

KYLA EBELS-DUGGAN

kebelsduggan@northwestern.edu

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Department of Philosophy
1880 Campus Drive
Northwestern University
Evanston IL 60208

Department Fax: (847) 491-2547
Department Phone: (847) 467-0437

ACADEMIC POSITIONS

Professor of Philosophy, Northwestern University, 2022-present
Director of Graduate Studies, 2018-present
Senior Fellow, Center for Ethics and Education, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2015-present
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Northwestern University, 2013-2022
Acting Director, Brady Program in Ethics and Civic Life, 2016-2017
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Northwestern University, 2007-2013
Weinberg College Fellow (Tenure Track Position), Northwestern University, 2006-2007

EDUCATION

Harvard University, Ph.D., Philosophy, March 2007
Dissertation: *Giving Reasons: Interpersonal Relationships and the Conditions of Autonomy*
Committee: Christine M. Korsgaard (chair), T.M. Scanlon, Gisela Striker and Melissa Barry
University of Michigan, B.A., Highest Distinction, Highest Honors in Philosophy, May 1998

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Ethics and Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Kant's Practical Philosophy, Philosophy of Education

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

History of Ethics, Applied Ethics, Philosophy of Religion

POST-DOCTORAL AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

Weinberg Research Recovery Grant, Fall 2022
Member, Mellon Project on Philosophy as a Way of Life Network, 2019-2022
Hewlett Fund Grant for Course Development, 2019
Public Voices Thought Leadership Fellowship Program, Northwestern University, 2018-2019
Visiting Fellowship at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Summer 2016
Non-Residential Fellowship with The Experience Project, 2015-2016
Non-Residential Fellowship with The Hope and Optimism Project, 2015-2016 (declined)
Visiting Fellowship at the Center for Ethics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs, University of St Andrews, Scotland, April-June 2014
Nominated for Weinberg Distinguished Teaching Award, Spring 2014
Spencer Foundation Initiative on Philosophy in Educational Policy and Practice Grant, 2012-2013
Laurance S. Rockefeller Fellowship at the Princeton Center for Human Values, 2009-2010
Visiting Faculty Fellowship at the Center for Ethics at the University of Toronto, 2009-2010 (declined)

PRE-DOCTORAL AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

George Plimpton Adams Prize for Outstanding Dissertation (2007)
Whiting Dissertation Completion Fellowship (2004-2005)
Edmond J. Safra Fellowship, Center for Ethics and the Professions at Harvard University (2003-2004)
Francis Bowen Prize for the Best Paper in Moral or Political Philosophy (2004): "The Hobbesian Agent and the Bondage of Self-interest"
Francis Bowen Prize (2003): "Inner Freedom and Required Ends"
Bechtel Prize for the Best Philosophy Paper (2002): "Acting Together: Negotiation, Coercion and Joint Decision-Making"
Francis Bowen Prize (2001): "Disagreement and Liberal Commitment"
Harvey Fellowship (2001-2005)
Harvard Graduate Society Summer Fellowship (2001)

Derek Bok Center Certificate of Excellence in Teaching (2000, 2003)
William K. Frankena Award for Most Outstanding Graduate in Philosophy (1998)
Virginia Vos Award for Excellence in Academic Writing (1998)
National Finalist, British Marshall Scholarship (1997)
Elsa L. Haller Award for Best Undergraduate Paper in Philosophy (1997)
Otto Graf Scholarship for Most Outstanding Junior in the Honors College (1997)
Phi Beta Kappa (1997)

PUBLICATIONS

Edited Books

Normativity and Agency: Themes from the Work of Christine M. Korsgaard, coedited with Tamar Schapiro and Sharon Street, Oxford University Press, 2022.

Responsibility and Alienation: The Collected Works of Stephen J. White, coedited with Berislav Marusić. Forthcoming from Oxford University Press.

Articles and Book Chapters

“Buck-passing and the Value of a Person,” forthcoming in *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics*, Mark Timmons, ed, Oxford University Press.

On T.M. Scanlon’s buck-passing view of value, for something to be valuable is just for us to have reasons to treat it in certain ways and to have certain attitudes towards it. Scanlon applies this view to understanding the value of a person. He claims that the reasons in question are just moral reasons, so that valuing a person is nothing more than taking one’s self to have reason to regulate one’s behavior towards them in accord with moral principles. I argue that this cannot be a complete account of the value of a person.

“Learning from Love: Reasoning, Respect, and the Value of a Person,” forthcoming in *The Value of Humanity: A Reevaluation*. Sarah Buss and Nandi Theunissen, eds., Oxford University Press.

We learn the moral attitude and grasp the reasons for it through experiences of loving individuals. In interpersonal love we appreciate the value of individual persons directly. This grasp of value plays an indispensable role in our moral convictions. Thus, though we have sufficient reasons for our moral commitments, we cannot reason to them. No argument addressing the moral skeptic of the kind that moral philosophers have traditionally sought is available. Instead of leading us to moral skepticism, this should bring us to rethink our conception of moral philosophy.

“Dignity and Consequences,” forthcoming in *The Norton Introduction to Ethics*, Elizabeth Harman and Alex Guererro, eds.

