

CURRICULUM VITAE

RODRIGO BORGES

AOS: Epistemology.

AOC: Philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and history of philosophy (especially Plato and Descartes).

PERSONAL INFORMATION

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EDUCATION

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| 2007–2015 | PhD in Philosophy at Rutgers University, USA.
Thesis Title: Knowledge from Knowledge: An Essay on Inferential Knowledge; Committee: Peter Klein (supervisor), Ernest Sosa, Duncan Pritchard, Claudio de Almeida. |
| 2005–2007 | MA in Philosophy at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil.
Thesis Title: Skepticism, Contextualism and the Transmission of Justification; Supervisor: Claudio de Almeida. |
| 2001–2004 | BA in Philosophy at Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. |

PROFESSIONAL APPOINTMENTS

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| 2018–present | University of Florida. Lecturer. |
| 2016–2018 | Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul. Assistant Professor. |

2015–2016	FAPESP Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at University of Campinas (UNICAMP), Brazil.
2014–2015	Rutgers University. Adjunct Faculty.
2014	Montclair State University. Adjunct Faculty.

CURRENT RESEARCH

I am currently pursuing the research project *Knowledge and Reasoning*. The goal is to produce new insights into the role of knowledge in theoretical reasoning. The project is ambitious and it involves traditional and formal epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and social psychology. The research is partially funded by PUCRS and by the federal government of Brazil and it engages almost ten members between undergraduate, master's and doctorate students. Some of my recent and forthcoming work disseminates key epistemological results of this research. This work is featured in volumes of collected papers with Oxford University Press and Springer, as well as in articles in collections and journals such as *Synthese* and *Erkenntnis*. A network of philosophers in four different continents and at the top of the profession also contributes to these and other aspects of the project.

PUBLICATIONS

Volumes

- *Knowledge and Justification: New Perspectives* (Synthese) (Spring 2019, expected).

This special issue aims at updating the philosophical scholarship on knowledge and justification with new, cutting edge work in epistemology. Although the analysis of knowledge and justification has been an obsession of epistemologists since Plato's Theaetetus, much progress can still be made in our understanding of how those concepts relate to other epistemological concepts (e.g., does knowing entail safety?) and to each other (e.g., does knowledge entail justification?). This special issue is searching for work featuring new perspectives on these and other issues of interest such as the regress problem, the internalism/externalism debate, Cartesian skepticism, the question of whether knowledge is a mental state different from belief, and the question of whether justification/knowledge is partially determined by pragmatic factors.

- *Knowledge, Scepticism, and Defeat: Themes from Klein*. Co-edited with Branden Fitelson and Cherie Braden. Synthese Library. (in production)

This is a collection of new essays on the work of Peter Klein. The essays reflect the breadth and depth of Klein's work by engaging directly with his views and with the views of his interlocutors.

- *Special Epistemology Issue of Manuscripta* (v.40;n.4, 2017). Guest Editor.

With original articles from Clayton Littlejohn, John N. Williams, Fred Adams & John Barker & Murray Clarke, among others.

- *Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem* (2017). Co-edited with Peter Klein and Claudio de Almeida. Oxford University Press. (link to table of contents here)

This is an edited collection of twenty-three (23) new papers on the Gettier Problem and the issues connected with it. The set of authors includes many of the major figures in contemporary epistemology who have developed some of the well-known responses to the Problem, and the list contains some younger epistemologists who bring new perspectives to the issues raised in the literature. Together, they cover the state of the art scholarship on virtually every epistemological and methodological aspect of the Gettier Problem.

Papers

- Knowledge from Knowledge (forthcoming). *American Philosophical Quarterly*.
- Gettier and Externalism (forthcoming). S. Hetherington (ed.) *The Gettier Problem*, Cambridge University Press.
- Knowledge, Despite Evidence to the Contrary in *Knowledge, Scepticism, and Defeat*. (expected Spring 2019)

Strong views of knowledge claim that knowing cannot be defeated by counterevidence. Weak views of knowledge claim that knowing can be defeated by counterevidence. I compare recent versions of those views of knowledge – Lasonen-Aarnio’s and Peter Klein’s, respectively – and argue that both are wanting. I then offer a novel version of the strong view of knowledge, one that improves on the version previously discussed.

