



Dianoia Institute of Philosophy,
Level 5, 250 Victoria Parade,
Australian Catholic University,
East Melbourne, VIC 3002.

+61 3 9230 8435 
cmlittlejohn@gmail.com 
claytonlittlejohn.com 

CLAYTON LITTLEJOHN

- appointments Professor, Dianoia Institute of Philosophy, Australian Catholic University. Present.
Professor, Department of Philosophy, King's College London. September 2018 - August 2022.
Reader, Department of Philosophy, King's College London. September 2015 - August 2018.
Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, King's College London. September 2011- August 2015.
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy and Classics, University of Texas, San Antonio. August 2009 - August 2011.
Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Southern Methodist University. August 2005 - August 2009.
- education Ph.D, Philosophy, University of Nebraska, 2005.
Dissertation: *All the Reason in the World*.
B.A., Philosophy, Rhodes College, 1998.
- publications *Books*
2021. w/J. Adam Carter. *This is Epistemology*. Wiley.
2012. *Justification and the Truth-Connection*. Cambridge University Press.
- Edited Collections*
Forthcoming. w/Maria Lasonen-Aarnio. *The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence*. Routledge.
2014. w/John Turri. *Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion*. Oxford University Press.
- Articles, Chapters, and Encyclopedia Entries*
Forthcoming. w/Julien Dutant. What is Rational Belief? *Noûs*.
Forthcoming. Why Externalism? In B. Roeber, E. Sosa, M. Steup, J. Turri (ed.) *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology* 3rd Edition. Wiley.
Forthcoming. Internalist and Externalist Theories of Justification. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

- Forthcoming. w/Julien Dutant. n-1 Guilty Men. In S. Kirchin (ed.), *The Future of Normativity*. Oxford.
- Forthcoming. Disagreement and the Standard of Proof. In M Baghramian, J. Carter, and R. Rowland (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Disagreement*. Routledge.
- Forthcoming. Dividing Away Epistemic Dilemmas. In N. Hughes (ed.), *Epistemic Dilemmas*. Oxford University Press.
- Forthcoming. A Plea for Epistemic Excuses. In F. Dorsch and J. Dutant (ed.), *The New Evil Demon*. Oxford University Press.
- Forthcoming. w/Julien Dutant. Knowledge and Prizes. In A. Logins and J. Vollett (ed.), *Putting Knowledge to Work: New Directions for Knowledge-First Epistemology*. Oxford University Press.
2022. Knowledge-First Theories of Justification. In L. Oliveira and P. Silva (ed.), *Propositional and Doxastic Justification*. Routledge.
2022. A Justification for Excuses. *Philosophical Studies*. 179:2683-2696.
2022. w/Julien Dutant. Even if it Might Not be True, Evidence Cannot be False. *Philosophical Studies*. 179: 801–827.
2021. Eleven Angry Men. *Philosophical Issues*. 31: 227-39.
2021. Knowledge, Justification, Ignorance, and Suspension. *Philosophical Topics*. 49: 371-84.
2021. Justified Belief and Just Conviction. In J. Robson and Z. Hoskins (ed.) *Truth and Trial*. Routledge.
2021. On What We Should Believe (and When (and Why) We Should Believe What We Know We Should not Believe). In K. McCain and S. Stapleford (ed.) *Epistemic Duties*. Routledge.
2021. w/Julien Dutant. Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance. In J. Brown and M. Simion (ed.), *Reasons, Justification, and Defeat*. Oxford University Press.
2020. Truth, Knowledge, and the Standard of Proof in Criminal Law. *Synthese*. 197: 5253-86.
2020. Do You See What I Know? *Philosophical Issues*. 30: 205-20.
2020. Should we be Dogmatically Conciliatory? *Philosophical Studies*. 177: 1381–98.
2020. w/Julien Dutant. Justification, Knowledge, and Normality. *Philosophical Studies*. 177: 1593–1609.
2019. Neither/Nor. In C. Doyle, J. Milburn, and D. Pritchard (ed.), *Epistemological Disjunctivism*. Routledge.
2019. Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 99: 605-27.
2019. Assertion and Moore's Paradox. In S. Goldberg (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Assertion*. Oxford University Press.
2019. Pritchard's Reasons. Part of a symposium on *Epistemological Disjunctivism* in *Journal of Philosophical Research*.

