

# DALE LEE CLARK

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## Areas of Specialization

Moral Psychology  
Moral Philosophy  
Epistemology  
Business Ethics

## Areas of Competence

Philosophy of Religion  
Applied Ethics  
Ancient Philosophy  
Modern Philosophy

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## Current Appointment

LECTURER: The University of South Dakota

## Previous Appointments

INSTRUCTOR: The University of Hong Kong

SENIOR INSTRUCTOR, ASSISTANT CURRICULUM DEVELOPER, HEAD OF INSTRUCTOR TRAINING: Foundation Global Education, Hong Kong, SAR

SENIOR LECTURER: Philosophy/Business Ethics, University of Texas at San Antonio, Department of Management, Business School

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## Education

*Doctor of Philosophy*, Philosophy, University of Utah

Fall 2011

Dissertation: *First-Person Authority: A Necessary But Temporary Condition Of Expertise*  
Committee: Elijah Millgram (Chair), Shaun Nichols, Ronald Mallon, Chrisoula Andreou,  
and John Hardwig

*Bachelor of Arts with Honors*, Philosophy, California State University Chico

Spring 2001

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## Publications

"Aesops Fox: Consequentialist Virtue Meets Egocentric Bias," *Philosophical Psychology*, Vol. 22, No. 6, December 2009, 727-737

"Authorship: Credit and Responsibility," co-authored with Leslie Francis and Bryan Benham, *Research Administration and Management*, ed. E. Kulakowski & L. Chronister. (Jones and Bartlett, 2006)

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## Awards/Fellowships/Grants

- Best Undergraduate Instructor, School of Business Student Council, University of Texas at San Antonio 2012
- Award for Teaching Excellence, School of Business Honors Society; University of Texas at San Antonio 2012
- Tanner Fellowship, Philosophy Department; University of Utah 2007
- Graduate Instructor of the Year; University of Utah 2004-2005
- Scientific Integrity Fellowship; University of Utah 2004
- Doc Abernethy Scholarship 2003
- Graduate Student Book Award; University of Utah 2002-2003
- Phi Sigma Tau Award for Academic Excellence 2001

## Presentations

- “Knowing One’s Mind: The Presupposition that Informed Consent Cannot Meet,” Invited Guest Speaker for Pre-Med Society, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX, April 2012
- “First-Person Authority: A Necessary but Temporary Condition of Expertise,” Dissertation Defense, University of Utah; Salt Lake City, Utah, December 2011
- Respondent to Jennifer Rowe, “A Priorism, Essentialism, and Wittgensteins Scientific Objector,” Intermountain West Philosophy Conference (University of Utah); Salt Lake City, Utah, February 2006
- “Aesops Fox: Consequential Virtue meets Egocentric Bias,” American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division), December 2005
- Respondent to Nat Hansen, “Groucho’s Joke,” Intermountain West Philosophy Conference (University of Utah); Salt Lake City, Utah, February 2005
- “Vice Virtue,” Intermountain West Philosophy Conference (University of Utah); Salt Lake City, Utah, February 2005
- Respondent to John Beer, “The Significance of Form in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy,” Intermountain West Philosophy Conference (University of Utah); Salt Lake City, Utah, February 2004.
- “Skilled Disconnections,” Rosenblatt Jr. Lecture (University of Utah); Salt Lake City, Utah, October 2003.

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## Teaching Experience

Graduate Seminar: International Ethics  
Seminar: Advanced Moral Theory  
Knowledge and Reality  
Biomedical Ethics  
Environmental Ethics  
Professional Ethics

Social and Ethical Issues in Business  
Ethical Dilemmas  
God, Faith and Reason  
Comparative Contemporary World Religion  
Introduction to Philosophy  
Logic and Critical Thinking

