

# ULF HLOBIL

## *Curriculum Vitae*

Department of Philosophy, Concordia University  
1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. W., Montréal, Quebec, Canada  
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## Biographical Information

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### AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION AND COMPETENCE

AOS Epistemology, Philosophy of Logic, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language  
AOC Philosophy of Action, Metaethics, Philosophy of Psychology, Moral Psychology

### EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

2020– CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY, MONTRÉAL  
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy  
2016–2020 CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY, MONTRÉAL  
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy

### OTHER POSITIONS

2017– CANADIAN SOCIETY FOR EPISTEMOLOGY  
Vice-president  
2016–17 UNIVERSITY OF HRADEC KRÁLOVÉ  
Visiting Professor (summer)  
2015–16 UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG  
Doctoral Fellow at the *Forschungskolleg Analytic German Idealism*

### EDUCATION

2016 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH  
Ph.D. in Philosophy  
Dissertation: *What Is Inference?*  
Committee: R. Brandom, J. McDowell, J. Shaw, K. Setiya  
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY  
Visiting Doctoral Student (2012–2013)  
2010 UNIVERSITY OF TRIER  
*Magister Artium* ( $\approx$  M.A.) in Philosophy (distinction)  
2008 UNIVERSITY OF TRIER  
*Diplom* ( $\approx$  M.Sc.) in Psychology

#### AWARDS, HONORS AND SCHOLARSHIPS

Publons Refereeing Award: *Top 1% in Arts and Humanities*. (2017)  
Saxonian Academy of Sciences and Humanities, one year scholarship (2015)  
Mellon First-Year Graduate Fellowship (2010)  
J. William Fulbright Scholarship (2009)

#### LANGUAGES

German (native speaker), English, Latin (*latinum* proficiency certificate), Spanish (intermediate), French (intermediate)

## Research

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#### PUBLICATIONS

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##### BOOKS

2. Hlobil, Ulf; and Robert B. Brandom (forthcoming). *Reasons for Logic, Logic for Reasons*. Routledge, under contract. (co-authored monograph)
1. Nieswandt, Katharina and Ulf Hlobil (eds.) (2014). *G. E. M. Anscombe: Aufsätze* (translated by Katharina Nieswandt and Ulf Hlobil). Berlin: Suhrkamp. (400 pages)  
Reviews:
  - Perler, Dominik. Was soll das sein, eine moralische Pflicht? *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Dec. 10, 2014.
  - Kietzmann, Christian (2015). G. E. M. Anscombe: Aufsätze. *Philosophische Rundschau*, 62(1): 88–92.

##### JOURNAL ARTICLES (PEER-REVIEWED)

24. Maranges, Heather; Iannuccilli, Maxine; Nieswandt, Katharina; Hlobil, Ulf & Dunfield, Kristen (2023). What Determines Feelings of Belonging and Majoring in an Academic Field? Isolating Factors by Comparing Psychology and Philosophy. *Current Research in Behavioral Sciences*, forthcoming.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crbeha.2023.100097>
23. Lota, Kenji and Ulf Hlobil (2023). Resolutions Against Uniqueness. *Erkenntnis* 88: 1013–1033.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00391-z>
22. Hlobil, Ulf (2023). The Laws of Thought and the Laws of Truth as Two Sides of One Coin. *The Journal of Philosophical Logic* 52(1): 313–343.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-022-09673-5>
21. Hlobil, Ulf (2022). A Truth-Maker Semantics for ST: Refusing to Climb the Strict/-Tolerant Hierarchy. *Synthese*, 200(5): 1–23.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03820-w>

