
Guy Schuh

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AOS: Ancient Philosophy

AOC: Ethics, Phenomenology, Medieval, Classical Chinese Philosophy

PROFESSIONAL APPOINTMENTS,

Visiting Assistant Professor, Georgia Southern University

August 2017—May 2018

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Philosophy, Boston University

January 2017

Dissertation: *Aristotle on the Impossibility of Pure Altruism*

I defend the interpretation that Aristotle posits one's own *eudaimonia* as the ultimate goal of human action; many scholars believe that if this is Aristotle's view, he never attempts to defend it. I argue, to the contrary, that he does so through his discussion of friendship.

Readers: David Roochnik, Charles Griswold, David Konstan (NYU)

B.A., Liberal Arts, St. John's College

May 2007

PUBLICATIONS

"Friendship and Aristotle's Defense of Eudaimonism"—Forthcoming in *The Review of Metaphysics*

"Was Eudaimonism Ancient Greek Common Sense?"—Forthcoming in *Apeiron*

WORKS CONDITIONALLY ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION

"Reading the *Nicomachean Ethics* as an Investigation"—*Logical Analysis and the History of Philosophy*

WORKS UNDER REVIEW

"Achieving Knowledge of Logical Laws in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*"

PRESENTATIONS (* = refereed)

"Friendship and Aristotle's Defense of Eudaimonism"
National Taiwan University

December, 2018

Shenzhen Youth Scholars Forum (Sun Yat-Sen University)	December, 2018
“Was Eudaimonism Ancient Greek Common Sense?” *Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy (Christopher Newport University)	October, 2018
“The Meaning of <i>To Kalon</i> in Aristotle’s Ethics” *International Society for Neoplatonic Studies (Loyola Marymount)	June, 2018
“Moral and Non-Moral Senses of <i>To Kalon</i> .” *Fourth Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Heritage of Western Greece (Sicily Center for International Education) —Declined due to lack of travel funding	June, 2018
“Is Aristotle’s Account of Moral Virtue Inconsistent?” *Ancient Philosophy Society (Emory University)	April, 2018
“Egoism and Ancient Greek Popular Opinion” *Marquette University Graduate Conference Harvard History of Philosophy Workshop	April, 2016 March, 2016
“Aristotle’s Preliminary Definition of Friendship” *Societies for Ancient Greek Philosophy and the Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science Joint Conference (Fordham University)	October, 2015
“Injustice and the Ultimate Harm in Plato’s <i>Gorgias</i> ” *International Plato Society (Emory University)	March, 2015

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Boston University (Full Responsibility)	
<i>Classical Chinese Philosophy</i>	Spring 2019
<i>Introduction to Philosophy</i>	Spring 2017
<i>Introduction to Philosophy</i>	Fall 2016
<i>History of Ancient Philosophy</i>	Summer 2014
<i>History of Ancient Philosophy</i>	Summer 2013
Adjunct Professor, Emerson College	
<i>Comparative Western/Chinese Ethics: The Ethics of Lying</i> (x2)	Fall 2018
Visiting Assistant Professor, Georgia Southern University	
<i>Medieval Philosophy</i>	Spring 2018
<i>Introduction to Philosophy</i> (x4)	Spring 2018
<i>Ancient Philosophy</i>	Fall 2017
<i>Introduction to Philosophy</i> (x4)	Fall 2017

Teaching Assistant

<i>Reasoning & Argumentation</i> , Judd Webb	Spring 2016
<i>Introduction to Ethics</i> , Daniel Star	Spring 2015
<i>Introduction to Ethics</i> , Daniel Star	Fall 2014
<i>Introduction to Philosophy</i> , John Grey	Spring 2012
<i>Reasoning & Argumentation</i> , Judd Webb	Spring 2011
<i>Introduction to Philosophy</i> , Ian Blaustein	Fall 2011
<i>Introduction to Ethics</i> , Charles Griswold	Fall 2010

COURSEWORK (* = audit)

Ancient Philosophy

* <i>Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics</i> , David Roochnik	Spring 2014
* <i>Plato's Republic</i> , Alessandra Fussi	Fall 2013
* <i>Plato's Symposium & Phaedrus</i> , Drew Hyland	Fall 2012
* <i>Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics</i> , Robert Bartlett (Boston College)	Fall 2012
<i>Plato's Protagoras</i> , Robert Bartlett (Boston College)	Spring 2012
<i>Directed Study on Plato's Gorgias</i> , David Roochnik	Spring 2012
<i>Plato's Republic</i> , David Roochnik	Fall 2011
<i>Aristotle's Metaphysics</i> , David Roochnik	Spring 2011
<i>Plato's Late Dialogues</i> , Mitchell Miller	Spring 2010
<i>Aristotle's Politics</i> , Robert Faulkner (Boston College)	Spring 2010
<i>De Anima</i> , David Roochnik	Fall 2009

Classics

* <i>Greek Seminar: Homer's Odyssey</i> , Stephen Scully	Spring 2013
<i>Greek Prose Composition</i> , Jeffrey Henderson	Spring 2010

Nietzsche

<i>Directed Study on Nietzsche</i> , Paul Katsafanas	Fall 2011
<i>Nietzsche</i> , Krzysztof Michalski	Fall 2009