2019. Knowledge and Normativity. In S. Hetherington and M. Valaris (ed.), *Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy*.
2018. Stop Making Sense? A Puzzle about Epistemic Rationality. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 96: 257-72.
Winning Essay in the 2015 Young Epistemologist Prize Competition
2018. w/Julien Dutant. Just Do It? When to Do What You Judge You Ought to Do. *Synthese*. 195: 3755–72.
2018. Reasons and Theoretical Rationality. In D. Star (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity*.
2018. Evidence and its Limits. In C. McHugh, J. Way, and D. Whiting (ed.), *Normativity: Epistemic and Practical*. Oxford University Press.
2018. Objectivism and Subjectivism in Epistemology. In V. Mitova (ed.), *The Factive Turn in Epistemology*. Cambridge University Press.
2018. Gettier Cases and Evidence. In S. Hetherington (ed.), *The Gettier Problem*. Cambridge University Press.
2018. The Good in the Right. In J. Dunn and K. Ahlstrom-Vij (ed.), *Epistemic Consequentialism*. Oxford University Press.
2018. w/Charles Cote-Bouchard. Knowledge, Reasons, and Errors about Error Theory. In C. Kyriacou and R. McKenna (ed.), *Metaepistemology: Realism and Antirealism*. Palgrave Macmillan.
2018. Knowledge-First Epistemology. In D. Pritchard (ed.), *Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy*.
2018. Standing in a Garden of Forking Paths. In K. McCain (ed.), *Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism*. Synthese.
2017. w/Maria Alvarez. When Ignorance is No Excuse. In P. Robichaud and J. Wieland (ed.), *Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition*. Oxford University Press.
2017. How and Why Knowledge is First. In A. Carter, E. Gordon, and B. Jarvis (ed.), *Knowledge-First Epistemology*. Oxford University Press.
2017. Small Stakes Give You the Blues. *Manuscrito*. 40: 31-38.
2016. The Truth in Gnosticism. *Análisis Revista de Investigación Filosófica* 3: 217-41.
2016. Learning from Learning from our Mistakes. In M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig (ed.), *Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals*. DeGruyter.
2016. Do Reasons and Evidence Share the Same Residence? Critical Discussion of Daniel Star's *Knowing Better*. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 93: 720-727.
2015. Who Cares What You Accurately Believe? *Philosophical Perspectives* 29: 217-48.
2015. Awareness and Knowledge. *Analysis* 75: 596-603.
2015. Potency and Permissibility. In B. Bramble and B. Fischer (ed.), *Stirring the Pot: The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat*. Oxford University Press.

