

Jeonggyu Lee

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Last Updated: March 2019

Employment

Lecturer

Seoul National University, South Korea

2018 - present

Korea Military Academy, South Korea

2018

Education

Ph.D. Philosophy

2018

University of California, Santa Barbara, USA

M.A. Philosophy

2015

University of California, Santa Barbara, USA

Ph.D. Student Philosophy

2009 - 2012

Seoul National University, South Korea

M.A. Western Philosophy

2009

Seoul National University, South Korea

B.A. Philosophy

2007

Seoul National University, South Korea

B.S. Physics Education

2007

Seoul National University, South Korea

Interests

Areas of Specialization

Philosophy of Language

Areas of Competence

Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, Logic

Publications (in peer-reviewed journals)

- "Against Predicativism about Names" (2018) *Philosophical Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1187-3>
- "In Defense of Hume's Skeptical Argument against Induction" (2015) *Chulhak (Philosophy)* 123: 153-169.
- "Contextualism, Relativism, and the 'Faultless Disagreement'" (2012) *Chulhakjuk Bunsuk (Philosophical Analysis)* 26: 45-73.
- "On the Problem of Fixing the Reference of a Name and a New Description Theory" (in Korean) (2010) *Chulhak (Philosophy)* 102: 81-107.

Work in Progress

- "Tracking down the Conditions for Singular Thought" (*under review*)
- "The Myth of Descriptive Names: We Still Do not Know When Newman2 Will Be Born" (*under review*)
- "Knowing What Conditions for Singular Thought Are Not" (*under review*)
- "Sherlock Holmes Is a Particular Arbitrary Detective" (*in progress*)
- "How to Create Vulcan" (*in progress*)
- "Thinking about My (nonexistent possible future) Baby" (*in progress*)

Presentations (*refereed)

- "The Myth of Descriptive Names: We Still Do not Know When Newman2 Will Be Born" *the Society for Exact Philosophy*, York University (May 2019)*
- "Tracking down the Conditions for Singular Thought" *American Philosophical Association Central Division Colloquium Session*, Denver (February 2019)*
Western Canadian Philosophical Association, Calgary (Paper accepted, but could not attend) (October 2018)*
Conference on Contemporary Philosophy in East Asia, National Chengchi University, Taiwan (August 2018)*
Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Grad Conference, Stanford University (May 2018)*
- "Against Predicativism about Names" *Seongkyunkwan University, Institute of Philosophy Conference* (December 2018) (Invited)
the Society for Exact Philosophy, University of Connecticut (May 2018)*
American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Colloquium Session, San Diego (March 2018)*
University of Connecticut Grad Conference, University of Connecticut (Paper accepted, but could not attend) (March 2018)*
Central States Philosophical Association, Washington University in St. Louis (October 2017)*
- "Knowing-wh and Singular Thought" *Grad Colloquium*, University of California, Santa Barbara (December 2016)
- "In Defense of Skepticism about Knowing Contingent Truths *A Priori*" *Conference on Contemporary Philosophy in East Asia*, Seoul National University, South Korea (August 2016)*
- "Logical Pluralism as Contextualism" *Language & Epistemology Workshop*, Yonsei University, South Korea (September 2014)

- "Contextualism, Relativism, and the 'Faultless Disagreement'"
*Seoul Philosophy Graduate Student Conference, Yonsei International Campus, South Korea (May 2012)**
- "Towards a New Description Theory of Reference"
BESETO Conference of Philosophy, Peking University, Beijing, China (January 2011)
- "A New Description Theory of Reference Fixing and a Solution to Semantic Objections"
BESETO Conference of Philosophy, Seoul National University, South Korea (January 2010)
- "The Fundamentality of Success in Science"
BESETO Conference of Philosophy, University of Tokyo, Japan (January 2009)
- "Is A Posteriori Necessary Truth Possible?"
*World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul National University, South Korea (July - August 2008)**
- "The Problem of Reference in Science"
Philosophy Graduate Workshop, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong (February 2008)

Comments

- "Nihilism is an Ethos for Vague Language" (David Sackris)
Central States Philosophical Association, Washington University in St. Louis (October 2017)

Teaching Experience and Certificates

Lecturer, Seoul National University 2018 - present

- Logic (Winter 2018, Fall 2018)
- Graduate Seminar in Epistemology (Fall 2018)

Lecturer, Korean Military Academy 2018

- Philosophy and Ethics (Fall 2018)

Teaching Assistant, University of California, Santa Barbara 2013 - 2018

- **PHIL 1** - Short Introduction to Philosophy (Spring 2015)
- **PHIL 3** - Critical Thinking (Fall 2013, Winter 2014, Spring 2014, Fall 2014, Winter 2015, Summer 2015, Winter 2016, Spring 2016, Summer 2016, Summer 2017, Fall 2017, Spring 2018)
- **PHIL 4** - Introduction to Ethics (Winter 2018)
- **PHIL 20C** - History of Philosophy (Spring 2017)
- **PHIL 183** - Beginning Modern Logic (Fall 2015, Fall 2016, Winter 2017)

