•  1
    Review of In Praise of Reason, by Michael P. Lynch (review)
    Essays in Philosophy 14 (2): 323-327. 2013.
  •  4
    The Cohen problem of informed consent
    Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (9): 617-622. 2020.
    To avoid potential abuse and respect patient autonomy, physicians have a moral obligation to obtain informed consent before performing any significant medical intervention. To give informed consent, a patient must be competent, understand her condition, options and their expected risks and benefits and must freely and expressly consent to one of those options. Shlomo Cohen challenges this conception of informed consent by constructing cases based on Edmund Gettier’s classic counterexamples to tr…Read more
  •  19
    Substance, rights, value, and abortion
    Bioethics 33 (9): 1002-1011. 2019.
    Bioethics, EarlyView.
  •  13
    On Moral Enhancement
    American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3 (4). 2012.
  •  16
    On Psychopaths and Moral Enhancement
    American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 7 (3): 156-158. 2016.
  •  103
    This article contends that recent attempts to construct Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) are irrelevant to the debate over free will. The principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) states that moral responsibility requires indeterminism, or multiple possible futures. Frankfurt's original case purported to demonstrate PAP false by showing an agent can be blameworthy despite not having the ability to choose otherwise; however he admits the agent can come to that choice freely or by force, and thus has…Read more
  •  163
    The Compensation Principle
    Filosofiska Notiser 2 (1): 47-60. 2015.
    In "Should Race Matter?," David Boonin proposes the compensation principle: When an agent wrongfully harms another person, she incurs a moral obligation to compensate that person for the harms she has caused. Boonin then argues that the United States government has wrongfully harmed black Americans by adopting pro-slavery laws and other discriminatory laws and practices following the end of slavery, and therefore the United States government has an obligation to pay reparations for slavery and d…Read more
  •  212
    Frowe's Machine Cases
    Filosofiska Notiser 2 (2). 2015.
    Helen Frowe (2006/2010) contends that there is a substantial moral difference between killing and letting die, arguing that in Michael Tooley's infamous machine case it is morally wrong to flip a coin to determine who lives or dies. Here I argue that Frowe fails to show that killing and letting die are morally inequivalent. However, I believe that she has succeeded in showing that it is wrong to press the button in Tooley's case, where pressing the button will change who lives and dies. I argue …Read more
  •  7
    In Control
    Philosophical Inquires 2 (1): 59-75. 2014.
    In George Sher’s recent article “Out of Control”, he discusses a series of 9 cases that he believes illustrates that some agents are uncontroversially morally responsible for actions they “cannot help” but perform (2006: 285). He argues these agents exert partial control over these actions insofar as their actions are determined from their character; but this is no control at all. Here I argue that in each of these cases the agent exerts morally relevant control over her actions and that none of…Read more
  •  21
    Proponents of the substance view contend that abortion is seriously morally wrong because it is killing something with the same inherent value and right to life as you or I. Rob Lovering offers two innovative criticisms of the anti-abortion position taken by the substance view – the rescue argument and the problem of spontaneous abortion. Henrik Friberg-Fernros offers an interesting response to Lovering, but one I argue would be inconsistent with the anti-abortion stance taken by most substance …Read more
  •  17
    On Robust Alternate Possibilities and the Tax Evasion Case
    Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (1): 101-107. 2015.
  •  32
    Essays on the History of Ethics by Michael Slote (review)
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (3): 500-501. 2013.
    In this book Michael Slote discusses the history of ethics from a sentimentalist perspective. It can be read in two ways: first, as a tribute to great thinkers whose contributions have helped shape contemporary ethics, and second, as a defense of a sentimentalist virtue theory. This review centers on the two chapters most relevant to sentimentalist virtue theory: chapter 1, in which Slote defines and defends elevationism, and chapter 5, in which he offers a defense of sentimentalism. The first e…Read more
  •  13
    The primary goal of this dissertation is to articulate and defend a robust commonsense libertarian theory of moral responsibility; that moral agents are the causes, and owners, of their actions, and in virtue of this it is appropriate to hold them praiseworthy or blameworthy for what they do. Here, I critique and defend two commonsense principles concerning moral responsibility - the control principle, and the principle of alternate possibilities. In recent years these principles have come under…Read more
  •  23
    Review of "In Praise of Reason" (review)
    Essays in Philosophy 14 (2): 12. 2013.
  •  5
    Harry J. Gensler , Ethics and the Golden Rule . Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 34 (5): 225-226. 2014.
  •  10
    Moral and Professional Accountability for Clinical Ethics Consultants
    American Journal of Bioethics 14 (6): 50-51. 2014.
    No abstract
  •  40
    Abortion, Property, and Liberty
    The Journal of Ethics 20 (4): 373-383. 2016.
    In “Abortion and Ownership” John Martin Fischer argues that in Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist case you have a moral obligation not to unplug yourself from the violinist. Fischer comes to this conclusion by comparing the case with Joel Feinberg’s cabin case, in which he contends a stranger is justified in using your cabin to stay alive. I argue that the relevant difference between these cases is that while the stranger’s right to life trumps your right to property in the cabin case, the violin…Read more
  •  51
    "Review of" Rationality+ Consciousness= Free Will" (review)
    Essays in Philosophy 14 (1): 10. 2013.
  •  40
    Intention and Moral Enhancement
    Bioethics 30 (9): 714-720. 2016.
    Recently philosophers have proposed a wide variety of interventions referred to as ‘moral enhancements’. Some of these interventions are concerned with helping individuals make more informed decisions; others, however, are designed to compel people to act as the intervener sees fit. Somewhere between these two extremes lie interventions designed to direct an agent's attention either towards morally relevant issues – hat-hanging – or away from temptations to do wrong – hat-hiding. I argue that th…Read more
  •  15
    On Derivative Moral Responsibility and the Epistemic Connection Required for Moral Responsibility
    Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy 2 (2): 61-75. 2015.
    Derivative moral responsibility is not moral responsibility at all. Much of the confusion found in the literature concerning moral responsibility and the free will problem can be traced back to a penchant to reconcile our philosophical theories of moral responsibility with our folk commonsense linguistic accounts of moral responsibility, a tradition that is notable for its utter lack of making two important distinctions - the distinction between derivative moral responsibility and non-derivative…Read more
  •  27
    Bernard Berofsky, Nature's Challenge to Free Will . 280, price £37.50 hb
    Philosophical Investigations 36 (2): 185-188. 2013.
  •  20
    Under the Veil
    American Journal of Bioethics 13 (8): 27-28. 2013.
    No abstract