

Anna-Sara Malmgren

CURRICULUM VITAE

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Department of Law, Philosophy, and International Studies
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EMPLOYMENT

2021–present Professor of Philosophy, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences.
2020–2021 Lecturer in Philosophy, Stanford University.
2011–2020 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University.
2013–2015 (15%) Professor II, Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo.
2008–2011 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin.

EDUCATION

2009 PhD in Philosophy, New York University.
Thesis Committee: P. Boghossian (supervisor), S. Schiffer & C. Wright.
2001 BPhil in Philosophy, Magdalen College, University of Oxford.
(First class honours, with distinction.)
1999 BA in Philosophy, King’s College London, University of London.
(First class honours, with distinction.)

RESEARCH AREAS

Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind (AOS).
Action Theory, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language (AOC).

AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

2023–2025 Humility in Inquiry Research Grant, John Templeton Foundation (collaborative).
2022 Inland Norway University Research Prize (with INN Philosophy Research Group).
2021–2024 RJ Project Research Grant, Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation (collaborative).
2014–2015 William H. and Frances Green Faculty Fellowship, Stanford University.
2012 Article Prize, American Philosophical Association.
2010 Visiting Fellowship at Arché, University of St Andrews.
2008–2010 Blossom Flowers Ford Burns Excellence Endowment, University of Texas at Austin.
2008 Dean’s Fellowship, University of Texas at Austin.
2006–2007 Dean’s Dissertation Award, New York University.
2005–2006 Frankel Fellowship, New York University.
2001–2006 McCracken Fellowship, New York University.
1999–2001 Scatcherd Scholarship, University of Oxford.
1998 Adrian Grey Turner Prize, King’s College London.
1997 Sambrooke Exhibition, King’s College London.

ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONSArticles

Inference, Taking, and Reason-Responsiveness. In *Kornblith and His Critics*, J. DiPaolo & L. Oliveira (eds), Wiley-Blackwell, forthcoming.

Beliefs as Dispositions to Make Judgments. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 106(3): 795–803, 2023 (symposium).

Goodness, Availability, and Argument Structure. *Synthese* 198 (11): 10395–10427, 2021.

On Fundamental Responsibility. *Philosophical Issues* 29: *Epistemology*, L. Miracchi & E. Sosa (eds.), 198–213, 2019.

Varieties of Inference? *Philosophical Issues* 28: *Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning*, C. Juhl & J. Schechter (eds.), 221–254, 2018.

A Priori Testimony Revisited. In *The A Priori in Philosophy*, A. Casullo & J. Thurow (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 158–185, 2013.

Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements. *Mind* 120 (478): 263–327, 2011.
(Winner of the APA Article Prize 2012.)

Is There A Priori Knowledge by Testimony? *Philosophical Review* 115 (2): 199–241, 2006.

Reviews

Review of *Philosophy Without Intuitions*, H. Cappelen, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 2013.

Review of *Relying on Others*, S. Goldberg, *Mind* 120 (480): 1251–1258, 2011.

Editorial work

Referring to the World: An Opinionated Introduction to the Theory of Reference, by Kenneth A. Taylor, New York: Oxford University Press, 2021 (with M. Crimmins, R. Jeshion & J. Perry).

WORK IN PROGRESS

Books

Understanding Inference, monograph, under contract with Oxford University Press.

The Nature of Inferential Processes, monograph, under contract with Cambridge University Press.
(Elements in Epistemology series.)

Articles

Inferential (and Non-Inferential) Justification, for *Philosophy Compass*.

Thought Experiments Redux: the Content Problem, Deviance, and Disagreement, *ms*.

The Significance of Inferential Integration, *ms*.

CAREER INTERRUPTIONS

2015–2017 Illness (reduced capacity).

2008–2009 Childbirth and infant care.

RESEARCH COLLABORATIONS

2023–2025 Co-Principal Investigator, with B. Gawronski, *Does Intellectual Humility Reduce Susceptibility to Misinformation?* (funding: the John Templeton Foundation).

2021–2024 Co-Investigator, with A. Schoebe and M. Gerken, *Linguistic and Epistemological Perspectives on Testimony* (funding: the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation).

2023–2024 Intl. Project Partner, *Thought Experiments, Arguments, and the Role of Argumentation in Philosophy* (funding: the German Research Foundation).

2018–2022 Intl. Project Partner, *Experimental Philosophy and the Method of Cases: Theoretical Foundations, Responses, and Alternatives* (funding: German Research Foundation).

2011–2021 Faculty Affiliate, Symbolic Systems Program, Stanford University.