Kant argues that each person has dignity, a special sort of value, which he contrasts with *price*. That a person has this irreplaceable and infinite value seems true to our experience of individual people, most obviously the ones that we love. I aim to show that this way of thinking of the value of each person is deeply at odds with the idea that you should always aim to make the world as good as possible. I argue that we should resolve this tension in favor of holding on to our convictions about human dignity.

“Bad Debt: The Kantian Inheritance of Humean Desire,” forthcoming in *The Idea of Freedom: New Essays on the Kantian Theory of Freedom*. Dai Heide and Evan Tiffany, eds, Oxford University Press.

Kant’s claim that virtue has nothing to do with the content of our desires, but depends only on the strength of will needed to manage them, depends on an unattractive conception of inclination that he inherits from empiricists like Hume. Kantians can replace this with a better view of desire without giving up what is most attractive about the Kantian approach: the claim that reason can motivate, and the associated illuminating account of practical freedom.

“The Formula of Universal Law,” forthcoming in *Understanding Kant’s Groundwork*, Steven Cahn, ed, Hackett.

I offer an interpretation of Kant’s Formula of Universal Law and explain how he argues for it.

“Kantian Ethics,” revised with Bennett Eckert, forthcoming in *The Bloomsbury Companion to Ethics* Christian Miller, ed.

Originally published in *The Continuum Companion to Ethics*, Christian Miller, ed. (Continuum 2012).

We articulate and defend the most central claims of contemporary Kantian moral theory. We also explain some of the most important internal disagreements in the field, contrasting two approaches to Kantian ethics: Kantian Constructivism and Kantian Realism. We connect the former to Kant’s Formula of Universal Law and the latter to his Formula of Humanity. We end by discussing applications of the Formula of Humanity in normative ethics.

“Ethics Requirements in the Liberal Arts Curriculum,” in *Academic Ethics Today: Problems, Policies, and Prospects for University Life*, Steven Cahn, ed. Rowman and Littlefield, 2022.

I defend the importance of ethics requirements in higher education, in part by responding to two misunderstandings about what such courses should aim to do. Many colleges and universities require undergraduate students to fulfill distribution requirements in ethics and values, alongside more familiar requirements in the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities. But some worry that either such courses will merely describe some culture’s system of values, in which case they seem to belong to the social sciences, or they will advocate for some system of values, in which case they verge into a kind of ideological indoctrination that has no appropriate role in university education. Against these two characterizations, I argue that courses in ethical thinking have a distinct and important role to play in undergraduate education.

“Liberalism for Feminists,” Critical Notice of Gina Schouten’s *Liberalism, Neutrality and the Gendered Division of Labor*, *Analysis* 82 (1): 180-190. 2022.

In *Liberalism, Neutrality, and the Gendered Division of Labor*, Schouten argues that the commitments of political liberalism require feminist policies that aim to eradicate the gendered division of labor and political liberals should support these policies. I trace her ambitious and intricate argument, and raise three possible points of concern: First, her identification of reasons that all can accept by reference to an idealized conception of the citizen makes the motivation for political liberalism opaque. Second, her conception of the interests of citizens as such could be challenged. And third, one might wonder about her application of these interests in her argument to the political conclusion.

“A Question of One’s Own,” in *Normativity and Agency*, Tamar Shapiro, Kyla Ebels-Duggan, and Sharon Street, eds, Oxford University Press, 2022.

A modest constructivism that endorses the constructivist account of moral concepts, but gives up on the idea of deriving normative conceptions from them, retains most of the advantages of the more ambitious view that embraces both theses. It can address Prichard’s Dilemma and parry metaphysical and epistemological challenges. It cannot answer all intelligible skeptical questions. But I argue that it can answer all those that are *ours* in Christine Korsgaard’s important sense.

“Beyond Words: Inarticulable Reasons and Reasonable Commitments,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 98:3, May 2019, pp 623-641.

We often come to value someone or something through experience of that person or thing. You may thereby come to embrace a value that you did not grasp prior to the experience in question. Moreover, it seems that in a large and important subset of cases you *could not have* fully appreciated that value merely by considering a report of the reasons or arguments that purport to establish that it is valuable. Despite its ubiquity, this phenomenon goes missing in a great deal of contemporary work in ethics and political philosophy. In this paper I further specify the phenomenon of interest by developing a series of examples. Then I support the claim that philosophers routinely overlook it by surveying several significant philosophical positions that do so.

“Love and Agency,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Love*. Adrienne Martin, ed. Routledge, 2019.

We must think of love as a contentful attitude attributable to its agent, something that the agent is doing. But familiar ways of understanding agency sort love into the category of things that happen to us, rather than that of things that we do: You cannot love at will, nor is love an attitude

to which you could reason. I conclude that questions about the relationship of our agency to what we love are not superficial, but stem from deep tensions about the relationship between love and reasons. A resolution to these difficulties would provide important insight not only into the character of love, but also the nature of agency, and its relationship to values, reasoning and reasons.

“Christian Philosophy and the Christian Life,” in *Christian Philosophy: Conceptions, Continuations, and Challenges*. J. Aaron Simmons, ed. Oxford University Press, 2018.