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## Service

- Referee: Polish Journal of Philosophy, 2012-present
- Voting Member, Standing Committee on Parking and Traffic, University of Texas at San Antonio, 2011-2013
- Management Department Library Liaison, School of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio, 2011-2013
- Faculty Advisor for Young Democrats of University of Texas at San Antonio, 2011-present
- Judge, Texas Regional Ethics Bowl, St. Mary’s University, San Antonio, TX, 2011, 2012, 2013
- Judge, Future Business Leaders of America National Leadership Conference, San Antonio, TX, 2011, 2012
- Community Judge, National Christian Forensics and Communications Association, New Braunfels, TX, 2012, 2013, 2014
- Chair, Intermountain West Philosophy Conference, 2004, 2005
- Co-Coordinator, Intermountain West Philosophy Conference, 2004, 2005
- Vice-President, University of Utah Student Philosophical Association, 2002-2003
- Treasurer, University of Utah Student Philosophical Association, 2001-2002

- Vice-President, Phi Sigma Tau, Chico Chapter, 2000-2001
- Co-Coordinator, “Mental Crossroads: Intersections Between Philosophy and Psychology,” Conference(California State University Chico); Chico, CA, 2000

# Dissertation Summary

## FIRST-PERSON AUTHORITY: A NECESSARY BUT TEMPORARY CONDITION OF EXPERTISE

*Committee: Elijah Millgram (Chair), Shaun Nichols, Ron Mallon, Chrisoula Andreou, and John Hardwig*

Most people are acquainted with their mental life. When I say what I am thinking the presumption is that I know what I think. Moreover, when I report what I am thinking, justification is rarely expected. Lack of evidence does not undermine my sincerity or convictions about the content of my mind; nor does it weaken the confidence that others have in my ability to pronounce on the matter accurately. This is just one consequence of the generic assumption of first-person authority. In my thesis, I explicate the need for, and subsequently propose a new understanding of, first-person authority.

I document the claim that an early focus on epistemic justification has led to a misunderstanding with regard to the role first-person authority can and should play within epistemology. Previous accounts of first-person authority are motivated by epistemological objectives: in particular, they are meant to address a general skepticism about the possibility of theoretical, or propositional knowledgewhat Ryle called knowledge-that. I provide empirical evidence that the existence and quality of first person authority as it pertains to this kind of knowledge is regularly both transient, and unreliable. I next document the claim that experts in various domains exhibit qualitatively different problem solving methods from novices. In line with this data, I argue that first-person authority is not of philosophical interest as an anchor for knowledge-that; what is of interest is its role in a temporary precondition of being able to learn and do things wellthat is, of acquiring Ryles knowledge-how.

My methodology is congruent with recent and promising work in experimental philosophy, a recent move in the field that emphasizes bringing empirical research to bear on various philosophical issues. Much research in this relatively new field relies almost exclusively on asking people for their intuitions: that is, asking them to report what is going on in their minds. My work on first-person authority will contribute to the field by challenging the reliability of such intuition-based methodologies; if my thesis is correct, we need to reassess this kind of self-reporting.

Moreover, on my account, expertise significantly reduces persons' capacity to report on what is involved in exhibiting their expertise. This suggests a startling consequence for pedagogy in general, namely, that those who are the best in a field are not particularly well suited to teach in that field. The adage, those who can't do, teach, it turns out, may not be so much an affront to good sense as it is good counsel.

My new account of first-person authority also speaks to both traditional as well as contemporary concerns for Virtue Ethics. A major criticism of Aristotle's ethical theory is that it does not counsel a specific decision procedure to recommend virtuous action. If we cannot identify any codifiable principles upon which to base our list of the virtues, it is unclear how to distinguish virtuous dispositions to behave from characters that nonetheless seem quite vicious. My account of first-person authority provides an empirically informed explanation for why Aristotle fails to provide a useful procedure for acquiring virtue.

Concomitantly, my view also points to why most contemporary attempts at identifying the virtues themselves should prove equally unsuccessful. While my criticism is specifically directed at deontological attempts, I argue that the problem is actually a general one.

Finally, my research suggests that procedures intended to promote self-determination or autonomy within bioethics must be revised. Patient autonomy is promoted by informed consent, and both patients and institutions currently proceed on the assumption that having the options explained by a highly skilled medical services providersay, by one's surgeonis the best way to guarantee that consent is informed. On my account of first-person authority, those who best perform those procedures are ill-suited to explain them. Informed consent procedures require more self-aware—and therefore less skilled—informants.

## References

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### **Shaun Nichols**

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### **John Hardwig**

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### **Joseph J. Tinguely**

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