- 2017–2019 International Network Member, *Knowledge Beyond Natural Science* (funded by the John Templeton Foundation, the University of Stirling, and the *Thought* trust).
- 2014–2019 Team Member, *NeuroCircuit Interventional Research Consortium for Understanding the Brain and Improving Treatment* (funding: the Wu Tsai Neurosciences Institute).
- 2013–2015 Professor II, Center for Mind in Nature (funding: the Norwegian Research Council).

INVITED TALKS AND PRESENTATIONS

(department colloquia unless otherwise specified)

- 2024 “Inference, Taking, and Reason-Responsiveness.” University of Glasgow (upcoming)
“Inference, Content, and Computation.” University of Barcelona.
- 2023 “Thought Experiments Redux: Fiction, Deviance, and Disagreement.” University of Helsinki. (1st Nordic Network in Epistemology Workshop.)
“Another Problem that Logic (Probably) Can’t Solve.” LOGOS, University of Bergen. (Workshop: Logic, Inference, and Reasoning.)
- 2022 “Thought Experiments Redux: the Content Problem, Fiction, Deviance and Disagreement.” Gothenburg University. (Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy.)
“Thought Experiments Redux: the Content Problem, Fiction, Deviance and Disagreement.” EXTRA, Ruhr University Bochum (Workshop: Thought Experiments and Arguments.)
“Why be Reflective?” RREEXAM, University of Luxembourg. (Workshop: The Powers and Limits of Rational Reflection.)
“Thought Experiments, Deviance, and Disagreement.” New York University. (Mind and Language Seminar.)
“The Problems of Metaphilosophy.” Stockholm University. (Higher Seminar, T. Phil.)
“The Problems of Metaphilosophy”, Uppsala University. (Higher Seminar, T. Phil.)
- 2021 Comments on *The Epistemic Role of Consciousness* by D. Smithies. Pacific APA.
“The Problem of Relevant Completeness.”, University of St Andrews. (Job talk.)
“Introduktion till Kant: Medvetandefilosofi och Kunskapsteori.” INN. (Trial lecture.)
- 2019 “On a Principled Problem for the Distinction between Inferential and Non-Inferential Justification.” CONCEPT, University of Cologne. (Conference: The Epistemology of Reasoning.)
- 2018 “Why Be Reflective?” KBNS, University of Stirling. (Workshop: Self-Knowledge and The A Priori.)
“Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure.” University of Quebec at Montréal. (CPA Annual Congress.)
Reply to “Rationality Requires Rationally Representing Representations as Rational” by R. Neta. University of North Carolina Chapel Hill. (Conference: Inference and Reasoning.)
- 2016 “Goodness, Availability, and Argument Structure.” Philosophy Society, Lund University.
“Goodness, Availability, and Argument Structure.” University of Miami.
- 2015 “Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure.” Arizona State University.
“The Normativity of the Sub-Personal.” Gothenburg University. (Higher Seminar, T. Phil.)
“Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure.” Oberlin College.
“Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure.” University of North Carolina Chapel Hill. (48th Chapel Hill Philosophy Colloquium.)
- 2014 “Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure.” Simon Fraser University.
“Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure.” Konstanz University.
“Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure.” University of California at Irvine.
“Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure.” University of California at Los Angeles.
“Availability, Goodness, and Argument Structure.” CSMN, University of Oslo. (Workshop: Perspectives on Inference.)