Modern and Contemporary

<i>Metaphysics</i> , David Liebesman	Spring 2011
<i>Continental Rationalism</i> , Aaron Garrett	Spring 2011
<i>Phenomenology</i> , Walter Hopp	Fall 2010
<i>Philosophical Problems of Logic & Mathematics</i> , Judd Webb	Fall 2010
<i>History of Analytic Philosophy</i> , Jaakko Hintikka	Spring 2010
<i>Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding</i> , Aaron Garrett	Fall 2009

SERVICE

Conference Chair for "Williamstown Revisited: Celebrating Allan Gotthelf and Jim Lennox's Collaboration in Aristotle Scholarship"	Summer 2018
Reviewer for American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly	Spring 2017

Book Assistance for Adam Beresford
reviewed translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*;
helped with notes, bibliography

Fall 2016-Spring 2017

Research Assistant for David Roochnik
reviewed and analyzed literature on
the composition of the *Nicomachean Ethics*

Summer 2015

Co-Organizer of Greek Reading Group at Boston University

Fall 2012-Fall 2013

AWARDS

Diamandopoulos Fellowship in Hellenic Studies (one year fellowship) 2015-16, 2013-14
Boston University Center for the Humanities Student Award (paper prize) 2015
Boston University Presidential Fellowship 2009-10

LANGUAGES

Ancient Greek (Advanced Reading); French (Basic Reading)

REFERENCES

David Roochnik—Professor
Dept. of Philosophy
Boston University
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Adam Beresford—Associate Professor
Dept. of Philosophy
University of Massachusetts, Boston
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Prof. Charles Griswold—Professor
Dept. of Philosophy
Boston University
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Teaching:

Karin Fry—Professor and Chair
Dept. of Philosophy & Religious Studies
Georgia Southern University
kfry@georgiasouthern.edu
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David Konstan—Professor
Dept. of Classics
New York University
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212-998-8597

Maria Adamos—Associate Professor
Dept. of Philosophy & Religious Studies
Georgia Southern University
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Marc Gasser-Wingate—Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy
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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Aristotle on the Impossibility of Pure Altruism

I argue that Aristotle accepts a form Psychological Eudaimonism (i.e., the view that one's own *eudaimonia* is the ultimate goal of human action) that does not in principle rule out non-instrumental concern for others; that is, since *eudaimonia* means a blessed or flourishing life, as opposed to a narrower subjective condition like "happiness," it is possible to aim at the well-being of others as an intrinsic part of one's own *eudaimonia*. Call this sort of non-instrumental concern for others that still subordinates their well-being to one's own *eudaimonia* "Impure Altruism." Nevertheless, the interpretation that Aristotle adopts Psychological Eudaimonism has been, and continues to be, challenged. I therefore elaborate, and respond to, two prominent objections that have been made against this interpretation. The first objection takes its bearing from Aristotle's statement that friends wish good things for each other "for each other's own sake." It then argues, on this basis, that friends do not benefit each other for one's own sake but rather for the sake of one's friend. And if friends do not benefit each other for one's own sake, then they do not (necessarily) aim at their own *eudaimonia* when they act. I respond to this objection by pointing out that acting for the sake of one's own *eudaimonia* does not in principle rule out acting for the sake of others' as well, insofar as their *eudaimonia* may be an intrinsic component of one's own. The second objection takes its bearing from Aristotle's claim that virtuous action is *kalon* ("noble" or "fine") and "for the sake of the *kalon*." *Kalon* actions were popularly understood to be actions of selfless beneficence. This objection then argues that Aristotle employs the popular understanding of *kalon* actions and that, as a result, he does not believe that the actions of virtuous people necessarily aim at their own *eudaimonia*. In response, I argue that he claims *kalon* actions are personal goods that are pursued by the virtuous as such.

Many scholars think that if Aristotle accepts Psychological Eudaimonism, he assumes this position and never defends it. I argue, to the contrary, that he defends Psychological Eudaimonism; that is, he defends the view that human beings act ultimately for the sake of their own *eudaimonia*. In order to establish this, I show that, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he responds to a particular challenge to this view. This challenge is the popular claim that friends care about the well-being of their friends not only in a non-instrumental way but also selflessly—that is, without subordinating the well-being of their friend to their own *eudaimonia*. Call this sort of non-instrumental concern for the well-being of another "Pure Altruism." Pure Altruism would thus appear to be a counterexample to Aristotle's Psychological Eudaimonism. I argue that Aristotle relies on three observations about friendship to make the case that it does not exemplify pure altruism. The first observation is that friendship is dissolved by prolonged distance. He concludes from this that friendship aims primarily at the presence of the friend, whose presence, he argues, is both a great pleasure and a great good and is sought as such. The second observation is that friends do not wish for their friends to become gods—i.e., perfectly blessed beings—which would result in the dissolution of their friendship. He concludes from this observation that friends care more about the personal good they find in their friendships than they do about the well-being of their friends per se. The third observation is that the reciprocation of benefits is required to preserve friendship. He concludes from this that the gifts of friends are given on the condition that they will be in some way reciprocated and so are not examples of pure altruism.