Teaching Assistant, Seoul National University 2010 - 2012

- Contemporary Western Philosophy (Spring 2012)
- Logic and Critical Thinking (Summer 2011)
- Symbolic Logic (Spring 2010)

Teaching Practicum

Physics, Seoul National University Girl's Middle School

May - June 2005

Certificates

Teacher's Licence in Physics

Certificated by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of Korea

2007

Scholarships and Awards

Scholarships

- The Ralph W. Church Scholarship, University of California, Santa Barbara (2012 – 2017)
- The Brain Korea 21 Scholarship, Department of Philosophy, Seoul National University (2007 – 2012)
- Full Scholarship, Department of Philosophy, Seoul National University (2012)
- Honor Student Scholarship, Department of Physics Education, Seoul National University (2002-2006)

Awards

- The Aida and Philip F. Siff Prize in Philosophy for Best Essay, University of California, Santa Barbara (2018)
- The Woogok Grand Prize for the Best M.A. Thesis, Department of Philosophy, Seoul National University (2009)
- The Myungkyung Grand Prize for the Best B.A. Thesis, Department of Philosophy, Seoul National University (2007)
- The Excellence Prize for Essay Writing Competition, Center for Teaching and Learning, Seoul National University (2006)

Professional Service

Journal Referee

Erkenntnis (2019)

Proofreading Assistant, Seoul National University Institute of Philosophy

2011 - 2012

Philosophical Investigation on Mind (in Korean), Seoul National University Press. (An introductory philosophy book for undergraduates)

Project Team Member, Korean Research Memory in Korean Research Foundation

2007 - 2011

Online Database Construction Project for Philosophy and Religion

Short Dissertation Abstract

Tracking down the Conditions for Singular Thought

Supervisor: Nathan Salmon

Committee Members: Daniel Korman, Teresa Robertson

In my dissertation, I investigate the conditions for having singular thought. I defend a moderate version of the acquaintance theory of singular thought by arguing that a subject must grasp a certain track of an object in order to have singular thought. I then address the intimately related issues of whether there is contingent *a priori* knowledge and whether names are predicates.

Long Dissertation Abstract

Tracking down the Conditions for Singular Thought

Supervisor: Nathan Salmon

Committee Members: Daniel Korman, Teresa Robertson

The primary aim of my dissertation is to investigate the conditions for having a singular thought, a thought directly about an object. For example, if I think about Bruno Mars that he is a musician, I have a singular thought about Mars, while if I simply think that the winner of the American Music Award for Artist of the Year in 2017 is a musician, I only have a descriptive thought regarding Mars. In the dissertation, I criticize existing theories on singular thought and defend a new version of the acquaintance theory; I suggest the trackability condition for singular thought: in order for a subject S to have a singular thought about an object O , S must be able to track down O in principle.

After arguing that there is a substantial constraint, I consider two exiting attempts to articulate it: First, I consider the existing acquaintance theories and argue that there are some intuitive cases for having singular thought that even the moderate notion of acquaintance cannot cover. Second, I criticize the so-called “knowing-wh” constraint on singular thought, according to which we must know what an object is in order to think about it. I analyze the concept of knowing-wh and argue that knowing-wh is neither necessary nor even sufficient for singular thought.

I then suggest *trackability* as the condition for singular thought: in order for a subject S to have a singular thought about an object O , S must grasp a certain track of O . In principle, S will encounter the very object O at the starting point of the track if she keeps following the track she grasps. I argue that this tracking idea provides a unified explanation for various cases involving singular thought. Then I provide responses to Hawthorne and Manley’s objections against a substantial constraint on singular thought.

Investigating the conditions for having a singular thought is intimately related to other issues. First, it sheds light on the debate about the contingent *a priori*. With my view on singular thought, I argue against the possibility of knowing the contingent singular propositions *a priori*. I start by clarifying the argument for the contingent *a priori* and point out one implicit assumption the argument for the contingent *a priori* hinges on, which is the real issue behind the contingent *a priori*: the assumption that stipulative linguistic knowledge can play a justificatory role in having extra-linguistic knowledge in question. I argue that this assumption is implausible and, hence, so is the argument for the contingent *a priori*.

Second, since we usually directly think about an object by using its name, the issue is also related to the debate between referentialism and predicativism about names, the view that names which occur in argument positions have the same type of semantic contents as predicates. To defend the referentialist view that the semantic content of a name is simply its reference, I present three objections to predicativism – the modal, the epistemic, and the translation objections – and show that they succeed even against the more sophisticated versions of predicativism defended by Fara and Bach.

In future work, I plan to show that the tracking account of singular thought has serious ramifications for singular thought about abstract, fictional, and possible objects.