

Jim Hutchinson

Curriculum Vitae

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Department of History, Philosophy, and Religious Studies

Nazarbayev University

53 Kabanbay Batyr Avenue, Room 8.115

Astana, Kazakhstan

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|--|---|-------------------------------------|
| Employment | Nazarbayev University Assistant Professor | Present |
| | University of Toronto, Mississauga Postdoctoral Fellow | 2020-2022 |
| | Simon Fraser University Term Lecturer | 2019-2020 |
| | Indiana University, Bloomington Oscar R. Ewing Visiting Assistant Professor | 2018-2019 |
| Education | University of California, Berkeley Ph.D. in Philosophy (Advisors: John MacFarlane & John Campbell) Dissertation: <i>A Haunting Conviction: Frege On Truth and Logic</i> | 2009-2018 |
| | University of Toronto B.A. in Philosophy | 2006-2009 |
| | Wilfrid Laurier University | 2004-2006 |
| Specialization | History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Logic, Epistemology | |
| Competence | Value Theory, Philosophy of Mind/Language, Early Modern Philosophy | |
| Publications | [Paper about Normativity and Logic] [Paper about Frege's Epistemology] | Under Review Revisions Submitted |
| | "Metaphys. Separatism and Epistemol. Autonomy in Frege and Beyond" <i>British Journal for the History of Philosophy</i> | 2022 |
| | "Frege's Critical Arguments for Axioms" <i>Pacific Philosophical Quarterly</i> | 2021 |
| | "Frege on the Generality of Logical Laws" <i>European Journal of Philosophy</i> | 2020 |
| | "Why Can't What is True Be Valuable?" <i>Synthese</i> | 2019 |
| Upcoming Talks (* =Blind Review) | "Moral Principles and Normative Generality" * Pacific APA: Colloquium Nazarbayev Philosophy Faculty Work-In-Progress Talks | April 2023 November 2022 |

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| Selected Talks | “Frege’s Metaphysical Separatism” | |
| (* =Blind Review) | * Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy | July 2022 |
| | “General Norms and Logic” | |
| | * Pacific APA: Colloquium | April 2022 |
| | UC Berkeley Work-In-Progress Talk | October 2021 |
| | “Logical Pluralism and Normativity: Conflict and Collapse” | |
| | * Eastern APA: Colloquium | January 2022 |
| | “Frege’s Radical Anti-Psychologism” | |
| | * Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy | July 2021 |
| | * Eastern APA: Colloquium | January 2021 |
| | “Psychologism and Normative Generality” | |
| | University of Toronto LEMM Group | October 2020 |
| | “Post-Truth and the Value of Truth” | |
| | * Pacific APA: Colloquium | April 2021 |
| | * IU Inter-Campus Philosophy Conference | March 2019 |
| | “The Centrality of Simplicity in Frege’s Philosophy” | |
| | * Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy | June 2019 |
| | “Did the Later Wittgenstein Accept Frege’s Anti-Psychologism?” | |
| | * Kraków Conf.: Wittgenstein and Frege on Psychologism | November 2018 |
| | “Why Can’t What Is True Be Valuable?” | |
| | * Eastern APA: Colloquium | January 2020 |
| | Simon Fraser University Philosophy Colloquium | September 2019 |
| | * North Carolina Philosophical Society Conference | March 2019 |
| | * Indiana Philosophical Association Conference | November 2018 |
| | IU Bloomington Philosophy Faculty Work-In-Progress Talks | September 2018 |
| | “Frege on the Generality of Logical Laws” | |
| | * TiLPS History of Analytic Philosophy Workshop | July 2019 |
| | IU Bloomington Logic Seminar | September 2018 |
| | “Frege and Lotze on Criteria of Identity” | |
| | * Pacific APA: North American Neo-Kantian Society | March 2018 |
| | “Frege’s Critical Arguments for Axioms” | |
| | * Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy | June 2018 |
| | * Brown University Mark Shapiro Graduate Conference | November 2017 |
| | * Eastern APA: Colloquium | January 2017 |
| | * Berkeley-London Graduate Conference | May 2016 |
| | * Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Graduate Conference | April 2016 |
| | “Frege, Leibniz, and Kant on Primitive Truths” | |
| | * Pacific APA: Colloquium | April 2016 |
| | * Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Graduate Conference | May 2015 |
| | “A Criterion for Sameness of Sense in Frege” | |
| | * Berkeley-London Graduate Conference | May 2013 |
| | UC Berkeley Undergraduate Philosophy Forum | November 2012 |
| | “Are Perceptual States Object-Dependent?” | |
| | * Berkeley-London Graduate Conference | May 2012 |
| | “Inquiry, Indication, and Rigid Beliefs” | |
| | * Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Graduate Conference | April 2011 |

