Yuchen Guo

We can portray or take on the role of someone whom we are not. For example, a professional actor can play the role of a fictional character who does not exist in the real world, although she believes she is not that person. This behavior is named “acting.” My aim here is to locate the necessary and sufficient conditions of acting. In my view, acting is a process of communication between actors and audiences. One of its necessary components is that actors use their own features to represent those features that their characters have; another is that actors intend to make their audiences imagine that they are themselves identical to their characters. In this article, I specify these two components, critique other views of the definition of acting and distinguish acting from other similar processes.

Gregory Currie has argued for the indispensability of i-desires – a kind of imaginative counterpart of desires – by drawing a distinction between the satisfaction conditions of the desire-like states involved in our emotional responses to tragedies and those of genuine desires. Nevertheless, Fiora Salis has recently shown that the same sort of distinction can also be found in nonfictional cases and has proposed a solution to the issue of satisfaction conditions that dispenses with i-desires. In this paper, I refute Salis’s stance and argue for the indispensability of i-desires. For this aim to be achieved, I first argue that the distinction between the satisfaction conditions of i-desires and those of desires can be given a different explanation, and that in this case, the same sort of distinction cannot arise in nonfictional cases; Secondly, I argue that we cannot make sense of the conflict between our desire-like states triggered by fictions and our background desires, and therefore i-desires should be introduced to avoid this conflict.Keywords: i-desires, desire-like imaginings, tragedy, imaginative desires

Abstract:Although many actors report experiencing genuine emotions befitting a specific character’s circumstances, the actors themselves are neither their characters nor in their characters’ circumstances. Moreover, it seems that if our circumstances do not afford certain emotions, we will not experience these emotions. Thus, actors experience “a paradox of onstage emotion.” This article aims to provide a solution to this paradox. I argue that actors’ onstage emotions are repeatable, controllable, scripted, and impersonal; however, everyday genuine emotions are neither repeatable nor controllable nor scripted and are always personal. Therefore, onstage emotions are not genuine emotions. I then argue that imagination is a repeatable and controllable mental state and that it can be scripted and impersonal. Finally, given that imagination is seen as a re-creation of occurrent experiences, I conclude that onstage emotions are not genuine emotions but rather are imaginative emotions—a re-creation of genuine emotions, and the solution of imaginative emotions better accounts for actors’ onstage performance.

What is the nature of the kind of behaviour English speakers call “acting”? A popular strategy is to say that acting is a kind of pretence, and onstage actors pretend to do and say what the character does and says. This paper aims to reject this “pretence theory of acting”. To do so, first, I introduce several counterexamples showing that actors do not engage in pretending but still enact their characters; second, I argue that the reasons in favour of the pretence theory of acting are not persuasive; finally, I argue that the pretence theory of acting can lead to a misunderstanding about acting.

Many actors report a form of dual-consciousness when playing roles on stage: they react to the given circumstances as their characters would do, but they do not forget they are on the stage. This paper analyzes the concept of dual-consciousness and argues that actor dual-consciousness results from the actor’s imaginings, which both recreate the experience of the character and inform the actor about the non-reality of the experience. Keywords: Acting, actor, dual-consciousness, recreative imagination, experiential identification.