

Anna-Sara Malmgren
CURRICULUM VITAE
August 2022

Department of Law, Philosophy and International Studies
Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences
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[philpeople page](#), [dept profile](#)

Employment

Professor of Philosophy, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, 2021–present.
Lecturer in Philosophy, Stanford University, 2020–2021.
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University, 2011–2020.
Professor II, Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo, 2013–2015 (15%).
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin, 2008–2011.

Education

PhD in Philosophy, New York University, 2009.
Thesis Committee: Paul Boghossian (supervisor), Stephen Schiffer, Crispin Wright.
BPhil in Philosophy, Magdalen College, University of Oxford, 2001. (1st with distinction.)
BA in Philosophy, King’s College, University of London, 1999. (1st with distinction.)

Research Areas

Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind (AOS).
Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics, Action Theory (AOC).

Awards and Fellowships

RJ Project Research Grant, Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation (Riksbankens Jubileumsfond), with M. Gerken & A. Schoubye, 2021–2023.
William H. and Frances Green Faculty Fellowship, Stanford University, 2014–2015.
APA Article Prize (for “Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements”), 2012.
Visiting Fellowship at Arché, University of St Andrews, 2010.
Blossom Flowers Ford Burns Excellence Endowment, University of Texas at Austin, 2008–2010.
Dean’s Fellowship, University of Texas at Austin, 2008.
Dean’s Dissertation Award, New York University, 2006–2007.
Frankel Fellowship, New York University, 2005–2006.
McCracken Fellowship, New York University, 2001–2006.
Scatcherd Scholarship, University of Oxford, 1999–2001.
Adrian Grey Turner Prize, King’s College London, 1998.
Sambrooke Exhibition, King’s College London, 1997.

PublicationsArticles

“Beliefs as Dispositions to Make Judgments”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (symposium), forthcoming.

“Goodness, Availability, and Argument Structure”, *Synthese*, vol. 198, 10395–10427, 2021.

“On Fundamental Responsibility”, *Philosophical Issues 29: Epistemology*, ed. L. Miracchi & E. Sosa, 198–213, 2019.

“Varieties of Inference?”, *Philosophical Issues 28: Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning*, ed. C. Juhl & J. Schechter, 221–254, 2018.

“A Priori Testimony Revisited”, *The A Priori in Philosophy*, ed. A. Casullo & J. Thurow, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 158–185, 2013.

“Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements”, *Mind*, vol. 120: 478, 263–327, 2011.

“Is There A Priori Knowledge by Testimony?”, *Philosophical Review*, vol. 115: 2, 199–241, 2006.

Reviews

Review of *Philosophy Without Intuitions*, H. Cappelen, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 2013.

Review of *Relying on Others*, S. Goldberg, *Mind*, vol. 120: 480, 1251–1258, 2011.

Editorial work

Referring to the World: An Opinionated Introduction to the Theory of Reference, by Kenneth A. Taylor, New York: Oxford University Press, 2021 (with M. Crimmins, R. Jeshion & J. Perry).

Work in ProgressBooks

Understanding Inference, monograph, under contract with Oxford University Press.

The Nature of Inferential Processes, monograph, under contract with Cambridge University Press (Elements-series).

Articles

“Inferential and Non-Inferential Justification”, for *Philosophy Compass*.

“The Content Problem, Deviance, and Disagreement”, ms.

“The Significance of Inferential Integration”, ms.

“Why be Reflective?”, ms.

Invited Talks/Presentations

— departmental colloquia talks unless specified

Upcoming

TBA, University of Glasgow.

TBA, Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy, Gothenburg University.

“Thought Experiments Redux”, Workshop: Thought Experiments and Arguments, EXTRA, Ruhr University Bochum.

“Why be Reflective?”, Workshop: The Powers and Limits of Rational Reflection, RREEXAM, University of Luxembourg.

2022

“Thought Experiments, Deviance, and Disagreement”, Mind and Language Seminar, New York University.

“The Problems of Metaphilosophy”, Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy, Stockholm University.

“The Problems of Metaphilosophy”, Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy, Uppsala University.

2021

Comments on *The Epistemic Role of Consciousness* by D. Smithies, Pacific APA.

“The Problem of Relevant Completeness”, job talk, University of St Andrews.

