

Selim Berker

Mailing Address:

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Harvard University, Department of Philosophy
Cambridge, MA 02138

Email: sberker@fas.harvard.edu**Website:** <https://sberker.scholars.harvard.edu>**Employment:**

Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity, Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, 2017–present
Harvard College Professor, Harvard University, 2024–2029
Edmond & Lily Safra Center for Ethics Fellow in Residence, 2024–2025
Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University, 2015–2017
John L. Loeb Associate Professor of the Humanities, Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, 2013–2015
Fellow, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University, 2013–2014
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University, 2007–2013
Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Faculty Fellow, University Center for Human Values, Princeton University, 2009–2010
Instructor in Philosophy, Harvard University, 2006–2007

Education:

Ph.D. in philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007
M.A. in physics, Harvard University, 2000 (*admitted as Ph.D. candidate but left to pursue philosophy*)
A.B. *summa cum laude* in physics, Harvard College, 1998

Areas of Specialization:

Ethics, Epistemology, Metaphysics

Areas of Competence:

Action Theory, Logic, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind

Publications:

- “Comments on Kelly: Against Positing a Non-Pejorative Sense of ‘Bias’,” *Philosophical Studies* 182 (2025): 3047–55.
“What Is Rational Sentimentalism?” *Philosophical Studies* 182 (2025): 2339–50.
“Is There Anti-Fittingness?” *Ergo* 11 (2024): 1051–82.
“The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting,” in Christopher Howard and R. A. Rowland (eds.), *Fittingness: Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 23–57.
“Quasi-Dependence,” *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 15 (2020): 195–218.
“The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles,” *Noûs* 53 (2019): 904–36.
“Mackie Was Not an Error Theorist,” *Philosophical Perspectives* 33 (2019): 5–25.
“A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief,” *Analytic Philosophy* 59 (2018): 427–70.
“The Unity of Grounding,” *Mind* 127 (2018): 729–77. [Selected by *The Philosopher’s Annual* as one of the ten best philosophy papers published in 2018.]
“Coherentism via Graphs,” *Philosophical Issues* 25 (2015): 322–52.

- “Reply to Goldman: Cutting Up the One to Save the Five in Epistemology,” *Episteme* 12 (2015): 145–53.
- “Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Normativity Is Mind-Dependent?” in Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson (eds.), *Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics* (Oxford University Press, 2014), 215–52.
- “The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism,” *Philosophical Issues* 23 (2013): 363–87.
- “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions,” *Philosophical Review* 122 (2013): 337–93.
- “Gupta’s Gambit,” *Philosophical Studies* 152 (2011): 17–39.
- “The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 37 (2009): 293–329. [Selected by *The Philosopher’s Annual* as one of the ten best philosophy papers published in 2009. Reprinted and translated into German in Norbert Paulo and Jan Christoph Bublitz (eds.), *Empirische Ethik: Grundlagentexte aus Psychologie und Philosophie* (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2020).]
- “Luminosity Regained,” *Philosophers’ Imprint* 8, no. 2 (2008): 1–22.
- “Particular Reasons,” *Ethics* 118 (2007): 109–39.

Talks:

- TBD, Jowett Society, University of Oxford, May 2026 (*expected*)
- TBD, University College London, May 2026 (*expected*)
- “Knowledge, Grounding, and Truth,” Keynote, Columbia–NYU Graduate Philosophy Conference, April 2026 (*expected*)
- “Knowledge, Grounding, and Truth,” Keynote, Syracuse University Graduate Philosophy Conference, March 2026 (*expected*)
- TBD, Vanderbilt University, February 2026 (*expected*)
- “On the Metaphysics of Voting,” Union College, January 2026 (*expected*)
- “On the Metaphysics of Voting,” Cornell University, December 2025
- “On the Metaphysics of Voting,” the State University of New York at Albany, October 2025
- “A Reason Itself Neither Requires nor Permits: On an Alleged Distinction between Two Roles for Reasons,” Australian National University, July 2025
- “On the Metaphysics of Voting,” Australian National University, July 2025
- “Knowledge, Grounding, and Truth,” Australian National University, July 2025
- “Knowledge, Grounding, and Truth,” Workshop on Reductionism in Metaphysics, Metaethics, and the Philosophy of Mind, Université de Fribourg, June 2025
- “On the Metaphysics of Voting,” Rutgers University, April 2025
- “On the Metaphysics of Voting,” Workshop on Voting: Philosophical Foundations, Moral and Political Implications, Edmund & Lily Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University, April 2025
- “How Your Vote Determines a Winner: On the Metaphysics of Voting,” Fellows-in-Residence Seminar, Edmund & Lily Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University, March 2025
- “How Your Vote Determines a Winner: On the Metaphysics of Voting,” Legal Theory Workshop, UCLA, February 2025
- “Favorers as Explainers: Some Doubts,” Keynote, Workshop on Normative Reasons, Explanation, and Grounding, Bielefeld University, Germany, October 2024
- “A Becauseal Theory of Knowing,” Bielefeld University, Germany, October 2024
- “A Reason Itself Neither Requires nor Permits: On an Alleged Distinction between Two Roles for Reasons,” Workshop on Dimensions of Normative Strength, College of William & Mary, September 2024