I consider how Christian philosophers should decide which questions are worth asking. I provide an interpretation and defense of Alvin Plantinga’s claim that Christian philosophers should strive for autonomy, and argue that this rules out some ways of settling on our questions. I then argue that the questions in which Christian philosophers should take an interest are those arising from or continuous with a distinctively Christian way of life.

“Love (of God) as a Middle Way Between Dogmatism and Hyper-rationalism in Ethics,” *Faith and Philosophy* 35:3, 2018, pp 279-298.

In the *Groundwork* Kant dismisses theistic principles, along with all other competitors to his Categorical Imperative, claiming that they are heteronomous. By contrast, he asserts, the fundamental moral principle must be a principle of autonomy. I argue that the best case for this Kantian conclusion conflates our access to the reasons for our commitments with an ability to state these reasons such that they could figure in an argument. This conflation, in turn, results from a certain Kantian conception of inclination, and its role in our moral psychology. These are views that we ought to reject. Having done so we will see that a theistic ethics based on desire or love for God would not face a distinctive problem of heteronomy.

“Freedom and Influence in Formative Education,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Freedom*, David Schmidtz and Carmen Pavel, eds. Oxford University Press, 2018.

The principle that children’s freedom should be preserved in their upbringing is sometimes thought to provide an alternative to imposing a particular conception of the good on them. But to sustain the alternative we must distinguish between those desires and proclivities that are educated into a person and those that are his own. Several philosophers appeal to innate or presocial tendencies to ground this distinction, but that approach fails. The ability to exercise first personal authority over a desire or commitment provides a better conception of what it is for such a state to be one’s own. But such desires and commitments are not distinct from those educated into a person. While the ideal of autonomy, conceived in these terms, can still provide some guidance for upbringing, it does not compete with, and cannot substitute for, teaching children a conception of the good.

“The Right, the Good, and the Threat of Despair: (Kantian) Ethics and the Need for Hope in God,” in *Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Volume 7*. Jon Kvanvig, ed. Oxford, 2015.

Kant rejects all of the standard accounts of the dependence of morality on religious claims or commitment. He nevertheless thinks that morality “leads to” religion. I defend an account of this “leading to” relationship, arguing that it is the result of Kant’s struggle to capture the practical import of the consequences of our actions within a moral theory that rejects the idea that we must maximize the good. I argue that all moral theories face some version of the tension that Kant is attempting to negotiate. On Kant’s view, the best way to acknowledge that the outcomes of our actions matter, while maintaining uncompromising commitment to the moral law, is to hope in God.

“Autonomy as Intellectual Virtue,” in *The Aims of Higher Education: Problems of Morality and Justice*, Harry Brighouse and Michael MacPherson, eds. University of Chicago, 2015.

Volume awarded the *Frederick Ness Prize* for best contribution to understanding and improvement of liberal education.

Many thinkers agree that facilitating the development of students’ autonomy is a proper aim of education generally and higher education in particular. I defend a version of the autonomy view, but not as I think its other advocates imagine it. I suggest that an important aim of education is the facilitation of intellectual virtues. What is right about the idea that education should facilitate students’ autonomy is best captured in virtue terms as intellectual charity and humility

“Educating for Autonomy: An Old-fashioned View,” *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 31:1, Fall 2014, pp 257-275.

Also published in *Education: Ideals and Practices*, David Schmitz, ed. Cambridge, 2014.

We cannot adequately characterize the aims of education in terms of some formal conception of what it is to think well. Implementing any such aim requires reliance on and communication of further, substantive normative commitments. This reveals that a standard contrast between an old-fashioned approach to education that aims to communicate a particular normative outlook, and a progressive approach that aims to develop skills of critical reasoning and reflection is confused and misleading.

“Moral Education in the Liberal State,” *Journal of Practical Ethics*, 1:2, December 2013, 34-63.

Political liberals should not support the monopoly of a single educational approach in state sponsored schools, but should allow reasonable citizens latitude to choose the worldview in which their own children are educated.

“Dealing With the Past: Responsibility and Personal History,” *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 164:1, 2013, 141-161.

Unfortunate formative circumstances do not undermine the warrant for either responsibility or blame. I then diagnose the tendency to think that formative circumstances do matter in this way, arguing that knowledge of these circumstances can play an essential epistemic role in our interpersonal interactions.

“Kant’s Political Philosophy,” *Philosophy Compass* vol. 7:12, November 2012, 896-909.

In the first half of the essay I give a reading of Kant’s argument for the obligation to found the state: Each person has an innate right to freedom, but it is possible to simultaneously honor everyone’s right only under the rule of law. So we are obligated to submit to the authority of the state if we have one, and to establish one if we do not. In the second half I survey four points of controversy: (1) What is the relationship between Kant’s political philosophy and his moral philosophy? (2) How does the innate right to freedom support the postulate that we are permitted to acquire property and other private rights? (3) How does the postulate support an obligation to found the state? (4) How should we understand Kant’s views about political revolutions?

“Kantianism” in *The Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics*. 2nd edition. (Elsevier 2012).

This article focuses largely on Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. I also discuss Kant’s later moral works in which he defends government authority, develops a theory of virtue, and argues that moral commitment leads the rational person to religious commitment.

“Critical Notice of Arthur Ripstein’s *Force and Freedom*” (article length, peer reviewed), *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 41:4, December 2011, 549-573.

