

**CURRICULUM VITAE**  
**ADAM PAUTZ**

Department of Philosophy  
Brown University  
Box 1918  
45 Prospect St.  
Providence, RI 02912  
Fax 401-863-2719  
adam\_pautz@brown.edu

**EDUCATION**

New York University  
Ph.D. Philosophy. 2004. Dissertation Title: *The Hard Core of the Mind-Body Problem*.  
Dissertation Supervisor: Ned Block.

The University of Minnesota  
B.A. in Psychology, B. A. in Philosophy. *Summa Cum Laude*. 1998. Thesis Title:  
*Representationalism and Phenomenal-Neural Dependence*. Thesis supervisor: Joseph  
Owens.

**EMPLOYMENT**

Full Professor, Department of Philosophy, Brown University. 2015-

Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin. 2012-  
2015.

Research Fellow, Centre for Consciousness. Department of Philosophy, Australian  
National University. January-June 2012.

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin. 2004-  
2011.

Postdoctoral Fellow, Centre for Consciousness. Department of Philosophy, Australian  
National University. 2004-2005 and 2006-2007.

**AREAS**

Areas of Specialization: Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics  
Areas of Competence: Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

**PUBLICATIONS**

(For links to my recent and forthcoming papers, as well as to publications by others addressing my work, please see my website <http://www.brown.edu/academics/philosophy/adam-pautz> )

## Books

*Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block's Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness*. Pautz and Stoljar (eds.) Cambridge, MA. MIT Press. Published January, 2019.

*Perception*, under contract with Routledge Press, expected late 2019.

## Articles

“Consciousness Meets Lewisian Interpretation Theory”, forthcoming in inaugural issue of *Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind*, 2019.

“Representationalism about Consciousness”. In U. Kriegel (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. In press.

“The Arrationality of Perception.”  
*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. In Press.

“How Does Color Experience Represent the World?”  
Forthcoming in D. Brown and F. Macpherson (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour*, forthcoming July 2019.

“Naïve Realism and the Science of Consciousness”, forthcoming in *Analytic Philosophy*. 2019.

“What is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness?” *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 26: 188-215. 2019. *published*

“Themes in Ned Block's Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness”. Co-authored with Daniel Stoljar. In A. Pautz and D. Stoljar (eds.) *Blockheads! Ned Block's Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2019 *published*

“How Can Brains in Vats Experience a Spatial World? A Puzzle for Internalists”.  
Forthcoming in A. Pautz and D. Stoljar (eds.) *Blockheads! Ned Block's Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2019 *published*

Discussion of Anil Gupta's “Outline of an Account of Experience” with Alex Byrne, Charles Goldhaber, Anil Gupta, and Raja Rosenhagen *Analytic Philosophy* 59 (1): 75-88. 2018

Discussion of Bill Brewer's "Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason", with Bill Brewer, David de Bruijn, Chris Hill, Raja Rosenhagen, Miloš Vuletić, and Wayne Wu  
*Analytic Philosophy* 59 (1): 19-32. 2018.

"The Significance Argument for the Irreducibility of Consciousness"  
*Philosophical Perspectives* 2017. Special Issue: Philosophy of Mind.

"The Perceptual Representation of Objects and Natural Kinds".  
*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 95: 470-477. 2017.  
With a reply by Jeff Speaks.

"Experiences are Representations: An Empirical Argument."  
In B. Nanay (ed.) *Current Debates in Philosophy of Perception*  
(Routledge), 23-42. 2017.

"Propositions and Properties".  
*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 93: 478-486. 2016.  
With a reply by Trenton Merricks.

"What is My Evidence that Here is a Cup?"  
*Philosophical Studies* 173: 915-927. 2016.

"The Real Trouble with Armchair Arguments Against Phenomenal Externalism".  
In Kallestrup and Sprevak (eds.) *New Waves in Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 153-85.  
Palgrave. 2014.

"Do the Benefits of Naïve Realism Outweigh the Costs?" *Philosophical Studies* 163:  
25-36. 2013.

"The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists: The Science of Pain, Taste and  
Smell".  
In Brown (ed.) *Consciousness Inside and Out*, pp. 237-298. Springer. 2013.

"Ignoring the Real Problems for Phenomenal Externalism: A Reply to Hilbert and  
Klein". In Brown (ed.) *Consciousness Inside and Out*, pp. 307-317. Springer. 2013.

"Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?"  
In Kriegel (ed.) *Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays*, pp. 194-234. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press. 2013.

