Charles Siewert presents a series of thought experiment based arguments against a wide range of current theories of phenomenal consciousness which I believe achieves a considerable measure of success. One topic which I think gets insufficient attention is the discussion of functionalism and I address this here. Before that I consider the intriguing issue, which is seldom considered but figures prominently at the close of Siewert's book, of the value of consciousness. In particular, I broach the …Read more
  •  403
    A brief history of the philosophical problem of consciousness
    In P. D. Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness, Cambridge University Press. pp. 9--33. 2007.
  •  133
    Theories of Consciousness provides an introduction to a variety of approaches to consciousness, questions the nature of consciousness, and contributes to current debates about whether a scientific understanding of consciousness is possible. While discussing key figures including Descartes, Fodor, Dennett and Chalmers, the book incorporates identity theories, representational theories, intentionality, externalism and new information-based theories
  •  3
    Is Nuclear Deterrence Paradoxical?
    Dialogue 23 (2): 187-198. 1984.
  •  123
    A philosophical zombie is a being physically indistinguishable from an actual or possible human being, inhabiting a possible world where the physical laws are identical to the laws of the actual world, but which completely lacks consciousness. For zombies, all is dark within, and hence they are, at the most fundamental level, utterly different from us. But, given their definition, this singular fact has no direct implications about the kind of motion, or other physical processes, the zombie will…Read more
  •  2
    The Elimination of Experience
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2): 345-365. 1993.
  • Leibniz Lexicon
    with Reinhard Finster, Graeme Hunter, Robert F. Mcrae, and Murray Miles
    Studia Leibnitiana 22 (1): 112-114. 1990.
  •  324
    Ground truth and virtual reality: Hacking vs. Van Fraassen
    Philosophy of Science 62 (3): 459-478. 1995.
    Hacking argues against van Fraassen's constructive empiricism by appeal to features of microscopic imaging. Hacking relies on both our practices involving imaging instruments and the structure of the images produced by these micropractices. Van Fraassen's reply is formally correct yet fundamentally unsatisfying. I aim to strengthen van Fraassen's reply, but must then extend constructive empiricism, specifically the central notion of "theoretical immersion." I argue that immersion is more analogo…Read more
  •  151
    Whitehead’s philosophy is of perennial scholarly interest as one of the relatively few really serious attempts at a systematic metaphysics. But unlike almost all major ‘philosophical systems’ it is not merely an historical curiosity, but retains contemporary supporters actively deploying Whitehead’s viewpoint in discussion of a variety of live philosophical problems. Furthermore, Whitehead’s metaphysics is the sole example of a comprehensive philosophical system which aims to take into account t…Read more
  •  144
    Emotional introspection
    Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4): 666-687. 2002.
    One of the most vivid aspects of consciousness is the experience of emotion, yet this topic is given relatively little attention within consciousness studies. Emotions are crucial, for they provide quick and motivating assessments of value, without which action would be misdirected or absent. Emotions also involve linkages between phenomenal and intentional consciousness. This paper examines emotional consciousness from the standpoint of the representational theory of consciousness . Two interes…Read more
  •  85
    Real patterns and surface metaphysics
    In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment, Mit Press. pp. 95--129. 2000.
    Naturalism is supposed to be a Good Thing. So good in fact that everybody wants to be a naturalist, no matter what their views might be1. Thus there is some confusion about what, exactly, naturalism is. In what follows, I am going to be pretty much, though not exclusively, concerned with the topics of intentionality and consciousness, which only deepens the confusion for these are two areas
  •  41
    Though there are many analogies between time and space, there appear to be three commonplace yet deeply perplexing features of time that reveal it to be quite unlike space. These can be called ‘orientation’, ‘flow’ and ‘presence’. By orientation I mean that there is a direction to time, a temporal order between events which is not merely a reflection of how they are observed (what McTaggart 1908/1968 labelled the B-series time). Assertions that objects stand in spatial relations, such as to the …Read more
  •  1497
    Panpsychism, aggregation and combinatorial infusion
    Mind and Matter 8 (2): 167-184. 2010.
    Deferential Monadic Panpsychism is a view that accepts that physical science is capable of discovering the basic structure of reality. However, it denies that reality is fully and exhaustively de- scribed purely in terms of physical science. Consciousness is missing from the physical description and cannot be reduced to it. DMP explores the idea that the physically fundamental features of the world possess some intrinsic mental aspect. It thereby faces a se- vere problem of understanding how mor…Read more