

Scott Simmons

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Columbus, OH 43212

Areas of Specialization: Environmental Ethics, Animal Ethics, Metaethics

Areas of Competence: Medical Ethics, Philosophy of Death & Dying

EDUCATION:

- PhD Bowling Green State University: Applied Philosophy Aug 2020
Dissertation: *Nihilism and Argumentation: A Weakly Pragmatic Defense of Authoritatively Normative Reasons*
Committee: Michael Weber (Chair), Christian Coons, Molly Gardner, Sara Worley, Terence Cuneo (University of Vermont)
- MA Bowling Green State University: Applied Philosophy May 2014
- BA Hiram College: Philosophy, Biomedical Humanities May 2009

PUBLICATIONS

- “Liberty For Corvids,” with M. Wells and D. Klimas, in *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Vol 31. No. 3. (2017).
- “How To Evolve a Good of Your Own: The Biological Interests of Instant Organisms,” in *Designer Biology: The Ethics of Intensively Engineering Biological and Ecological Systems*, J. Basl and R. L. Sandler, eds. 255-275. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books (2013).

EMPLOYMENT

- Owens Community College (Findlay, OH), Instructor, Fall 2019 – Fall 2021 (2 courses, 11 sections)
- Rhodes State College (Lima, OH), Instructor, Fall 2019 – Fall 2021 (1 course, 3 sections)
- Hiram College (Hiram, OH), Instructor, Spring 2017 – Spring 2020 (2 courses, 5 sections)
- Bowling Green State University (Bowling Green, OH), Instructor, Fall 2016 – Spring 2020 (6 courses, 27 sections)

COURSES TAUGHT:

Owens Community College (11)

Online (Synchronous & Asynchronous)

Principles of Ethics (x5)

Medical Ethics (x6)

Rhodes State College (3)

Introduction to Philosophy (x3)

Hiram College (5)

Blended (In-Person & Online):

Environmental Ethics (x3)

Contemporary Moral Problems (x2)

Bowling Green State University (27)

In-Person (19):

Introduction to Philosophy (x3)

Introduction to Ethics (x2)

Contemporary Moral Issues (x9)

Medical Ethics (x2)

Philosophy of Death & Dying (x2)

Philosophy of Punishment

Online (8):

Introduction to Ethics (x3)

Contemporary Moral Issues (x2)

Philosophy of Death & Dying (x3)

PRESENTATIONS

Pedagogy

“In Defense of ‘No Questions Asked’ Extensions on Assignments,” American Association of Philosophy Teachers - American Philosophical Association (AAPT-APA) Teaching Hub at the APA, Central Division meeting, February 26, 2020 (virtual poster session)

Research

“An Epistemological Tension in Defenses of Normative Error Theory,” Rocky Mountains Ethics Conference (RoME), August 9, 2019 (poster session).

“The Easy Defense of the Feathered Apes (and the Hard Problems it Raises),” Ohio Philosophical Association Annual Conference, April 11, 2015, Baldwin Wallace University, Berea, Ohio.

“The Easy Defense of the Feathered Apes (and the Hard Problems it Raises),” Kent State University Graduate Conference, March 14, 2014, Kent State University.

SERVICE

Ethics Bowl Judge, Upper Midwest Regional Ethics Bowl Competition, Oakland University, 2017.

Workshop Lead Organizer, Bowling Green State Third Annual Graduate Workshop in Applied Ethics: “The Ethics of Emerging Technologies,” November 6-7, 2015.

Workshop Assistant, Bowling Green State University Workshop in Applied Ethics, 2011-2014, 2016.

Graduate Student Senate, Philosophy Dept. Representative, Bowling Green State University, 2010-2011.

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Nibilism and Argumentation: A Weakly Pragmatic Defense of Authoritatively Normative Reasons

Common judgments presuppose that some norms generate weightier, more legitimate or more authoritative normative reasons than others (e.g. the judgment that Gyges should not murder the king, because morality outweighs prudence). Yet there are powerful arguments for the view that the phenomenon of normative authority is illusory. My dissertation argues that the plausibility of these error theoretic arguments provides powerful support for the reality of normative authority. To do this, I argue that the theoretical power of error theoretic arguments can only be fully vindicated by the assumption that there are some norms that are authoritative for argumentative activity. My argument begins from a series of observations about how even unsound arguments can still be partial theoretical successes. I argue that the best explanation of this is that even unsound arguments can still make it rational to accept their conclusion. I then argue that rationality in the relevant sense must mean authoritative norms for argumentative success. This follows because any attempt to explain argumentative success by appeal to non-authoritative norms must grant that some of these norms are privileged, in at least some contexts. I then argue that any account of what this privileging consists in would just be an account of normative authority, even if a highly relativistic one.

REFERENCES

Teaching Reference

Molly Gardner

Assistant Professor of Philosophy
The University of Florida
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Research & Teaching References

Michael Weber

Professor of Philosophy, Chair
Bowling Green State University
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Richard Yetter Chappell

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