

## CURRICULUM VITAE

14 September 2024

### Ralph Wedgwood

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Born: 10 December 1964, Vancouver, BC, Canada  
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#### Current position

Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California, 2012–  
Director of the School of Philosophy, University of Southern California, 2022–

#### Previous positions

Visiting Professor in the Council of the Humanities and Old Dominion Fellow in Philosophy,  
Princeton University, Spring Semester 2018  
Distinguished Research Professor (part-time), University of Birmingham, 2013–17  
Professor of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 2007–11  
University Lecturer (CUF) in Philosophy, University of Oxford, 2002–11  
Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, Merton College, Oxford, 2002–11  
Associate Professor, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT, 1999–2002  
Assistant Professor, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT, 1995–99  
Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, 1994–95  
Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, UCLA, 1993–94

#### Education

Ph. D. in Philosophy, Cornell University, 1994  
Thesis: *Principle and Sentiment: An Essay in Moral Epistemology*  
M. Phil. in Philosophy, King's College London, 1989  
Thesis: *Scepticism and Rational Belief*  
B. A. in Classics and Modern Languages (German and Greek), Class I (congratulated)  
Magdalen College, Oxford, 1987

#### Fellowships and Awards

Visiting Research Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford, Michaelmas Term 2018  
Visiting Fellow, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 2010  
Leverhulme Research Fellowship, 2009–10 (Research Project: *The Requirements of Rationality*)  
Fellow, Institute for Advanced Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2008  
Visiting Fellow, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, 2005  
AHRB Research Leave Award, 2005  
Young Epistemologist Prize, Rutgers Epistemology Conference, 2001  
Jean Hampton Prize, American Philosophical Association, 2000  
Fellow, National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, 1998–99

## **Publications**

### **Published books**

1. *Rationality and Belief*. Pp. x + 314 (Oxford University Press, 2023).
2. *The Value of Rationality*. Pp. x + 267 (Oxford University Press, 2017).
3. *The Nature of Normativity*. Pp. x + 296 (Oxford University Press, 2007).

### **Edited book**

*Fact and Value: Essays in Ethics and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson*, ed. Alex Byrne, Robert Stalnaker, and Ralph Wedgwood (MIT Press, 2001).

### **Forthcoming articles**

1. “Dilemmas as Conflicts between Values”, in *Epistemic Dilemmas*, ed. Nick Hughes (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
2. “The Iniquity of Oblivion”, in *Bernard Williams on History and Philosophy*, ed. Marcel van Ackeren and Matthieu Queloz (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
3. “Decision-Theoretic Virtue Ethics”, in *Engaging Raz: Themes in Normative Philosophy*, ed. Kimberley Brownlee, David Enoch, and Andrei Marmor (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

### **Published articles**

1. “Pricean Ignorance”, *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* (22 April 2024). DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2024.2334763.
2. “How Can ‘Evidence’ be Normative?”, in *The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence*, ed. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn (Routledge, 2024): 74–90.
3. “Ethical Naturalism, Non-Naturalism, and In-Between”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism*, ed. Paul Bloomfield and David Copp (Oxford University Press, 2023): 131–155.
4. “Hierocles’ Concentric Circles”, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, Vol. 62, ed. Victor Caston and Rachana Kamtekar (Oxford University Press, 2023): 293–331.
5. “The Reasons Aggregation Theorem”, *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics*, Vol. 12, ed. Mark Timmons (Oxford University Press, 2022): 127–148.
6. “Doxastic Rationality”, in *Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance*, ed. Luis Oliveira and Paul Silva Jr. (Routledge, 2022), 219–240.
7. “Practical and Theoretical Rationality”, in *The Handbook of Rationality*, ed. Markus Knauf and Wolfgang Spohn (MIT Press, 2021), Chap. 2.2: 137–45.
8. “The Internalist Virtue Theory of Knowledge”, *Synthese*, 197, no. 12, Special Issue: The Epistemology of Ernest Sosa (2020): 5357–5378.
9. “Moral Disagreement and Inexcusable Irrationality”, *American Philosophical Quarterly* 56, no. 1 (2019): 97–108.
10. “A Probabilistic Epistemology for Perceptual Belief”, *Philosophical Issues*, 28 – Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning (2018): 374–398.
11. “The Unity of Normativity”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity*, ed. Daniel Star (Oxford University Press, 2018): 23–45.
12. “Plato’s Theory of Knowledge”, in *Virtue, Happiness, and Knowledge: Themes from the Work of Gail Fine and Terence Irwin*, ed. David Brink, Susan Sauvé Meyer, and Christopher Shields (Oxford University Press, 2018): 33–56.
13. “Epistemic Teleology: Synchronic and Diachronic”, in *Epistemic Consequentialism*, ed. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn (Oxford University Press, 2018): 85–112.
14. “The Coherence of Thrasymachus”, in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, Vol. 53, ed. Victor Caston (Oxford University Press, 2017): 33–63.

