

Kurt L. Sylvan

CONTACT INFORMATION	Philosophy, School of Humanities University of Southampton Avenue Campus Southampton SO17 1BF	k.l.sylvan@soton.ac.uk www.kurtlsylvan.com (+44) 07922 773365
AOS	Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Practical Reason	
AOC	Ethics, Political Philosophy, Kant, Classical Indian Philosophy	
POSITIONS	University of Southampton , Associate Professor since 2020 University of Southampton , Lecturer (Continuing) from 2015–2019 University of Southampton , Lecturer (Fixed Term), 2014–2015	
EDUCATION	Rutgers University , New Brunswick, NJ Ph.D., Philosophy, Awarded May 2014 Dissertation: <i>On the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality</i> Committee: Ernest Sosa (chair), Alvin Goldman, Ruth Chang, Susanna Schellenberg, and Jonathan Dancy (external) University of Iowa , Iowa City, IA B.A., Philosophy, May 2008 <i>Summa cum laude</i> and with distinction in the major Honors Thesis: <i>Laws of Nature and the Traditional Problem of Induction</i>	
PUBLICATIONS/ FORTHCOMING	<i>Books</i> Forthcoming. <i>The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology (Third Edition)</i> , in two volumes, co-edited with Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup. 2021. <i>The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason</i> , co-edited with Ruth Chang. <i>Articles and Book Sections</i> Forthcoming. “Presentation and the Ways of Knowing.” <i>Ergo</i> . Forthcoming. “Experience and the Foundations of Perceptual Knowledge” in <i>The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology (Third Edition)</i> . Wiley-Blackwell. Forthcoming. “Beginning in Wonder: Suspensive Attitudes and Epistemic Dilemmas” (with Errol Lord) in Hughes, N. (ed.) <i>Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas</i> . Oxford University Press. 2025. “On the Presentational Unity of Knowing in Nyāya.” <i>British Journal for the History of Philosophy</i> 33(6): 1360–1387. 2025. “Neurodiversity and Attentional Normativity” (with Claire Field). <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> 111 (2): 513–531. 2025. “Inference and the Presentational Conception of Knowing” in Campbell, L. (ed.) <i>Forms of Knowledge</i> . Oxford University Press.	

2024. “The Possibility of Internalist Epistemology” in Roeber, B., Sosa, E., Steup, M., and Turri, J. (eds.) *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Third Edition)*. Blackwell.
2023. “On the Autonomy of (Some) Knowledge”. *Analysis* 83(4): 849–858.
2023. “Evidence and Virtue (and Beyond).” In Lasonen-Aarnio, M. and Littlejohn, C. (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence*. Routledge.
2022. “Suspending Properly” (with Errol Lord) in Oliveira, L. and Silva, P. (eds.) *Propositional and Doxastic Justification*. Routledge.
2021. “Respect and the Reality of Apparent Reasons.” *Philosophical Studies* 178: 3129–3156.
2021. “Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat” (with Errol Lord) in Brown, J. and Simion, M. (eds.) *Reasons, Justification, and Defeat*. Oxford University Press.
2020. “An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.” *Philosophical Review* 129(1): 1-51.
2020. “Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism.” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 100: 525–555.
2020. “The Eclipse of Instrumental Rationality” in Chang, R. and Sylvan, K. (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason*.
2020. “An Introduction to the Philosophy of Practical Reason” (with Ruth Chang) and “Appendix” in Chang, R. and Sylvan, K. (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason*.
2020. “Non-Epistemic Perception as Technology.” *Philosophical Issues* 30: 324–345.
2020. “Responsibilism within Reason” in Greco, J. and Kelp, C. (eds.) *Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches*. Cambridge University Press.
2020. “Prime Time (for the Basing Relation)” (with Errol Lord) in Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) *Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation*. London: Routledge.
2020. “Can Performance Epistemology Explain Higher Epistemic Value?” *Synthese* 197: 5335–5356.
2019. “Epistemic Consequentialism and its Aftermath.” *Analysis* 79(4): 773-783.
2019. “Reasons: Right, Wrong, Normative, Fundamental” (with Errol Lord). *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 15: 43-74.
2018. “Veritism Unswamped.” *Mind* 127: 381–435
2018. “Knowledge as a Non-Normative Relation.” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 97: 190–222.
2018. “The Place of Reasons in Epistemology” in Star, D. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity* (with Ernest Sosa).
2017. “Responsibilism out of Character” in Alfano, M. and Fairweather, A. (eds.) *Epistemic Situationism*. Oxford University Press.
2017. “Contextualism about Epistemic Reasons” in Ichikawa, J. (ed.) *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism* (with Daniel Fogal).
2016. “Skorupski on Spontaneity, Apriority, and Normative Truth.” *Philosophical Quarterly* 66: 617–628.
2016. “The Illusion of Discretion.” *Synthese* 193: 1635–1665.
2016. “Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.” *Philosophy Compass* 11: 364–376.

