

Andrew D. Garland

curriculum vitae

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Education

Ph.D. PHILOSOPHY, University of Virginia, 2020

M.A. PHILOSOPHY, Virginia Tech, 2011

M.Ed. MATHEMATICS, Bob Jones University, 2007

B.A. HUMANITIES *cum laude*, Bob Jones University, 2005

Publications

ENCYCLOPEDIA ARTICLES

“Atoms” and “Pierre Bayle,” in *A Jonathan Edwards Encyclopedia*, ed. Harry S. Stout, Kenneth Minkema, and Adriaan Neele (William B. Eerdmans, 2017).

Research Experience

Hecht-Levi Fellow, Berman Institute of Bioethics, Johns Hopkins University, 2020-

Also affiliated with the NIH Collaboratory Ethics and Regulatory Core

Presentations

CONFERENCES

- “Can Conscience Provide Basic Moral Knowledge?” Evangelical Philosophical Society, 2016
- Comments on “Intertheoretic Value Comparison: A Modest Proposal,” by Christian Tarsney, Virginia Philosophical Association, 2016
- “Fanatics and Political Liberalism,” St. Louis University Graduate Conference, 2010
- “Roger Williams and Liberty of Conscience,” University of Kentucky Graduate Conference, 2010
- Comments on “Practical Reasoning and the Nature of Obedience” by Kory DeClark, Virginia Tech Graduate Philosophy Conference, 2010

- Comments on “Roush’s Theory of Evidence: The Best of Both Worlds?” by Bengt Autzen, Virginia Tech Graduate Philosophy Conference, 2009

WORKSHOPS

- “Divine Command Theory”, University of Virginia Ethics Tea Party, November 2014
- Philosophy of Statistics Workshop, Virginia Tech, April 2009

Awards and Fellowships

Mellon Fellowship in Digital Humanities, 2014-2015

Teaching

TEACHING ASSISTANT

Introduction to Moral and Political Philosophy (Sam Duncan), Fall 2012

Early Modern Philosophy (Walter Ott), Spring 2013

Introduction to Philosophy (Jesse Newton), Spring 2013

Philosophical Problems in the Law (A. John Simmons), Spring 2014

The Meaning of Life (Wlater Ott), Fall 2014

International Political Philosophy (Sahar Akhtar), Fall 2015

Introduction to Moral and Political Philosophy (Loren Lomasky), Spring 2016

Professional Associations

American Philosophical Association, September 2010–

Society of Christian Philosophers, September 2010–

Evangelical Philosophical Society, January 2011–

Dissertation summary

Conscience: An essay in moral epistemology

Conscience used to be a common topic in moral philosophy, but it has retreated into limited domains over the last 150 years or so. As a result, some of the variety of views about conscience have been lost. In the early modern British tradition, conscience frequently refers to a special cognitive faculty for acquiring particular moral knowledge about one’s own actions. This view fits the common-sense, ordinary view of conscience as used in other intellectual domains and in common discourse. On this view, conscience produces appearances of right and wrong by means of a distinctive kind of experience. Beliefs based on conscience are more like beliefs based on perception than on deliberation. This perceptual model explains why experiences of conscience can be so compelling and

persistent, while also explaining why conscience is fallible. But conscience can still supply adequate grounds for rational beliefs about the moral quality of my actions. Conscience produces presentations of right and wrong, and these presentations are justified in ways similar to other commonplace presentations. Conscience's limits do not make it useless, or even inferior to other sources of moral knowledge. This theory of conscience can explain the typical platitudes about conscience's role in society. Conscience is a way to resist social consensus, even against state coercion. But it is not infallible or decisive. The folk conception of conscience can account for common intuitions about conscience in society better than other common conceptions of conscience. It is still worth cultivating a clear conscience, and common platitudes about respecting conscience remain in force.

Last updated: October 15, 2020