15. “Must Rational Intentions Maximize Utility?” *Philosophical Explorations*, 20, sup. 2 (2017): 73–92.
16. “The Predicament of Choice”, in *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, Vol. 12, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford University Press, 2017): 294–313.
17. “Two Grades of Non-consequentialism”, *Criminal Law and Philosophy*, 10, no. 4 (2016): 795–814.
18. “Objective and Subjective ‘Ought’”, in *Deontic Modality*, ed. Nate Charlow and Matthew Chrisman (Oxford University Press, 2016): 143–168.
19. “Is Civil Marriage Illiberal?”, in *After Marriage: Rethinking Marital Relationships*, ed. Elizabeth Brake (Oxford University Press, 2016): 29–50.
20. “The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons’”, *Philosophical Issues*, 25 – Normativity (2015): 125–143.
21. “An Inferentialist Conception of the *A Priori*”, in *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*, Vol. 5, ed. Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (Oxford University Press, 2015): 295–314.
22. “Rationality as a Virtue”, *Analytic Philosophy*, 55, no. 4 (2014): 319–338.
23. “Moral Disagreement among Philosophers”, in *Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief*, ed. Michael Bergmann and Patrick Kain (Oxford University Press, 2014): 23–39.
24. “The Right Thing to Believe”, in *The Aim of Belief*, ed. Timothy Chan (Oxford University Press, 2013): 123–139.
25. “The Weight of Moral Reasons”, *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics*, Vol. 3, ed. Mark Timmons (Oxford University Press, 2013): 35–58.
26. “Gandalf’s Solution to the Newcomb Problem”, *Synthese*, 190, no. 14 (2013): 2643–2675.
27. “*Akrasia* and Uncertainty”, *Organon F*, 20, no. 4, ed. Julian Fink (2013): 483–505  
<<http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/organon/?q=en/akrasia-and-uncertainty>>
28. “Rational ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’”, *Philosophical Issues*, 23 (2013): 70–92.
29. “*A Priori* Bootstrapping”, in *The A Priori in Philosophy*, ed. Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow (Oxford University Press, 2013): 226–246.
30. “Doxastic Correctness”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Suppl. Vol. 87 (2013): 38–54.
31. “Outright Belief”, *dialectica*, 66, no. 3, Special Issue: Outright Belief and Degrees of Belief, ed. Philip Ebert and Martin Smith (2012): 309–329.
32. “Justified Inference”, *Synthese*, 189, no. 2 (2012): 273–295.
33. “Defending Double Effect”, *Ratio*, 24, Special Issue: Deontological Ethics, ed. Brad Hooker (2011): 384–401. German translation (“Zur Verteidigung der Lehre von der Doppelwirkung”), in *Analytische Moralphilosophie der Gegenwart*, ed. Sebastian Muders and Philipp Schwind (Suhrkamp, 2021): 424–444.
34. “Primitively Rational Belief-Forming Processes”, in *Reasons for Belief*, ed. Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (Cambridge University Press, 2011): 180–200.
35. “Instrumental Rationality”, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, Vol. 6, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford University Press, 2011): 280–309.
36. “The Refutation of Expressivism”, in *Truth, Reference, and Realism*, ed. Zsolt Novák and András Simonyi (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011): 207–234.
37. “The Moral Evil Demons”, in *Disagreement*, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010): 216–246.
38. “Diotima’s Eudaemonism: Intrinsic Value and Rational Motivation in Plato’s *Symposium*”, *Phronesis*, 54 (2009): 297–325.
39. “The ‘Good’ and the ‘Right’ Revisited”, *Philosophical Perspectives*, 23 (2009): 499–519.
40. “Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action”, *Philosophical Issues*, 19 (2009): 342–363.
41. “The Normativity of the Intentional”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin and Ansgar Beckermann (Oxford University Press, 2009): 421–436.
42. “Contextualism about Justified Belief”, *Philosophers’ Imprint* 8, no. 9 (2008): 1–20  
<[www.philosophersimprint.org/008009/](http://www.philosophersimprint.org/008009/)>.
43. “Butler on Virtue, Self-Interest and Human Nature”, in *Morality and Self-Interest*, ed. Paul Bloomfield (Oxford University Press, 2007): 177–204.

44. “Normativism Defended”, in *Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen (Blackwell, 2007): 69–85.
45. “The Normative Force of Reasoning”, *Noûs* 40, (2006): 660–686.
46. “The Meaning of ‘Ought’”, in *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, Vol. 1, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford University Press, 2006): 127–160.
47. “The Internal and External Components of Cognition”, in *Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science*, ed. Robert Stainton (Blackwell, 2006): 307–325. Chinese translation by Xiaoai Yang (China Science and Publishing, 2015).
48. “How We Know What Ought to Be”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 106 (2005): 61–85.
49. “The Metaethicists’ Mistake”, *Philosophical Perspectives*, 18 (2004): 405–426.
50. “Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly”, in *Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality*, ed. Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet (Oxford University Press, 2003): 201–229.
51. “The Aim of Belief”, *Philosophical Perspectives*, 16 (2002): 267–297. Spanish translation “La meta de la creencia”, in *Normas, virtudes y valores epistémicos: Ensayos de epistemología contemporánea*, ed. Margarita M. Valdés and Miguel Ángel Fernández (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2011): 485–528.
52. “Internalism Explained”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 65 (2002): 349–369.
53. “Practical Reason and Desire”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 80 (2002): 345–358.
54. “Practical Reasoning as Figuring Out What is Best: Against Constructivism”, *Topoi*, 21 (2002): 139–152.
55. “Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms”, *Philosophical Review*, 110 (2001): 1–30.
56. “The Price of Non-Reductive Physicalism”, *Noûs*, 34 (2000): 400–421.
57. “The Price of Non-Reductive Moral Realism”, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 2 (1999): 199–215.
58. “The Fundamental Argument for Same-Sex Marriage”, *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 7 (1999): 225–242.
59. “The A Priori Rules of Rationality”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 59 (1999): 113–131.
60. “The Essence of Response-Dependence”, *European Review of Philosophy*, 3 (1998): 31–54.
61. “The Fundamental Principle of Practical Reasoning”, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 6 (1998): 189–209.
62. “Non-Cognitivism, Truth and Logic”, *Philosophical Studies*, 86 (1997): 73–91.
63. “Theories of Content and Theories of Motivation”, *European Journal of Philosophy*, 3 (1995): 273–288.
64. “Scepticism and Rational Belief”, *Philosophical Quarterly*, 40 (1990): 45–64.

### Discussions and Critical Notices

1. “The Sources of Moral Knowledge”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (2023). DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13022
2. “Can our reasons explain what it is rational for us to believe?”, *Philosophical Studies* (2023). DOI: 10.1007/s11098-023-02034-1
3. “Scanlon on Double Effect”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 83 (2011): 464–472.
4. “*The Nature of Normativity: Précis*”, *Philosophical Studies*, 151, no. 3 (2010): 445–448.
5. “*The Nature of Normativity: A Reply to Holton, Railton, and Lenman*”, *Philosophical Studies*, 151, no. 3 (2010): 479–491.
6. “Schroeder on Expressivism: For – Or Against?” *Analysis*, 70 (2010): 117–129.
7. “Christopher Peacocke’s *The Realm of Reason*”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 74, no. 3 (2007): 776–791.
8. “Railton on Normativity” (Discussion of Peter Railton, *Facts, Values, and Norms*, Part III), *Philosophical Studies*, 126, no. 3 (2005): 463–479.

9. “Sensing Values?” (Comments on Mark Johnston, “The Authority of Affect”), *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 63 (2001): 215–224.
10. Critical Notice of *The Authority of Reason*, by Jean E. Hampton, *Philosophical Books*, 40 (1999): 218–227.

