

# EUNHONG LEE

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## EDUCATION

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- 2020 – 2026 (Expected)      **Ph.D., Philosophy, University of Nebraska-Lincoln**  
Dissertation: *Beyond Fittingness: A Pragmatic Defense of Emotional Rationality*  
Committee: John Brunero (Chair), Mark van Roojen, Aaron Bronfman,  
Carrie Heitman
- 2014 – 2018      **M.A., Philosophy, Chung-Ang University**  
Thesis: *Against Fischer's Semi-Compatibilism: On Compatibility between  
Determinism and Moral Responsibility*  
Advisor: Jae-ho Lee
- 2011 – 2014      **B.A., Philosophy, Chung-Ang University (Summa cum laude)**  
Senior Thesis: *Time and Persistence in Kant's Refutation of Idealism*

## RESEARCH AREA

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- AOS      Philosophy of Emotion, Metaethics, Social and Political Philosophy  
AOC      Normative Ethics, Applied Ethics, Philosophy of Mind

## PUBLICATION

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[“Explanation, Moral Responsibility, and Incompatibilism”](#)  
[Philosophical Investigation 42 \(2016\): 107 – 138](#)

## FELLOWSHIPS AND HONORS

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### 2025

- The Fling Fellowship (for 2025-2026 Academic Year): University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Graduate Studies ([Link](#)) Awarded \$20,000 stipend, full tuition, fees, health insurance, and \$750 travel allowance.
- Digital Humanities Summer Fellowship (2025 summer): Funded by the Center for Digital Research in the Humanities (University of Nebraska-Lincoln) ([Link](#)) for Philosopher Robert C. Solomon Digital Archive: Mapping Emotion, Existentialism, and Ethics. *Award: \$4500.*
- Teaching Assistantship (2020-2025): University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Philosophy Department, Awarded stipend, full tuition, and health insurance.
- Travel Award: Presented by the philosophy department at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln for travel to the AGENT 2025 conference. *Award: \$500.*
- Graduate Student Travel Award: Presented by the University of Nebraska-Lincoln for travel to the Uehiro 2025 conference. *Award: \$500.*

- Graduate Travel Awards Program (GTAP), presented by the Graduate Student Assembly (GSA) for travel to the Uchiro 2025 conference. *Award: \$600.*

## 2024

- Center for Transformative Teaching (CTT) Teaching Grant: Awarded for the proposal, “Ethics of Generative A.I.: Incorporating ChatGPT in Philosophy Classes.” [[Link](#)] *Award: \$1,000*
- Graduate Student Excellence in Mentoring Award: Recognized by the University of Nebraska-Lincoln for contributions in student mentoring. [[Link](#)] *Award: \$1,000*
- Travel Award: Presented by the philosophy department at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln for travel to the APPE 2024 conference. *Award: \$500.*
- Graduate Student Travel Award: Presented by the University of Nebraska-Lincoln for travel to the EWPC 2024 conference. *Award: \$500.*

## 2022

- Outstanding Graduate Teaching Assistant Award: Presented by the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. [[Link](#)] *Award: \$1,000*

## 2014-2016

- Excellent Student Scholarships for M.A.: Awarded from Chung-Ang University (Received full tuition from 2014 to 2016)
- 2<sup>nd</sup> Prize, “Jong-Hee Hwang’s Critical Succession of Tradition – Social and Educational Aspects” (2014), The Korean Society for Chinese Studies, Graduate Student Award.

## 2011-2014

- Graduated early with *Summa cum laude* honors
- Department Honor Scholarship: Awarded to the top student in the department for the semester. (Fall 2013, Spring 2013, Spring 2011)
- Department Secondary Honor Scholarship: Awarded to the second-highest-ranking student in the department for the semester. (Fall 2014, Fall 2012)

## PRESENTATIONS

### 2026

- “Why Do 'Pragmatic Reasons for Emotions' Matter for Social Integration?” Eastern Division APA (American Philosophical Association), January 7-10.
- “Freedom through Talking to Yourself: Inner Speech and Frankfurtian Free Will,” Central Division APA (American Philosophical Association), February 18-21
- “The Puzzle of Emotional Accommodation: Temporal Normativity and the Weight of Reasons,” 8th “Memory, Affects and Emotions” International Interdisciplinary Conference April 16-17. [[Link](#)]
- “An Unwarranted Assumption in Maguire's Argument Against Reasons for Affective Attitudes,” the 19th Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, August 6-9. [[Link](#)] (*Forthcoming*)
- “The Rationality of Traumatic Emotions,” Tennessee Value and Agency (IVA): Grief, Trauma, Anger, and Resilience, October 29-31. [[Link](#)] (*Forthcoming*)

### 2025

- “The Puzzle of Emotional Accommodation: Temporal Normativity and the Weight of Reasons,” 2025 Iowa Philosophical Society Conference, November 15.