2014. Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism. *Symposion 1*: 77-87.
2014. Fake Barns and False Dilemmas. *Episteme* 11: 369-89.
2014. Know Your Rights: On Warranted Assertion and Truth. *Erkenntnis* 79: 1355-65.
2014. Are Epistemic Reasons Ever Reasons to Promote? *Logos and Episteme* 4: 353-60.
2014. The Unity of Reason. In C. Littlejohn and J. Turri (ed.), *Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion*. Oxford University Press.
2013. A Note Concerning Justification and Access. *Episteme* 10: 369-86.
2013. The Russellian Retreat. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 113: 293-320.
2013. Don't Know, Don't Believe: Reply to Kroedel. *Logos and Episteme* 4: 231-38.
2013. No Evidence is False. *Acta Analytica* 28: 145-59.
2012. Lotteries, Probabilities, and Permissions. *Logos and Episteme* 3: 509-14.
2012. Disagreement and Defeat. In D. Machuca (ed.) *Disagreement and Skepticism*. Routledge.
2012. Does 'Ought' Still Imply 'Can'? *Philosophia* 40: 821-8.
2012. Morality and Reasons for Action. In H. LaFollette (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of Ethics*. Wiley-Blackwell.
2011. Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 83: 603-19.
2011. Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism. *Analytic Philosophy* 52: 35-48.
2011. Moral Knowledge by Intuition. In J. Hernandez (ed.), *The New Intuitionism*. Continuum.
2011. Knowledge and Evidence. *Erkenntnis* 74: 241-62.
2011. Reasons and Belief's Justification. In A. Reisner and A. Steglich-Petersen (ed.), *Reasons for Belief*. Cambridge University Press.
2011. Evidence and Armchair Access. *Synthese* 179: 479-500.
2010. Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 88: 79-100.
2009. Critical Notice of Michael Zimmerman's *Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance*, for *Philosophical Books* 50: 235-47.
2009. Must We Act Only On What We Know? *Journal of Philosophy* 106: 463-74.
2009. The Externalist's Demon. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 39: 399-435.
2009. 'Ought', 'Can', and Practical Reasons. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 46: 363-73.
2009. On the Coherence of Inversion. *Acta Analytica* 24: 127-37.
2009. On Treating Something as a Reason for Action. *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*. 1-4.
2009. The New Evil Demon Problem. *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
2008. From E = K to Scepticism? *The Philosophical Quarterly* 58: 679-84.
2007. Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? *The Reasoner* 1: 6-7.

Reviews

- Review of Susanne Mantel, *Determined by Reasons* for *Mind*.
 Review of Benjamin Kiesewetter, *The Normativity of Rationality* for *Ethics*.
 Review of Richard Swinburne, *Mind, Brain, and Free Will* for *Metapsychology*.
 Review of Duncan Pritchard, *Epistemological Disjunctivism* for *Mind*.
 Review of Trent Dougherty (ed.), *Evidentialism and its Discontents* for *Philosophy in Review*.
 Review of Richard Foley, *When is True Belief Knowledge?* For *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.
 Review of Eric Marcus, *Rational Causation* for *The Philosopher's Magazine*.
 Review of Maria Alvarez, *Kinds of Reasons* for *Ethics*.
 Review of Jeremy Fantl and Matt McGrath, *Knowledge in an Uncertain World* for *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.
 Review of Paul Boghossian, *Content and Justification* for *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.

talks

- TBD. SLACRR. Date TBD.
 Fumerton on Naked Statistical Evidence. December 2020. University of Arizona.
 Consequentialising Epistemology. November 2020. University of Glasgow.
 Consequentialising Epistemology. November 2020. University of St. Andrews.
 n-1 Guilty Men. NYU Abu Dhabi Workshop on Normativity and Reasoning. February 2020.
 Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance. University of Helsinki. December 2019.
 Epistemology Consequentialised. University of Barcelona. October 2019.
 We Should Be Incoherent. Higher-Order Evidence in Epistemology, Ethics, and Aesthetics. Southampton. June 2019.
 On Knowledge and What Follows. Cologne Summer School in Philosophy. August 2019.
 Truth, Knowledge, and Blame. University of Porto. Keynote for the MLAG Graduate Conference. April 2019.
 Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance. University of Glasgow. Evidence and Knowledge Workshop Symposium on Jessica Brown's *Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge*.
 Rationality and the Normativity of Normative Reasons. University of Michigan. Colloquium on Norms and Values. February 2019.
 The Value of Epistemic Value. Institut für Philosophie Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. January 2019.
 Are Normative Reasons Normative? Institut für Philosophie Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. January 2019.
 Are Normative Reasons Normative? Durham Normativity Seminar. November 2018.
 Veritism and the Value of Epistemic Value. Hungarian Academy of Sciences. November 2018.