“Introduktion till Kant’s medvetandefilosofi och kunskapsteori”, job talk, Inland Norway University.

2019

“On a Principled Problem for the Distinction between Inferential and Non-Inferential Justification”, Conference: The Epistemology of Reasoning, CONCEPT, University of Cologne.

2018

“Why Be Reflective?”, Workshop: Self-Knowledge and The A Priori, KBNS, University of Stirling.

“Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure”, CPA Annual Congress, UQAM.

Reply to “Rationality Requires Rationally Representing Representations as Rational” by R. Neta, Conference: Inference and Reasoning, UNC Chapel Hill.

2016

“Goodness, Availability, and Argument Structure”, Philosophy Society (Filosofiska Föreningen), Lund University.

“Goodness, Availability, and Argument Structure”, University of Miami.

2015

“Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure”, Arizona State University.

“The Normativity of the Sub-Personal”, Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy, Gothenburg University.

“Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure”, Oberlin College.

“Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure”, 48th Chapel Hill Philosophy Colloquium, UNC.

2014

“Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure”, Simon Fraser University.

“Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure”, Konstanz University.

“Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure”, Workshop: Perspectives on Inference, CSMN, University of Oslo.

“Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure”, University of California at Irvine.

“Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure”, University of California at Los Angeles.

“The Problem of Relevantly Complete Representation”, University of Notre Dame.

“On Getting Started”, Symposium on Philosophical Method, Tufts University.

2013

“A Puzzle about Inference”, University of Copenhagen.

“A Puzzle about Inference”, 5th Formal Epistemology Festival, University of Toronto.

“Inference: Explanation and Justification”, Workshop, CSLI, Stanford University.

“Inference: Explanation and Justification”, University of Arkansas.

Reply to “Intuitive Knowledge & the Benacerraf Problem” by J. Bengson, Pacific APA.

“Philosophy Without *What?*”, Symposium on *Philosophy Without Intuitions* by H. Cappelen, The Institute of Philosophy (University of London)/CSMN (University of Oslo).

2012

“Inference: Explanation and Justification”, LEMMING Graduate Conference (keynote speaker), University of Cologne.

“Inference: Explanation and Justification”, University of Victoria.

“Particularistically Unreasonable”, Workshop on Intentions, University of Leeds.

2011

“A Priori Testimony Revisited”, Harvard University.

“Varieties of Inference”, Arché/CSMN Graduate Conference (keynote), University of St Andrews.

“A Priori Testimony Revisited”, North Carolina Metaphysics Workshop, UNC.

Reply to “Easy Knowledge, Reliabilism, and the Transparency of Justification” by R. Neta, Pacific APA.

“Varieties of Inference”, Workshop on the Philosophy of Richard Feldman, University of Texas at San Antonio.

“Varieties of Inference”, job talk, King’s College London.

“Varieties of Inference”, job talk, Stanford University.

2010

“Varieties of Inference”, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

“Quine’s Two Dogmas”, job talk, University of Oslo.

Reply to “Iconic Representation and the Interface Problem” by C. Montemayor, UT/UNAM Conference on Perception and Consciousness, University of Texas at Austin.

“Sub-Personal Reasons”, Workshop on Theoretical and Practical Reason, University of Leeds.

“The Content Problem” and “Varieties of Inference”, Arché Methodology Seminar, University of St Andrews.

Reply to “McKinsey One More Time” by C. Wright, Conference: Self-Knowledge and Rational Agency, CSMN, University of Oslo.

“Warrant-Preservation and Testimony”, Forry and Micken Lecture Series on the Philosophy of Testimony, Amherst College.

“Testimony, Self-Knowledge and The A Priori”, Workshop IV, Basic Knowledge Knowledge, Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen.

Reply to “Delusion, Assertion and Mad Belief” by D. Murray, Central APA.

2009

“The Justification of Intuitive Judgments”, Workshop: Thought Experiments and The A Priori, University of Fortaleza.

“Inferential Integration and Epistemic Relevance”, Filosofidagarna, Lund University.

2008

“Intuitions by Inference”, job talk, University College London.

“Intuitions by Inference”, job talk, Cornell University.

“Intuitions by Inference”, job talk, University of Rochester.

“Intuitions by Inference”, job talk, University of Massachusetts Amherst.

“Intuitions by Inference”, job talk, University of Western Ontario.