Ripstein’s Kantian argument for the authority of the state purports to demonstrate that state authority is a necessary condition of each individual’s freedom. Ripstein regards an individual as free just in case her entitlement to control what is hers is not violated. After questioning whether his approach adequately distinguishes standards of legitimacy from standards of ideal justice, I argue for the superiority of an alternative conception of freedom. On the view that I defend a person is free just in case she is able to move her body in space unimpeded by others. I argue that this conception allows for a more convincing version of the Kantian argument.

“Awarding Custody: Children’s Interests and the Fathers’ Rights Movement,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, vol. 24:4, October 2010, 257-278.

Child custody cases in the United States are usually settled by appeal to what is taken to be in the children’s best interests. A growing movement for fathers’ rights asserts that an explicit recognition of parental rights should replace this standard, and further that this should lead us to favor split custody arrangements. I argue for the first part of the claim, appealing to the fundamental commitments of political liberalism. But I argue against the idea that this should make a 50/50 split the default custody arrangement. I explain how this proposal would license ongoing, intrusive state intervention, and so undermine the very parental rights it aims to recognize.

“The Beginning of Community: Politics in the Face of Disagreement,” *The Philosophical Quarterly* vol. 60:238, January 2010, 50-71.

Rawls’ requirement that citizens of liberal democracies support only policies that they believe can be justified in public reason depends on a certain ideal for the relationships between citizens. I affirm the value of this ideal, and thus hold that citizens have reasons to try to achieve it. But I argue that it is not always possible to find the common ground that we would need to do so, and thus reject Rawls’ strong claim that we have an *obligation* to defend our views in public reason.

“Moral Community: Escaping the Ethical State of Nature,” *Philosophers’ Imprint* vol. 9:8, August 2009. I attempt to vindicate our authority to create new practical reasons for others by making choices of our own. In *The Doctrine of Right* Kant argues that we have an obligation to leave the Juridical State of Nature and found the state. In a less familiar passage in *Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason* he argues for an obligation to leave what he calls the Ethical State of Nature and join together in the Moral Community. I read both texts as addressing and trying to resolve a tension between our individual freedom and our authority to make claims on one another. I explicate the political argument, and then develop the view that Kant sketches in the *Religion*, arguing that regarding others as capable of making choices that give you reasons to act is a condition of the full exercise of your autonomy.

“Against Beneficence: A Normative Account of Love,” *Ethics* vol. 119:1, October 2008, 142-170. Rather than aiming at the well-being of those whom we love, we should aim to share in their ends. The former stance runs the risk of being objectionably paternalistic and, as I explain, only the latter makes reciprocal relationships possible. I end by diagnosing our attraction to the idea that we should promote our loved-ones’ well-being.

Book Reviews

Henry S. Richardson, *Articulating the Moral Community*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 99:1, (2021), 205-207.

Christine M. Korsgaard, *Fellow Creatures*. *Kantian Review* 24:4, (2019), 653-659.

Mark Murphy, *God’s Own Ethics. Faith and Philosophy* vol. 36:1, (January 2019), 244-250.

Julia Markovits, *Moral Reason*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*. December 3, 2014.

Thomas E. Hill, *Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations*. *Mind* 122:488, (2013), 1098-1102.

Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly, *All Things Shining*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, September 9, 2011.

Bennett Helm, *Love, Friendship and the Self*. *Ethics* vol. 121:4, July 2011, 808-812.

Blog Posts and Public Philosophy

“The Great Masquerade of Evil,” *The Raven: A Magazine of Philosophy*, Fall 2021.
<https://ravenmagazine.org/magazine/the-great-masquerade-of-evil/>

“A Culture of Disbelief: Title IX Changes Will Add Burdens to Victims,” *The Hill*, March 9, 2019.
<https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/433288-a-culture-of-disbelief-title-ix-changes-will-add-burdens-to-victims>

“America’s Moral Crisis,” *Morality Tales, Psychology Today*, December 19, 2018.
<https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/morality-tales>

“Don’t Stop Thinking about Ethics and Values,” *The Northwestern Daily*, January 7, 2017.
<https://dailynorthwestern.com/2017/01/30/opinion/opinion-this-is-no-time-to-stop-thinking-about-ethics-and-values/>

“More than Words Can Say: Inarticulacy and Normative Commitment,” *Pea Soup*, June 24, 2015.
<http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2015/06/more-than-words-can-say-on-inarticulacy-and-normative-commitment-by-kyla-ebels-duggan.html>

“How Not to Solve the Liberal Dilemma of Child-Rearing” *Philosophy-her*, August 14, 2014.
<http://politicalphilosopher.net/2014/08/15/featured-philosoph-her-kyla-ebels-duggan/>

WORKS IN PROGRESS

Beyond Words: Reasonable Commitments and Inarticulacy about Value (under contract with OUP)

Experiences of value play a central role in providing reasons for our normative commitments. It is more common to hold such commitments on the basis of experience than to embrace them simply because one is convinced by some argument. Love for another person on the basis of direct experience and appreciation of him is a paradigm example. But the reasons that these experiences provide standardly outstrip any attempts to capture them in propositional form. Thus we can have good reason to value what we do, while being incapable of saying what these reasons are. To the extent that we are thus inarticulate about our reasons they cannot be fully communicated to others. This has important, and underappreciated, implications in moral and political philosophy. It places limits on the possibility of interpersonal justification in both personal and political contexts, and has related implications for the communication of values in moral education.