"Can Disjunctivists Explain Our Access to the Sensible World?"  
*Philosophical Issues* 21: 384-333. 2011.

"Do Theories of Consciousness Rest on a Mistake?"  
*Philosophical Issues* 20: 333-367. 2010.

“Why Explain Visual Experience in terms of Content?”  
In B. Nanay (ed.) *Perceiving the World*, pp. 254-310. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010.

“A Simple View of Consciousness.”  
In G. Bealer and R. Koons (eds.) *The Waning of Materialism*, pp. 25-67. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Published in 2010.

“Philosophical Theories of Colour.”  
In T. Bayne (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Consciousness*, pp. 144-149. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Published in 2009.

“What Are the Contents of Experiences?”  
*The Philosophical Quarterly* 59: 483-507. Published in 2009.  
Reprinted in MacPherson and Hawley (eds.) *The Admissible Contents of Experiences*: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

“An Argument Against Fregean That-Clause Semantics.”  
*Philosophical Studies* 138: 335-347. 2008.

“The Interdependence of Phenomenology and Intentionality.”  
*The Monist* 91: 250-272. 2008.

“Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence.”  
*Philosophical Perspectives* 21: 495-541. 2007.

“Sensory Awareness is not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument against Externalist Intentionalism.”  
*Noûs* 40: 205-240. Published in 2006.

“Can the Physicalist Explain Colour Structure in terms of Colour Experience?”  
*Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 83: 535-564. 2006.

“Byrne and Hilbert on the Unitary-Binary Structure of the Color.”  
*Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 26: 44-45. 2003.

“An Argument against Armstrong's Analysis of the Resemblance of Universals.”  
*Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 75: 109-111. 1997.

## Reviews

“Review of Phenomenal Intentionality”. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, forthcoming.

“Review of *Outside Color*”. *Philosophical Review* 127: 558-561. 2018

“Review of Hill’s *Consciousness*.” *Analysis* 71: 294-297. 2011.

“Review of Cohen’s *The Red and The Real*.” *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*. 2010.

“Review of Langsam’s *The Wonder of Consciousness*.” *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*. 2014.

## PRESENTATIONS

Perceptual Structuralism, Pacific Meeting of American Philosophical Association, April 17-21, 2019.

Consciousness Meets Lewisian Interpretation Theory, presentation at Carla Merino-Rajme seminar on Consciousness and Intentionality at the University of North Carolina, April, 2019.

The Puzzle of the Laws of Appearance, invited speaker, annual SSPP meeting, Cincinnati, Ohio, March 6-10, 2019.

Comments on Brian Cutter “The Experience of Left and Right”, annual SSPP meeting, Cincinnati, Ohio, March 6-10, 2019.

Perception and Perceptual Belief, guest presentation at E. J Green and Alex Byrne’s seminar Perception and Concepts at MIT, March 2019.

The Significance Argument for the Irreducibility of Consciousness. Colloquium. University of Toronto. October, 2018.

Are Qualia in the World or in the Head? Colloquium. York University in Toronto. October, 2018.

Phenomenal Indeterminacy and Graded Perceptual Justification. Guest presentation at Susanna Siegel’s graduate seminar, Harvard University, April, 2018.

Comments on “The Metaphysical Cosmic Coincidence Problem for Metanormative Non-Naturalism”. Philosophy Mountain Workshop, Telluride, CO. March 2-4. 2018.

Comments on Siegel, Author Meets Critics, *The Rationality of Perception*. Eastern APA. January, 2018.

Conference on Russellian Monism: Time for the Details. Saturday the 12th to Sunday the 13<sup>th</sup>. Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. 2017

“Could Consciousness be the Source of Intentionality?”  
Institut Jean Nicod. Workshop organized by Uriah Kriegel and John Morrison

“Could Consciousness be the Source of Intentionality?” Cambridge New Directions Project. Summer 2017

“Could Consciousness be the Source of Intentionality?”  
“Being Present to the Mind: A New Case for the Irreducibility of Consciousness”  
“How Does Color Experience Represent the World?”  
Leeds. Summer 2017.

“Does Science Undermine Naïve Realism?”  
Conference on sensible qualities. UC Berkeley. Spring 2017.

“Does Science Undermine Naïve Realism?”  
Conference on color primitivism, organized by Derek Brown, Spring 2017.

“Comments on Speaks, *The Phenomenal and the Representational*”  
Central APA, 2017

“Are Sensory Qualities in the Head or In the World?” Presentation at Perception and Action talks series. Brown University. 2017

“Are Sensory Qualities in the Head or In the World?” Presentation at Brown Institute for Brain Science. 2016

Commentator at “Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason”  
University of Pittsburgh. October 21, 2016.

