My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept both
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept: no free will
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept: rationalism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: non-Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept: non-classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept both
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Lean toward: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: non-physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept both
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept both
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Lean toward: one box
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept more than one
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Accept more than one
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Accept: death
Time: A-theory and B-theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Lean toward: don't switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept another alternative Conceivable but not logically possible