PRESENTATIONS

TBD

Korsgaard Retirement Celebration and Conference, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, May 2023

University of California-Los Angeles, April 2023

University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, April 2023

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI, March 2023

“Living in the Story”

Jellema Lecture, Calvin University, Grand Rapids, MI, October 2022

“The Reasons We Cannot Share”

UNC Colloquium Conference, Chapel Hill, NC, October 2022 (originally scheduled, October 2020)

University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, September 2022 (postponed from March 2021)

“Buck-passing and the Value of a Person”

American Philosophical Association, SGIR Special Session, Chicago IL, February 2022

Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics (WiNE), Tucson AZ, January 2022

T.M. Scanlon Conference, University of Kansas (online), October 2021

“How to Have Reasons for Your Values”

Pomona College, Claremont, CA, February 2020

Westmont College, Santa Barbara, CA, February 2020

Philosophy of Education Society of North America (PESNA), Mundelein, IL, October 2018

Society of Christian Philosophers, Grand Rapids, MI, September 2018

EDGe Workshop, Ann Arbor, MI, April 2018

“Morality, Love, and the Value of Humanity”

NAKS at the Eastern APA, Philadelphia, PA, January 2020

Brown University, Providence, RI, December 2019

Kant and Confucianism, Seoul, South Korea, September 2019

Rice Workshop in Humanistic Ethics, Houston TX, April 2019

UW-Madison Philosophy Department Colloquium, Madison WI, December 2018

Boston University Workshop in Late Modern Philosophy, Boston MA, February 2018

Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics (WiNE), Tucson AZ, January 2018

Keynote Address, Society of Christian Philosophers Eastern Regional Meeting, Asbury University,

Wilmore KY, September 2017

UK Kant Society, Conference on Kant and Contemporary Philosophy, St Andrews UK, September 2017
Wheaton Political Theory Workshop, Wheaton IL, July 2017
Other Minds/Other Wills Workshop, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, June 2017
Northwestern University Practical Workshop, Evanston, IL, May 2017

Reasonable Commitments and Inarticulacy About Value
Houghton College Reading Group, videoconference, December 2019

“Inarticulacy and The Prospects for Public Reason”
Keynote Address, Politics and Religion Conference, Notre Dame, South Bend, IN, November 2019
Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, March 2019

Roundtable on Discussion of Case-Based Philosophy
NAAPE, Mundelein, IL, October 2019

Roundtable on Liberal Arts Education
NAAPE, Mundelein, IL, October 2019

“Constructivisms and Moral Skepticisms”
Pacific Study Group of NAKS, San Diego, CA, January 2019

“Learning What is Good”
Workshop on the Arts, the Sciences, and Human Betterment, Madison, WI, July 2018

“Autonomy in Education”
Society of Christian Philosophers, Dallas, TX, November 2017

“Love, Reasons and Reasoning”
Normativity Working Group (GRIN), McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, March 2017

“Inarticulacy and Reasonable Commitments”
Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, September 2016
Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, July 2016
Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, April 2016
Auburn University Philosophy Conference, Auburn, AL, March 2016
Moral and Philosophy Workshop, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, March 2016
Work in Progress Series, MIT, Cambridge, MA, March 2016
Transformative Experiences Working Group, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill (by video-conference), February 2016
University of Chicago Practical Workshop, Chicago, IL, February 2016

“Bad Debt: The Kantian Inheritance of Humean Desire”
Awesome Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Canberra, Australia, July 2016
Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, May 2015
3rd Annual Tennessee Value and Agency Conference, Knoxville, TN, November 2014
Invited Address, Conference on Kantian Freedom, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, BC, October 2014

“The Inarticulate First Person”
Moral, Political, and Social Thought Seminar, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, July 2016

“Autonomy as Intellectual Virtue”
Society for Applied Philosophy Meetings at the Eastern APA, Washington, DC, January 2016
Honors Residential College, Baylor University, Waco, TX, February 2013
Spencer Foundation Conference on Achieving the Aims of Higher Education: Problems of Morality and Justice, Evanston, IL, October 2011
Spencer Foundation Workshop on Achieving the Aims of Higher Education: Problems of Morality and Justice, Chicago, IL, June 2011

“On Love”

Center for Christian Thought, Biola University, La Miranda, CA, November 2015

“Love (of God) as a Middle Way Between Dogmatism and Hyperrationalism in Ethics”

Theistic Ethics Workshop, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, October 2015

“Freedom and Influence in Formative Education”

Wheaton Political Theory Workshop, Wheaton, IL, July 2015

“Moral Community: Escaping the Ethical State of Nature”

Georgetown Moral Innovation Seminar, Washington DC, October 2014

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge, MA, September 2005

“The Right, the Good, and the Threat of Despair: (Kantian) Ethics and the Need for Hope in God”

University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, UK, April 2014

University of Illinois-Chicago, Chicago, IL, April 2014

University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IN, December 2013

Baylor University, Waco, TX, February 2013

“Christian Philosophy and the Christian Life”

Keynote Address, Society of Christian Philosophers Midwest Meeting, Palos Heights, IL, March 2014