- “The Rationality of Traumatic Emotions,” Memory, Trauma and Recovery - 6th International Interdisciplinary Online Conference, September 18-19. [[Link](#)]
- “In Defense of Pragmatic Reasons for Emotions,” the 18th Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, August 7-10. [[Link](#)]
- “Why Is Persistent Grief Not Irrational?,” Ohio Philosophical Association (OPA), April 5.
- “Why Do 'Pragmatic Reasons for Emotions' Matter for Social Integration?,” the University of Iowa Graduate Philosophical Society Conference (UIGPS), March 28-29. [[Link](#)]
- “Why Is Persistent Grief Not Irrational?,” Austin Graduate Ethics and Normativity Talks (AGENT) January 31-February 1. [[Link](#)]
- “Why Do 'Pragmatic Reasons for Emotions' Matter for Social Integration?,” the Uehiro Graduate Student Conference, “Political and Social Emotions – How They Divide or Unite,” on January 23-24. [[Link](#)]

## 2024

- “Why Is Persistent Grief Not Irrational?,” the Indiana Philosophical Association (IPA) conference. [[Link](#)]
- “Rational Retrodiction and Causation by Absence,” LMPST Taiwan 2024 學術研討會：會議議程 Conference agenda. [[Link](#)] (did not attend)
- “Reasons-responsiveness of Traumatic Emotions,” the 12th East-West Philosophers' Conference: Trauma and Healing. (May. 24-31) [[Link](#)]
- “The Continuity of Emotions and Reason Responsiveness,” the 33rd Annual Association for Practical and Professional Ethics (APPE) International Conference (Feb. 22-25) [[Link](#)]

## 2023

- “Two Interpretations of Ruth Chang’s Given Reasons’ Running out: Internalism and Externalism about Given Reasons,” Chung-Ang University (June 2nd) [[Link](#)]

## 2022

- “How to Include Morality as One of the Reasons for All-Things-Considered Reasons,” Grad-Faculty Philosophy Research Colloquium at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.

## 2021

- “The Internalism and Externalism of reasons for love,” KSAP Grad Division, (August 6th)

## 2017

- “Against Semi-Compatibilism on Freewill” The 4th Korean Grad Students Society for Analytic Philosophy Workshop, Sungkyunkwan University

## 2014

- “Jong-Hee Hwang’s Critical Succession of Tradition - Social and Educational Aspects” The 1st Korean Grad Students for The Korean Society for Chinese Studies

## COMMENTS

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- Comments on "Defining Genocide" by Susanna Melkonian-Altshuler, *APA Central Division*, February
- Comments on “Is Moral Feeling Owed?” by Mica Rapstine, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Graduate Conference, March

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

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### University of Nebraska-Lincoln

#### Lead Instructor with Full Responsibility for Course

2026 Summer	(PHIL 105) Philosophy of Food
2025 Summer	(PHIL 105) Philosophy of Food
2025 Spring	(PHIL 105) Philosophy of Food
2024 Fall	(PHIL 105) Philosophy of Food
2024 Summer	(PHIL 213) Medical Ethics
2024 Spring	(PHIL 213) Medical Ethics
2023 Fall	(PHIL 105) Philosophy of Food
2023 Summer	(PHIL 213) Medical Ethics
2023 Spring	(PHIL 105) Philosophy of Food
2022 Spring	(PHIL 106) Philosophy and Current Issues

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### University of Nebraska-Lincoln

#### Teaching Assistant Recitation Instructor

2022 Fall	(PHIL 213) Medical Ethics
2021 Fall	(PHIL 106) Philosophy and Current Issues
2021 Spring	(PHIL 105) Philosophy of Food
2020 Fall	(PHIL 105) Philosophy of Food

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### University of Nebraska-Lincoln

#### Grader

2024 Fall	(PHIL 105) Philosophy of Food
2022 Summer	(PHIL 110) Logic and Critical Thinking
2021 Summer	(PHIL 106) Philosophy and Current Issues

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## PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

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- **Creator & Director**, Robert C. Solomon Digital Archive (2025) [[Link](#)]
- **Journal Reviewer**, *Asian Journal of Philosophy*, 2024. Reviewed manuscripts on topics related to metaphysics, metaethics, and normative ethics.
- **Colloquium Leader**, Teaching Assistant Program. Department of Philosophy, University of Nebraska-Lincoln (2022–2024) [[Link](#)]

- **Graduate Representatives** of the Philosophy Department. Graduate Student Assembly (GSA) at University of Nebraska-Lincoln (2021-2022) [[Link](#)]
- **Ethics Bowl Mentor.** Mentored the Undergraduate Ethics Bowl Team, University of Nebraska-Lincoln (2023–2024)
- **Conference Paper Reviewer,** University of Nebraska–Lincoln Graduate Philosophy Conference, 2025. Evaluated submissions in the field of philosophy of emotion, metaethics, and rationality. [[Link](#)]
- **Session Chair,** Submitted Colloquium: 'Moral Demands,' 2024 APA Central Division Meeting.
- **Editor, Korean Graduate Student Division:** Korean Society for Analytic Philosophy (KSAP Grad Division) (2015-2016) [[Link](#)]

