Yvette Drissen

The chapter reflects systematically on matters of discrimination, diversity and inclusion in the context of businesses. Ethical questions about discrimination, diversity and inclusion typically come up in the context of hiring practices and workplace management. Discrimination against people based on irrelevant factors (e.g. skin color) is not only morally wrong, but also illegal. Nevertheless, it is up for debate how far companies should go in the active promotion of diversity and inclusion. The chapter provides a socio-historical context to this question and presents three typical arguments in favor of more diversity and inclusion.

Competition plays a substantial and structural role in philosophy today. It is therefore remarkable that it has received little systematic ethical scrutiny in the literature until now. This paper aims to contribute to establishing a discussion about competition in the discipline of philosophy by arguing that philosophy is not inherently competitive and that competition tends to corrupt the practice of philosophy. Regarding, I argue that philosophy can best be understood as a cooperative endeavour. The idea that philosophy is a matter of competitive adversarial argumentation impedes philosophers from achieving what philosophy is all about, that is, realising what Alasdair MacIntyre calls ‘internal goods’: acquiring greater wisdom and knowledge and getting closer to the truth. I then show that a lot of the competition that characterises today’s practice of philosophy revolves around obtaining external goods, such as money, status, prizes and academic positions. While external goods are needed to sustain and regulate the practice of philosophy, competition for such goods also tends to 'corrupt' the practice, by which I mean that internal goods are seriously compromised. This, in turn, excludes prospective philosophers who are not ‘competitive’ enough, which is also a loss for philosophy generally.

Competition plays a substantial and structural role in philosophy today. It is therefore remarkable that it has received little systematic ethical scrutiny in the literature until now. This paper aims to contribute to establishing a discussion about competition in the discipline of philosophy by arguing (i) that philosophy is not inherently competitive and (ii) that competition tends to corrupt the practice of philosophy. Regarding (i), I argue that philosophy can best be understood as a cooperative endeavour. The idea that philosophy is a matter of competitive adversarial argumentation impedes philosophers from achieving what philosophy is all about, that is, realising what Alasdair MacIntyre calls ‘internal goods’: acquiring greater wisdom and knowledge and getting closer to the truth. I then show that a lot of the competition that characterises today’s practice of philosophy revolves around obtaining external goods, such as money, status, prizes and academic positions. While external goods are needed to sustain and regulate the practice of philosophy, competition for such goods also tends to corrupt the practice (ii), by which I mean that internal goods are seriously compromised. This, in turn, excludes prospective philosophers who are not ‘competitive’ enough, which is also a loss for philosophy generally.

This paper takes issue with the widespread claim that positional competitions are zero-sum games. It shows how the notions of ‘positional good’ and ‘positional competition’ have changed in meaning and how this has resulted in conceptual confusion in discussions amongst economists and philosophers. I argue that the Zero-Sum Claim is hardly ever true when it comes to the novel understanding of positionality that currently dominates the philosophical literature. I propose dropping the Zero-Sum Claim and construing positional competitions as win-lose. This is conceptually clearer and deepens our understanding and ethical evaluation of these important competitions in contemporary societies.