“Intuitions by Inference”, job talk, University of California Berkeley.

“Intuitions by Inference”, job talk, University of Pittsburgh.

“Intuitions by Inference”, job talk, University of Texas at Austin.

“Intuitions by Inference”, job talk, University of California Davis.

2007

Reply to “Is God an Unnecessary Hypothesis?” and “We’re Right, They’re Wrong” by P. van Inwagen, Workshop on Science and Religion, New York Institute of Philosophy.

2006

“What Do We Know When We Know That Smith Doesn’t Know—And *How* Do We Know It?”, University of Texas at Austin.

“Intuitions and The A Priori”, Arché Epistemology Seminar, University of St Andrews.

Reply to “Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals” by T. Williamson, Anders Wedberg Lectures, Stockholm University.

2003

“A Priori Knowledge by Testimony”, Logic and Language Seminar, Stockholm University.

1997

“Is There a Coherent Form of Environmentalism?”, Cumberland Lodge, King’s College London.

Professional Service

Departmental

Research Group Leader, Philosophy, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, 2022–present.

Chair, Philosophy Colloquium, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, 2021–present.
 Project Supervisor, Sunwoo Lee’s Symbolic Systems M.S. Degree, Stanford University, 2020–2021.
 Member, Stanford Committee on Enhancing Graduate Education, 2020–2021.
 Member, Stanford Philosophy Diversity Committee, 2018–2021.
 Departmental Advisor for Taylor Madigan, Stanford University, 2016–2018.
 Member, Stanford Philosophy Graduate Admissions Committee, 2011–2017.
 Member, Peter Hawke’s PhD Dissertation Committee, Stanford University, 2013–2017.
 Member, Samuel Asarnow’s PhD Dissertation Committee, Stanford University, 2013–2015.
 Member, Stanford Philosophy Search Committee, 2013–2015.
 Chair, Stanford Philosophy Colloquium Committee, 2011–2014.
 Member, UT Austin Philosophy Colloquium Committee, 2010–2011.
 Member, UT Austin Philosophy Outreach Committee, 2010–2011.
 Member, Jenn Nielson’s Dissertation Committee, UT Austin, 2010.

Other

Debater, *Philosophers Meet Critics*, CONCEPT/University of Cologne, 2022 (upcoming).
 External Expert/Evaluator (Sakkunnig), Umeå University, 2022.
 External Expert/Evaluator (Sakkunnig), Gothenburg University, 2022.
 Commentator, APA Committee Session on Diversity in Philosophy Departments, Pacific APA, 2019.
 Member, Expert Committee (Sakkyndig Komité), University of Oslo, 2015.
 Co-organizer (with O. Gjelsvik), Workshop: Perspectives on Inference, University of Oslo, 2014.
 Sub-Editor in Philosophy of Language, *Thought*, 2013.

Referee for: *Analysis*, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *Dialectica*, *Disputatio*, *Episteme*, *Erkenntnis*, *European Journal of Philosophy*, *Inquiry*, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, *Journal of Philosophical Research*, *Mind*, *Noûs*, *Philosophers’ Imprint*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophia*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Synthese*, *Thought*, *Teorema*, Bellingham Summer Conference, NOW (Dutch Research Council), Oxford University Press, and Routledge.

Invited Discussant at: Penn Reasons and Foundations of Epistemology Conference, University of Pennsylvania, 2017, 2016; Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference, University of British Columbia, 2017; Workshop: The Normativity of Logic, University of Bergen, 2017; Orange Beach Epistemology Workshop, University of South Alabama, 2016; Workshop in Honor of A. Goldman’s *Epistemology and Cognition*, College of William and Mary, 2016.

Research Collaborations

Project Participant, ‘Linguistic and Epistemological Perspectives on Testimony’, Stockholm University, funded by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, 2021–present.

International Cooperation Partner, ‘Experimental Philosophy and the Method of Cases: Theoretical Foundations, Responses, and Alternatives’ (EXTRA), funded by the German Research Foundation, 2018–present.

Team Member, NeuroCircuit Interdisciplinary Consortium, Stanford Neurosciences Institute, 2014–2021.

Faculty Affiliate, Symbolic Systems Program, Stanford University, 2011–2021.