## CERTIFICATES & TEACHING SEMINARS

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- The Teaching Online Learning Community (TOLC) - TOLC focuses on overcoming the challenges of teaching online. (July 8th through August 2nd, 2024) ([Link](#))
- The American Association of Philosophy Teachers' (AAPT) 2021 Seminar on Teaching and Learning in Philosophy [[Link](#)]
- Certificate on Institute for International Teaching Assistants from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln [[Link](#)]

## GRADUATE COURSEWORK

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### Course Taken

- **2023** - PHIL 920 (Ethical Theory/Topic: Moral Testimony), PHIL 915 (Advanced Metaphysics), PHIL 850 (Ancient Philosophy)
- **2022** - PHIL 920 (Topic: Why be Moral?), PHIL 914 (Philosophy of Mind/Topic: Narrow Contents), PHIL 814 (Philosophy of Mind), PHIL 913 (Advanced Epistemology), PHIL 971 (Topic: Kant's Critical Philosophy), PHIL 920 (Topic: Incommensurable Values)
- **2021** - PHIL 823 (Advanced Ethics), PHIL 880 (German Idealism), PHIL 920 (Topic: On Rationality), PHIL 811 (Formal Logic), PHIL 818 (Metaphysics), PHIL 920 (Topic: Mish Mashed Metaethics)
- **2020** - PHIL 920 (Topic: Reasons for Love), PHIL 824 (Philosophy of Action), PHIL 971 (Topic: Kantian Conception of Rational Agency)

### Course Audited

- **2025** – PHIL 920 (Topic: Weight of Reasons), PHIL 905 (Philosophy of Language/Topic: Slur), PHIL 920 (Topic: Moral Epistemology)
- **2024** - PHIL 923 (Philosophy of Mind/Topic: Inner Speech), PHIL 830 (Topic: Moral Legal Philosophy)
- **2023** - PHIL 920 (Topic: Reasons and Fittingness)

# DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Eunhong Lee

My doctoral dissertation, *Beyond Fittingness: A Pragmatic Defense of Emotional Rationality*, defends the rationality of emotions, particularly negative ones, by explaining how both fitting and pragmatic reasons shape our emotional lives. While many philosophers and psychologists have long regarded emotions as *irrational* intrusions or simply *arational* reflexes, akin to physiological reactions like a fever, this work argues that emotions can be a rational response to reasons.

Furthermore, it challenges the dominant “fittingness-only” view—a view held even among philosophers who accept that emotions are responsive to reasons—which holds that an emotion is rational only if it “fits” its object of emotion: a fear is rational only if there is a fitting relation between the fear and a genuinely dangerous object. This narrow perspective excludes pragmatic reasons for emotions, such as the practical benefits of feeling an emotion, dismissing them as the “wrong kind of reasons.” I argue against this prevailing consensus by defending the existence and importance of pragmatic reasons for emotions. This dissertation, composed of three papers, introduces a new framework for understanding how emotions can be justified and integrated into a rational life.

The dissertation is composed of three papers. The first paper, *In Defense of Pragmatic Reasons for Emotions*. This paper challenges the long-standing philosophical view that only fitting reasons can be genuine normative reasons for emotions. I address three major objections against pragmatic reasons for emotions: the claim that feeling an emotion in terms of a pragmatic reason is psychologically impossible, the idea that pragmatic reasons are at best reasons to *want* or *try* (not) to have an emotion, and the argument that only reasons referring to an emotion’s proper object are genuine reasons for that emotion. I contend that these objections fail and that pragmatic considerations can constitute genuine normative reasons for emotions.

The second paper, *The Rationality of Traumatic Emotions*. This work directly confronts the common philosophical and psychological assumption that traumatic emotions, such as persistent grief, are either arational or always irrational. I argue that they are neither. Instead, I demonstrate that traumatic emotions fall within the domain of rationality and that having them is not necessarily irrational. Specifically, I argue that both fitting and pragmatic reasons support traumatic emotions, backing my argument with both philosophical reasoning and psychological evidence. This paper extends my defense of emotional rationality to some of the most challenging and misunderstood emotional experiences.

The third paper, “Emotional Fittingness over Time and the Form of Emotions,” addresses the puzzle of emotional accommodation. Grief typically diminishes over time even though the reasons that support it—the fact of the loss, the significance of the relationship, the love once borne—remain unchanged. If those reasons persist, the attenuation of grief appears a failure of reason-responsiveness. I examine several existing solutions and find them unsatisfactory, arguing that they overlook a crucial dimension of normative reasons. A reason’s claim possesses not only *presence* and *intensity* but also *form*—the qualitative manner in which it calls for emotional acknowledgment. Drawing on the distinction between reference and sense, I propose the Changing-Claims View, which holds that changes in the agent’s practical identity alter the form of fitting response without any change in the underlying evaluative fact.