“What Philosophy of Education Can Teach Us about the Virtues”

Conference on Education: Ideals and Practices, Park City, UT, August 2013

Conference on Educating for Intellectual Virtues, Loyola Marymount, Los Angeles, CA, June 2013

“Kant on Morality, Happiness, and Religion”

Baylor-Georgetown-Notre Dame Conference on Philosophy of Religion, San Antonio, TX, November 2012

Southern North American Kant Society, Tulsa, OK, September 2012

International Symposium on the Foundations of Morality, Wuhan, China, October 2011

Felician Ethics Conference, Rutherford, NJ, April 2011

Wheaton College Philosophy Speaker Series, Wheaton, IL, January 2011

“Dealing with the Past: Responsibility and Personal History”

Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, Boulder, CO, August 2012

Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, Bellingham, WA, July 2012

University of Chicago Practical Workshop, Chicago, IL, December 2011

Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, March 2010

Mid-Atlantic Reading Group in Ethics, New York, NY, February, 2010

Fellows Seminar, Center for Human Values, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, February 2010

“Moral Education in the Liberal State”

The Society for Applied Philosophy Conference, Oxford, England, UK June 2012

The Virtue of Justice Conference, Conway, AR, March 2012

Northwestern Practical Philosophy Workshop, Evanston, IL, May 2011

Vanderbilt Political Theory Workshop, Nashville, TN, September 2010

Northeastern Political Science Association Meeting, Philadelphia, PA, November 2009

“Taking Responsibility”

American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Chicago, IL, February 2010

Conference on Developing Character: Moral and Intellectual Virtues, Dubuque, IA, March 2007

Grand Valley State University, Allendale, MI, March 2007

Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, Conference on Modernity, South Bend, IN, November 2006

“Kant on Freedom and the Development of Character”

UK Kant Society Conference on Kant and Society, Lancaster, England, UK, July 2009

“Anselmian Moral Skepticism”

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI, April 2009

University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, January 2009
Baylor University, Waco, TX, December 2008

“Children’s Interests and the Fathers’ Rights Movement”

American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Chicago, IL, February 2009
Grand Valley State University Philosophy Club, Allendale, MI, March 2007
Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge, MA, April 2006

“Inner Freedom and Required Ends”

North American Kant Society Midwest Study Group, Milwaukee, WI, November 2006
Boston University, Graduate Student Conference on Kant, Boston, MA, April 2004
Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge, MA, February 2003

“Against Beneficence”

Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, February 2006
University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign, Champaign, IL, February 2006
University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Amherst, MA, February 2006
University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, February 2006
Bowdoin College, Brunswick, ME, February 2006
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, February 2006
University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IN, January 2006
University of Western Ontario, London, ON, January 2006
MIT Workshop on Gender and Philosophy, Cambridge, MA, January 2006
Harvard Department of Philosophy, Cambridge, MA, November 2005

“Relationships as Sharing Ends”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge, MA, April 2005

“The Problem with Taking Care of What We Care About”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge, MA, October 2004

“The Beginning of Community: Politics in the Face of Disagreement”

Center for Ethics and the Professions, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, May 2004

“Sovereign Autonomy and Interpersonal Authority”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge, MA, April 2004

“Conservative Christians as Political Liberals”

Baylor University, Conference on Christianity and the Soul of the University, Waco, TX, March 2004

“The Hobbesian Agent and the Bondage of Self-Interest”

Center for Ethics and the Professions, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, January 2004

“Two States of Nature”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge, MA, October 2003

“Autonomy and Others’ Authority”

University of California-Irvine, Graduate Student Colloquium, Irvine, CA, November 2002

“Acting Together: Negotiation, Coercion, and Joint Decision-Making”

University of California-Irvine, Graduate Student Colloquium, Irvine, CA, May 2002
University of California-Los Angeles Workshop in Moral Philosophy, Los Angeles, CA, May 2002

“Commitment to Principles and Persons”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge, MA, October 2001

“Disagreement and Liberal Commitment”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge, MA, February 2001

COMMENTS

Anthony Laden, "Two Concepts of Civility"

Philosophy of Education Society of North America (PESNA), Mundelein, IL, October 2018

Aleksy Tarasenko-Struc, "Objectification, Domination, and the Objective Stance"

Bechtel Reunion Workshop, Evanston, IL, September 2018

Nomy Arpaly, "In Defense of Benevolence"

Northwestern University Society for the Theory of Ethics and Politics (NUSTEP), Evanston, IL, May 2016

Kristi Olsen, "The Anatomy of Envy-Freeness"

Bechtel Workshop, Boston, MA, June 2015

Allen Wood, "Universal Law"

Paton Colloquium in Kantian Ethics, St Andrews, UK, May 2014

Patrick Kain, "Good, God, and Kant"

Baylor-Georgetown-Notre Dame Conference on Philosophy of Religion, South Bend, IN, October 2013

Ian MacMullen, "Status Quo Bias," *Civics Beyond Critics*, Chapter 7.

Book Manuscript Workshop, St. Louis, MO, September 2013

Harry Brighouse, "What Are Educational Goods and How Should They Be Distributed?"

