

Curriculum Vitae 2015
Cornelius (“Neil”) Francis Delaney Jr.

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Current Academic Employment:

Visiting Scholar, (sponsor Professor B. Reginster), Brown University, 2016
Teaching Professor, University of Notre Dame, 2010-present (on leave 2015-16)

Academic Employment History:

Visiting Scholar, (sponsor Professor A. Roth), Ohio State University, 2009-10
Visiting Assistant Professor, UNLV, 2008-09
Visiting Ryan Family Chair of Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy, Georgetown University 2006-08
Visiting Scholar (sponsor Professor S. Darwall), University of Michigan 2005-06
Adjunct Professor, University of San Francisco, 2005
Visiting Scholar (sponsor Professor J. Perry), Stanford University, 2004-05
Assistant Professor, Arizona State University, 1997-98 *(Resigned tenure stream appointment due to illness)
Lecturer, Princeton University, 1996-97
Tutor, Monash University, 1996

Education:

University of Warwick, MPhil. in Philosophy candidate
Yale Law School, (2000-2001)
Princeton University, Ph.D. in Philosophy (1997)
Princeton University, M.A. in Philosophy (1993)
Stanford University, B.A. in Philosophy with Honors and Distinction (1990)

Areas of Specialization:

Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Love, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy and Literature

Areas of Competence:

19th Century European Philosophy

Work in Progress:

- “Properties as Proper Grounds for Loving Persons.”
- “Schopenhauer’s Ethics of Compassion”

Articles and Reviews:

- “The Doctrine of Double Effect: Some Remarks on Intention and Evaluation,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 89, 3, 2015 pp.397-406.
- “What Romance Could Not Be,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 83, 4, 2010 pp.489-498.
- “Two Cheers for ‘Closeness’: Terror, Targeting and Double Effect,” *Philosophical Studies* 137, 3, 2008 pp.335-367.

- “Romantic Love and Loving Commitment: Articulating a Modern Ideal,” (revised version), invited for publication in German translation in Von Person zu Person (Suhrkamp Verlag), ed. Axel Honneth, August 2008.
- Review of T.A. Cavanaugh, Double Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil (Oxford, 2006), *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, October 2007.
- “A Note on Intention and the Doctrine of Double Effect,” *Philosophical Studies* 134, 2, 2007 pp.103-110.
- “To Double Business Bound: Reflections on the Doctrine of Double Effect,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 75, 4, 2001 pp.561-583.
- Review of Lansing Pollock, The Free Society (Westview Press, 1996), *Ethics* October 1997 pp.246-247.
- “Romantic Love and Loving Commitment: Articulating a Modern Ideal,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 33, 4, 1996 pp.339-356.
- “Kant’s Challenge: The Second Analogy as a Response to Hume,” *Dialogue* 32, 1990, pp.51-56.

Commissioned Work:

- “Friendship, Rivalry and Excellence,” with David Baggett, commissioned for Tennis and Philosophy (Philosophy and Popular Culture Series), University Press of Kentucky, ed. David Baggett, 2010.

Dissertation: Essays on Ethics and Action. (Princeton, 1997), Advisor: Gilbert Harman

Honors and Grants:

Departmental Scholarship, University of Warwick, 2015-16 (deferred)
 Andrew W. Mellon Graduate Prize Fellow at the Princeton University Center for Human Values 1995-96
 Andrew W. Mellon Fellowship in the Humanities 1990-93
 Robert M. Golden Award for Excellence in the Humanities and Creative Arts, Stanford University 1990
 Rhodes Scholarships Finalist 1990
 A. Bartlett Giamatti Graduate Prize, Yale University 1990 (declined)
 Phi Beta Kappa 1990 (Student Commencement Speaker)

Presentations:

“Thoughts After Anscombe: Intention, Confidence, Likelihood and Intentional Action,” UNLV February 2011.
 “What Romance Could Not Be,” UNLV August 2009
 “Revisiting Kant on the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty,” Providence College, February 2009
 “Love’s Contours: Afterthoughts and Friendly Amendments,” New Mexico State University, February 2008
 “Holistic Choice and Complex Intentions: A Sellarsian Approach to Double Effect,” UNLV, November 2007
 “Love, Motivation, Obligation,” Inaugural Baylor Symposium on Faith and Culture, Friendship: Quests for Character, Community and Truth. October 2007
 “What is Morality?,” Baruch College CUNY, January 2007
 “Two Cheers for ‘Closeness’: Terror, Targeting and the Doctrine of Double Effect,” Georgetown University, March 2006
 “Love and Truth,” University of South Carolina, January 2006