### Reviews

1. Review of *Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defense of the Marriage-Free State*, by Clare Chambers. *Ethics* 129, no. 2 (2019): 398–403.
2. Review of *Fifteen Sermons and Other Writings on Ethics*, by Joseph Butler. *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 56, no. 3 (2018): 563–564.
3. Review of *Being Realistic about Reasons*, by T. M. Scanlon, *Philosophical Quarterly*, 66, no. 262 (2016): 213–217.
4. Review of *Taking Morality Seriously: A Defence of Robust Realism*, by David Enoch, *Philosophical Quarterly*, 63, no. 251 (2013): 389–94.
5. Review of *Minimizing Marriage: Marriage, Morality and the Law*, by Elizabeth Brake, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (2012) <<http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/35201-minimizing-marriage-marriage-morality-and-the-law/>>.
6. Review of *The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations*, by Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar and Adrian Haddock, *Analysis*, 72, no. 1 (2012): 187–89.
7. Review of *Reasons without Rationalism*, by Kieran Setiya, *Mind*, 117 (2008): 1130–5.
8. Review of *Hate Crimes: Criminal Law and Identity Politics*, by James B. Jacobs and Kimberly Potter, *Journal of Homosexuality*, 45, no. 1 (2003): 152–159.
9. Review of *Value-Judgement: Improving our Ethical Beliefs*, by James Griffin, *Philosophical Review*, 107 (1998): 447–449.
10. Review of *Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness*, edited by Christopher Peacocke, *Philosophical Quarterly*, 47 (1997): 255–257.
11. Review of *The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics*, by Philip Pettit, *European Journal of Philosophy*, 4 (1996): 111–116.
12. Review of *White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice*, by Ruth Garrett Millikan, *Philosophical Review*, 104 (1995): 156–159.

### Encyclopedia entries

1. “Normativity”, in *The International Encyclopedia of Ethics*, ed. Hugh LaFollette (Wiley, 2013). doi: 10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee150.
2. “Moral Concepts and Moral Properties”, in *The International Encyclopedia of Ethics*, ed. Hugh LaFollette (Wiley, 2013). doi: 10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee175
3. “Moral Epistemology”, in *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online*, ed. Tim Crane (Routledge, 2012) <<http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L151>>.

### Work in progress

1. “The Stoic Definition of Possibility”, submitted to *Phronesis*
2. “Morality and Collective Rationality”
3. “Values First”
4. “Three Bulwarks of Non-Consequentialist Axiology”
5. “A General Account of the Measurement of Value”
6. “Intending the Improbable”

### Philosophy weblogs

1. “The Meaning of Same-Sex Marriage”, *New York Times*, Opinionator, 24 May 2012  
<<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/marriage-meaning-and-equality/>>
2. Contributing Member of *PEA Soup* <<http://peasoup.us/>>

### Invited Lectures and Conference Talks

1. “Rational Explanations”, August 2024 (World Congress of Philosophy, Rome, Italy)
2. “The Internal / External Distinction in Stoic Modality”, April 2024 (APA Pacific Division Meeting) and May 2024 (History of Philosophy Roundtable, UC San Diego)
3. “Three Bulwarks of Non-consequentialist Axiology”, April 2024 (Royal Ethics Conference, University of Texas, Austin)
4. “A General Account of the Measurement of Values”, October 2023 (Axiology workshop, McGill University)
5. “‘Bad’, ‘Inappropriate’, and ‘Wrong’”, June 2023 (Frankfurt Metaethics Workshop)
6. “Decision-Theoretic Virtue Ethics”, April 2022 (Notre Dame – ACU International Ethics Conference), June 2022 (Bled Ethics Conference, Slovenia), April 2023 (APA Pacific Division Meeting), and October 2023 (Conference in Memory of Joseph Raz, Columbia University Law School)
7. “Diachronic Rationality: How and Why”, November 2021 (Northeastern University) and April 2023 (*Epistemic Justification: Formal Epistemology Meets Mainstream Epistemology*, Conference at the Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilian University, Munich)
8. Comments on Mark Schroeder, *Reasons First*, April 2022 (APA Pacific Division Meeting)
9. “Hierocles’ Concentric Circles”, June 2021 (Ancient Philosophy Society conference) and February 2022 (APA Central Division Meeting)
10. Comments on Douglas Portmore, *Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options*, March 2021 (APA Pacific Division Meeting)
11. “Against ‘Evidence’”, January 2021 (Texas A & M University)
12. Response to Worsnip and Carr, January 2020 (“Author Meets Critics: Ralph Wedgwood, *The Value of Rationality*”, APA Eastern Division Meeting)
13. Comments on Karl Schafer, “The Unity of Reason: Kantian Lessons for the Contemporary Debate”, April 2019 (APA Pacific Division Meeting)
14. “The Rational Angel”, April 2019 (Sievert Keynote Lecture, University of Iowa Philosophy Graduate Conference) and December 2019 (The Ohio State University)
15. “The Measurement of Incorrectness”, April 2019 (University of California, San Diego).
16. “The Varieties of Belief”, October 2018 (All Souls College, Oxford)
17. “Morality as Collective Rationality”, September 2018 (Keynote Lecture, International Rationality Summer Institute, Irsee, Germany)
18. “Three Probabilistic Models of the Epistemology of Perception”, May 2018 (Wuhan University) and June 2018 (Nanjing University, East China Normal University, and Beijing Normal University)
19. “The Reasons Aggregation Theorem”, May 2018 (USC / Shandong Conference on Ethics and Epistemology, Jinan, China), June 2018 (Xi’an Jiaotong University), September 2018 (Groningen Netherlands Metaethics Workshop), May 2019 (Moral Epistemology Conference, Croatian Inter-University Center, Dubrovnik) and January 2021 (Arizona Normative Ethics Workshop).
20. Comments on Justin Snedegar, *Contrastive Reasons*, March 2018 (APA Pacific Division Meeting)
21. Comments on Julia Staffel, *Unsettled Thoughts*, December 2017 (Workshop on Julia Stafflel’s book manuscript, Washington University, St Louis)
22. “Normativity”, June 2017 (four lectures given at the University of Zurich, Philosophy Summer School)

