•  226
    New dimensions of confirmation theory
    Philosophy of Science 35 (2): 134-155. 1968.
    When Hempel's "paradox of confirmation" is developed within the confines of conditional probability theory, it becomes apparent that two seemingly equivalent generalities ("laws") can have exactly the same class of observational refuters even when their respective classes of confirming observations are importantly distinct. Generalities which have the inductive supports we commonsensically construe them to have, however, must incorporate quasi-logical operators or connectives which cannot be def…Read more
  •  92
    Is Epimenides Still Lying
    Analysis 18 (5). 1957.
  •  66
    New mysteries for old: The transfiguration of Miller's paradox
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (4): 345-353. 1969.
  •  50
    Dispositions revisited
    Philosophy of Science 40 (1): 59-74. 1973.
    Subjunctive conditionals have their uses, but constituting the meaning of dispositional predicates is not one of them. More germane is the analysis of dispositions in terms of "bases"--except that past efforts to maintain an ontic gap between dispositions and their bases, while not wholly misguided, have failed to appreciate the semantic birthright of dispositional concepts as a species of theoretical construct in primitive science.
  •  48
    Studies in the empiricist theory of scientific meaning
    Philosophy of Science 27 (4): 359-373. 1960.
    Part I is concerned with the tenet of modern Emperical Realism that while the theoretical concepts employed in science obtain their meanings entirely from the connections their usage establishes with the data language, the referents of such terms may be "unobservables," that is, entities which cannot be discussed within the data language alone. Such a view avoids both the restrictive excesses of logical positivism and the epistemic laxity of transcendentalism; however, it also necessitates a bre…Read more
  •  38
    It has become customary in modern behavioristics to speak of stimuli as though they elicit responses from organisms. But logically this is absurd, for analysis of the grammatical roles of stimulus and response concepts shows that stimuli and responses differ in logical type from causes and effects. The "S elicits R" formula thus stands revealed as elliptical for a more complicated form of assertion. The trouble with this ellipsis, however, is that by suppressing vital components of formal struct…Read more
  •  34
    Ontological induction and the logical typology of scientific variables
    Philosophy of Science 28 (4): 337-377. 1961.
    It is widely agreed among philosophers of science today that no formal pattern can possibly be found in the origins of scientific theory. There is no such thing as a "logic of discovery," insists this view--a scientific hypothesis is susceptible to methodological critique only in its relation to empirical consequences derived after the hypothesis itself has emerged through a spontaneous creative inspiration. Yet confronted with the tautly directed thrust of theory-building as actually practiced …Read more
  •  31
    Scientific theories often need to envision that a given output variable Y is jointly determined by all input variables of a certain kind ΣX that we can identify onlyas a kind without knowing all its specific instances or even how many of these there are, When the number of variables in ΣX is possibly infinite, the function by which they determine Y proves to be enormously enigmatic, epistemically, mathematically, and scientifically
  •  31
    Why I Know so Much More than You Do
    American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (4). 1967.
  •  31
    On behavioral theories of reference
    Philosophy of Science 46 (2): 175-203. 1979.
    Efforts to bare the psychonomic nature of the semantic reference (representation) relation have been remarkably scanty; in fact, the only contemporary account developed with any care is the one proposed by Osgood. However, not even Osgood has looked deeply at the difficulties that beset any attempt to analyze reference in terms of common effects appropriately shared by a symbol and its significate
  •  28
    Of selection operators and semanticists
    Philosophy of Science 31 (3): 282-285. 1964.
  •  27
    The logic of color words
    Philosophical Review 67 (July): 353-366. 1958.
  •  20
    A note on Carnap's meaning criterion
    Philosophical Studies 11 (3). 1960.
  •  20
    Can information be de-cognitized?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1): 76-77. 1983.
  •  13
    Of Selection Operators and Semanticists
    with H. Bohnert
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (2): 321. 1971.
  •  13
    The logic of representation
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (3): 385-386. 1982.
  •  13
    The dark side of Skinnerian epistemology
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4): 533. 1984.
  •  10
    New Dimensions of Confirmation Theory II: The Structure of Uncertainty
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970. 1970.
  •  9
    Mediation variables in scientific theory
    Psychological Review 63 (4): 249-264. 1956.
  •  8
  •  6
    "On the possible psychophysical laws": Comment
    Psychological Review 69 (6): 552-552. 1962.
  •  6
    The untenability of Luce's principle
    Psychological Review 69 (6): 542-547. 1962.
  •  5
    On Ushenko's Version of the Liar-Paradox
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (1): 108-112. 1967.
  •  3
    "What is Learned?"—An empirical enigma
    Psychological Review 65 (1): 22-33. 1958.