2016. “Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.” *Philosophy Compass* 11: 377–389.
2015. “What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be.” *Philosophical Studies* 172: 587–606.
2012. “How to Be a Redundant Realist.” *Episteme* 9: 271–282.
2012. “Truth Monism without Teleology.” *Thought* 1: 161–169.

Reviews

2024. *Fitting Things Together* by Alex Worsnip. *Philosophical Review* 133: 206–211.
2023. *Realisms Interlinked* by Arindam Chakrabarti. *Mind* 132: 278–287.
2019. *Knowing Better* by Daniel Star. *The Journal of Moral Philosophy* 16: 97–100.
2018. *The Logic of Commitment* by Gary Chartier. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.
2017. *Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue* eds. Fairweather, A. and Flanagan, O. *Analysis* 77: 663–667.
2016. *The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory* eds. Hirose, I. and J. Olson. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (with Errol Lord).

Bibliographies

“Reasons in Epistemology” in *Oxford Bibliographies Online*.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Respect for the Truth: A Kantian Account of Theoretical Normativity
 “What is Learning?”
 “The Structure of Knowledge Rebuilt”
 “Inferential Apprehension and Epistemic Immediacy in *Statement and Inference*”
 “Hylomorphism about Rationality”

TALKS

“What Is Learning?”
Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Capacities, University of Lisbon May 2025
University of Sussex October 2024

“Reasonable Adjustments in Attentional Normativity” (with Claire Field)
British Society for the Theory of Knowledge September 2024

“Theoretical Normativity”
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill August 2024

“Respect for the Truth: A Kantian Account”
University of Zurich March 2024

“Hylomorphism about Rationality”
King’s College London January 2024

“Deep Foundationalism and the Varieties of Epistemic Building”
Cologne Epistemology Winter Workshop (University of Cologne) December 2023

“Inferential Apprehension and Epistemic Immediacy in *Statement and Inference*”
Oxford Realism in Context (TU Dortmund) November 2023

“Knowledge and the Presentation of Reality in Nyāya, Advaita Vedānta, and Traditional Epistemology” <i>British Society for the History of Philosophy</i>	March 2023
“Inference, Epistemic Priority, and the Presentational Account of Knowing” <i>Oxford University</i>	January 2023
“A Kantian Account of Theoretical Normativity” <i>Normativity and Reasoning, NYU Abu Dhabi</i>	January 2023
<i>New Directions in Epistemology, Glasgow</i>	December 2022
<i>The Power and Limits of Rational Reflection, Luxembourg</i>	September 2022
<i>Inquiry and its Norms, Madrid</i>	June 2022
“From Epistemic Kantianism to Transcendental Idealism” <i>Online Workshop on Epistemic Pluralism (Organized by Ylwa Wirling)</i>	Nov. 2021
“Theoretical Normativity” <i>Online Workshop on Inquiry (Organized by Anthony Booth)</i>	September 2021
“Respect for Truth and Epistemic Autonomy: Resolving a Tension” <i>Epistemic Autonomy in Kant and Beyond (Online)</i>	August 2021
“A Kantian Account of Epistemic Worth” <i>University of Glasgow (COGITO Epistemology Research Centre)</i>	March 2021
“The Non-Instrumental Structure of Practical Reason” <i>University of Texas, Austin</i>	February 2020
“Knowledge and the Presentation of Reality” <i>University of Warwick</i>	January 2020
“Respect for the Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality” <i>University of Helsinki</i>	December 2019
“From Conceptual to Doxastic Pragmatism?” <i>University of Zurich</i>	March 2019
“Respect and the Reality of Apparent Reasons” <i>Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop</i>	March 2019
“Respect for the Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality” <i>University of St. Andrews</i>	December 2018
“Evidence and Virtue (and Beyond)” <i>New Directions in Virtue Epistemology, Glasgow</i>	September 2018
“Knowledge and the Presentation of Reality” <i>Freiburg Normative Epistemology Workshop</i>	July 2018
<i>Bloomsbury Epistemology Group</i>	March 2018
<i>University of Stirling (Speaker Series)</i>	February 2018
“An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism” <i>UNC Chapel Hill (Normativity Reading Group)</i>	September 2017