“Love, Motivation, Obligation,” University of South Carolina, January 2006
“Intention and Evaluation,” Arizona State University, February 1997

Conferences:

Commentator, “Love and Agency,” APA Eastern Division 2013
Commentator, “The Experience of Authorship and Automatic Action,” APA Central Division 2008
Chair, “Friendship in the Monastic Tradition,” Inaugural Baylor Symposium on Faith and Culture, Friendship: Quests for Character, Community and Truth. October 2007
Commentator, “Rethinking Double Effect,” Georgetown University April 2007
Chair, Colloquium, “Neurath’s Ethical Naturalism,” APA Central Division 2007
Commentator, “Plans and their Accomplishment,” American Maritain Association Meeting, APA Eastern Division 2006
Chair, Symposium, “Hobbes’ Fool Revisited,” APA Western Division 1998

Editorial:

Referee, *Mind*.
Referee, *Philosophical Studies*.
Referee, *American Philosophical Quarterly*.
Referee, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*
Referee, *Philosophical Quarterly*.
Referee, *Philosophical Psychology*.
Referee, *Oxford University Press*.
Referee, *Sophia*.
Referee, *Political Studies*.

Service:

Curriculum Committee, Arizona State University

Professional Organizations:

American Philosophical Association
American Catholic Philosophical Association
Hume Society
Melville Society

Recent Teaching:

- *College Seminar: Aspects of Love*, Spring 2015, Notre Dame
- *Ethics*, Spring 2015, Notre Dame
- *Introduction to Philosophy: The Great Conversation*, Fall 2014, Notre Dame
- *Moral Problems*, Fall 2014, Notre Dame
- *Ethics: Socratic Studies*, Spring 2014, Notre Dame
- *Kierkegaard and Nietzsche*, Spring 2014, Notre Dame
- *Ethics*, Fall 2013, Notre Dame
- *Introduction to Philosophy: God, Freedom and Justice*, Fall 2013, Notre Dame
- *Directed Readings: Early Wittgenstein*, Spring 2013, Notre Dame
- *Love and Friendship: An Introduction*, Spring 2013, Notre Dame
- *Ancient Ethics: Socrates and the Stoics*, Fall 2012, Notre Dame
- *Introduction to Philosophy*, Spring 2012, Notre Dame
- *Love and Friendship: An Introduction*, Fall 2011, Notre Dame

- *Ethics*, Spring 2011, Notre Dame
- *Critical Thinking and Reasoning*, Spring 2009, UNLV
- *Honors Critical Thinking and Reasoning*, Fall 2008, UNLV
- *Critical Thinking and Reasoning*, Fall 2008, UNLV
- *Aspects of Love: Romantic Love*, Spring 2008, Georgetown
- *Introduction to Ethics*, Spring 2008, Georgetown
- *Independent Study Tutorial: Romantic Love*, Fall 2007, Georgetown
- *Aspects of Love: Sexual Desire*, Fall 2007, Georgetown
- *Introduction to Ethics*, Fall 2007, Georgetown
- *Jurisprudence: Legal Positivism*, Spring 2007, Georgetown
- *Independent Study Tutorial: Ethics of Stem Cell Research*, Spring 2007, Georgetown
- *Introduction to Ethics*, Spring 2007, Georgetown
- *Recent Work in Moral Psychology: Aspects of Love*, Fall 2006, Georgetown
- *Introduction to Ethics*, Fall 2006, Georgetown

Recent Work and Work in Progress: Aspects of Love.

My work is currently focused on ongoing research in the philosophy of love and friendship. I taught a College Seminar this past spring at Notre Dame titled *Aspects of Love*, from which I am planning to produce a book manuscript. I describe the goals of the seminar below. I have also just completed an essay on the doctrine of double effect.

College Seminar Spring 2015: *Aspects of Love*

This seminar will consist of readings in analytic philosophy of love including Robert Solomon and Kathleen Higgins, *The Philosophy of (Erotic) Love* and A.C. Grayling's *Friendship* along with study of Soren Kierkegaard's *Stages on Life's Way* and Leo Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*. We will also be viewing a number of classic and contemporary romantic comedies and thinking about these in conjunction with some of the philosopher and film studies specialist Stanley Cavell's work. The main objective is to generate fruitful discussions of romantic love, friendship and divine love. General themes include impartiality, duty, equality, mutuality, self-love and sacrifice. More specific topics in analytic philosophy include loving persons for their properties, alternatives to this notion, the idea of love as a moral emotion, valuing relationships, romantic unions/federations, fungibility in love and friendship, jealousy, and varieties of romantic and friendly commitment.

Double Effect Reasoning

DER plays a prominent role in both bioethical and military ethical debates. Very roughly the Doctrine of Double Effect states that in some cases there is a moral difference between doings that are intended as means and those that are merely foreseen as side effects. The Doctrine is sometimes used to morally distinguish between

therapeutic hysterectomies and craniotomies on the grounds that in the first instance the death of the fetus is foreseen but unintended, and thus the operation may be permissible, whereas in craniotomies the death of the fetus is intended and thus the procedure is flatly impermissible. The Doctrine is also commonly invoked to distinguish morally legitimate targeting of enemy military installations from morally illegitimate targeting of enemy noncombatants, the latter course of action often referred to as “terror bombing.” The driving thought behind the Doctrine is that it regularly makes a moral difference whether the killing of innocents has been adopted as a means to a good end or is merely foreseen as a side effect in an action plan whose means and ends are legitimate.

Philosophers from Wilfrid Sellars, Charles Fried and Philippa Foot to Jonathan Bennett, Frances Kamm and H.L.A. Hart have proposed analyses of intention according to which what is intended in these sorts of cases varies considerably in scope. Sellars’ view is among the most inclusive in the sense that what is intended is to be broadly construed, while Hart’s is probably the most exclusive in the sense that what is intended is regularly strictly confined to ends and the precise means required to secure them. That being said, very lately I have been revising my earlier inclusive analyses of intention in favor of a Hart-style exclusive treatment according to which intention is construed rather strictly in, for instance, the craniotomy case. Rather than arguing that the doctor has a complex intention to [crush the skull and kill the fetus], as Sellars might contend, I follow Hart in suggesting that the doctor strictly intends a head modification or skull crushing with the foreseen but unintended regrettable and practically certain side effect of bringing about the death of the viable fetus.

In earlier essays I tried to do justice to Alison McIntyre’s insistence that intention simply cannot be construed so narrowly so as to leave all regrettable aspects of a chosen course of action to the side. Now I argue that in craniotomy the doctor only INTENDS the skull crushing. There are some cases where the agent seems to intend death even on the most austere counterfactual analysis--the case of Hamlet wanting to send Claudius’ soul to hell unshriven seems to be one where death is strictly intended. But in craniotomy, we should say that the doctor is fully morally responsible for the death on some other grounds than that he intends it.

Admittedly, if we do this, things get messy from the point of view of articulating a clear principle or set of principles that determine full culpability. But this approach has the virtue of leaving the concept of intention undistorted. Best that we say that an agent is fully responsible for those means that she adopts under a strict construal of intention and also fully responsible for foreseen regrettable side effects that are intimately bound up with the means at the level of practical certainty. So the intend/foreseen distinction ends up being less of a load-bearing aspect of our evaluative practices than the standard double effect theorist might have it. (Warren Quinn’s approach to DER strikes me as being immune to this criticism insofar as he relocates the point of moral significance in a distinction between direct and indirect harmful agency).

One possible objection to my currently favored approach to DER is that experimental results like the Knobe Effect suggest that our very concept of intention (or at least the adverbial modification “intentionally”) may be tied tightly to responsibility. Despite this finding I am now persuaded by writers like Kamm who want to interpret intention quite narrowly. Ascriptions of intention and descriptions of actions as having been performed intentionally should closely follow the agent’s dispositions to behave

differently under various specified counterfactual transformations. This line of thought ultimately leads me to the conclusion that DER and the Doctrine of Double Effect need to be radically reconceived as Quinn has done or significantly downplayed as evaluative apparatus.

That said, excellent brand new work on these matters by Nelkin and Rickless offers a clear and principled “tweaking” of double effect in the spirit of Quinn that seems on a first pass to resolve many of the classic hard cases satisfactorily. If their work is as successful as it strikes me at present, then the doctrine of double effect and DER may indeed live to fight another day.