- The Value of Epistemic Value. Rationality: Epistemic and Practical Perspectives. Ruhr University. July 2018.
- Knowledge, Reasons, and Lost Causes. Keynote for the Future of Normativity Conference. University of Kent. June 2018.
- Knowledge, Reasons, and Lost Causes. Keynote for the Edinburgh Epistemology Graduate Conference. June 2018.
- On the Normativity of Rationality and of Reasons. Epistemology Seminar. Ruhr University. June 2018.
- The Significance of Fixed-Points. Leuven-London Epistemology Workshop. May 2018.
- Knowledge, Reasons, and Lost Causes. Knowledge First, Epistemology and Mind: Themes from Tim Williamson. Cardiff. May 2018.
- Knowledge, Reasons, and Lost Causes. MIT University. May 2018.
- Rational Belief in Action. Rationality and Reasonableness Conference. The Cologne Center for Contemporary Epistemology and the Kantian Tradition. April 2018.
- An Argument against the Normativity of Rationality. Southern Normativity Group Meeting. University of Reading. March 2018.
- Being More Realistic About Reasons. Workshop on the Normativity of Rationality with Benjamin Kiesewetter.
- Steadfastly Conciliatory. The Epistemic Dynamics of Disagreement Conference. Cologne. October 2017.
- Explaining Externalism. The Principles of Epistemology Conference. Paris. September 2017.
- Prichard's Question and Reasons Perspectivism. Conference on Dancy and Practical Inference. Saarbrücken. July 2017.
- You're So Vain. You Probably Think Your Reasons Should Guide You. KCL-UNC Conference. June 2017.
- Crime, Punishment, and Individualized Evidence. ReaDoubt 2017: From Reasonable Doubt to Undue Skepticism. Birkbeck. May 2017.
- Perception, Particularity, and Predication. American Philosophical Association. April 2017.
- Gnosticism and Normative Skepticism. New York University. Mind and Language Seminar. April 2017.
- Crime, Punishment, and Individualized Evidence. University of Leuven. December 2016.
- Crime, Punishment, and Individualized Evidence. University of Edinburgh. November 2016.
- Standing in a Garden of Forking Paths. University of St. Andrews. August 2016.
- Standing in a Garden of Forking Paths. University of Warwick. June 2016.
- Who Cares What You Accurately Believe? Keele University. May 2016.

- Evidence and its Limits. University of Leuven, Epistemic Norms Workshop, November 2015.
- A Plea for Epistemic Excuses. University of Groningen, JustGroningen 2015, August 2015.
- The Good in the Right. University of Konstanz, Epistemic Consequentialism Workshop, July 2015.
- Stop Making Sense? The Rutgers Epistemology Conference, April 2015.
- Stop Making Sense? University of Vienna, The Factive Turn in Epistemology, April 2015.
- How and Why Knowledge Comes First. University of Edinburgh, Knowledge First Epistemology Conference, December 2014.
- Stop Making Sense? University of Southampton, Epistemic and Practical Normativity Seminar, December 2014.
- The Good in the Right. London School of Economics, Epistemic Consequentialism Workshop, November 2014.
- Stop Making Sense? University of Luxembourg, Normative Epistemic Reasons Conference, July 2014.
- Evidence and its Limits. University of Kent, Evidence Workshop, June 2014.
- Evidence and its Limits. University of Helsinki, Evidence in Science and Epistemology, May 2014.
- On the Basis Problem. University of Oxford, Jowett Society, February 2014.
- Author Meets Critics Panel for Duncan Pritchard's *Epistemological Disjunctivism* American Philosophical Association (Central), February 2014.
- Justification, Reasons, and Ability. University of Luxembourg, Conference on Epistemic Justification and Reasons, November 2014.
- When Ignorance is No Excuse. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Workshop on Epistemic and Instrumental Rationality, November 2013.
- Reasons, Abilities, and Foundations. University of East Anglia, October 2013
- Scepticism and Factive Reasons. University of Cologne, Cologne Summer School on Radical Scepticism, September 2013.
- A Plea for Epistemic Excuses. The University of Geneva, Conference on the New Evil Demon Problem, September 2013.
- Knowledge, Reasons, and Causalism. Cambridge University, Workshop: The Roles of Knowledge, June 2013.
- Knowledge, Reasons, and Causalism. Bled Philosophical Conference on Evidence, Reliability, and Group Epistemology, June 2013.
- The Russellian Retreat. Aristotelian Society, London, May 2013.
- Knowledge, Reasons, and Causalism. The University of Geneva, Conference: The Ontology of Evidence, April 2013.