“Can Performance Epistemology Explain Reflective Epistemic Value?” <i>Bled 2017: Epistemic Virtues and Epistemic Skills</i>	June 2017
“The Theaetetus Thesis” <i>Second Southampton-Leuven Epistemology Conference</i>	April 2017
“Respect for the Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality” <i>Sole Keynote Speaker, Second Cologne-Leuven Epistemology Workshop</i>	May 2016
“Reasons: Right, Wrong, Normative, Fundamental” (with Errol Lord) <i>The Language and Metaphysics of Normativity, Uppsala</i>	May 2016
“Knowledge as a Non-Normative Relation” <i>The Normativity of Attitudes, Saarbrücken</i>	December 2015
<i>2015 European Normativity Network Conference, Berlin</i>	November 2015
<i>Bled 2015: The Intersection of Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind</i>	June 2015
“Against Full Aptness” <i>Symposium on Sosa’s Judgment and Agency, KU Leuven</i>	September 2015
“The Achievements of Reason: A Rationalist Virtue Epistemology” <i>Virtue Epistemology Conference, KU Leuven</i>	September 2015
“Reasons: Right, Wrong, Normative, Fundamental” (with Errol Lord) <i>St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality</i>	May 2015
“Respect and the Reality of Apparent Reasons” <i>Normativity of Rationality Conference, Cardiff University</i>	May 2015
“Explaining the Significance of the Internal in Epistemology” <i>University of California, San Diego</i>	January 2015
“How to Be an Epistemic Non-Consequentialist” <i>Second Southampton Normativity Workshop</i>	January 2015
“Rationality and Fundamental Epistemic Value: What’s the Connection?” <i>University of Graz</i>	June 2014
“Veritism, Epistemic Virtue, and Hurka’s Principle” <i>NYU Value and Virtue in Ethics and Epistemology Conference</i>	May 2014
“The Objective Significance of the Subjective” <i>University of Pennsylvania (Epistemic Normativity Graduate Seminar)</i>	April 2014
“Reasons: Right, Wrong, Normative, Fundamental” <i>Southern Normativity Conference, University of Kent</i>	March 2014
“Apparent Reasons and the Fragmentation of Epistemic Evaluation” <i>Harvard University</i>	January 2014
“Rationality and Justification: Reasons to Divorce?” <i>University of Edinburgh (Early Career Forum, Research Talk)</i>	November 2013
“Why Be Rational?” <i>University of Edinburgh (Early Career Forum, Public Talk)</i>	November 2013

“How to Divorce Rationality and Justification in Epistemology”
University of Southampton October 2013

“The Place of Reasons in Epistemology”
St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality May 2013

“Reasons and the Metaphysics of Epistemology”
Northwestern–Notre Dame Epistemology Conference April 2013
Georgetown Reasons and Reasoning Conference April 2013

“On How Groups Possess Evidence”
Princeton–Rutgers–Penn Social Epistemology Workshop April 2013

