•  92
    Lucky understanding without knowledge
    Synthese 191 (5): 1-15. 2014.
    Can one still have understanding in situations that involve the kind of epistemic luck that undermines knowledge? Kvanvig (The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009a; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009b) says yes, Prichard (Grazer Philos Stud 77:325–339, 2008; in: O’Hear A (ed) Epistemology, 2009; in: Pritchard D, Millar A, Haddock A (eds) The nature and value of knowledge: three i…Read more
  •  41
    Game theory has played a critical role in elucidating the evolutionary origins of social behavior. Sober and Wilson model altruism as a prisoner's dilemma and claim that this model indicates that altruism arose from group selection pressures. Sober and Wilson also suggest that the prisoner's dilemma model can be used to characterize punishment; hence, punishment too originated from group selection pressures. However, empirical evidence suggests that a group selection model of the origins of altr…Read more
  •  25
    A Duty to Cognitively Enhance Animals
    Environmental Values 27 (2): 137-158. 2018.
  •  24
    Is There a Prima Facie Duty to Preserve Genetic Integrity in Conservation Biology?
    with Emma Marris
    Ethics, Policy and Environment 18 (3): 233-247. 2015.
    Some conservation biologists invoke the concept of ‘genetic integrity,’ which they generally assume is a good worth preserving without explicit justification. We examine the question of whether or not there is a prima facie duty to preserve genetic integrity in conservation biology. We examine several possible justifications for the potential duty found in the conservation biology literature. We argue, contra a dominant trend of thought in conservation biology, that there is no prima facie duty …Read more
  •  19
    An Analysis of Potential Ethical Justifications for Mammoth De-extinction And a Call for Empirical Research
    with Emma Marris
    Ethics, Policy and Environment 21 (1): 127-142. 2018.
    We argue that the de-extinction of the mammoth cannot be ethically grounded by duties to the extinct mammoth, to ecosystem health or to individual organisms in ecosystems missing the mammoth. However, the action can be shown to be morally permissible via the goods it will afford humans, including advances in scientific knowledge, valuable experiences of awe and pleasure, and perhaps improvements to our moral character or behaviour—if and only if suffering is minimal. Finally, we call for empiric…Read more