Yingying Tang

In this chapter, we aim to argue that 1) the idea of autonomy fails to justify the neutrality principle, according to which the state should be neutral between particular, disputed conceptions of the good life; and 2) autonomy raises a serious challenge to perfectionism, which is the view that it is permissible for the state to use any means, even coercion, to promote the good. By analyzing two aspects of autonomy: autonomy as coherence and autonomy as independence, we attempt to demonstrate that a person’s living a way of life is manifestly valuable only if she is pursuing it autonomously. While some methods of advancing particular conceptions of the good life may violate the citizens’ autonomy, we argue, other methods are compatible with the value of autonomy.

Recently there is heated discussion on the puzzle of imaginative resistance, i.e. the puzzle of why it is difficult to imagine certain counterfactual scenarios. After examining Brian Weatherson’s “In-Virtue-Of Hypothesis”, I put forward an alternative hypothesis that all and only conceptual impossibilities are unimaginable. I argue that my account has some theoretical advantages over the In-Virtue-Of hypothesis. I consider some challenges to my hypothesis and then attempt to show that those objections are unsuccessful.

Can the difference among people’s contributions to the society serve as a desert-based reason for unequal distributions? John Rawls contends that it cannot, though contribution may provide an efficiency-based reason for distribution. Contrary to Rawls, luck egalitarians contend that difference in contribution that is not a result of luck may provide a desert-based reason for unequal distributions. My view contrasts with both of these views. By appealing to a fundamental moral principle, the principle of reciprocity, this paper argues that the difference among people’s contributions can serve as a desert-based reason for unequal distributions, even when it is a result of luck.

According to prioritarianism, an influential theory of distributive justice, we have a stronger reason to benefit people the worse off these people are. Many authors have adopted a consequentialist version of prioritarianism. On this account, we have a consequentialist reason to benefit the worse off because the state of affairs where the worse off gains a given amount of utility is more valuable than the state of affairs where the better off gains roughly the same amount of utility. In this paper, we argue that the consequentialist approach to prioritarianism is problematic. However, it doesn't follow that the prioritarian doctrine per se is groundless. We then suggest that we can make sense of prioritarianism by appeal to a contractualist approach.

The opponents of egalitarianism insist that distributional equality can never have intrinsic value, because it is hard to find how equal distribution could benefit people intrinsically. In this paper, we attempt to demystify the intrinsic value of distributional equality and suggest a possible direction of vindicating egalitarianism. First, we propose the principle that it is (epistemically) reasonable to regard x as an intrinsic value for a person S if S rationally desires x for its own sake. Second, we argue by thought experiment that people can rationally desire equal distribution of certain goods for its own sake in certain circumstances.

Although the sufficientarian approach to distributive justice is increasingly popular in contemporary political philosophy, it is not easy to give an appropriate formulation of sufficientarianism. In this article, I aim to show that a proper formulation of sufficientarianism should satisfy three conditions: the Distinctiveness condition, the Intermediacy condition, and the Universality condition. However, I argue that it is very difficult to propose a substantial account of sufficiency that can satisfy the three conditions altogether. After examining several influential sufficientarian accounts, I contend that none of them can satisfy the three conditions on sufficientarianism.

In Western aesthetics, there is a consensus that imagination is significant in art appreciation. But the significance of imagination in appreciating nature is still a matter of debate; this is especially true within contemporary analytic environmental aesthetics. While some aestheticians passionately embrace the significance of imagination in appreciating nature, other aestheticians hold that imagination is not just unnecessary, but even inappropriate, for the aesthetic appreciation of nature.Emily Brady famously contends that imagination can help to discover certain aesthetic truths about natural objects. She uses the following examples to illustrate how aesthetic truths about natural objects...