20. Hlobil, Ulf (2022). Teleo-Inferentialism. *Philosophical Topics*, 50(1): 185–211.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20225019>
19. Golan, Rea and Ulf Hlobil (2022). Minimally Nonstandard K3 and FDE. *Australasian Journal of Logic* 19(5): 182–213.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v19i5.7540>
18. Hlobil, Ulf (2021). The Guise of Good Reason. *Philosophical Explorations* 24(2): 204–224.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2021.1908577>
17. Hlobil, Ulf (2020). Limits of Abductivism About Logic. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 103(2): 320–340.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12707>
16. Hlobil, Ulf (2020). Why You Cannot Make People Better by Telling Them What is Good. *European Journal of Philosophy* 28(4): 986–996.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12542>
15. Hlobil, Ulf (2019). Inferring by Attaching Force. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 97(4): 701–714.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1564060>
14. Nieswandt, Katharina and Ulf Hlobil (2019). Do the Virtues Make You Happy? *Philosophical Inquiries* 7(2): 181–202.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v7i2.235>
13. Hlobil, Ulf and Katharina Nieswandt (2019). Foot Without Achilles’ Heel. *Philosophia* 47(5): 1501–1515.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00062-y>
12. Nieswandt, Katharina and Ulf Hlobil (2018). Virtues for the Imperfect. *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, 53(4): 605–625.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-018-9676-3>
11. Hlobil, Ulf (2018). Goodness-Fixing Isn’t Good Enough: A Reply to McHugh and Way. *Mind* 128(512): 1309–1318.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy035>
10. Hlobil, Ulf (2018). We Cannot Infer by Accepting Testimony. *Philosophical Studies* 176(10): 2589–2598.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1142-3>
9. Hlobil, Ulf (2018). Faithfulness for Naive Validity. *Synthese* 196(11), 4759–4774.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1687-x>
8. Hlobil, Ulf (2018). The Cut-Free Approach and the Admissibility-Curry, *Thought: A Journal of Philosophy* 7(1): 40–48.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.267>
7. Hlobil, Ulf (2016). Social Norms and Unthinkable Options. *Synthese* 193(8): 2519–2537.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0863-5>
6. Hlobil, Ulf (2016). Chains of Inferences and the New Paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning. *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 7(1): 1–16.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0230-y>

5. Hlobil, Ulf and Katharina Nieswandt (2016). On Anscombe's Philosophical Method. *Klesis Revue Philosophique* 35: 180–198.
  - Reprinted in:  
John Haldane (ed.) (2019). *The Life and Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe* (pp. 42–61). Exeter: Imprint Academic.
4. Hlobil, Ulf (2015). There are Diachronic Norms of Rationality. *Thought: A Journal of Philosophy* 4(1): 38–45.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.155>
3. Hlobil, Ulf (2015). Anti-Normativism Evaluated. *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 23(3): 376–395.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2015.1042398>
2. Hlobil, Ulf (2014). Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on Inference. *Philosophical Studies* 167(2): 419–429.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0104-z>
1. Hlobil, Ulf; Chaturbhuj, R., Aley, A., Sankara, S. & Kurupath, R. (2008). Impaired Facial Emotion Recognition in Patients with Mesial Temporal Lobe Epilepsy Associated with Hippocampal Sclerosis (MTLE-HS): Side and Age at Onset Matters. *Epilepsy Research* 80(2-3): 150–157.  
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.epilepsyres.2008.03.018>

#### PAPERS IN EDITED VOLUMES AND CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

5. Hlobil, Ulf (2022). Having the Meaning of Life in View. In Christian Kietzmann (ed.) *Festschrift for Anselm Müller*, forthcoming.
4. Hlobil, Ulf (2020). Expressing Validity: Towards a Self-Sufficient Inferentialism. In Martin Blichka and Igor Sedlár (eds.) *The Logica Yearbook 2019* (pp. 67–82), College Publications: London.
3. Hlobil, Ulf (2018). Choosing Your Nonmonotonic Logic: A Shopper's Guide. In Pavel Arazim and Tomáš Lávička (eds.) *The Logica Yearbook 2017* (pp. 109–123), College Publications: London.
2. Hlobil, Ulf (2017). When Structural Principles Hold Merely Locally. In Pavel Arazim and Tomáš Lávička (eds.) *The Logica Yearbook 2016* (pp. 53–67), College Publications: London.
1. Hlobil, Ulf (2016). A Nonmonotonic Sequent Calculus for Logical Expressivist Inferentialists. In Pavel Arazim and Michal Dancak (eds.) *The Logica Yearbook 2015* (pp. 87–105), College Publications: London.

#### BOOK REVIEWS

3. Hlobil, Ulf (2020). McKinsey's Consequences of Reference Failure. In: *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*. June 2020:  
<https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/consequences-of-reference-failure>
2. Hlobil, Ulf (2017). A Handbook for Social Change: Bicchieri's Norms in the Wild. In: *Metascience* 26(3): 459–462.

1. Hlobil, Ulf (2010). Review of Timo-Peter Ertz's *Regel und Witz*. In: *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 64(3): 416–419.

#### CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS (INVITED TALKS MARKED BY \*)

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- 2023 “Wie ähneln sich Denken und Wirklichkeit?“, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität, Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany (June)
- “Inferential Individuation of Contents,” Workshop: The Nature of Belief; Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Poland (May)\*
- “Inferring by Attaching Force,” guest lecture at Timothy Rosenkoetter’s seminar, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, USA (Feb.)\*
- 2022 “The Normativity of Logic” (together with Filippo Ferrari), European Network for the Philosophy of Logic (<https://euphilo.net/>), online (Dec.)\*
- “Logic as Continuous with the Fine Arts,” Conference: The Methodology of Logic: Abductivist and Non-abductivist Approaches; University of Bonn, Germany (July)\*
- “Two Kinds of Certainty in Reasoning,” Conference: Inference; University of Leipzig, Germany (June)\*
- “Inferring by Attaching Force,” visiting Matthew McGrath’s research seminar at Washington University in St. Louis, USA (Feb.)\*
- 2021 “What is the Topic of Logic?,” 2021 Workshop of the Canadian Society for Epistemology: How should we (and how did we) choose our logical theories? Université de Montréal, Canada (Nov.)\*
- “Teleo-Inferentialism,” Philosophy Department Colloquium, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, USA (Nov.)\*
- “Teleo-Inferentialism,” Conference: Why and How We Give and Ask for Reasons: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives, University of Hradec Králové, Hradec Králové, Czech Republic (Oct.)\*
- “A Realist Interpretation of ST,” 10th Workshop on Philosophical Logic, Buenos Aires Logic Group, CONICET, Buenos Aires, Argentina (via Zoom) (Aug.)\*
- “Bilateralist Truth-Maker Semantics for ST, TS, LP, K3, ...,” Logic Colloquium, University of Connecticut Logic Group, Storrs, Connecticut, USA (via Zoom) (Apr.)\*
- “Why Care about Explainability of AI?,” Conference: AI, Its Nature and Its Ethical Foundations, Champlain College, Montreal, Canada (via Zoom) (Mar.)\*
- 2020 “Varieties of Strength of Reasons,” Symposium on Reasons and Reasoning at the 2020 meeting of the American Philosophical Association Central Division, Chicago, Illinois, USA (Feb.)\*
- 2019 “Expressing Validity: Towards a Self-Sufficient Inferentialism,” LanCog Workshop on Substructural Logics, Lisbon, Portugal (Sep.)
- “Expressing Validity: Towards a Self-Sufficient Inferentialism,” Logica 2019, Academy of Science of the Czech Republic, Hejnice, Czech Republic (June)
- “Is Philosophy of Language Just Bad Linguistics?” The Concordia Centre for Cognitive Science, Montreal, Canada (Nov.)\*

"Reasoning First," Defeasible Inference in Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence, University of California, Los Angeles, USA (Oct.)\*

"Two Kinds of Certainty in Reasoning," Workshop: The Epistemology of Reasoning, CONCEPT, University of Cologne, Germany (June)\*

"Forging Expressive Tools, not Explanations: On the Freedom of a Logician," Workshop: Exceptionalist and Anti-Exceptionalist Perspectives on Logic, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel (June)\*

"Two Kinds of Certainty in Reasoning," Workshop on Belief and Reasoning, Union College, USA (May)\*

"Why You Cannot Make People Better by Telling them What is Good," University of Missouri, St. Louis, USA (April)\*

"Moral Testimony and Practical Reasoning: The Truth in Pessimism," UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico (Feb.)\*

"Expressing Validity: Towards a Self-Sufficient Inferentialism," UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico (Jan.)\*

2018 "Extensions of Non-Monotonic and Non-Transitive Atomic Bases," UNILOG 2018, Vichy, France (June)

"Naive Admissibility in the Cut-Free Approach," Canadian Philosophical Association 2018, Montreal, Quebec, Canada (June)

"Naive Admissibility in the Cut-Free Approach," ALFAn-Philologica 2018, Villa de Leyva, Colombia (May)

"Naive Admissibility in the Cut-Free Approach," American Philosophical Association Central Division 2018, Chicago, Illinois, USA (Feb.)

"Towards a Self-Sufficient Inferentialism," SADAF Workshop: Validity and Metainferences, Buenos Aires, Argentina (Dec.)\*

"Do the Virtues Make You Happy?" (together with Katharina Nieswandt), Enhancing Human Dignity: The Virtues and Practical Reason, Udine, Italy (Nov.)\*

"The Taking Condition and the Guise of the Good," Auburn University Philosophical Society, Auburn, USA (Nov.)\*

"The Taking Condition and the Guise of the Good," International Conference "Inference in Action," Munich, Germany (Oct.)\*

"Do the Virtues Make You Happy?" (together with Katharina Nieswandt), Teleological Structures in Human Life: A Workshop with Anselm W. Müller, University of Leipzig, Germany (July)\*

"On Weighing Reasons with Defeaters," Groupe de recherche interuniversitaire sur la normativité (GRIN), Université de Montréal, Montreal, Canada (April)\*

"Revolutionary Virtues?" (Katharina Nieswandt and Ulf Hlobil), Workshop on Virtue and Moral Reasoning under Oppressive Social Conditions, Concordia University, Canada (Feb.)\*