“Is There Anti-Fittingness?” Conference on Contemporary Metaethics and Ancient Value Theory, the Institute for Advanced Study in Berlin, Germany, June 2024
 “Comments on Kelly: Biases as Bases,” Symposium on Thomas Kelly’s *Bias: A Philosophical Study*, Princeton University, April 2024
 “Is There Anti-Fittingness?” Philosophy Mountain Workshop, Chamonix, France, March 2024
 “Is There Anti-Fittingness?” St. Andrews Centre for Ethics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs, January 2024
 “A Becausal Theory of Knowing,” Midwest Epistemology Workshop, St. Louis, October 2023
 “A Distinctive Fit,” University of Texas, Austin, March 2023
 “A Distinctive Fit,” Tufts University, February 2023
 “Is There Anti-Fittingness?” Chapel Hill Metaethics Workshop, December 2022
 “The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting,” Australian National University, August 2022
 “Worsnip’s Unification of Structural Rationality,” Orange Beach Epistemology Workshop, University of Alabama, May 2022
 “The Right, the Good, and the Fitting,” Judy Thomson Memorial Event, MIT, April 2022
 “Comments on Hurka and Chan on Ross on Virtue and Vice,” Notre Dame–ACU International Ethics Conference, University of Notre Dame, April 2022
 “The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting,” Practical and Epistemic Normativity Workshop, University of Helsinki, December 2021
 “The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting,” University of Neuchâtel, December 2021
 “The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting,” Group for Analytic Metaphysics & Epistemology, Texas A&M University, October 2021
 “The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting,” Uppsala University, May 2021
 “The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting,” Zoom Conference on Fittingness, May 2021
 “The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting,” Tel-Hai Academic College, Israel, March 2021
 “The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting,” University of Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar, February 2021
 “The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting,” Northeast Normativity Workshop, October 2020
 Two lectures, Iowa State University, October 2020 (*canceled because of pandemic*)
 Masterclass on fittingness, University of Zurich, September 2020 (*canceled because of pandemic*)
 Keynote address at the Second Annual Explaining Philosophy Conference at Wuhan University, China, May 2020 (*canceled because of pandemic*)
 “A Becausal Theory of Knowing,” Conference on Grounding and Its Applications, North Carolina State University, September 2019
 “Quasi-Dependence,” Philosophical Methodology and Metametaphysics Conference, Dartmouth University, May 2019
 “Practical Reasons to Suspend Judgment?” Central APA, February 2019
 “Comments on Yu’s ‘Tacit Knowledge; Towards a Pragmatic Turn in Epistemology,’” NYC–China Epistemology Conference, Fordham University, October 2018
 “Quasi-Dependence,” Madison Metaethics Workshop, University of Wisconsin, Madison, September 2018
 “Mackie Was Not an Error Theorist,” Keynote at Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, March 2018
 “The Explanatory Character of Moral Principles,” University of Southampton, September 2017