- “The Problem of Relevantly Complete Representation.” University of Notre Dame.
 “On Getting Started.” Symposium on Philosophical Method, Tufts University.
- 2013 “A Puzzle about Inference.”, University of Copenhagen.
 “A Puzzle about Inference.” University of Toronto. (5th Formal Epistemology Festival.)
 “Inference: Explanation and Justification.” CSLI, Stanford University. (Workshop.)
 “Inference: Explanation and Justification.” University of Arkansas.
 Reply to “Intuitive Knowledge & the Benacerraf Problem” by J. Bengson, Pacific APA.
 “Philosophy Without *What?*” The Institute of Philosophy, University of London/CSMN,
 University of Oslo. (Symposium on *Philosophy Without Intuitions* by H. Cappelen.)
- 2012 “Inference: Explanation and Justification.” University of Cologne. (LEMMing Graduate
 Conference. Keynote speaker.)
 “Inference: Explanation and Justification.” University of Victoria.
 “Particularistically Unreasonable.” University of Leeds. (Workshop on Intentions.)
- 2011 “A Priori Testimony Revisited.”, Harvard University.
 “Varieties of Inference.” University of St Andrews. (Arché/CSMN Graduate Conference.
 Keynote speaker.)
 “A Priori Testimony Revisited.” UNC Chapel Hill. (North Carolina Metaphysics Workshop.)
 Reply to “Easy Knowledge, Reliabilism, and the Transparency of Justification” by R. Neta.
 Pacific APA.
 “Varieties of Inference.” University of Texas at San Antonio. (Workshop on the Philosophy
 of Richard Feldman.)
 “Varieties of Inference.” King’s College London. (Job talk.)
 “Varieties of Inference.” Stanford University. (Job talk.)
- 2010 “Varieties of Inference.” Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
 “Quine’s Two Dogmas.” University of Oslo. (Trial lecture.)
 Reply to “Iconic Representation and the Interface Problem” by C. Montemayor, University
 of Texas at Austin. (UT/UNAM Conference on Perception and Consciousness.)
 “Sub-Personal Reasons.” University of Leeds. (Workshop on Theoretical and Practical
 Reason.)
 “The Content Problem” and “Varieties of Inference.” University of St Andrews. (Arché
 Methodology Seminar.)
 Reply to “McKinsey One More Time” by C. Wright. CSMN, University of Oslo.
 (Conference: Self-Knowledge and Rational Agency.)
 “Warrant-Preservation and Testimony.” Amherst College. (Forry and Micken Lecture
 Series on the Philosophy of Testimony.)
 “Testimony, Self-Knowledge and The A Priori.” Northern Institute of Philosophy,
 University of Aberdeen. (Workshop IV, Basic Knowledge Project.)
 Reply to “Delusion, Assertion and Mad Belief” by D. Murray, Central APA.
- 2009 “The Justification of Intuitive Judgments.” University of Fortaleza. (Workshop: Thought
 Experiments and The A Priori.)
- 2008 “Inferential Integration and Epistemic Relevance.” Lund University. (Filosofidagarna.)
 “Intuitions by Inference.” University College London. (Job talk.)
 “Intuitions by Inference.” Cornell University. (Job talk.)
 “Intuitions by Inference.” University of Rochester. (Job talk.)
 “Intuitions by Inference.” University of Massachusetts Amherst. (Job talk.)
 “Intuitions by Inference.” University of Western Ontario. (Job talk.)
 “Intuitions by Inference.” University of California Berkeley. (Job talk.)
 “Intuitions by Inference.” University of Pittsburgh. (Job talk.)
 “Intuitions by Inference.” University of Texas at Austin. (Job talk.)

- 2007 “Intuitions by Inference.” University of California Davis. (Job talk.)
 Reply to “Is God an Unnecessary Hypothesis?” and “We’re Right, They’re Wrong” by P. van Inwagen. New York Institute of Philosophy. (Workshop on Science and Religion.)
- 2006 “What Do We Know When We Know That Smith Doesn’t Know—And *How* Do We Know It?” University of Texas at Austin.
 “Intuitions and The A Priori.” University of St Andrews. (Arché Epistemology Seminar.)
 Reply to “Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals” by T. Williamson. Stockholm University. (Anders Wedberg Lectures.)
- 2003 “A Priori Knowledge by Testimony.” Stockholm University. (Logic and Language Seminar.)
- 1997 “Is There a Coherent Form of Environmentalism?” Cumberland Lodge, King’s College London.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

Departmental

- 2024–present Vice-Chair of Research, Department of Law, Philosophy and International Studies, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences (INN).
- 2023–present Organizer and Chair, Lillehammer Lecture in Philosophy (public lecture series), INN.
- 2022–present Research Group Leader, Philosophy, INN.
- 2021–present Organizer and Chair, Philosophy Colloquium, INN.
- 2020–2021 Project Supervisor, Sunwoo Lee’s Symbolic Systems M.S., Stanford University.
- 2020–2021 Member, Stanford Committee on Enhancing Graduate Education.
- 2018–2021 Founding Member, Stanford Philosophy Diversity Committee.
- 2016–2018 Departmental Advisor for Taylor Madigan, Stanford University.
- 2011–2017 Member, Stanford Philosophy Graduate Admissions Committee.
- 2013–2017 Member, Peter Hawke’s PhD Dissertation Committee, Stanford University.
- 2013–2015 Member, Samuel Asarnow’s PhD Dissertation Committee, Stanford University.
- 2013–2015 Member, Philosophy Search Committee, Stanford University.
- 2011–2014 Chair, Stanford Philosophy Colloquium Committee.
- 2010–2011 Member, UT Austin Philosophy Colloquium Committee.
- 2010–2011 Member, UT Austin Philosophy Outreach Committee.
- 2010 Member, Jenn Nielson’s PhD Dissertation Committee, UT Austin.

Other

- 2024 Organizer and Chair, 2nd Nordic Network in Epistemology Workshop, INN.
- 2022 External Expert/Evaluator (Sakkunnig), Umeå University.
- 2022 External Expert/Evaluator (Sakkunnig), Gothenburg University.
- 2019 Commentator, APA Committee Session on Diversity in Philosophy Departments, Pacific APA.
- 2015 Member, Expert Committee (Sakkyndig Komité), University of Oslo.
- 2014 Co-organizer, Workshop: Perspectives on Inference, University of Oslo.
- 2013 Sub-Editor in Philosophy of Language, *Thought*.

