My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will There is no fact of the matter
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: non-Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Lean toward: classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism The question is too unclear to answer
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Lean toward: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Accept: two boxes
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Lean toward: consequentialism
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Lean toward: biological view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: egalitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Lean toward: Millian
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Accept: death
Time: A-theory and B-theory Lean toward: A-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Accept: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible