
CURRICULUM VITAE

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EDUCATION:

PhD. in Philosophy, University of Georgia, May, 2017.
Dissertation: "Deontological Epistemology"
Dissertation Adviser: Sarah Wright
B.A. magna cum laude, in philosophy, 2012, Christopher Newport University

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION:

Epistemology
Philosophy of Religion

AREAS OF COMPETENCE:

Metaphysics
Logic
Early Modern Philosophy

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

As instructor of record: Introduction to Philosophy (Fall, 2015; Spring, 2016; Summer, 2016);
Ancient Philosophy (Fall, 2016); Logic and Critical Thinking (Spring, 2017)
As teaching assistant: Introduction to Philosophy (Fall, 2012; Spring, 2013; Spring, 2015);
Introduction to Ethics (Fall, 2014); Symbolic Logic (Spring, 2014)
As grader: Ancient Philosophy (Fall, 2013); 19th Century Philosophy (Fall, 2013)

PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS:

"Transworld depravity and divine omniscience." *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*. Volume 77 (3):205-218.
"Virtue and Strength in the Metaphysics of Morals"- Commentary, *Georgia Philosophical Society*, March 2014

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES:

Secretary, University of Georgia Graduate Philosophy Student Association, 2015-2016
Graduate Student Moderator, University of Georgia Department of Philosophy, 2016-2017

GRADUATE COURSES:

PHIL 6230: Aesthetics, Fall 2012. Instructor: Chris Cuomo
PHIL 8200: Seminar in Ethics, Fall 2012. Instructor: Melissa Seymour Fahmy
PHIL 8310: Seminar in Philosophy of Mind, Fall 2012. Instructor: René Jagnow
PHIL 8600: Seminar in Metaphysics, Fall 2012. Instructor: Edward Halper
PHIL 6040: British Empiricism, Spring 2013. Instructor: Ashley Dunn
PHIL 6500: Philosophy of Religion, Spring 2013. Instructor: Frank Harrison
PHIL 8010: Seminar in Modern and Continental Philosophy, Spring 2013. Instructor: Richard Winfield
PHIL 6510: Deductive Systems, Fall 2013. Instructor: Charles B. Cross
PHIL 8000: Seminar in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Fall 2013. Instructor: Bradley Bassler
PHIL 8300: Seminar in Philosophy of Language, Fall 2013. Instructor: Charles B. Cross

PHIL 8310: Seminar in Philosophy of Mind, Fall 2013. Instructor: Edward Halper
PHIL 6520: Model Theory, Spring 2015. Instructor: Charles B. Cross
PHIL 8210: Seminar in Political Philosophy, Spring 2015. Instructor: Melissa Seymour Fahmy
PHIL 8610: Seminar in Epistemology, Spring 2015. Instructor: Sarah Wright
PHIL 8900: Environmental Philosophy, Spring 2015. Instructor: Piers Stephens

AWARDS AND HONORS:

Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award, University of Georgia, Spring, 2017
Departmental Academic Achievement Scholarship, Christopher Newport University
Department of Philosophy, Fall 2011

REFERENCES:

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

The goal of my dissertation project is to defend two logically independent but related conclusions regarding epistemic justification. The first is that epistemic justification is correctly described only by a deontological theory (abbreviated hereafter as 'DCEJ,' for, 'deontological conception of epistemic justification), meaning justification is analyzed in terms of duty fulfillment. The second is that we have at least one epistemic duty: an unconditional obligation to believe the truth. The first thesis provokes something of a ground-breaking in contemporary epistemology. While the DCEJ is controversial in itself, my review of the related literature suggests no one has correctly identified what, precisely, the DCEJ is. Once one resolves this latter issue, one is faced with a set of hitherto unconsidered questions. The second thesis finds support in the strong intuition that justification and truth are importantly connected, but stands opposed to almost every theorist on epistemic justification in that it denies the possibility of justified, but false belief. Finally, given the truth of these theses, epistemic norms are incommensurable with other types of norms, meaning the importance of obeying our obligation to believe the truth cannot be weighed against the importance of any moral obligations we might face.