- “A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief,” Northern New England Workshop in Ethics and Epistemology, University of Vermont, August 2017
- “A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief,” CUNY Graduate Center, May 2017
- “A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief,” University of Miami, February 2017
- “Comments on Rosen’s ‘Normative Grounding,’” SOFIA Conference on Grounding, Huatulco, Mexico, January 2017
- “The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles,” Chapel Hill Metaethics Workshop, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, December 2016
- “The Explanatory Role of Moral Principles,” Workshop on Ground, University of Texas, Austin, May 2016
- “A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief,” Keynote at Northwestern–Notre Dame Graduate Epistemology Conference, April 2016
- “The Unity of Grounding,” University of Vermont, March 2016
- “A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief,” University of Michigan, February 2016
- “The Unity of Grounding,” Yale University, December 2015
- “A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief,” Penn Reasons and Foundations in Epistemology Conference (PeRFECt), University of Pennsylvania, November 2015
- “The Unity of Grounding,” Princeton University, October 2015
- “The Unity of Grounding,” Columbia University, March 2015
- “Smith’s Super-Humean Theory of Reasons for Action,” Central APA, February 2015
- “The Unity of Grounding,” University of California, Berkeley, January 2015
- “The Unity of Grounding,” Normativity and Reasoning Workshop, NYU Abu Dhabi, January 2015
- “The Unity of Grounding,” University of Wisconsin, Madison, December 2014
- “A Graph-Theoretic Approach to Coherentism about Epistemic Justification,” Sabanci University, Turkey, May 2014
- “Coherentism via Graphs,” *Harvard Review of Philosophy* Lecture, Harvard University, May 2014
- “Graphic Coherence,” Epistemology and Ethics Workshop, Fordham University, April 2014
- “Graphic Coherence,” Brown University, March 2014
- “Rethinking the Regress Argument,” Radcliffe Fellows Presentation, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University, February 2014
- “Reply to Goldman: Cutting Up the One to Save the Five in Epistemology,” *Episteme* 10th Anniversary Conference, Costa Rica, January 2014
- “Graphing the Coherentist Response to the Regress Problem,” Workshop on Infinite Regress, Vanderbilt University, October 2013
- “The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism,” Workshop on Aims and Norms: Judgment, University of Southampton, April 2013
- “Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Reasons for Action Are Mind-Dependent?” CRÉUM, Université de Montréal, March 2013
- “Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Reasons for Action Are Mind-Dependent?” University of Toronto, February 2013
- “The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism,” MIT-ing of the Minds Conference, MIT, January 2013
- “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions,” Ohio State University,

- September 2012
- “The Metaethical Irrelevance of Evolutionary Theory,” Workshop on Moral Psychology and Human Agency, Michigan University, June 2012
- “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions,” Brandeis University, March 2012
- “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions,” Cornell University, March 2012
- “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions,” University of Pittsburgh, February 2012
- “The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism,” SOFIA Conference on Epistemic Agency, Huatulco, Mexico, January 2012
- “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions,” Boston University, December 2011
- “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions,” New York University, November 2011
- “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions,” University of California, Berkeley, September 2011
- “The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience,” Center for Neuroscience & Society, University of Pennsylvania, April 2011
- “Paul Ziff’s Contributions to Epistemology,” Memorial Session on the Philosophy of Paul Ziff, Central APA, April 2011
- “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions,” University of Rochester, March 2011
- “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions,” Workshop on the Rationality of Belief and Desire, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, February 2011
- “Using the Evolved Mind as a Moral Divining Rod: the Dual-Process Strategy,” Amherst College, December 2010
- “The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience,” Origins of Morality Workshop, Arizona State University, November 2010
- “Using Our Neural Machinery as a Normative Divining Rod: the Dual-Process Strategy,” Conference on Intuitions in Ethics, Humboldt University, Berlin, September 2010
- “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions,” Workshop on Theoretical and Practical Reasons, Leeds University, June 2010
- “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions,” Fellows Seminar, Princeton’s University Center for Human Values, April 2010
- “The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience,” Human Values Forum, Princeton University, February 2010
- “Can Brain Scans Teach Us about the Nature of Right and Wrong?” Trajectories and Friends Symposium, MIT, October 2009
- Commentary on Elizabeth Harman’s “Is It Reasonable to ‘Rely on Intuitions’ in Ethics?” Fellows Seminar, Princeton’s University Center for Human Values, October 2009
- “The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience,” Fellows Seminar, Princeton’s University Center for Human Values, September 2009
- “Can Normative Conclusions Be Wrung from Neural Bases?” Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, University of Colorado, Boulder, August 2009
- “Can Normative Conclusions Be Wrung from Neural Bases?” Cognitive Theory and the Arts Seminar, Harvard Humanities Center, February 2009
- “Comments on Gupta’s *Empiricism and Experience*,” Authors Meets Critics Session, Eastern APA, December 2008
- “Can Normative Conclusions Be Wrung from Neural Bases?” Faculty Workshop in Ethics,