“What Isn’t the Swamping Problem?”
USC–UCLA Graduate Conference February 2013

COMMENTS

On J. Adam Carter’s *Autonomous Knowledge*
Pacific APA April 2022

On Chris Blake Turner’s ‘What Basing Must Be’
Eastern APA January 2019

On Ernest Sosa’s *Epistemic Explanations*
COGITO Symposium, University of Glasgow September 2018

On Peter Klein’s “Certain Knowledge from Fallible Foundations”
Episteme Conference, Tenerife, Canary Islands July 2018

On Jonathan Ichikawa’s *Contextualizing Knowledge*
Pacific APA March 2018

On Daniel Greco’s “On the Very Idea of an Epistemic Dilemma”
Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference August 2017

On Elizabeth Harman’s “When Is a Failure to Realize Exculpatory?”
Responsibility—The Epistemic Dimension II, Amsterdam May 2015

On Juan Comesaña’s “Can We Believe for Practical Reasons?”
SOFIA Conference, Huatulco, Mexico January 2015

On Maria Alvarez’s “Reasons for Action as Reasons for Belief”
First Southampton Normativity Workshop June 2014

On Ryan Walsh’s “A Hard Problem for Schroeder’s Analysis of Knowledge”
Pacific APA April 2014

On Daniel Fogal’s “Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure”
Princeton–Rutgers Graduate Conference April 2013

On Mark Phelan’s “Believing *Qua* Member”
Pacific APA March 2013

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

Lecturer (at Southampton)

Epistemology	2015, Spring 2017, Fall 2017, 2018, 2019, 2023, 2025
Fundamentals of Ethical Theory (MA level)	2025
Truth, Opinion, and Ideology	Spring 2023, 2024, 2025
Philosophy of Mind	Fall 2015, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023; Spring 2025
MA Seminar on Foundationalism	Fall 2023
Appearance and Reality (Small Group Tutorials)	Fall 2022, 2023
Classical Indian Philosophy	Spring 2023
Political Philosophy	Fall 2015, Spring 2022, Spring 2023
Kant's Copernican Revolution in Philosophy	Spring 2022
Ethics	Spring 2018, Spring 2021
MA Seminar on the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Categories	Fall 2021
Classical Indian Philosophy (co-taught with Chris Janaway)	Fall 2019, Fall 2020
Moral Philosophy	Spring 2014, Fall 2014, Spring 2019, Fall 2020
MA Seminar on the Metaphysics of Knowledge	Fall 2019
The Ethics of Belief	Spring 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019
Knowledge and Mind (Small Group Tutorials)	Fall 2018, Spring 2019
Scepticism	Fall 2018
MA Seminar on the Epistemology of Perception	Fall 2017
Reasons, Rationality, and Ethics	Fall 2014
Ethics (Small Group Tutorials)	Fall 2014, Spring 2016, Spring 2018, Fall 2018
Advisor (at Southampton)	
Countless undergraduate dissertations	Ongoing since 2014
MA dissertations (Sam Jones, Jack Maden, David Field, Charlotte Bonar, Josef Nickerson, Kirsty Bishop, Anthony Kelly, Lily Dommett, Mia Zhang, Alex Conway, Luca Ringlet)	Ongoing since 2014
MA independent studies in epistemology, ethics, mind, neurodiversity, political philosophy, and Indian philosophy	Ongoing since 2014
Visiting PhD student (Julen Ibarrondo Murguialday (Madrid))	Spring 2019
Visiting PhD student (Moises Barba (Madrid))	Fall 2021
PhD: Benjamin Paget-Woods (with Conor McHugh)	2020
PhD: Sigmund Bruno Schilpzand	2019-2022
PhD: James Ross (with Naomi Thompson)	2020-present
Instructor (at Rutgers)	
Introduction to Epistemology	Summer 2013
Aesthetics of Film	Summer 2012
Introduction to Metaphysics	Summer 2011
Teaching Assistant (at Rutgers)	
Introduction to Philosophy (for James Simmons)	Spring 2011
Current Moral and Social Issues (for Jeff McMahan)	Fall 2010