Conference on Moral Education: Ancient and Contemporary, Evanston, IL, June 2013

Michelle Mason, "Love, Benevolence, and How to Share a Beloved's Ends"

Northwestern University Society for the Theory of Ethics and Politics (NUSTEP) *Conference*, Evanston, IL, May 2013

John Hare, "Kant and the Notion of Conscience"

Conference on Challenges to Religious and Moral Belief: Disagreement and Evolution, Indianapolis, IN, September 2012.

Mary Clayton Coleman, "Yes, Virginia, There is a Genuinely Metanormative Constructivism"

American Philosophical Association, Central Division Meeting, Chicago, IL, February 2012

Sharon Anderson-Gold, "The Metaphysics of Marriage: Kant on Real Personal Rights"

First Bi-Annual Meeting of the North American Kant Society, Urbana-Champaign, IL, June 2011

David Sussman, "Korsgaard on the Reality of Pain"

Northwestern University Society for Ethical Theory and Political Philosophy Conference, Evanston, IL, May 2010

Abe Roth, "Can Shared Activity Simply Be Willed?"

Northwestern University Society for Ethical Theory and Political Philosophy Conference, Evanston, IL, April 2009

Edward Hinchman, "Receptivity and the Will"

Northwestern University Society for Ethical Theory and Political Philosophy Conference, Evanston, IL, May 2008

Helga Varden, "Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy"

American Philosophical Association, Central Division Meeting, Chicago, IL, April 2008

Helga Varden, "International Political Obligation"

*Northwestern University Society for Ethical Theory and Political Philosophy Conference, Evanston, IL,
May 2007*

Richard Galvin, “The Practical Contradiction Interpretation Reconsidered”
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division Meeting, San Francisco, CA, April 2007

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Northwestern University Courses Taught:

Graduate Seminars

Phil 402: *Proseminar: Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory*, Fall 2020-Winter 2021
Phil 488: *Professional Skills Seminar*, Spring 2013; Spring 2020
Phil 460: *Seminar in Moral Theory: Valuing Attitudes: Reasons without Reasoning*, Spring 2019
Phil 460: *Seminar in Moral Theory: Love, Reasons and Reasoning*, Winter 2017 (Taught concurrently at the University of Chicago as Phil 50101.)
Phil 460: *Seminar in Moral Theory: Limits of Articulacy*, Spring 2016
Phil 460: *Seminar in Moral Theory: Desires*, Winter 2015
Phil 402: *Proseminar: Kantian Ethics*, Fall 2013-Winter 2014
Phil 460: *Seminar in Moral Theory: Virtue Ethics*, Winter 2012
Phil 410: *Special Topics in Philosophy: Kant’s Political Theory*, Fall 2010
Phil 477: *Seminar in Moral Theory: Moral Skepticism*, Fall 2008
Phil 410: *Special Topics in Philosophy: Responsibility*, Fall 2007

Advanced Undergraduate Classes

Phil 360: *Topics in Moral Theory: Anscombe, Murdoch, Foot*, Fall 2022
Phil 363: *Kant’s Moral Theory*, Winter 2011; Spring 2013; Spring 2015; Fall 2019
Phil 360: *Topics in Moral Theory: Contemporary Moral Theory*, Winter 2009; Spring 2011; Fall 2018; Fall 2021
Phil 360: *Topics in Moral Theory: Philosophy of Education*, Fall 2013
Phil 360: *Topics in Moral Theory: Kant’s Moral Theory*, Spring 2007

Introductory Classes

Phil 109: *Freshman Seminar: How to Live the Good Life*, Spring 2020
Phil 109: *Freshman Seminar: Plato on Tyranny and Democracy*, Fall 2017
Phil 273-2: *Brady Scholars Seminar: The Moral Life*, Winter 2012; Winter 2014; Winter 2015; Winter 2016; Fall 2016; Winter 2018; Winter 2019; Winter 2020; Winter 2021; Winter 2022
Phil 240: *Freedom and Responsibility*, Spring 2015
Phil 109: *Freshman Seminar: If God is Dead, Is All Permitted?* Spring 2011
Phil 264: *Classics of Political Theory*, Spring 2009
Phil 263: *Classics of Moral Theory*, Spring 2008

Graduate Advising

Primary Advisor (doctoral defense dates and current positions are indicated in parentheses)

Isaac Schur (first year)
Ken-Terika Zellner (prospectus phase)
Samuel Filby (prospectus phase)
Christiana Eltiste (prospectus phase)
Juan Andrés Abugattas (ABD)
Susan Bencomo (ABD)
Hao Liang (ABD)
Jessica Talamantez (ABD)
Joshua Kissel (2021, Instructor, Philips Andover Academy, 2021)
Abigail Bruxvoort (2021, Professor and Chair, Kilgore Community College)
Raffanna Donelson (2017, Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Law at Louisiana State University)

Member of Dissertation Committee

Katie Wong (prospectus phase, University of Michigan)
Jasmine Khin (prospectus phase)