Harvard's Safra Center for Ethics, December 2008
 "Neuroscientific Challenges to the Probative Force of Moral Intuitions," Arché Philosophical Research Center, St. Andrews, October 2008
 "Against Williamson Against Luminosity," Annual Conference of the Australasian Association for Philosophy (AAP), July 2005
 "Do Particularists Have a Coherent Notion of a Reason for Action?" Australian National University, June 2005
 "Against Williamson Against Luminosity," Princeton–Rutgers Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, February 2005
 Commentary on Hille Paakkunainen's "Judgment, Rightness, and Reasons," Harvard–MIT Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, March 2004
 "Does It Really Matter If I'm a Brain in a Vat?" Independent Activities Period (IAP) Lecture, MIT, January 2002

Honors and Fellowships:

Harsanyi Fellowship, Centre for Moral, Social, and Political Theory, Australian National University, 2025
 Harvard College Professorship (for distinguished contributions to undergraduate and graduate teaching), Harvard University, 2024–2029
 Edmond & Lily Safra Center for Ethics Fellowship in Residence, 2024–2025
 "The Unity of Grounding" selected by *The Philosopher's Annual* as one of the ten best philosophy papers published in 2018
 Grant from Harvard's Provostial Fund for the Arts and Humanities (for a Workshop on the Ethics of Belief co-organized with Susanna Rinard at Harvard in March 2018)
 Phi Beta Kappa Prize for Excellence in Teaching, 2015
 John L. Loeb Associate Professorship in the Humanities, Harvard University, 2013–2015
 Roslyn Abramson Award (for excellence in undergraduate teaching), Harvard University, 2013
 ACLS Fellowship, 2013–2014
 Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study Fellowship, 2013–2014
 Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences Fellowship, 2013–2014 (*declined*)
 National Humanities Center Fellowship, 2013–2014 (*declined*)
 Donald D. Harrington Faculty Fellowship, University of Texas at Austin, 2010–2011 (*forced to decline because Harvard does not allow two years of leave in a row*)
 "The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience" selected by *The Philosopher's Annual* as one of the ten best philosophy papers published in 2009
 Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Faculty Fellowship, Princeton's University Center for Human Values, 2009–2010
 Edmond & Lily Safra Center for Ethics Fellowship in Residence, 2009–2010 (*declined*)
 Graduate Fellowship, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000–2005
 Hertz Fellowship, 1998–2000 (*turned down final three years of funding to pursue philosophy*)
 Phi Beta Kappa, Harvard College, 1997 (*selected as a junior*)
 John Harvard Scholarship, Harvard College, 1995–1997
 Detur Book Award, Harvard College, 1995

Teaching Experience:

Philosophy 274f: The Good and the Fitting (co-taught with Christine Korsgaard)	Spring 2026 (<i>expected</i>)
Philosophy 301b: First-Year Colloquium	Spring 2026 (<i>expected</i>)