Referee for: *Analysis*, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *Dialectica*, *Disputatio*, *Episteme*, *Erkenntnis*, *European Journal of Philosophy*, *Inquiry*, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, *Journal of Philosophical Research*, *Mind*, *Noûs*, *Philosophers’ Imprint*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophia*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Synthese*, *Thought*, *Teorema*, Bellingham Summer Conference, NOW, Oxford University Press, and Routledge.

Invited Debater or Commentator-at-large at: Evidentialism at 40 Workshop, St Thomas University New Brunswick; *Philosophers Meet Critics*, CONCEPT/University of Cologne; Penn Reasons and Foundations of Epistemology Conference, University of Pennsylvania; Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference, University of British Columbia; Workshop: The Normativity of Logic, University of Bergen; Orange Beach Epistemology Workshop, University of South Alabama; Workshop in Honor of A. Goldman's *Epistemology and Cognition*, College of William and Mary.

OPINION PIECES

- 2019 Dictators Aren't Built In a Day (with L. Tas), *Brussels Times*.
 2019 Trump and the Two Thousand (with R. Hockett), *Haaretz*.
 2018 A Call to Defend Rojava (with D. Bookchin, R. Hockett, M. Tax), *New York Review of Books*.
 2018 Feminism Across Borders: Don't Let Afrin Become The Next Srebrenica (with R. Hockett), *Jerusalem Post*.
 2016 Turkey is Murdering Its Own Kurdish Civilians. Will America Speak Out? (with R Hockett), *Haaretz*.

COURSES TAUGHT

Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences

- (upcoming) Knowledge and Science (with O. Vassend) (undergraduate)
 2022, 2023 *Examen Philosophicum* (undergraduate)
 2022, 2023 *Examen Facultatum* (undergraduate)

Stanford University

- 2017–2020, 2013–2015 Advanced Dissertation Development Seminar (graduate)
 2021 Topics in the Theory of Justification (mixed: undergraduate, graduate)
 2020–2021, 2012–2013 Dissertation Development Pro-Seminar (graduate)
 2020 Formal and Informal Epistemology (with R. Briggs) (mixed)
 2020 Justification and Consciousness (undergraduate)
 2019 Concepts and Concept Possession (undergraduate)
 2019 Truth as the Aim of Belief and Inquiry (mixed)
 2018 Self-Knowledge and Consciousness (undergraduate)
 2013–2017 (x5) Philosophy of Mind (mixed)
 2017, 2012 Metaphysics (mixed)
 2014 Rule-Following (graduate)
 2014, 2013 Explanation and Justification (undergraduate)
 2013 Bounded Rationality (undergraduate)
 2012 Theory of Knowledge (mixed)
 2012 (x2) What's an Inference? (graduate)

University of Texas at Austin

- 2010 Thought Experiments (graduate)
 2009, 2010 (x3) Theory of Knowledge (undergraduate)
 2009, 2010 Knowledge and Reality (undergraduate)

New York University

- 2008 Minds and Machines (undergraduate)
 2007, 2005 Belief, Truth and Knowledge (undergraduate)

REFERENCES

Paul Boghossian, Silver Professor of Philosophy, New York University, Department of Philosophy, 5 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, United States. paul.boghossian@nyu.edu.

Mark Crimmins, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University, Department of Philosophy, 450 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305, United States. crimmins@stanford.edu.

Anstein Gregersen, Vice-Dean of Research and Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of Law, Philosophy and International Studies, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, Pb. 400 Vestad, 21418 Elverum, Norway. anstein.gregersen@inn.no.

Hilary Kornblith, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Philosophy, E305 South College, Amherst, MA 01003, United States. kornblith@philos.umass.edu.

Krista Lawlor, Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University, Department of Philosophy, 450 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305, United States. klawlor@stanford.edu.

Ram Neta, Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, Department of Philosophy, Caldwell Hall, 240 East Cameron Av., Chapel Hill, NC 27599, United States. neta@email.unc.edu.

John Perry, Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, Stanford University, Department of Philosophy, 450 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305, United States. johnperry43@gmail.com.

James Pryor, Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, Department of Philosophy, Caldwell Hall, 240 East Cameron Av., Chapel Hill, NC 27599, United States. jimpryor@unc.edu.

Ralph Wedgwood, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California, School of Philosophy, 3709 Trousdale Parkway, Los Angeles, CA 90089, United States. wedgwood@usc.edu.

Crispin Wright, Professor of Philosophical Research, University of Stirling, Pathfoot Building, Stirling, FK9 FLA, United Kingdom. c.j.wright@stir.ac.uk.