•  79
    A Dilemma for Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2): 529-544. 2021.
    In this paper, I show that David Benatar’s asymmetry argument for anti-natalism leads to a dilemma. In Chapter 2 of his book Better Never to Have Been, Benatar claims that there is an axiological asymmetry between harms and benefits that explains four prevalent asymmetries. Based on the axiological asymmetry, he defends the anti-natalist conclusion that we should not have children. The four prevalent asymmetries to be explained are moral duties, reasons, attitudes, or feelings concerning life as…Read more
  •  56
    Death and the Meaning of Life: A Critical Study of Metz’s Meaning in Life
    Journal of Philosophy of Life 5 (3): 134-149. 2015.
    In Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study, Thaddeus Metz advocates a kind of naturalistic objective theory of meaning in life, through a rejection of supernaturalism. In this paper, I examine Metz’s argument on supernaturalism, in particular, soul-centered theory and immortality. I will argue that his objection to supernaturalism is inadequate because he does not treat properly a familiar idea about the relationship between death and meaning, namely, the idea that a person’s death itself makes her l…Read more
  •  19
    Anti‐natalism is incompatible with Theory X
    Bioethics 38 (2): 114-120. 2024.
    The anti‐natalist philosopher David Benatar defends a position asserting that all life is harmful, and that it is, therefore, wrong to have children. In this paper, I critique Benatar's less‐discussed claim that his anti‐natalism provides solutions to population ethics problems, such as the Non‐Identity Problem, the Repugnant Conclusion, and the Mere Addition Problem, all of which are presented in Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons. Since the publication of his Better Never to Have Been, Benatar…Read more