SERVICE

Administrative Roles	
Doctoral Programme Director for Philosophy	January 2025-present
Senior Tutor for Philosophy	August 2021-July 2024
Lifelong Learning Officer	August 2020-July 2024
Director of Undergraduate Admissions	August 2017-January 2020
Interim Director of Graduate Studies	Spring and Summer 2017
Dissertation Coordinator	2014-16
External Examiner	
Ph.D. Thesis of Brian Pollex at UT Austin	Summer 2021
M. Phil Theses of Claire Field, Thomas Byrne, and Lorin Thompson at KCL	Fall 2015, Fall 2016, Spring 2021
Internal Examiner	
PhD Thesis of Liam Livesley	Fall 2025
PhD Thesis of Francesco Gandellini	Winter 2025
PhD Thesis of Tim Kjeldsen	Winter 2024

PhD Thesis of Atus Mariqueo Russell	Fall 2023
Editorial	
Editorial Assistant for the following books by Ernest Sosa: <i>Judgment and Agency</i> , Oxford University Press, 2015 <i>Epistemology</i> , Princeton University Press, 2017	2014-15
Editorial Manager for <i>PPR</i> , <i>Noûs</i> , and <i>Philosophical Issues</i>	2013-14
Editorial Assistant for <i>PPR</i> , <i>Noûs</i> , and <i>Philosophical Issues</i>	2011-12
Editor of the following PhilPapers categories: Infinetism The Speckled Hen Problem	Since 2015
Assistant Editor of the following PhilPapers categories: Perception and Skepticism; Perceptual Knowledge; Perceptual Evidence	Since 2013
Referee for Presses and Journals	Since 2012
OUP, CUP, MIT Press, Routledge, Springer, Bloomsbury, <i>Philosophical Review</i> , <i>Journal of Philosophy</i> , <i>Mind</i> , <i>Noûs</i> , <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> , <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , <i>Mind and Language</i> , <i>American Philosophical Quarterly</i> , <i>Analysis</i> , <i>Analytic Philosophy</i> , <i>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</i> , <i>Canadian Journal of Philosophy</i> , <i>Dialectica</i> , <i>Dialogue</i> , <i>Episteme</i> , <i>Ergo</i> , <i>Erkenntnis</i> , <i>Ethical Theory and Moral Practice</i> , <i>Inquiry</i> , <i>Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i> , <i>Journal of the American Philosophical Association</i> , <i>Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy</i> , <i>Journal of Moral Philosophy</i> , <i>Journal of Value Inquiry</i> , <i>Organon F</i> , <i>Pacific Philosophical Quarterly</i> , <i>Philosophical Explorations</i> , <i>Philosophers' Imprint</i> , <i>Philosophical Quarterly</i> , <i>Ratio</i> , <i>Synthese</i> , <i>Teorema</i> , <i>Thought</i>	
Referee for Conferences	Since 2009
British Society for Ethical Theory, Canadian Philosophical Association, Princeton-Rutgers Graduate Conference, Southampton-Humboldt Normativity Conference, St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality, Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference	
Referee for Funding Bodies	Since 2017
Swiss National Science Foundation, Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada	
Organizer	
The Epistemic Role of Simple Seeing Workshop, Southampton	2017
Epistemology and Normativity Workshop, Rutgers	2012
Research Circle on Epistemic Value, Rutgers	2011
Research Circle on Rationality, Coherence and Normativity, Rutgers	2010
Research Circle on the Epistemology of Perception, Rutgers	2010
Co-Organizer	
Indian Philosophy and the Historiography of Philosophy, Southampton	2024
Knowing by Looking Workshop, Southampton	2016
Attitudes and Agency: Epistemology Workshop, Southampton	2016
Three Workshops on Social and Cultural Ontology, Southampton	2015-6
Value and Virtue in Ethics and Epistemology, NYU	2014
Rutgers philosophy department colloquium series	2013
Rutgers graduate student colloquium series	2012
Princeton-Rutgers Graduate Conference	2011
Outreach and Public Engagement Talks and Events	
'Neurodiversity: A Conceptual Engineering Approach', a workshop at Southampton Science and Engineering Festival	March 2024
'The Hidden Universe of Children's Philosophy', a workshop at Hands-On Humanities Day	November 2022
'The Octopus Within' at the Southampton Arts and Humanities Festival	November 2022
'The Autobiography and Science of Neurodiversity' at the Southampton Science and Engineering Festival	March 2022