23. “Moral Obligations and Moral Requirements”, June 2017 (Workshop on Moral Obligation, Humboldt University of Berlin)
24. “The Measurement of Value”, January 2017 (University of Birmingham), May 2017 (University of Oxford), February 2018 (Centre de recherche en éthique, Montréal, Québec), September 2018 (University of Groningen), and December 2019 (University of Zurich).
25. “From Rational Belief to Knowledge”, November 2016 (University of Oxford) and June 2017 (*Epistemology*, Conference in Bled, Slovenia)
26. “*The Normativity of Rationality*, Chapter 8”, June 2016 (Workshop on my book manuscript, Humboldt University, Berlin)
27. “*The Normativity of Rationality*, Chapter 3”, June 2016 (Workshop on my book manuscript, Free University of Berlin)
28. “The Pitfalls of Evidence”, June 2016 (Conference on *Reasoning*, University of Leipzig) and May 2017 (St Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality)
29. “Moral Disagreement and Inexcusable Irrationality”, May 2016 (Conference on *Disagreement*, Centre de recherche en éthique, Montréal, Québec), February 2018 (Princeton Workshop on Normative Philosophy), and March 2019 (New York University Mind and Language Seminar)
30. “*The Normativity of Rationality*”, May 2016 (Workshop on my book manuscript, Université de Montréal)
31. “Ethical Values”, May 2016 (series of six lectures at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru)
32. “Values First”, March 2016 (University of Birmingham), April 2016 (Dartmouth College Ethics Workshop), and February 2019 (Murphy Institute Center for Ethics and Public Affairs, Tulane University).
33. “The Normativity of Intentionality Revisited”, March 2016 (APA Pacific Division Meeting)
34. Comments on Chrisoula Andreou, “The Real Puzzle of the Self-Torturer”, September 2015 (Conference on *Belief, Rationality and Action over Time*, University of Wisconsin, Madison).
35. “Epistemic Teleology: Synchronic and Diachronic”, June 2015 (Conference on *Epistemic Consequentialism*, University of Kent), July 2015 (Conference on *Epistemic Consequentialism*, University of Konstanz), February 2016 (University of Michigan Spring Colloquium), and December 2017 (Indiana University).
36. “Plato’s Theory of Knowledge”, June 2015 (*The Intersection of Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind*, Conference in Bled, Slovenia) and September 2017 (Workshop on *Ancient and Contemporary Epistemology*, New York University).
37. “What Internalists Should Learn from Ernest Sosa – and Where They Should Demur”, June 2015 (*The Intersection of Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind*, Conference in Bled, Slovenia).
38. “Rationality and Probability”, April 2015 (Université de Montréal).
39. “Internalism Re-Explained”, February 2015 (Rutgers University).
40. Comments on “Does Belief Aim at Truth?” by Iskra Fileva, February 2015 (APA Central Division Meeting, St Louis, Missouri)
41. “The Unity of Normativity”, January 2015 (New York University, Abu Dhabi)
42. “The Predicament of Choice”, June 2014 (Conference on *The Moral Significance of Intentions*, University of Leeds), October 2014 (University of Calgary), and October 2015 (Chapel Hill Metaethics Workshop)
43. “The Measurement of Belief”, February 2014 (*Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology*, Charleston, SC)
44. “Two Grades of Non-Consequentialist Constraints”, October 2013 (Conference on *Deontology and Criminal Law*, Rutgers University Law School)
45. “The Virtue of Rationality”, September 2013 (Conference in honour of Gail Fine and Terence Irwin, Cornell University), December 2013 (*Analytic Philosophy* conference, University of Texas at Austin), and April 2014 (University of Nebraska)
46. “The Internalist Character of Rationality”, August 2013 (Workshop on *Narrow Content*, Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo) and May 2014 (University of Stockholm)

47. “Scepticism and Probabilism”, July 2013 (Conference on *External-World Scepticism*, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)
48. “The Pitfalls of Reasons”, June 2013 (Conference on *Reasons*, University of St Andrews), May 2014 (New York University), and January 2015 (MIT-ing of Minds Workshop, MIT)
49. “The Normativity of Rationality”, May 2013 (University of Tromsø) and June 2014 (Conference on *Ethics and Metaethics*, Bled, Slovenia)
50. “The External Aim of Rationality”, May 2013 (University of Oxford)
51. “Is Civil Marriage Illiberal?”, March 2013 (Western Political Science Association, Los Angeles), April 2014 (APA Pacific Division Meeting), and January 2015 (Workshop on Legal Theory, UCLA)
52. “An Inferentialist Theory of the *A Priori*”, March 2013 (Kline Workshop on the *A Priori*, University of Missouri), June 2014 (Workshop on Inference, Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo), and July 2014 (Conference on Reasoning, University of Konstanz)
53. “Doxastic Correctness”, January 2013 (University of Arizona), February 2013 (Northwestern University), and July 2013 (Joint Session of the Mind Association and Aristotelian Society, University of Exeter)
54. “Akrasia and Uncertainty”, October 2012 (Auburn University) and December 2012 (Princeton University)
55. “Moral Disagreement among Philosophers”, September 2012 (Conference on *Disagreement and Evolution: Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief*, Purdue University)
56. “The Normativity of Epistemic Rationality”, 6 lectures, July 2012 (Cologne Summer School in Philosophy, University of Cologne)
57. “Rational Belief and Rational Choice”, June 2012 (Conference on *Wedgwood on Normativity and Rationality*, University of Rijeka)
58. “Normativity in the Plurality of its Types”, June 2012 (Conference on *Dimensions of Normativity*, University of Frankfurt)
59. Comments on Kate Nolfi, “Re-evaluating Wedgwood’s Argument for Normativism about the Nature of Belief”, May 2012 (Conference on *Social Epistemology and Epistemic Responsibility*, King’s College London)
60. “Rationality and Probability”, March 2012 (University of California, Riverside, and Stanford University), July 2012 (Centre for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich), and October 2012 (University of California, Santa Barbara).
61. “Subjective and Objective ‘Ought’”, March 2012 (University of California, Berkeley) and June 2013 (University of Edinburgh)
62. “Epistemic ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’”, January 2012 (Conference on *Epistemic Agency*, Oaxaca, Mexico)
63. “The Weight of Moral Reasons”, January 2012 (Workshop on Ethical Theory, University of Arizona) and February 2012 (APA Central Division Meeting)
64. “Rational ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’”, December 2011 (University of Reading)
65. “Rational Inference”, September 2010 (Cornell University, and Yale University) and March 2011 (Conference on the *Epistemology of Inference*, Brown University)
66. “The Right Thing to Believe”, September 2010 (Victoria University of Wellington, and University of Auckland)
67. “The Internalist Character of Rationality”, September 2010 (University of Otago)
68. “Utility vs. Choiceworthiness”, August 2010 (University of Sydney, University of Adelaide, and University of Melbourne) and November 2010 (London School of Economics)
69. “The Structure of Belief”, August 2010 (Monash University)
70. “Primitively Rational Belief-Forming Processes”, August 2010 (Conference on *Epistemology*, Australian National University)
71. “Values of Acts and Values of Consequences”, May 2010 (Conference on *Moral and Non-Moral Value*, King’s College London)