- On Pritchard’s *Epistemic Angst* (2017). *Manuscript*.

Critical assessment of Duncan Pritchard’s most recent book, *Epistemic Angst*. It includes a response by Pritchard.

- Inferential Knowledge and The Gettier Conjecture (2017). in *Explaining Knowledge*.

I propose and defend the conjecture that what explains why Gettiered subjects fail to know is the fact that their justified true belief depends essentially on unknown propositions. The conjecture follows from the plausible principle about inference in general according to which one knows the conclusion of one’s inference only if one knows all the premises it involves essentially.

- Introduction (2017). (with Peter Klein, and Claudio De Almeida). *Explaining Knowledge*.

The Introduction contains a section that briefly discusses the historical precursors of the Gettier problem, for example, Plato’s jury case, Russell’s stopped-clock case, and some of the medieval cases discussed by Risto Hilpinen in his contribution. But the primary objective of the Introduction is to display and discuss a range of ‘Gettier cases’ that have played an important role in the literature.

- E=K and the Gettier Problem: A Reply to Comesaña and Kantin (2017). *Erkenntnis* 82(5), 1031-1041.

A direct implication of E=K seems to be that false beliefs cannot justify other beliefs, for no false belief can be part of one's total evidence and one's total evidence is what inferentially justifies belief. The problem with this alleged implication of E=K, as Juan Comesaña and Holly Kantin (2010) have noted, is that it contradicts a claim Gettier cases rely on. The original Gettier cases relied on two principles: that justification is closed under known entailment, and that sometimes one is justified in believing a falsehood. In this paper I argue that E=K, contrary to what Comesaña and Kantin would want us to believe, is compatible with the agent being justified in believing a falsehood.

- Unreasonable Selflessness (2016). (with Felipe Medeiros). *Veritas* 61(3), 492-502.

According to Jennifer Lackey (2007), one should assert that p only if (i) it is reasonable for one to believe that p and (ii) if one asserted that p, one would assert that p at least in part because it is reasonable for one to believe that p. As data for this norm of assertion Lackey appeals to the intuition that in cases of 'selfless assertion' agents assert with epistemic propriety something they don't believe. If that norm of assertion was true, then it would explain why selfless assertions are epistemically proper. In this paper we offer a *reductio ad absurdum* of this view. The result is that selfless assertions are not epistemically appropriate.

- Bad Luck for the Anti-Luck Epistemologist (2016). *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*. v.54(4). 463-479.

Anti-luck epistemologists tell us that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck and that epistemic luck is just a special case of luck in general. Much work has been done on the intricacies of the first claim. In this paper I scrutinize the second claim. I argue that it does not survive scrutiny. I then offer an analysis of luck that explains the relevant data and avoids the problems from which the current views of luck suffer. However, this analysis of luck is of no help to the anti-luck epistemologist for it uses knowledge to explain luck, making this account of knowledge circular. The main lesson is that the only viable analysis of luck is not suited for the anti-luck epistemologist's coveted non-circular analysis of knowledge.

- A Failed Twist to an Old Problem: A Reply to John N. Williams (2016). *Logos and Episteme* VII, 1. (volume contains a rejoinder from Williams)

This is a reply to John N. Williams' paper 'Not Knowing You Know: A New Objection to the Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge' (2015). That paper argues that Peter Klein's defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has (first-order) a posteriori knowledge. Klein himself answered a version of this objection in his (1971). Williams' paper adds a new twist to the 1971 objection. I argue that Williams' objection misses its target because of this new twist.

- On Synchronic Dogmatism (2015). *Synthese* 192 (11), 3677-3693.

Saul Kripke (2011) argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism (i.e., the view that, if one knows that *p*, then one may rationally decide now to disregard any future evidence against *p* one may encounter). According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the literature is mistaken.

- How to Moore a Gettier: Notes on the Dark Side of Knowledge (2014). *Logos and Episteme*, V 4, I 2, 2014, p.133-140.