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| Teaching | (2x) NU: Ethics (Intermediate) | Spring 2022/Fall 2022 | |
| | NU: Metaphysics and Epistemology (Intermediate) | Spring 2022 | |
| | NU: Epistemology (Advanced) | Spring 2022 | |
| | UTM: Mentoring: The Socrates Project (Advanced) | Fall 2021/Spring 2022 | |
| | UTM: History: Early Analytic Philosophy (Advanced) | Fall 2021 | |
| | SFU: Epistemology/Logic: Justifying Axioms (Graduate) | Summer 2020 | |
| | SFU: History: Early Analytic Philosophy (Advanced) | Summer 2020 | |
| | (2x) SFU: Logic: Truth and Generality (Introductory) | Sum. 2020/Fall 2019 | |
| | (2x) SFU: Epistemology: The Value of Truth (Intermediate) | Spring 2020/Fall 2019 | |
| | SFU: Metaphysics: Reality (Intermediate) | Spring 2020 | |
| | SFU: Metaph./Epist.: Authenticity and Objectivity (Introductory) | Fall 2019 | |
| | IUB: Logic: Generality and Modality (Intermediate) | Spring 2019 | |
| | (2x) IUB: Ethics: Pleasure, Love, Truth, and the Meaning of Life (Intro.) | S2019/F2018 | |
| | IUB: Epistemology: The Value of Truth (Advanced) | Fall 2018 | |
| | UCB: History: Modern Philosophy (Intermediate) | Summer 2017 | |
| | UCB: Mind: Nature of Mind (Introductory) | Summer 2014 | |
| | UC Berkeley | (2x) Mentoring: Berkeley Connect (All levels, Lara Buchak) | F. 2017/S. 2018 |
| | Assistant Teaching | Mentoring: Philosophical Methods (Advanced, Lara Buchak) | Spring 2017 |
| | | History: Kant (Advanced, Daniel Warren) | Fall 2016 |
| | | History: Spinoza (Advanced, Tim Crockett) | Spring 2016 |
| History: Aristotle (Advanced, Klaus Corcilius) | | Fall 2015 | |
| History: Later Wittgenstein (Advanced, Barry Stroud) | | Spring 2015 | |
| History: Modern Philosophy (Intermediate, Hannah Ginsborg) | | Spring 2014 | |
| Language: Theory of Meaning (Advanced, John MacFarlane) | | Spring 2013 | |
| History: Frege (Advanced, Hans Sluga) | | Fall 2012 | |
| Logic: Introductory Logic (Introductory, Daniel Warren) | | Spring 2012 | |
| Mind: Philosophy of Mind (Advanced, John Searle) | | Spring 2011 | |
| (2x) Mind: Nature of Mind (Intro., John Campbell / Geoff Lee) | | F. 2011/F. 2010 | |
| UC Berkeley Courses (* = Audited Seminar) | | (2x) * Daniel Warren on Kant's Metaphysics and Epistemology | S. 2017 / S. 2018 |
| | | * Kristin Primus on Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza | Fall 2016 |
| | | (2x) * Barry Stroud on Meaning, Judgement, Understanding | S. 2012 / S. 2016 |
| | | * Hannah Ginsborg on the Normativity of Meaning | Spring 2016 |
| | * Paolo Mancosu and Hans Sluga on Wittgenstein's Tractatus | Fall 2014 | |
| | * John Campbell on Attention, Perception, and Thought | Spring 2013 | |
| | * Jay Wallace on Reasons and Normativity | Spring 2013 | |
| | (2x) * Michael Martin on Perception, Content, and Consciousness | F. 2009 / F. 2012 | |
| | * John Campbell and Michael Martin on Perception | Fall 2011 | |
| | * John MacFarlane on Expressivism and Relativism | Spring 2011 | |
| | * Geoff Lee on the Metaphysics of Objects and Properties | Spring 2011 | |
| | Democratic Authority (Niko Kolodny) | Spring 2011 | |
| | Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Dorothea Frede) | Fall 2010 | |
| | Concepts, Attitudes, and the Unity of Judgement (Barry Stroud) | Fall 2010 | |
| | Hume (Michael Martin) | Fall 2010 | |
| Consciousness (Geoff Lee) | Spring 2010 | | |
| Content Without Structure (John MacFarlane & Seth Yalcin) | Spring 2010 | | |
| Conceptual Representation (Hannah Ginsborg & Tania Lombrozo) | Fall 2009 | | |
| Attention, Consciousness, and Mental Causation (John Campbell) | Fall 2009 | | |
| First Year Graduate Seminar (John MacFarlane t Niko Kolodny) | Fall 2009 | | |

