•  22
    Concept Representation and the Geometric Model of Mind
    Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 67 (1): 151-167. 2022.
    Current cognitive architectures are either working at the abstract, symbolic level, or the low, emergent level related to neural modeling. The best way to understand phenomena is to see, or imagine them, hence the need for a geometric model of mental processes. Geometric models should be based on an intermediate level of modeling that describe mental states in terms of features relevant from the first-person perspective but also linked to neural events. Concepts should be represented as geometri…Read more
  •  7
    Improving the generalizability of infant psychological research: The ManyBabies model
    with Ingmar Visser, Christina Bergmann, Krista Byers-Heinlein, Rodrigo Dal Ben, Samuel Forbes, Laura Franchin, Michael C. Frank, Alessandra Geraci, J. Kiley Hamlin, Zsuzsa Kaldy, Louisa Kulke, Catherine Laverty, Casey Lew-Williams, Victoria Mateu, Julien Mayor, David Moreau, Iris Nomikou, Tobias Schuwerk, Elizabeth A. Simpson, Leher Singh, Melanie Soderstrom, Jessica Sullivan, Marion I. van den Heuvel, Gert Westermann, Yuki Yamada, Lorijn Zaadnoordijk, and Martin Zettersten
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45. 2022.
    Yarkoni's analysis clearly articulates a number of concerns limiting the generalizability and explanatory power of psychological findings, many of which are compounded in infancy research. ManyBabies addresses these concerns via a radically collaborative, large-scale and open approach to research that is grounded in theory-building, committed to diversification, and focused on understanding sources of variation.
  •  3
    Hylomorphism Extended: Dynamical Forms and Minds
    Philosophies 3 (4): 36--0. 2018.
    Physical objects are compounds of matter and form, as stated by Aristotle in his hylomorphism theory. The concept of “form” in this theory refers to physical structures or organizational structures. However, mental processes are not of this kind, they do not change physical arrangement of neurons, but change their states. To cover all natural processes hylomorphism should acknowledge differences between three kinds of forms: Form as physical structure, form as function resulting from organizatio…Read more
  •  16
    Why minds cannot be received, but are created by brains
    Scientia et Fides 5 (2): 171-198. 2017.
    There is no controversy in psychology or brain sciences that brains create mind and consciousness. Doubts and opinions to the contrary are quite frequently expressed in non-scientific publications. In particular the idea that conscious mind is received, rather than created by the brain, is quite often used against “materialistic” understanding of consciousness. I summarize here arguments against such position, show that neuroscience gives coherent view of mind and consciousness, and that this vi…Read more
  •  22
    Facing the hard question
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1): 187-188. 2001.
    The following questions are considered: Why is it difficult to create a theory of consciousness? What are the contents of consciousness? What kind of theory is acceptable as transparent? and, What is the value of conscious experience?
  •  22
    Challenges for Computational Intelligence (edited book)
    with Jacek Mandziuk
    Springer. 2007.
    The book written by top experts in CI provides such clear directions and the much-needed focus on the most important and challenging research issues, showing a ...
  •  16
    Reprezentacje umysłowe jako aproksymacje stanów mózgu
    Studia Z Kognitywistyki I Filozofii Umysłu 3. 2009.
    Neuronauki dokonały znacznego postępu w rozumieniu wyższych czynności poznawczych, w tym procesów decyzyjnych. Brakuje jednak zarówno prostych modeli, które pozwolą wyobrazić sobie te procesy, jak i głębszej refleksji nad wpływem tych wyników na zrozumienie natury umysłu, rozproszenia obaw, że nie jesteśmy tylko automatami. Płodny punkt widzenia na kwestię reprezentacji mentalnych daje próba zrozumienia, w jaki sposób informacja reprezentowana jest przez mózgi, jak w przybliżony sposób opisać st…Read more
  •  6
    Just bubbles?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4): 410-411. 2003.
    Lehar misrepresents the Neuron Doctrine and indirect realism. His conclusions on consciousness are unjustified. The Bubble Gestalt perceptual modeling disconnected from neuroscience has no explanatory power.
  •  19
    Rules, similarity, and threshold logic
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1): 23-23. 2005.
    Rules and similarity are two sides of the same phenomenon, but the number of features has nothing to do with transition from similarity to rules; threshold logic helps to understand why.
  •  27
    What type of artificial systems will claim to be conscious and will claim to experience qualia? The ability to comment upon physical states of a brain-like dynamical system coupled with its environment seems to be sufficient to make claims. The flow of internal states in such system, guided and limited by associative memory, is similar to the stream of consciousness. Minimal requirements for an artificial system that will claim to be conscious were given in form of specific architecture named ar…Read more
  •  43
    What is computational intelligence and where is it going?
    In Wlodzislaw Duch & Jacek Mandziuk (eds.), Challenges for Computational Intelligence, Springer. pp. 1--13. 2007.
    What is Computational Intelligence (CI) and what are its relations with Artificial Intelligence (AI)? A brief survey of the scope of CI journals and books with ``computational intelligence'' in their title shows that at present it is an umbrella for three core technologies (neural, fuzzy and evolutionary), their applications, and selected fashionable pattern recognition methods. At present CI has no comprehensive foundations and is more a bag of tricks than a solid branch of science. The change …Read more
  •  99
    Brain-inspired conscious computing architecture
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (1-2): 1-21. 2005.
    What type of artificial systems will claim to be conscious and will claim to experience qualia? The ability to comment upon physical states of a brain-like dynamical system coupled with its environment seems to be sufficient to make claims. The flow of internal states in such system, guided and limited by associative memory, is similar to the stream of consciousness. Minimal requirements for an artificial system that will claim to be conscious were given in form of specific architecture named ar…Read more
  •  367
    Synchronicity, Mind, and Matter
    International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 21 153-168. 2002.
    Experiments with remote perception and Random Event Generators (REG) performed over the last decades show small but significant anomalous effects. Since these effects seem to be independent of spatial and temporal distance, they appear to be in disagreement with the standard scientific worldview. A very simple explanation of quantum mechanics is pre- sented, rejecting all unjustified claims about the world. A view of mind in agreement with cognitive neuroscience is introduced. It is argued that …Read more
  •  463
    Brain-Inspired Conscious Computing Architecture
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (1-2): 1-22. 2005.
    What type of artificial systems will claim to be conscious and will claim to experience qualia? The ability to comment upon physical states of a brain-like dynamical system coupled with its environment seems to be sufficient to make claims. The flow of internal states in such systems, guided and limited by associative memory, is similar to the stream of consciousness. A specific architecture of an artificial system, termed articon, is introduced that by its very design has to claim being conscio…Read more
  •  34
    Just bubbles?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4): 410-411. 2003.
  •  62
    Rules, similarity, and threshold logic
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1): 23-23. 2005.