Author Meets Critics for Justification and the Truth-Connection. American Philosophical Association (Pacific), April 2013.

Knowledge, Reasons, and Causalism. University of Nottingham, March 2013.

Knowledge is Probably the Norm of Belief. University of Southampton, Workshop: Aims and Norms, January 2013.

Knowledge is Probably the Norm of Belief. Bristol University, January 2013.

Knowledge is Probably the Norm of Belief. University of Edinburgh, January 2013.

The Unity of Reason. University of Reading, December 2012.

Evidence and Exculpation. University of Leeds, November 2012.

Reducing Epistemic Responsibility. KCL-UNC Conference: Social Epistemology and Epistemic Responsibility, London, May 2012.

Truth, Belief, and Action. Institute Jean Nicod, Paris, Conference: Justification: Normativity and Normativity, April 2012.

The Unity of Reason. Southern Methodist University, Dallas, April 2012.

The Unity of Reason. Bristol Philosophy Society at Bristol University, March 2012.

In Defense of Assisted Suicide. The Heythrop Ethics Society, February 2012.

Undoing Evidentialism. University of Southampton, November 2011.

The Unity of Reason. Boston University, Ethics Reading Group, October 2010.

Disjoining Disjunctivism. University of Edinburgh, July 2010.

It's Not the Thought that Counts. University of Texas, Royal Ethics Conference, February 2010.

Disagreement, Intellectual Trust, and Epistemic Rationality. Baylor University Philosophy of Religion Conference, February 2010.

Departmental
Service

King's College London

Undergraduate Admissions Tutor
Steering Committee
REF Panel
Research Lead
Supervision of Postgraduate Students
Head of Rationality Research Cluster
Creator and Convener of Normativity Seminar
Head of Search Committee (Philosophy of Science)
MPhilStud Tutor
Diversity and Inclusion Committee
MPhilStud Admissions Tutor
AHRC MA/MPhil Grants Committee
PG Admission Panel
Graduate Career Advisor

Liberal Arts Representative
 First Year Research Seminar
 Co-Director of Postgraduate Studies
 Study Abroad Tutor
 Visiting Speaker Coordinator
 MA Research Seminar Coordinator

University of Texas at San Antonio

Committee to Design MA Program
 Organized Brackenridge Workshop
 Search Committee
 Departmental Outreach and Recruitment of Majors
 Advisor to Phi Sigma Tau (Philosophy Honor Society)

Service to the
 Profession

Area Editor for *Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy* 2020-present
 Scientific Committee of the British Society for the Theory of Knowledge 2020-present
 External Examiner for University of Warwick 2016-2020
 External Referee for University of Tampere Search Committee 2020
 External Referee for University of St. Andrews REF Exercise 2017
 Management Committee of the Institute of Philosophy 2011-2015 <https://www.overleaf.com/project/5acddf4f16d6b>
 PhD dissertation examiner for Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette (Oxford), Sophie Edwards (UCL), Emil Moeller (Oxford), Kate Munn (Oxford), David Scholtz (University of Johannesburg), and Alex Trofimov (Kent). MPhil dissertation examiner for Josh Habgood-Coote (Birkbeck) and David Olbrich (UCL).
 Referee for American Philosophical Quarterly, Analysis, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Dialectica, Dialogue, Episteme, Erkenntnis, Ethics, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Journal of Philosophy, Journal of Moral Philosophy, Mind, Nous, Oxford University Press, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Palgrave-MacMillan, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy Compass, Philosopher's Imprint, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Polish Journal of Philosophy, Res Philosophica, Routledge, Social Epistemology, Synthese, Thought, Wiley-Blackwell, and the W.W. Norton Company.