72. “The Normativity of Rationality”, March 2010 (University of Vienna) and April 2010 (University of Uppsala)
73. “The Structure of Rational Belief”, December 2009 (University of Glasgow) and January 2010 (University of Konstanz)
74. “Defending Double Effect”, October 2009 (University of Toronto), March 2010 (Trinity College Dublin) and March 2011 (Conference *In Memory of Philippa Foot*, Somerville College, Oxford)
75. “Instrumental Rationality”, October 2009 (Harvard University, and Brown University)
76. “Naturalism and the Causal Efficacy of the Normative”, September 2009 (Conference on *Naturalism*, University of Leeds)
77. Comments on John Broome, “Williams’ Deontic Theory”, July 2009 (Conference on the *Philosophy of Bernard Williams*, University of Leeds)
78. “How Truth Guides Belief”, June 2009 (University of Oslo) and October 2009 (Conference at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México)
79. “The Normativity of Social Rules”, June 2009 (University of Antwerp)
80. “Gandalf’s Solution to the Newcomb Problem”, May 2009 (Formal Epistemology Festival, University of Michigan)
81. “Response to Holton and Railton”, April 2009 (“Author Meets Critics: Ralph Wedgwood, *The Nature of Normativity*”, APA Pacific Division Meeting)
82. “*A Priori* Bootstrapping”, April 2009 (University of Southern California), November 2009 (University of Bristol), August 2010 (University of Wollongong) and December 2010 (conference on *Justification and Scepticism* at the University of Bologna)
83. “Grundlegend rationale Denkweisen” (in German), October 2008 (University of Göttingen)
84. “The ‘Right’ and the ‘Good’ Revisited”, June 2008 (Conference on *Metaethics Etc.*, Hebrew University of Jerusalem) and February 2009 (Keynote Address at the Danish Philosophical Association Meeting, Århus)
85. “Primitively Rational Belief-Forming Practices”, May 2008 (Conference on *Scepticism*, University of Edinburgh), June 2008 (NYU Conference on *Scepticism: Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary*, Villa La Pietra, Florence)
86. Comments on Simon Rippon, “Instrumental Rationality”, April 2008 (APA Central Division Meeting)
87. “A Platonic Theory of Reasons for Action”, February 2008 (Université de Montréal; and Conference on *Reason and Value*, University of California, Santa Barbara) and March 2008 (University of Edinburgh; and University of Stirling)
88. “Themes from *The Nature of Normativity*”, February 2008 (Research Seminar on Mind and Language, New York University)
89. “The Normativity of the Intentional: A Defence”, December 2007 (Workshop on *Normativity*, Université de Genève)
90. “The Moral Evil Demons”, September 2007 (Meta-Ethics Workshop, University of Wisconsin, Madison), April 2009 (University of Barcelona) and October 2009 (Boston University)
91. “The Epistemic Significance of Moral Disagreement”, May 2007 (University of St Andrews and University of Nottingham)
92. “A New Solution to the Newcomb Problem?”, July 2007 (Conference on *Practical Reason*, University of Syracuse) and February 2008 (City University of New York)
93. Comments on Kevin Brosnan, “The Dissolution of a Dilemma: Why Darwinian Considerations Don’t Confront Moral Realism with Hard Choices”, April 2007 (APA Pacific Division Meeting)
94. “Normativism Defended”, March 2007 (University of Stockholm)
95. Comments on Stephen Darwall, *The Second-Person Standpoint*, December 2006 (Conference on *Solidarity and the Second Person: Themes in Moral Philosophy*, Institute of Philosophy, University of London)
96. Comments on Niko Kolodny, “Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?”, November 2006 (University of Stirling)

97. "Two Blind Alleys in Moral Semantics", September 2006 (Cornell University)
98. "The Context-Sensitivity of 'Ought'", July 2006 (University of Aberdeen)
99. "A Refutation of the Australians", December 2005 (University of Siena)
100. "Butler on Virtue, Self-Interest and Human Nature", November 2005 (University of Reading)
101. "How We Know What Ought to Be", November 2005 (Aristotelian Society)
102. "Contextualism about Justified Belief", November 2005 (Moral Sciences Club, University of Cambridge) and September 2006 (McGill University)
103. "Essence and Modal Logic", June 2005 (Conference on the *Philosophy of Kit Fine*, Université de Genève)
104. "The Refutation of Expressivism", April 2005 (Central European University) and March 2006 (University College Cork)
105. "The Meaning of 'Ought'", October 2004 (Meta-Ethics Workshop, University of Wisconsin, Madison) and December 2004 (University of Glasgow)
106. "Contextualism and Moral Beliefs", March 2004 (Conference on *Epistemological Contextualism*, University of Stirling)
107. "Normative Knowledge", October 2003 (University of York), November 2003 (Workshop on Moral Epistemology, University of Edinburgh), April 2004 (University of Oslo) and May 2005 (Conference on *Metaphysics and Epistemology*, Dubrovnik)
108. "The Normativity of the Intentional", August 2003 (Conference on *Metaphysics and Epistemology*, Dubrovnik), January 2004 (University of Bristol), April 2004 (University of Oslo) and May 2005 (Workshop on the *Metaphysics of Value*, Centre for Metaphysics and Mind, University of Leeds)
109. "The Metaethicists' Mistake", September 2003 (University College London) and October 2004 (University of Reading)
110. "Normative Explanations", September 2002 (University of Leeds), November 2002 (University of Glasgow and University of St Andrews)
111. Comments on Thomas Kelly, "The Significance of Epistemic Disagreement", March 2002 (APA Pacific Division Meeting)
112. "Practical reasoning as figuring out what is best: Against Constructivism", May 2001 (Conference on *Weakness of Will and Varieties of Practical Irrationality*, Université de Montréal) and February 2002 (University of Arizona)
113. "Internalism Explained", November 2000 (Stanford University) and April 2001 (Rutgers Epistemology Conference)
114. "Knowledge and the Aim of Belief", October 2000 (Princeton University), May 2001 (Ohio State University) and February 2002 (Brown University)
115. Comments on Mark Johnston, "Manifest Goods and Correct Desires", November 1999 (Conference on *Normativity*, Brown University)
116. "Another Answer to the Knave", October 1999 (Union College) and April 2000 (APA Pacific Division Meeting)
117. "Practical Reason and Desire", April 1999 (Duke University), and October 1999 (Central States Philosophical Association)
118. "The Price of Non-Reductive Physicalism", November 1998 (North Carolina State University), and March 1999 (APA Pacific Division Meeting)
119. "Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms", October 1998 (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) and December 1998 (East Carolina University)
120. "The Price of Anti-Reductionism", September 1998 (British Society for Ethical Theory)
121. "What is marriage and why is it worth fighting for?", March 1998 (APA Pacific Division Meeting)
122. "A Defence of Moral Judgment Internalism", August 1997 (Dartmouth College)
123. "A Priori Principles of Practical Reasoning", February 1995 (University of Edinburgh and University of Glasgow) and July 1995 (*Achilles and the Tortoise*, A Conference on Norms and Reasoning, University of Glasgow)
124. "Euthyphronic Explanations", May 1995 (University of St Andrews)