Discussion of my book MS, *Perception*. Columbia University.

“A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness”, Yale.

“A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness”  
2016 Cambridge New Directions Project

“A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness”  
2016 CUNY

“A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness”  
2016 Southern Methodist University

“A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness”  
2016 Metaphysics at the Ranch

“Are Colors out There? Comments on Chirumuuta’s *Outside Color*”  
2016 Pacific APA

“Does Science Support Internalism about Experience?”  
2015 Pacific APA. Invited Paper, with Geoff Lee and Casey O’Callaghan as commenters

“The Mind-Body Problem for Intentionalists: Some Empirical Puzzles”  
Spring 2015, Michigan

“What is Inquiry? Comments on Jane Friedman”  
2015 Metaphysics at the Ranch

“The Price of Internalism about Experience”  
Fall 2014. Brown, Philosophy Department Colloquium Series

“The Price of Internalism about Experience”  
Fall 2014. University of Southern California, Philosophy Department Colloquium Series

“The Puzzle of Personites: Comments on Mark Johnston”  
2014 Pacific APA

“The Content View vs. the Object View of Experience”  
Author Meets Critics, 2014 Central APA

“Consciousness as the Source of Rationality and Thought”  
Rice, Conference on Perception and Thought, 2013

“Could Consciousness be a Brain Process? A New Argument Against Type-Type Identity”  
Jowett Society Oxford, 2013

Comments on the Contents of Experience  
Pacific APA 2013

Comments on Susanna Schellenberg  
Central APA 2013

“Phenomenal Externalism”  
Australian National University. Seminar. 2012.

“Is Consciousness Just in the Head?”

The University of Western Australia. Consciousness Conference. 2012.

“Epistemic Troubles for Naïve Realists”

The Australian National University. Mind and Epistemology Conference. 2012.

“Do the Benefits of Naïve Realist Outweigh the Costs?”

Seattle, Washington. Invited commentary on Disjunctivism about Experience. Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association. 2012.

“Could Consciousness Just be a Brain Process?”

University of California at Berkeley. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2011.

“Against Phenomenal Externalism.”

Columbia University. Perception Conference. 2011.

“Experiencing *Abstracta*?”

University of Texas at Austin. Graduate Student Conference. 2011.

“The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists: The Science of Pain, Taste and Smell.”

Consciousness Online Conference III. 2011.

“How Do Sensible Properties Become Present to the Mind?”

University of California at San Diego. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2011.

“Retentionalist vs Extensionalist Theories of Time Consciousness.”

Harvard University. Time Consciousness Conference. 2010.

“Is Experience Predicational?”

New York University. Conference on the Predicational Structure of Experience. 2010.

“How Do Sensible Properties Become Present to the Mind?”

Rutgers University. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2010.

“Disjunctivism and Knowledge of Color.”

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Conference on Color Perception and Color Language. 2010.

“Epistemological Arguments Against Disjunctivism.”

Columbia University. New Directions in the Philosophy of Perception. 2010.

“Why Consciousness Can’t Just be in the Head.”

Cornell University. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2010

“Why Consciousness Can’t Just be in the Head.”  
Consciousness Online Conference II. 2010.

“Tastes, Pains, and Sounds: New Problems for Naturalizing Consciousness.”  
Lund University, Sweden. Filosofidagarna (Sweden’s National Philosophy  
Conference). 2009.

“Yuck and Yum: New Puzzles for Intentionalism.”  
The University of Texas at Austin. *The Waning of Materialism* Workshop. 2009.

“The Content of Color Experience and the Light View of Color.”  
The University of Texas at Austin. UTexas/UNAM Conference. 2008.

“An Argument for the Intentional View of Experience.”  
Syracuse University. Syracuse Philosophy Annual Workshop and Network. 2008.

“An Argument for the Intentional View of Experience”  
Umea University, Sweden. Lecture to the Philosophy Department. 2008.

“Is the External World Colored?”  
Umea University, Sweden. Lecture to the Philosophy Department. 2008.

“What are Colors?”  
Umea University, Sweden. Public Lecture. 2008.

“An Argument Against the Identity Theory of Experience.”  
The University of Texas at Austin. Understanding and Illusion Workshop. 2008.

“The Case for Intentionalism about Sensory Consciousness.”  
Merida, Mexico. UTexas/UNAM Conference. 2007.

