•  58
  •  30
    Gettierovi protuprimjeri i analiza znanja
    Prolegomena 2 (2): 197-217. 2003.
    Suprotno općeprihvaćenom mišljenju, argumentiram da Gettierovi protuprimjeri za trodijelnu analizu znanja kao opravdanoga istinitog vjerovanja nisu uspjeli zato što uvjet opravdanja, a pogotovo uvjet istinitosti za znanje u tim slučajevima nisu jednoznačno ispunjeni. Jer sudovi u koje se vjeruje jesu semantički ambivalentni te se za njih ne može jasno reći jesu ili istiniti ili neistiniti, pa stoga ni jesu li predmeti opravdanih istinitih vjerovanja. To je zbog zbunjujuće semantičke uloge koju i…Read more
  •  26
    Gettier’s Counterexamples and the Analysis of Knowledge
    Prolegomena 2 (2): 197-217. 2003.
    Contrary to the received view, I argue that Gettier’s counterexamples to the tripartite analysis of knowledge as justified true belief failed, because the justification condition and especially truth condition for knowledge in these cases are not unambiguously fulfilled. For the propositions believed are semantically ambiguous and cannot be clearly said to be either true or false and, therefore, to be the objects of justified true beliefs. This is due to the puzzling semantic role played by a de…Read more
  •  22
    Some aspects of explanation in Boškovič
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (1): 73-84. 1995.
    Bošković's explanatory procedure and his concept of explanation represents a certain departure from Newton's causal theory and his theory of explanation. Apart from particular elements of causal explanation, Bošković developed an alternative, non‐causal explanatory strategy. In this paper two different elements of this strategy are discussed: (i) the micro‐reductive explanatory strategy based on Bošković's idea of determination, and (ii) a type of explanation of a theory by means of a more gener…Read more
  •  22
    Boskovic's unobservables
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (3): 211-224. 1993.
    Boskovic treated unobservables in two different ways. During his earlier period (1741-48) the difference between observables and unobservables was a significant element of his specific semantic instrumentalism. The sentences of unobservables (such as absolute space, time and motions) were treated only as convenient tools conceived to provide for the empirical success of a theory. Later, especially in his Theory of Natural Philosophy (1763), Boskovic relativized this distinction by positing absol…Read more
  • » The Concept of Space in Bošković's Hypothesis of Forces.«
    Synthesis Philosophica 8 291-305. 1993.
  • Epistemologija: Vodič u teorije znanja (review)
    Prolegomena 4 (2): 239-245. 2005.
  • Knowledge Attributions and the Psychology of Reasoning: A Case against Contextualism
    with Dragana Sekulić
    Prolegomena 12 (2): 381-412. 2013.
    Epistemic contextualism in the works of S. Cohen, K. DeRose, D. Lewis and others amounts to the semantic thesis that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions or denials vary according to the contextually shifting standards for knowledge attributions and to the indexical character of the predicate “knows”. This semantic variation is primarily due to the pragmatic features of the attributor context, depending on “what is at stake” for the attributor. In this paper contextualism is confronted…Read more