125. Comments on Christine Korsgaard, “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason”, March 1995 (Conference on *Ethics and Practical Reason*, University of St Andrews).

### Upcoming talks

1. “Intending the Improbable”, October 2024 (University of Toronto)
2. “Three Bulwarks of Non-consequentialist Axiology”, January 2025 (Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics)
3. Comments on Bryan Reece, *Aristotle on Happiness, Virtue, and Wisdom*, April 2025 (APA Pacific Meeting)

### Teaching and graduate supervision at USC and Princeton (2012–)

#### Doctoral dissertations supervised (primary supervisor)

- Levy Wang, PhD thesis on reasons for attitudes, 2023–  
 Philip Li, PhD thesis on asymmetries in value, 2022–  
 Jesse Wilson, PhD thesis on epistemology and philosophy of cognitive science, 2017–2023  
 Michael Ashfield, PhD thesis on epistemology and political philosophy, 2016–21  
 Michael Pressman, PhD thesis on population ethics, 2014–18  
 Rima Basu, PhD thesis on the norms of belief, 2014–18  
 Michael Hatcher, PhD thesis on internalism in epistemology, 2012–17

#### Doctoral dissertations supervised (secondary supervisor)

- Robert Drummond (Classics), PhD thesis on music in Athenian theatre, 2024–  
 Rachel Keith, PhD thesis on duties to the self, 2023–  
 Rebecca Carlson, PhD thesis on moral realism and expressivism, 2023–  
 Wen Kin San, PhD thesis on the aggregation of value over time, 2023–  
 Joshua Allbright (Classics), PhD thesis on civic education in classical Athens, 2023  
 Stephanie van Fossen, PhD thesis on contractualist ethical theory, 2022–  
 Christa Peterson, PhD thesis on expressivism in metaethics, 2022–  
 Irene Bosco, PhD thesis on moral psychology, 2022–  
 Jennifer Foster, PhD on epistemic courage, 2022–  
 Faith McFadden (Classics), PhD thesis on beasts in classical Greek and Roman literature, 2021–  
 Paul Garofalo, PhD thesis on political legitimacy, 2018–23  
 Shane Ward, PhD thesis on creditworthiness, 2020– 23  
 Daniel Pallies, PhD thesis on pleasure and well-being, 2018–22  
 Simon Blessenohl, PhD thesis on democracy and social choice, 2019–21  
 Tatyana Kostochka, PhD thesis on emotions and moods, 2017–21  
 Nathan Howard, PhD thesis on ethics and practical reason, 2016–19  
 Jonathan Wright, PhD thesis on formal epistemology, 2015–19  
 Alex Dietz, PhD thesis on the ethics of collective action, 2015–18  
 Joe Horton, PhD thesis on the ethics of risk imposition, 2015–18  
 Ara Astourian, PhD thesis on political liberalism, 2014–17  
 Caleb Perl, PhD thesis on the moral semantics and epistemology, 2014–17  
 Nicholas Laskowski, PhD thesis on reductive naturalism in metaethics, 2014–17  
 Aaron Veek, PhD thesis on autonomy, 2014–16  
 Abelard Podgorski, PhD thesis on requirements of rationality, 2014–16  
 Michael Milona, PhD thesis on moral epistemology, 2014–16  
 Justin Dallmann, PhD thesis on formal epistemology, 2013–15  
 Matthew Lutz, PhD thesis on moral epistemology, 2012–15

Cecilia Stepp, PhD thesis on metaphor, 2012–14  
 Shyam Nair, PhD thesis on reasons and deontic logic, 2012–14  
 Julia Staffel, PhD thesis on reasoning and formal epistemology, 2012–13

### **Supervision of visiting students**

Zoë Johnson King (PhD student, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), Spring 2017  
 Sebastian Becker (PhD student, University of St Andrews), Spring 2015  
 Alexander Heape (Master's student, University of Aarhus), Fall 2014

### **Graduate Teaching at USC**

Philosophy 570 – Seminar on Epistemology (Fall 2013, 2015, 2019, 2020, and 2023)  
 Philosophy 593x – Teaching Philosophy (Fall 2015)  
 Philosophy 700 – Dissertation Seminar (Fall 2015)  
 Philosophy 501 – Recent work in Philosophy (Fall 2014 and Fall 2022)  
 Philosophy 503 – Proseminar for first-year PhD students: Introduction to the Contemporary  
 Literature on Value (Spring 2013, 2020, 2021, 2022, Fall 2023, 2024)  
 Philosophy 520 – Studies in Modern Philosophy: The early modern British moralists (Fall 2024)

### **Undergraduate Teaching**

Philosophy 416 – The Ancient Stoics (Spring 2022, 2024)  
 GESM 120g – What is the Best Way to Live? (Spring 2017 and Fall 2020)  
 Philosophy 472 – Moral Philosophy (Spring 2016 and Spring 2020)  
 Philosophy 360 – Epistemology (Spring 2014)  
 Philosophy 411 – Plato (Fall 2013, 2014, 2016, 2017, and Spring 2019 and 2023)  
 Philosophy 490 – Independent Study (Fall and Spring 2013, Spring 2017, Spring 2020)  
 Philosophy 494 – Undergraduate Senior Thesis (Spring 2013, and Spring 2014)  
 Philosophy 470 – Theory of Knowledge (Fall 2012)  
 ARLT 100g – Aspects of Ethics (Spring 2012)  
 Philosophy 471 – Metaphysics and Epistemology (Spring 2012)