The Gettier Problem and Moore's Paradox are related in a way that is unappreciated by philosophers. If one is in a Gettier situation, then one is also in a Moorean situation. The fact that *S* is in a Gettier situation (the fact that *S* is "Gettiered"), like the fact that *S* is in a Moorean situation (the fact that *S* is "Moored"), cannot (in the logical sense of "cannot") be known by *S* while *S* is in that situation. The paper starts the job of mapping what can be said about this feature of Gettier situations. The goal is to stimulate further exploration into this yet uncharted territory.

GRANTS, SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS

2014–2015	Graduate Assistantship. Rutgers University.
2015	Teaching Award (nominated by the Rutgers Philosophy Department).
2012–2014	Teaching Assistantship. Rutgers University.
2007–2012	Fulbright Scholarship.
2012	Summer Mellon Grant.
2011	Rutgers Graduate Travel Grant.

COURSES TAUGHT

Graduate	<p>Knowledge and Certainty.</p> <p>Philosophy of Mind (co-taught with Nythamar de Oliveira, Fabricio Pontin, and John Bolender).</p> <p>Seminar on Defeasible Reasoning and Knowledge First Epistemology.</p> <p>Seminar on Inferential Knowledge and Knowledge First Epistemology.</p> <p>Seminar in Neurophilosophy (co-taught with Nythamar de Oliveira and Fabricio Pontin).</p>
Undergraduate	Philosophy of Science.

Ethics and Citizenship.
Foundations of Logical Reasoning.
Introduction to Philosophical Thinking and Ethics.
Theory of Knowledge.
Knowledge and Assertion (online and traditional).
Introduction to Logic (online and traditional).
Introduction to Philosophy (online and traditional).
Current Moral and Social Issues (online and traditional).
Current Movements in Philosophy.
Descartes, Locke and the Seventeenth Century (online).

PRESENTATIONS

- 2018 Paper: *Knowledge, Despite Evidence to the Contrary*. Wichita State University.
- Paper: *Knowledge, Despite Evidence to the Contrary*. University of Florida.
- Paper: *Knowledge, Despite Evidence to the Contrary*. East Carolina University, department talk.
- Paper: *Gettier and Externalism*. East Carolina University, public talk.
- 2017 Paper: *Knowledge, Despite Evidence to the Contrary*. 1st Colloquium Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Federal University of Santa Maria.
- Paper: *Knowledge, Despite Evidence to the Contrary*. XIII Epistemology Colloquium, PUCRS.
- Paper: *Knowledge: A Lifetime Commitment*. Workshop on Probability, PUCRS.
- Paper: *Knowledge and Certainty*. Philosophy Club, East Carolina University.
- 2016 Paper: *A Knowledge First Account of Defeasible Reasoning*. XVII Meeting of the National Association of Graduate Programs in Philosophy.
- Paper: *The Knowledge Norm of Inference*. XVI Academic Week of the Graduate Program in Philosophy at PUCRS.
- Paper: *Defeating Objections to Group Knowledge*. V Social Epistemology Conference.

- Paper: *A Knowledge-First Account of Epistemic Defeat*. IV Colombian Conference on Logic, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. (Paper accepted)
- 2015 Paper: *Knowledge from Knowledge*. Second Epistemology Colloquium.
- 2014 Paper: *Knowledge from Knowledge*. Eighth Biennial University of Rochester Graduate Epistemology Conference. Fall 2014 Meeting of the Indiana Philosophical Association. 2014 Conference of the Florida Philosophical Association.
- Paper: Reply to Brendan Murday's "On Klein's Argument for Informatism" at the 2014 meeting of the Central States Philosophical Association Conference.
- 2013 Paper: *Inferential Knowledge and the Gettier Problem*. Swarthmore College - Epistemology reading group.
- 2012 Paper: *Selfless Assertions and Moore's Paradox*. Washington and Jefferson College – Pittsburgh Area Philosophy Colloquium; University of Minho, Portugal - National Meeting of the Portuguese Society for Analytic Philosophy (paper selected); 50th Annual Alabama Philosophical Society Conference (paper selected).

REFEREE WORK

Analysis.
 Episteme.
 Philosophical Studies.
 Synthese.
 The Southern Journal of Philosophy.
 Topoi.
 Veritas.
 Manuscripta.