Philosophy 311: Moral and Political Workshop	Fall 2025
Philosophy 159: Epistemology	Fall 2025
Philosophy 301b: First-Year Colloquium	Spring 2024
Philosophy 169: Nozick's <i>Philosophical Explanations</i> : Proseminar	Spring 2024
Philosophy 311: Moral and Political Workshop	Fall 2023
Philosophy 164: Metaphysics	Fall 2023
Philosophy 257: Inquiry: Seminar (co-taught with Susanna Siegel)	Spring 2023
Philosophy 301b: First-Year Colloquium	Spring 2023
Philosophy 173: Metaethics	Fall 2022
Philosophy 311: Moral and Political Workshop	Fall 2022
Philosophy 159: Epistemology	Spring 2022
Philosophy 301b: First-Year Colloquium	Spring 2022
Philosophy 256: Becausal Relations: Seminar	Fall 2021
Philosophy 311: Moral and Political Workshop	Fall 2021
Philosophy 267: Normative Categories: Seminar	Spring 2020
Philosophy 301b: First-Year Colloquium	Spring 2020
Philosophy 173: Metaethics	Fall 2019
Philosophy 311: Moral and Political Workshop	Fall 2019
Philosophy 169: Nozick's <i>Philosophical Explanations</i> : Proseminar	Spring 2019
Philosophy 301b: First-Year Colloquium	Spring 2019
Philosophy 159: Epistemology	Fall 2018
Philosophy 311: Moral and Political Workshop	Fall 2018
Philosophy 173: Metaethics	Spring 2018
Philosophy 301b: First-Year Colloquium	Spring 2018
Philosophy 252: Norms of Belief (co-taught with Susanna Rinard)	Fall 2017
Philosophy 311: Moral and Political Workshop	Fall 2017
Philosophy 159: Epistemology	Spring 2016
Philosophy 301b: First-Year Colloquium	Spring 2016
Freshman Seminar 38i: Morality, That Peculiar Institution	Fall 2015
Philosophy 311: Moral and Political Workshop	Fall 2015
Philosophy 268y: Normative and Meta-Normative Questions (co-taught with Derek Parfit)	Spring 2015
Philosophy 301b: First-Year Colloquium	Spring 2015
Philosophy 173: Metaethics	Fall 2014
Philosophy 311: Moral and Political Workshop	Fall 2014
Philosophy 250z: Metaphysical Grounding: Seminar	Spring 2013
Philosophy 301b: First-Year Colloquium	Spring 2013
Philosophy 159: Epistemology	Fall 2012
Philosophy 311: Moral and Political Workshop	Fall 2012
Freshman Seminar 38i: Morality, That Peculiar Institution	Spring 2012
Philosophy 301b: First-Year Colloquium	Spring 2012
Philosophy 173: Metaethics	Fall 2011
Philosophy 311: Moral and Political Workshop	Fall 2011
Philosophy 244: Epistemic Normativity: Seminar	Spring 2011
Philosophy 301b: First-Year Colloquium	Spring 2011
Freshman Seminar 38i: Morality, That Peculiar Institution	Spring 2009
Philosophy 159: Epistemology	Spring 2009
Philosophy 311: Moral and Political Workshop	Spring 2009
Philosophy 173: Metaethics	Fall 2008

Philosophy 311: Moral and Political Workshop	Fall 2008
Freshman Seminar 38i: Morality, That Peculiar Institution	Spring 2008
Philosophy 301b: First-Year Colloquium	Spring 2008
Philosophy 98hf: Tutorial on Sellars' <i>Empiricism and the Phil. of Mind</i>	Fall 2007
Philosophy 262: Intuitions and Philosophical Methodology: Seminar	Fall 2007
Philosophy 159: Epistemology	Spring 2007
Philosophy 311: Moral and Political Workshop	Spring 2007
Philosophy 173: Metaethics	Fall 2006
Philosophy 311: Moral and Political Workshop	Fall 2006

Student Supervision:

Ph.D. supervision (* = chair):

- Florence Bacus, in progress
- Veronika Hammond, in progress
- Denish Jaswal, in progress
- Emily Massey, in progress *
- Malcolm Morano, in progress *
- Becca Rothfeld, in progress *
- Yuan Tian, in progress *
- Megan Entwistle, "The Imagined Past," Summer 2024 *
- Caitlin Fitchett, "Ours to Reason Why: Essays on Practical Deliberation, Group Action, and Moral Personhood," Spring 2024 *
- Chaney Burlin, "Toward a Kantian Metaethic," Summer 2023 *
- Elís Miller Larsen, "The Ethics of Ignorance," Spring 2023
- Samuel Dishaw, "Understanding Morality Together," Spring 2023 *
- Noel Dominguez, "Responsibility for Implicitly-Biased Actions: A Strawsonian Approach," Spring 2022
- Heather Spradley, "Knowing With," Spring 2022
- Rachel Achs, "Self-Righteous Sentiment: On Blame and Its Norms," Spring 2021 *
- Javier Caride, "The Naturalism of Neo-Aristotelian Normative Naturalism," Spring 2021
- Zoe Jenkin, "Reasons and Percepts," Spring 2020
- Paul Marcucilli, "The Appraisal of Belief," Summer 2019 *
- Douglas Kremm, "Practical Cognitivism: An Essay on Normative Judgment," Summer 2018
- Michael Rabenberg, "Matters of Life and Death," Spring 2018
- Aleksy Tarasenko-Struc, "The Authority of Morality and the Recognition of Persons," Summer 2017
- Paul Julian, "Objectivity and Intersubjectivity in Moral Philosophy," Winter 2017 *
- Micha Glaeser, "Command and Counsel: An Address-Dependent Account of Authority," Summer 2016
- Alex Prescott-Couch, "Rational Reconstruction and the Construction of an Interlocutor," Fall 2015
- Oded Na'aman, "Loving, Valuing, Regretting, and Being Oneself," Summer 2015
- David Langlois, "The Normativity of Structural Rationality," Fall 2014
- Craig Nishimoto, "Rescue Duties: A Moderate Account," Fall 2013 *
- Ryan Doerfler, "Matters of Taste: Personal and Otherwise," Fall 2010
- S. Andrew Schroeder, "Divorcing the Good and the Right," Fall 2009
- Carlos Soto, "Extending and Ending Life in Health Care and Beyond," Spring 2009