Mauricio Maluff Masi (ABD)
 Maria Mejia (prospectus phase, UIC)
 Regina Hurley (ABD)
 Cristina Carrillo (ABD)
 Ashley Purdy (2022, degree from University of Pittsburgh, VAP Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Arkansas)
 Andrew Hull (2022)
 Mark Thomson (2021, Instructor, Capilano University)
 Robert Carry Osborne (2020, Academic Advisor, American University)
 William Cochran (2020, former post-doctoral fellow, Program for Leadership and Character and Department of Computer Science, Wake Forest University, post-doctoral fellow at Harvard's Embedded EthiCS project)
 Francey Russell (2017, degree from the University of Chicago, Assistant Professor at Barnard College, Columbia)
 Carlos Pereira di Salvo (2017, Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania)
 Amy Flowerree (2017, Assistant Professor at Texas Tech)
 Meg Schmitt (2017, degree from University of Notre Dame)
 Chelsea Egbert (2016)
 Seth Mayer (2015, former Assistant Professor at Manchester University, IN)
 Tyler Zimmer (2014, Assistant Director of Undergraduate Studies and Lecturer, University of Chicago)
 Oksana Maksymchuk (2013, Assistant Professor at the University of Arkansas)
 Emilie Pratico (2013, Manager at the Business for Social Responsibility, Paris)
 Christina Drogalis (2013, degree from Loyola University, Chicago)
 Heidi Giannini (2013, degree from Baylor University, former Assistant Professor at Houghton College)
 Max Cherem (2012, Associate Professor at Kalamazoo College)
 B. Scott Rousse (2011, Research Consultant with Pluralistic Networks)
 Laura Papish (2010, Associate Professor at George Washington University)
 Kelby Harrison (2010, Director of LGBT Resource Center, University of Southern California)
 Brad Cokelet (2008, Assistant Professor at the University of Kansas)

Undergraduate Thesis Supervision

Sofia Stutz (2022-2023)
 Emma Eder (2020-2021)
 Bennett Eckert (2019-2020)
 Steven Bennett (2016-2017)
 Benjamin Rudofsky (2010-2011)

Undergraduate Summer Research Grant Advising

Sophia Stutz (Posner Fellow, 2020, Mellon-Mays Fellow, 2021)
 Bennett Eckert (2018, 2019)
 Benjamin Rudofsky (2010)

Harvard University Tutorials:

Phil 97hf: *Applied Ethics: Commodification*, Fall 2005
 Phil 98hf: *Morality and Practical Reason*, Fall 2004
 Phil 98hf: *Hobbes' Leviathan*, Fall 2003
 Phil 97hf: *Plato's Republic*, Fall 2001
 Phil 97hf and Phil 98hf: *Theology and Moral Theory*, Spring 2000

Harvard University Teaching Fellowships:

Phil 175: *Ethical Theory*, Melissa Barry, Spring 2003
 Phil 102: *Aristotle*, Gisela Striker, Fall 2001
 MR 66: *Moral Reasoning About Social Protest*, Susanna Siegel, Fall 2000

SERVICE

Departmental Service

Search Committee in Moral and Political Philosophy (Chair) (2022-2023)

Director of Graduate Studies and Chair of Graduate Studies Committee (2018-2023)
Search Committee in African-American or Africana Philosophy (2021-2022)
Search Committee in Ancient Philosophy (2017-2018)
Undergraduate Studies Committee (2017-2018)
Speakers Committee (2008-2009, 2010-2011, 2016-2017, 2017-2018 (chair))
Faculty Liaison for Departmental Climate Committee (2014-2015; 2017-2018)
Search Committee in Political Philosophy and Race Theory (2016-2017)
Graduate Admissions Committee (2013-2014)
Ad Hoc Committee for Program Review (2013-2014)
Assessments Committee (2012-2013)
Search Committee in Moral and Political Philosophy (2011-2012)
Search Committee in 19th Century German Philosophy (2008-2009)
Undergraduate Studies Committee (Spring 2008)
Graduate Representative to Faculty (2000-2001)
Co-organizer of Harvard-MIT Graduate Conference (1999-2000)

University Service

Curricular Review Committee (2014-2016; 2017-2018; Winter, Spring 2019; 2019-2021)
Brady Program Visiting Postdoc Search Committee (2019-2020)
Graduate Research Grants Committee (Winter-Spring 2020)
Curricular Policies Committee (Fall 2018)
Brady Program Faculty Advisory Board (2013-2020)
Delegate to Foundational Disciplines Convention (2018)
NEH Summer Stipend Review Committee (2015)
Appointments Committee for Visiting Brady Scholar (2011-2012; 2012-2013)

Professional Service

Ethics Area Editor, *Ergo* (2016-present)
Executive Board Member, Society of Christian Philosophers, (2018-2020)
Diversity Committee Member, Society of Christian Philosophers (2018-2021)
Board of Editorial Consultants, *Faith and Philosophy* (2015-2025)
SSHRC External Assessor (2017-2018)
Book Referee for *Oxford University Press*
Journal Referee for *Philosophers' Imprint*, *The Philosophical Quarterly*, *The Journal of Ethics*, *Public Affairs Quarterly*, *Mind*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, *Ethics*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Res Philosophica*, *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, *Kantian Review*, *Philosophy Compass*, *Journal of Moral Philosophy*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, *Philosophy*
Reviewer for Spencer Foundation's IPEPP Small Grants Program (2014-2015)
Co-organizer of Annual Northwestern University Society for the Theory of Ethics and Politics (NUSTEP) Conference (2006-present)