“The Interdependence of Phenomenology and Intentionality.”  
The Australian National University. Phenomenology and Intentionality Workshop  
Conference. 2007.

“Intentionalism and the Admissible Contents of Experience.”  
The University of Glasgow. Conference on the Admissible Contents of Experience.  
2007.

“The Intentional View of Sensory Consciousness.”  
Kioloa Australia Conference on Consciousness. 2007.

“Why Believe that Experiences have Contents?”  
The University of Western Australia. Consciousness and Representation Conference.  
2007.

- “Intentionalism and Non-Visual Modalities.”  
Kioloa Australia Conference on Consciousness. 2006.
- “Can Intentionalists be Reductionists?”  
Canberra, Australia. Meeting of the Australasian Association of Philosophy. 2006.
- “Can Intentionalists be Reductionists?”  
Online Philosophy Conference. 2006.
- “Tracking Intentionalism and Optimal Conditions: A Reply to Byrne and Tye”  
Online Philosophy Conference. 2006.
- “Modesty versus Immodesty about the Role of Introspection in the Philosophy of Perception: Comments on Hellie.”  
Online Philosophy Conference. 2006.
- “Intentionalism and the Laws of Appearance.”  
New York, NY. Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Society. 2006.
- “Does Intentionalism Really Accommodate the Transparency Observation?”  
Australian National University. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2005.
- “A Critique of Realist Primitivism about the Colors.”  
Australian National University. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2005.
- “Can Colour Structure be Explained in terms of Colour Experience?”  
Australian National University. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2005.
- “The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.”  
Australian National University. Inaugural Lecture for the Centre for Consciousness. 2004.
- “The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.”  
The University of Texas at Austin. 2003.
- “The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.”  
The University of Michigan. 2003.
- “The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.”  
The University of Colorado at Boulder. 2003.
- “The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.”  
The University of Arizona. 2003.

“The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.”  
The University of Massachusetts at Amherst. 2003.

“The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.”  
The University of Iowa. 2003.

“The Mind-Body Problem for Intentionalists.”  
Linköping, Sweden. Filosofidagarna (Sweden’s National Philosophy Conference).  
2003.

“Representationalism and Phenomenal-Neural Dependence.”  
Tufts University. New England Undergraduate Conference. 1998.

## **ADVISING**

### **As Supervisor for Honors Theses**

Ian Jacobson. In Defense of Representationalism. Current.

Paul Dumond. Panpsychism. 2012.

Isaac Neeley. Experience. 2011.

Thomas Wald. *In Defense of A Priori Physicalism*. 2009.

Aisha Ellahi. *Consciousness and the Human Brain: Explaining the “Ghost Stuff” in Our Heads*. 2007.

### **As Chair of Dissertation Committees**

Brian Cutter.

Tomas Bogardus. *An Epistemological Approach to the Mind-Body Problem*. 2011.

David Ivy. *Disentangling Disjunctivism*. Current.

### **As Member of Dissertation Committees**

Leah Lasell Ph.D.

John Bengson Ph.D.

Briggs Wright Ph.D.

Steven James Ph.D.

Enrico Grube Ph.D.

Alex Grzankowski Ph.D.

Kevin Smith Ph.D.

Derek Anderson Ph.D.

Fatema Amijee Ph.D.

Lance Balthazar Ph.D.

Brian Cutter Phd. D.

## **SERVICE**

### **To the profession:**

Organizer of the New York University Mind and Language Colloquium. 1999-2003.

Outside Referee for David Bourget's Doctoral Dissertation at the Australian National University, *The Representational Theory of Consciousness*. (20 page report)

Referee for *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*.

Referee for *Noûs*.

Referee for *Mind and Language*.

Referee for *Synthese*.

Referee for *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*.

Referee for *Thought*.

Referee for *Philosopher's Imprint*.

Referee for *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.

Referee for *Philosophical Review*.

Referee for *Philosophical Studies*.

Referee for books for Oxford University Press (multiple times).

**To the university of Texas at Austin:**

2005-2006. Colloquy. New Chair Committee.

2007-2008. Curriculum.

2008-2009. Research. Cogburn Essay Competition Judge. Undergraduate Essay Competition Judge.

2009-2010. Research. Cogburn Essay Competition Judge.

2010-2014. Colloquy.

**AWARDS**

University of Texas Summer Research Award, 2006.

James Arthur Fellowship, 2003-2004.

Frankel Fellowship, 2002-2003. Awarded by the New York University Department of Philosophy to one fifth year student.