### **Graduate Teaching at Princeton**

Philosophy 525 – Ethics: Value and Practical Reason (Spring 2018)

### **External graduate supervision for other universities**

Eric Tracy, PhD thesis on the normativity of content, UCLA, 2015–19  
 Alexander Worsnip, PhD thesis on rational requirements on belief, Yale University, 2013–2015

## **Teaching at Oxford (2002–2011)**

### **Doctoral Theses Supervised (primary supervisor)**

Yair Levy, “Reasons and Rational Requirements”, 2010–12  
 Michael Gibb, “The Moral Relationship”, 2010–12  
 Daan Evers, “Irrealist Moral Semantics”, 2007–2010  
 David Tester, “Empirical Psychology and the Methodology of Moral Theory”, 2006–9  
 Eusebius McKaiser, “Responsibility for Beliefs”, 2004–05  
 James Morauta, “Rational Intention”, 2004  
 Mario Brandhorst, “Practical Reasoning and Reasons for Action”, 2003–04  
 Daniel Star, “Moral Principles and the Holism of Reasons”, 2003–04

### **Doctoral Theses Supervised (secondary supervisor)**

Amber Riaz, “Issues in Moral Epistemology”, 2006–10  
 Nico Silins, “The Paradox of Reasons”, 2003–04  
 Andres Nes, “Demonstrative Concepts and Perceptual Acquaintance”, 2003

### **BPhil Thesis Supervision**

Bernhard Salow, “Belief, Confidence, and Normative Conflict”, Hilary and Trinity Term 2011  
 Daan Evers, “Irrealist Moral Semantics”, Hilary and Trinity Term 2007  
 Amber Riaz, “Issues in Moral Epistemology”, Hilary and Trinity Term 2006 (co-supervised with Prof. Timothy Williamson)

### **Graduate Seminars**

Seminar for the First-Year Philosophy Graduate Students (24 graduate seminars), Michaelmas Term 2005, Hilary Term 2006, Trinity Term 2006 and Michaelmas Term 2010  
 The Normativity of the Mental (8 graduate seminars), Michaelmas Term 2006

### **Teaching for BPhil Students**

Supervisions in: Metaphysics and Epistemology, and Moral Philosophy

### **Undergraduate Tutorials**

Introduction to Philosophy (Elementary Logic; Moral Philosophy: J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*; General Philosophy: Descartes, *Meditations*)  
 Ethics  
 Knowledge and Reality  
 Plato, *Euthyphro* and *Meno* (in Greek)  
 Early Greek Philosophy (in Greek)  
 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (both in English and in Greek)  
 Plato, *Republic* (both in English and in Greek)

### **Undergraduate Lectures**

Metaethics (8 undergraduate lectures), Trinity Term 2003, and Hilary Term 2004  
 Epistemology (8 undergraduate lectures), Michaelmas Term 2007 and Michaelmas Term 2008

### **Other Undergraduate Teaching Responsibilities**

Director of Studies for PPE students at Merton College (overseeing student progress, organizing out-of-college tutorials, and setting and marking college exams (collections), etc.).

### **Internal Examining of Oxford Doctoral Theses**

Internal examiner for Michael Blome-Tillmann, *Scepticism and Contextualism*, DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2006–2007  
 Internal examiner for Leonard Kahn, *A Theory of Value*, DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2007  
 Internal examiner for Julian Fink, *The Nature of Rational Requirements*, DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2010  
 Internal examiner for Jane Friedman, *Suspension of Judgment and Evidential Norms*, DPhil thesis, 2011  
 Internal examiner for Courtney Cox, *Two Problems in Dynamic Ethics*, DPhil thesis 2011  
 Internal examiner for Mark McBride, *Basic Knowledge*, DPhil thesis, 2011–14

### **Other Internal Postgraduate Examining**

Assessor for the BPhil Examination in Philosophy, Oxford, 2004, 2007, 2008, 2011

### **Internal Undergraduate Examining**

Chairman of Examiners for the Final Honour School of Philosophy and Modern Languages, Oxford, 2009  
 Assessor for all Final Honour Schools involving Philosophy, Oxford 2004, 2007, 2008, 2009  
 Examiner for the Final Honour School of PPE, Oxford, 2004

### **Teaching at MIT (1995-2002)**

#### **Graduate Seminars**

Topics in Moral Philosophy: Early Modern British Moral Philosophy, Fall 2001  
 Topics in Moral Philosophy: Metaethics and Metaphysics, Fall 2000  
 Topics in Moral Philosophy: Ethics and Practical Reason, Fall 1999  
 Topics in Moral Philosophy: Kant's Ethics, Fall 1997  
 Topics in Moral Philosophy: Metaethics and Philosophy of Language, Spring 1997  
 Topics in Moral Philosophy: The Concept of Rationality, Spring 1996

#### **Upper-Division Undergraduate Classes**

Ethics: Fall 1995 and 1996, Spring 1998, 2000 and 2002  
 Varieties of Skepticism: 2000  
 Topics in Philosophy (Metaphysics): 1996 and 1997  
 Ancient Philosophy: Fall 1995, 1997, and 2001

#### **Undergraduate Lectures**

What is the Best Way to Live? (26 lectures on the history of ethics): Fall 1996, Spring 1998, Fall 1999 and 2000, Spring 2002

#### **Doctoral Thesis Supervised (primary supervisor)**

Elizabeth Harman, "Who Matters? Which Beings Matter Morally and Why", MIT, 2000–03

#### **Doctoral Theses Supervised (secondary supervisor)**

Ásta Sveinsdóttir, "Constructivism about Objects", MIT, 1999–2003  
 Alexander Friedman, "Minimizing Harm: Three Problems in Moral Theory", MIT 2000–02  
 Rachel Brown, "The Extension of Liberalism Beyond Domestic Boundaries", MIT, 1998–99  
 Robert Streiffer, "Moral Relativism and Reasons for Action", MIT, 1997–99  
 Timothy Hinton, "Foundations of Egalitarian Justice", MIT, 1995–96