Second-year paper supervision:

- Emily Massey, “Truthmaker Expressivism,” 2023–2024
Selorm Yao Ohene, “The Thesis of Conceptual Priority,” 2022–2023
John Abughattas, “The Sociality of Fittingness,” 2022–2023
Britta Clark, “Duties with Deadlines,” 2019–2020
Megan Entwistle, “Knowing by Inference: the Tracking View,” 2018–2019
Becca Rothfeld, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Aesthetic Value as a Grounds of the Ethical,” 2017–2018
Sanford Diehl, “Wrongness, Recognition, and the Foundations of Contractualism,” 2014–2015
Shantia Rahimian, “Epistemic Reasons for Action and Two-Dimensional Epistemology,” 2011–2012
Aleksy Tarasenko-Struc, “The Constitutivist and the Dogmatist: In Search of the Foundations of Ethics,” 2010–2011
David Langlois, “The Instrumental Principle and Practical Rationality,” 2008–2009
Colin Chamberlain, “The Significance of Projects,” 2007–2008
Craig Nishimoto, “Does the Justification of Action Require Morality?” 2006–2007

Senior thesis supervision:

- Pauliina Rumm, “Anti-Essence and Negative Meta-Grounding,” 2024–2025 (*winner of Hoopes Prize*)
Elysia Li, “On the Justification of Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,” 2021–2022
John Hunt, “Can There Be a Truly Autonomous Ethics?” 2018–2019
Gabriel Karger, “Is Cognitive Science Needed to Debunk Moral Intuitions?” 2017–2018
Gregory Kristof, “Can One Derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’?” 2014–2015 (*winner of Hoopes Prize*)
Adam Kern, “From the Ground Up: A Contractualist Theory of Moral Inquiry,” 2012–2013 (*winner of Hoopes Prize*)
Alexander Loomis, “The Epistemic Status of Basic Empirical Beliefs in Classical Foundationalism,” 2011–2012
Jeff Overall, “Moral Justification,” 2010–2011
Zander Li, “Property in Virtual Worlds: A Labor-Based Justification,” 2007–2008
Kelly Heuer, “The Scope of Morality: An Evolutionary Approach,” 2006–2007

Professional Service:

- Co-editor for Epistemology, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2024–present
Faculty Advisory Committee, Edmund & Lily Safra Center for Ethics, 2018–present
Executive Committee, Eastern Division of the APA, 2020–2023
Article referee (often multiple times) for *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Analysis*, *Analytic Philosophy*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Dialectica*, *Ergo*, *Ethics*, *European Journal of Analytic Philosophy*, *European Journal of Philosophy*, *Inquiry*, *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*, *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, *Journal of Moral Philosophy*, *Journal of Philosophical Research*, *Mind*, *Noûs*, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophical Explorations*, *Philosophical Psychology*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Synthese*
Book-proposal/manuscript referee for Acumen Publishing, MIT Press, Polity, Routledge

Non-Philosophy Publications:

- Selim Berker, Adam L. Epstein, and Kevin M. Pilgrim, “Remarks on the Period Three Cycles of Quadratic Rational Maps,” *Nonlinearity* 16 (2003): 93–100.