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| Awards and Honours (Competitive) | Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence EURO Travel Grant (IU Bloomington) | 2019 | |
| | Berkeley Connect Fellowship (UC Berkeley) | 2017-2018 | |
| | Outstanding Graduate Student Instructor Award (UC Berkeley) | 2016 | |
| | Intensive Language Course Grant (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst) | 2013 | |
| | John F.M. Hunter Memorial Scholarship (University of Toronto) | 2008 | |
| | Graham Solomon Logic Prize (Wilfrid Laurier University) | 2006 | |
| Referee | <i>British J. for the History of Phil.</i> | 2022- | Cambridge University Press 2019- |
| | <i>History and Philosophy of Logic</i> | 2022- | <i>J. of the History of Analytical Phil.</i> 2019- |
| | <i>Philosopher's Imprint</i> | 2022- | <i>Journal of Philosophical Logic</i> 2019- |
| | <i>Mind</i> | 2020- | <i>History of Philosophy Quarterly</i> 2019- |
| | <i>Thought</i> | 2020- | |
| | APA, Central Division | 2019 | Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Conf. 2010-16 |
| Judge | British Columbia Ethics Bowl | 2020 | UCB Undergrad. Essay Prize 2014,2016 |
| Other Service | Chair, UC Berkeley Graduate Student Instructor Evaluation Committee | 2017 | |
| | Graduate Student Library Liaison, UC Berkeley | 2015-2016 | |
| | Graduate Student Faculty Meeting Representative, UC Berkeley | 2015 | |
| | Organizer: Berkeley-London Philosophy Conference | 2015 | |
| | Research Assistant, Hans Sluga on <i>The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein</i> | 2014 | |
| | Organizer: UC Berkeley Philosophy Department Colloquium Receptions | 2009-2012 | |
| Languages | German (reading knowledge) | | |
| | French (reading knowledge) | | |
| Citizenship | Canadian | | |
| References | John Campbell | | Adam Leite |
| | Willis S. and Marion Slusser Prof. of Phil. University of California, Berkeley jcampbell@berkeley.edu | | Associate Professor of Philosophy University of Indiana, Bloomington aleite@indiana.edu |
| | John MacFarlane Professor of Philosophy University of California, Berkeley jgm@berkeley.edu | | Hans Sluga William and Trudy Ausfahl Prof. of Phil. University of California, Berkeley sluga@berkeley.edu |
| | Gurpreet Rattan Professor of Philosophy University of Toronto, Mississauga gurpreet.rattan@utoronto.ca | | Daniel Warren Associate Professor of Philosophy University of California, Berkeley dmwarren@berkeley.edu |
| | Gary Ebbs Professor of Philosophy University of Indiana, Bloomington gebbs@indiana.edu | | Barry Stroud Willis S. and Marion Slusser Prof. of Phil. University of California, Berkeley [Letter available] |

Abstract of *A Haunting Conviction: Frege on Truth and Logic*

Many philosophers think that *truth* is prior to *science*, in something like the following sense: though it belongs to the nature of science to pursue truth, the nature of truth does not itself involve science or the cognitive goals that we satisfy through it, such as understanding and explaining things. Frege denies this, giving no priority either to truth or to science. For him, the things that are true satisfy the cognitive goals of science: what we know about each can guide our thinking about the other. No truth is trivial, since every one has a contribution to make to these cognitive goals.

For both Frege and the Neo-Kantian philosophers in his philosophical milieu, it is this connection with these cognitive goals that makes truth a *value*, whose significance is comparable with that of goodness and beauty. This value and these goals enable Frege to offer a normative characterization of logic: the logical laws are those that tell us how all our judging must be if we are to achieve these goals.

These views of truth, science, and logic make possible an approach to the justification of logical axioms that has frustrated readers by its apparent inconsistency: Frege seems both to rule out arguing for logical axioms, and himself to offer arguments for them. The key to resolving the conflict is to see that he only means to rule out arguments that derive the axioms from other truths that we are already justified in accepting. His own arguments, by contrast, derive them directly from the *goals*: the point of the arguments is to show that the axioms *must* be true if our cognitive goals are ever to be reached.

The discussions of truth, science, and logic in which the above points emerge do not involve language in any significant way, which will surprise anyone who is familiar with Frege's reputation as the herald of the "linguistic turn"—his reputation for proclaiming an independent philosophy of language to be the foundation of all philosophy. I argue for a quite different account of the role of language in Frege's philosophy. I point out that key arguments in his *Foundations of Arithmetic* already force us to understand Frege's philosophy of language not as a foundation for philosophy, but as a grand project in *linguistic engineering*. Frege's goal is not to reveal how language is, but to re-design it in order to help us reach our (independently understood) cognitive goals. This technological interpretation of Frege's philosophy of language, I believe, will allow us to break the interpretive deadlock that has prevented us from understanding the key linguistic notion from Frege's later work: that of the *sense* of an expression.