‘Beyond Disorders: Neurodiversity, Radical Empathy, and the Future of Mental Health’ for Disability History Month	December 2021
‘Human Minds, Animal Minds, and Alien Minds’ at the Southampton Arts and Humanities Festival	October 2021
‘Can Ideas Have Authors?’ at the Southampton City Art Gallery	March 2019
Talk on Perception at Southampton City Art Gallery	February 2017
Talk on Studying Philosophy at Farnborough Sixth Form College	July 2015
Talks at Southampton Sixth Form Conferences	2014 (x2), 2016, 2021, 2022
Other Administrative Roles	
Member of internationalization committee	2014-15
Manager of departmental website	2014-15

GRADUATE	Epistemology	
COURSEWORK	Proseminar (in Epistemology and Mind) with Alvin Goldman	Fall 2008
(GPA: 4.0/4.0)	Knowing How with Jason Stanley	Spring 2009
‘*’ = AUDITED	Methodological Naturalism and Intuitions with Alvin Goldman	Fall 2009
	Social Epistemology with Alvin Goldman	Spring 2010
	Survey in Epistemology with Ernest Sosa	Spring 2010
	*Pragmatic Encroachment with Jason Stanley	Spring 2010
	Independent Study on Epistemic Rationality with Alvin Goldman	Spring 2010
	Independent Study on Epistemology of Perception with Ernest Sosa	Spring 2010
	*Skepticism with Brian Weatherson	Fall 2010
	Ancient Skepticism with Robert Bolton	Fall 2010
	Independent Study on Epistemic Value with Ernest Sosa	Spring 2011
	*Knowledge First with Jason Stanley	Fall 2012
	Ethics	
	Reasons for Action with Ruth Chang and Derek Parfit	Spring 2009
	Survey in Ethical Theory with Holly Smith	Spring 2010
	Independent Study on Requirements of Rationality with Ruth Chang	Spring 2010
	Advanced Topics in Ethics with Jeff McMahan and Derek Parfit	Spring 2011
	Independent Study on Reasons and Value with Ruth Chang	Spring 2011
	Mind	
	Proseminar (in Epistemology and Mind) with Alvin Goldman	Fall 2008
	Philosophy of Mind with Jerry Fodor, Zenon Pylyshyn, and Alan Leslie	Fall 2009
	Proseminar in Cognitive Science with Zenon Pylyshyn	Fall 2009
	Graduate Survey in Philosophy of Mind with Carrie Figdor (Iowa)	Fall 2007
	Intentionality with Francesco Orilia (Iowa)	Spring 2006
	Metaphysics and Language	
	Fundamentality and Metametaphysics with Ted Sider (NYU)	Spring 2009
	The Metaphysics of Propositions with Jeff King	Fall 2008
	Vagueness with Brian McLaughlin	Spring 2009
	Other	
	Hume with Martha Bolton	Fall 2008
	Probability with Barry Loewer	Fall 2008
	Non-Classical Logics with Brian Weatherson	Fall 2009
	Dissertation Seminar with Jason Stanley	Spring 2013

REFERENCES Ernest Sosa
Board of Governors Professor
Department of Philosophy E-mail: ernestsosa@me.com
Rutgers University, New Brunswick

Ruth Chang
Professor E-mail: ruthechang@gmail.com
Department of Philosophy
University of Oxford

Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
Professor
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University of Helsinki

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Ram Neta
Professor
Department of Philosophy
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Susanna Schellenberg
Professor
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Rutgers University, New Brunswick

E-mail: susanna.schellenberg@rutgers.edu