•  1306
    Hempel on Scientific Understanding
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 88 (8): 164-171. 2021.
    Hempel seems to hold the following three views: (H1) Understanding is pragmatic/relativistic: Whether one understands why X happened in terms of Explanation E depends on one's beliefs and cognitive abilities; (H2) Whether a scientific explanation is good, just like whether a mathematical proof is good, is a nonpragmatic and objective issue independent of the beliefs or cognitive abilities of individuals; (H3) The goal of scientific explanation is understanding: A good scientific explanation is t…Read more
  •  585
    In this paper, I survey some recent literature produced by the established Chinese philosophers who regularly publish in Chinese philosophy journals and work in Mainland China. Specifically, I review the recent research of these philosophers in two areas: Chinese Philosophy and epistemology. In each area, I focus on two topics that have caught the attention of a lot of Chinese philosophers. I argue that the Chinese philosophers’ research on these topics has two prevalent problems: (i) a lot of a…Read more
  •  565
    The Epistemic Value of Understanding-why
    Episteme 20 (1): 125-141. 2023.
    Some philosophers (e.g., Pritchard, Grimm, and Hills) recently have objected that veritism cannot explain the epistemic value of understanding-why. And they have proposed two anti-veritist accounts. In this paper, I first introduce their objection and argue that it fails. Next, I consider a strengthened version of their objection and argue that it also fails. After that, I suggest a new veritist account: Understanding-why entails believing the truth that what is grasped is accurate (or accurate …Read more
  •  522
    The epistemic account of faultless disagreement
    Synthese 197 (6): 2613-2630. 2020.
    There seem to be cases where A believes p, and B believes not-p, but neither makes a mistake. This is known as faultless disagreement. According to the epistemic account, in at least some cases of faultless disagreement either A or B must believe something false, and the disagreement is faultless in the sense that each follows the epistemic norm. Recently, philosophers have raised various objections to this account. In this paper, I propose a new version of the epistemic account and show how it …Read more
  •  484
    Why do True Beliefs Differ in Epistemic Value?
    Ratio 30 (3): 255-269. 2017.
    Veritism claims that only true beliefs are of basic epistemic value. Michael DePaul argues that veritism is false because it entails the implausible view that all true beliefs are of equal epistemic value. In this paper, I discuss two recent replies to DePaul's argument: one offered by Nick Treanor and the other by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Stephen Grimm. I argue that neither of the two replies is successful. I propose a new response to DePaul's argument and defend my response against a possib…Read more
  •  474
    In what sense is understanding an intellectual virtue?
    Synthese 198 (6): 5883-5895. 2019.
    In this paper, I distinguish between two senses of “understanding”: understanding as an epistemic good and understanding as a character trait or a distinctive power of the mind. I argue that understanding as a character trait or a distinctive power of the mind is an intellectual virtue while understanding as an epistemic good is not. Finally, I show how the distinction can help us better appreciate Aristotle’s account of intellectual virtue.
  •  327
    Is Epistemology a Kind of Inquiry?
    Journal of Philosophical Research 40 483-488. 2015.
    There are three widely held beliefs among epistemologists: (1) the goal of inquiry is truth or something that entails truth; (2) epistemology aims for a reflectively stable theory via reflective equilibrium; (3) epistemology is a kind of inquiry. I argue that accepting (1) and (2) entails denying (3). This is a problem especially for the philosophers (e.g. Duncan Pritchard and Alvin Goldman) who accept both (1) and (2), for in order to be consistent, they must reject (3). The tension is not rest…Read more
  •  228
    A defense of the veritist account of the goal of inquiry
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    Veritists hold that the goal of inquiry is true belief, while justificationists contend that the goal of inquiry is justified belief. Recently, Christoph Kelp makes two new objections to both veritism and justificationism. Further, he claims that the two objections suggest that the goal of inquiry is knowledge. This paper defends a sophisticated version of veritism against Kelp's two objections.
  •  165
    Is knowledge of causes sufficient for understanding?
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3): 291-313. 2019.
    ABSTRACT: According to a traditional account, understanding why X occurred is equivalent to knowing that X was caused by Y. This paper defends the account against a major objection, viz., knowing-that is not sufficient for understanding-why, for understanding-why requires a kind of grasp while knowledge-that does not. I discuss two accounts of grasp in recent literature and argue that if either is true, then knowing that X was caused by Y entails at least a rudimentary understanding of why X occ…Read more
  •  130
    On Evidence in Philosophy
    Analysis. forthcoming.
  •  103
    A few puzzles about William James' theory of truth
    Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 57 (135): 803-821. 2016.
    William James makes several major claims about truth: (i) truth means agreement with reality independently of the knower, (ii) truth is made by human beings, (iii) truth can be verified, and (iv) truth is necessarily good. These claims give rise to a few puzzles: (i) and (ii) seem to contradict each other, and each of (ii), (iii), and (iv) has counter-intuitive implications. I argue that Richard Gale's interpretation of James' theory of truth is inadequate in dealing with these puzzles. I propos…Read more
  •  75
    It is worth noting that Maddy oversimplifies the history of Gettierology, for a lot of epistemologists who work on the Gettier Problem do not engage in analysing the concept of knowledge.
  •  70
    Must a Successful Argument Convert an Ideal Audience?
    Argumentation 31 (1): 165-177. 2017.
    Peter van Inwagen defines a successful argument in philosophy as one that can be used to convert an audience of ideal agnostics in an ideal debate. Sarah McGrath and Thomas Kelly recently argue that van Inwagen’s definition cannot be correct since the idea of ideal agnostics is incoherent with regard to an absolute paradigm of a successful philosophical argument. This paper defends van Inwagen’s definition against McGrath and Kelly’s objection.
  •  65
    What do Philosophers do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy
    Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273): 862-864. 2018.
    What do Philosophers do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy. By Maddy Penelope.
  •  60
    Why Be Moral? Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers by Yong Huang
    Philosophy East and West 66 (3): 1032-1035. 2016.
    Why Be Moral? Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers, by Yong Huang, is a book written for Western philosophers. Professor Huang claims that there are two ways of introducing a Chinese philosopher to Western audiences: first, by showing them that the Chinese philosopher’s ideas are ridiculous or inferior compared to the corresponding Western ideas, and second, by showing them that the Chinese philosopher has better answers to some Western philosophical questions than great Western philos…Read more
  •  57
    Review of Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding by Christoph Kelp (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1): 287-289. 2022.
    Kelp compares inquiry to games like chess and archery, which have constitutive norms in the sense that if you do not follow such norms, you are not playing the game. But I tend to think inquiry is more like non-sport hunting. Such activities have constitutive goals (e.g., non-sport hunting aims at killing animals for food), but they do not have constitutive norms (e.g., one engages in non-sport hunting even if one is not skilled at doing so or violates all the guidelines offered by authorities).…Read more
  •  41
    On Evidence in Philosophy By William Lycan
    Analysis 80 (2): 401-403. 2020.
    _ On Evidence in Philosophy _ By LycanWilliamOxford University Press, 2019. ix + 160 pp.
  •  41
    Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding
    Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1): 287-289. 2022.
    This book attempts to revolutionise epistemology. A traditional goal of epistemology is to provide an analysis of knowledge in terms of more basic things. But the post-Gettier literature has made some philosophers like Timothy Williamson suspect that knowledge cannot be analysed. Kelp claims that both the traditional project and Williamson's knowledge-first project are misguided. He provides an alternative: Knowledge is an item in an inquiry-related network and can thereby be analysed in terms o…Read more
  •  28
    An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies. By Steve Coutinho
    International Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4): 463-465. 2014.