International Network Member, ‘Knowledge Beyond Natural Science’, funded by the John Templeton Foundation, University of Stirling, and the *Thought* trust, 2017–2019.

Opinion Pieces

— *selection*

“Dictators Aren’t Built In a Day” (with L. Tas), *Brussels Times*, October 2019.

“Trump and the Two Thousand” (with R. Hockett), *Haaretz*, January 2019.

“A Call to Defend Rojava.” (with D. Bookchin, R. Hockett, and M. Tax), *New York Review of Books*, 2018.

“Feminism Across Borders: Don’t Let Afrin Become The Next Srebrenica” (with R. Hockett), *Jerusalem Post*, 2018.

Courses Taught

Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences

“Examen Philosophicum.” (Undergraduate.) Fall 2022/upcoming.

“Examen Facultatum.” (Undergraduate.) Fall semester 2022/upcoming.

Stanford University

“Advanced Dissertation Development Seminar.” (Graduate.) Fall, Winter, Spring 2013–2015, 2017–2020, 2020–2021.

“Topics in the Theory of Justification.” (Undergraduate and Graduate.) Winter 2021.

“Dissertation Development Pro-Seminar.” (Graduate.) Fall, Winter 2012–2013, 2020–2021.

“Formal and Informal Epistemology.” With R. Briggs. (Undergraduate and Graduate.) Spring 2020.

“Justification and Consciousness”. (Undergraduate.) Winter 2020.

“Concepts and Concept Possession”. (Undergraduate.) Spring 2019.

“Truth as the Aim of Belief and Inquiry.” (Undergraduate and Graduate.) Winter 2019.

“Self-Knowledge and Consciousness.” (Undergraduate.) Spring 2018.

“Philosophy of Mind.” (Undergraduate and Graduate.) Spring 2013, 2014, 2016; Winter 2015, 2017.

“Metaphysics.” (Undergraduate & Graduate.) Spring 2012, Winter 2017.

“Rule-Following.” (Graduate.) Fall 2014.

“Explanation and Justification.” (Undergraduate.) Winter 2013, 2014.

“Bounded Rationality.” (Undergraduate.) Fall 2013.

“Theory of Knowledge.” (Undergraduate and Graduate.) Spring 2012.

“What’s an Inference?” (Graduate.) Winter 2012, Fall 2012.

University of Texas at Austin

“Thought Experiments.” (Graduate.) Spring 2010.

“Theory of Knowledge.” (Undergraduate.) Fall 2009, Spring 2010, Fall 2010.

“Knowledge and Reality.” (Undergraduate.) Fall 2009, 2010.

New York University

“Minds and Machines.” (Undergraduate.) Spring 2008.

“Belief, Truth and Knowledge.” (Undergraduate.) Summer 2005, Fall 2007.

References

Paul Boghossian, Silver Professor of Philosophy, New York University, Department of Philosophy, 5 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, United States. paul.boghossian@nyu.edu.

Mark Crimmins, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University, Department of Philosophy, 450 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305, United States. crimmins@stanford.edu.

Anstein Gregersen, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of Law, Philosophy and International Studies, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, Postbox 400, 2418 Elverum, Norway. anstein.gregersen@inn.no

Hilary Kornblith, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Philosophy, E305 South College, Amherst, MA 01003, United States. kornblith@philos.umass.edu.

Krista Lawlor, Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University, Department of Philosophy, 450 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305, United States. klawlor@stanford.edu.

Ram Neta, Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, Department of Philosophy, Caldwell Hall, 240 East Cameron Av., Chapel Hill, NC 27599, United States. neta@email.unc.edu.

John Perry, Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, Stanford University, Department of Philosophy, 450 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305, United States. johnperry43@gmail.com.

James Pryor, Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, Department of Philosophy, Caldwell Hall, 240 East Cameron Av., Chapel Hill, NC 27599, United States. jimpryor@unc.edu.

Ralph Wedgwood, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California, School of Philosophy, 3709 Trousdale Parkway, Los Angeles, CA 90089, United States. wedgwood@usc.edu.

Crispin Wright, Professor of Philosophical Research, Division of Law and Philosophy, University of Stirling, Pathfoot Building, Stirling, FK9 FLA, United Kingdom; Global Professor of Philosophy, New York University, Department of Philosophy, 5 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, United States. c.j.wright@stir.ac.uk; cw43@nyu.edu.