## Administrative responsibilities

### *For the School of Philosophy, USC*

Director of the School of Philosophy, 2022–25  
 Chair of the Search Committee, 2022–23, 2023–24, 2024–25  
 Host for post-doctoral fellow Mathis Koschel 2022–25  
 Host for visiting post-doctoral fellow Sebastian Schmidt 2022–23  
 Mentor for tenure-track Assistant Professor Zoë Johnson King 2020–22  
 Mentor for tenure-track Assistant Professor Jacob Nebel 2019–22  
 Co-chair of the Search Committee, 2015–16, 2016–17, 2019–20, 2021–22  
 Graduate Admissions Committee, 2012, 2013, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2024  
 Chair of the Graduate Admissions Committee, 2017, 2025  
 Interim Director of Graduate Studies, 2016–17  
 Culture and Outreach Committee, 2016–17  
 Faculty Review Committee, 2014–15  
 Chair of the Placement Committee, 2012–14  
 Search Committee, 2012–14

### *For USC*

Trustee and Presidential Scholarship interviews, 2016 and 2020

### *For Dornsife College of Letters, Arts, and Sciences, USC*

Sustainability Initiative Committee, 2013–16  
 Mentor for Jon Lawhead, Sustainability Post-Doctoral Fellow, 2014–16  
 Host for two Sustainability Guest Speakers (John Broome and Dale Jamieson), 2014–15

### *For Merton College, Oxford*

Governing Body, 2002–11  
 Warden and Tutors' Committee, 2002–11  
 Philosophy Admissions (both undergraduate and postgraduate), every year, 2002–11  
 Committee for the Election of Junior Research Fellows, 2003–04 and 2006–07  
 Appointment Committee for Fixed-Term Fellow in Classics, 2004  
 Appointment Committee for Fitzjames Research Fellow in Philosophy, 2004, 2005–06, 2007, 2011  
 College Interview Panel for Tutorial Fellow in Politics, 2004  
 College Library Committee, 2004–06  
 Committee on College Officers and Standing Committees 2004–05  
 Dean of Graduates (a position that conferred *ex officio* membership of the Hardship Committee, the Academic Needs Committee, the Committee for the Election of Graduate Scholars, the Domestic Committee, etc.), 2005–06 and 2009  
 Appointment Committee for College Lecturer in Philosophy (five times), 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011  
 Appointment Committee for Tutorial Fellow in Classics, 2007  
 Co-organizer of a one-day conference on T. W. Adorno, November 2004 (Merton College, Oxford)

### *For the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford*

Search Committee, 2003–06  
 Committee on the Ethics Syllabus, 2004  
 Co-organizer of Moral Philosophy Seminar Series (twice), 2003–04 and 2008–09  
 Placement Officer, 2004–05  
 BPhil Course Director (a position that confers *ex officio* membership of Philosophy Graduate Studies Committee and the Philosophy Graduate Admissions Committee), 2005–07

Appointment Committee for University Lecturer (CUF) at St John's College, 2006  
 Appointment Committee for University Lecturer (CUF) at Somerville College, 2009  
 PPE Admissions Co-ordinator for the Group 1 colleges, 2009–11  
 Director of Undergraduate Studies (a position that confers *ex officio* membership of the Philosophy Undergraduate Studies Committee (chair), the Philosophy Faculty Board, the Philosophy Finance and Planning Committee and the Working Group on Strategic Planning, the Undergraduate Joint Consultative Committee, the PPE Committee, and the Humanities Division Examinations Committee), 2010–11

#### *For MIT*

Committee on Graduate School Programs, 1999–02  
 Philosophy Concentration Adviser, 1996–98  
 Committee on the Philosophy Undergraduate Program, 1995–96  
 Philosophy Library Liaison Officer, 1995–98  
 Actively involved in faculty appointments, especially 1996–97  
 Philosophy Graduate Admissions, 1996–98, 2000, 2002

### **Professional Service**

#### **Editorial Responsibilities**

Value Theory Subject Editor, *Thought*, 2013–18  
 Editorial Board, *International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (Wiley-Blackwell), 2010–12

#### **Refereeing**

Referee for: *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Analysis*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *Dialectica*, *Ergo*, *Erkenntnis*, *Ethics*, *European Journal of Philosophy*, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, *Journal of Moral Philosophy*, *Journal of Political Philosophy*, *Journal of Value Inquiry*, *Legal Theory*, *Mind*, *Mind and Language*, *Noûs*, *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophers' Imprint*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Synthese*, and *Theoria*.  
 Reader for: MIT Press, Oxford University Press, Wiley-Blackwell, Cambridge University Press, and the British Society for Ethical Theory annual conference

#### **External Undergraduate Examining**

External Examiner for Undergraduate Examinations in Philosophy, University of Stirling, 2008-09 and 2010-12

#### **External assessing and advising**

Assessor (in confidence) for numerous promotion cases at various universities around the world  
 Assessor (in confidence) for numerous research grant applications  
 Assessor (in confidence) for candidates for Junior Research Fellowships and Post-Doctoral Fellowships at several colleges and universities in the UK  
 Panel for adjudicating the Sanders Prize in Meta-Ethics (2015)  
 Panel for adjudicating the Sanders Prize in Epistemology (2013)  
 External member of the appointment committee for the Professorship of Moral Philosophy at the University of St Andrews (2011)

### External Examining of Doctoral Theses

- External Examiner for Shr-Jie Jian, *The Rationality and Normativity of Intention*, DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2020
- External Examiner for Stephen Barrie, *Double Effect Reasoning: Intention in Action*, PhD thesis, King's College London, 2019
- External Examiner for Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, *Essays in Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, and Metaphysics*, Dissertation for the Dr.Phil. degree, Aarhus University, 2018
- External Examiner for Niall J. Paterson, *Doxastic Dispositions: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Belief*, PhD dissertation, University of Bristol, 2018
- External Examiner for Rachel Fraser, *Essays on Epistemic Structure*, DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2016
- External Examiner for Will MacAskill, *Moral Uncertainty*, DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2014
- External Examiner for Amia Srinivasan, *The Fragile Estate*, DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2013
- External Examiner for Ittay Nissan-Rozen, *Doing the Best One Can*, PhD thesis, London School of Economics, 2011
- External Examiner for David Beesley, *An Interpretivist Theory of Practical Reason*, PhD thesis, University of Nottingham, 2011
- External Examiner for David Heath, *McDowell and the Challenge of Moral Relativism*, MPhil thesis, University College London, 2003

### Service for Professional Organizations

- Committee of the *Analysis* Trust, 2005– (member of the *Analysis* Studentship subcommittee, 2007–2011 and 2024–27; member of the conference grants subcommittee, 2014–17)
- Committee on the Status of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender People in the Profession, American Philosophical Association, 2001–03 and 2018–21
- Nominating Committee, Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, 2020–2022