"What Does it Take to Be a Normative Creature?," CCD Brownbag Talk, Psychology Department, Concordia University, Canada (Feb.)\*

- 2017 “Virtues for the Imperfect” (together with Katharina Nieswandt), Eleventh Annual Conference of the Felician Institute for Ethics and Public Affairs, Felician University Rutherford Campus, New Jersey, USA (Oct.)
- “Choosing Your Nonmonotonic Logic: A Shopper’s Guide,” Poznań Reasoning Week, Adam Mickiewicz University, Department of Logic and Cognitive Science, Poznan, Poland (July)
- “Choosing Your Nonmonotonic Logic: A Shopper’s Guide,” Logica 2017, Academy of Science of the Czech Republic, Hejnice, Czech Republic (June)
- “Virtues for the Imperfect” (together with Katharina Nieswandt), Network Meeting: Practical Thought and Good Action, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany (July)\*
- “The Importance of Being Immoral,” Language-Mind-Society Center, Univerzita Hradec Králové, Czech Republic (May)\*
- “Defeasibility Between Failures of Cut and Relevance,” Workshop: Logics of Consequence, Concordia University, Montreal, Canada (March)\*
- 2016 “Grounding Logic on Defeasible, Material Implications” (with Daniel Kaplan), 5<sup>th</sup> Workshop On Philosophical Logic, Argentinean Society of Philosophical Analysis (SADAF), Buenos Aires, Argentina (Nov.)
- “When Structural Principles Hole Merely Locally,” Logica 2016, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Hejnice, Czech Republic (June)
- “Nonmonotonicity for Expressivist Inferentialist,” Philologica IV, Universidad de los Andes / Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá, Colombia (Feb.)
- “Practical Inference and the Guise of the Good,” Haifa University, Israel (Jan.)\*
- 2015 “Das Schließen und seine Rechtfertigung,” Martin-Luther-Universität, Halle (Nov.)\*
- “Breaking the Rules in Order to Change the World: Making Norms Visible,” Center for the Study of Language, Mind and Society, University of Hradec Králové, Czech Republic (Sep.)\*
- “Logic for Inferentialist Expressivists,” Logicko-filosofický seminář, Prague (Sep.)\*
- “A Nonmonotonic Sequent Calculus for Logical Expressivist Inferentialists,” Logica 2015, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Hejnice, Czech Republic (June)
- 2014 “The ‘Natural Unintelligibility’ of Normativity: Anscombe on Hume’s Circle” (K. Nieswandt and U. Hlobil), Prague International Colloquium on the Nature of Rules and Normativity, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague, Czech Republic (Sep.)
- “Anti-Normativism Evaluated,” Cracow Workshop in Analytical Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland (June)
- 2013 “The Normative Significance of Consequence Relations,” XVII Congresso Interamericano de Filosofia, SIF 2013, Salvador, Bahia, Brazil (Oct.)
- “The Normative Significance of Validity,” Tenth Annual Intermountain West Student Philosophy Conference, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA (March)
- “The Normative Significance of Validity,” Thirty-Seventh Annual Midsouth Philosophy Conference, Rhodes College, Memphis, Tenn., USA (Feb.)

- “What Does ‘Therefore’ Mean?” The New York Philosophy of Language Workshop, New York, USA (Feb.)\*
- 2012 “Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on Inference,” Graduate Student Workshop in Philosophy, Colombia University, USA (Nov.)\*
- “Meaning is a Normative Concept,” Inferentialism in the Philosophy of Language, Mind, and Action, UNED, Madrid, Spain (Oct.)
- 2011 “Meaning is a Normative Concept,” Prague International Colloquium on the Normativity of Meaning, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague, Czech Republic (April)
- 2008 “Philosophy as Ancilla Scientiae?” Philosophy Graduate Student Conference, Philipps-University Marburg, Germany (June)

#### AS COMMENTATOR

- 2023 Invited Commentator at the roundtable on James Shaw’s *Inference and the Foundations of Logic*, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, USA (June)
- 2019 “Hunter on Inference and Credal Illusions” Workshop on David Hunter’s “On Being a Believer,” Groupe de recherche interuniversitaire sur la normativité (GRIN), Université de Montréal, Montreal, Canada (November)
- 2018 “Comments on Griffin Klemick’s: ‘McDowell, Moral Realism, and Reflective Self-Scrutiny,’” CPA 2018, Montreal, Canada (June)
- 2014 Comments on Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini’s “Why the Conceptual Explanation of Transparency Fails,” Cracow Workshop in Analytical Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Poland (July)
- Comments on Sebastian Becker’s “Contextualism about the Epistemic ‘Ought’ vs. Subjectivist Norms for Belief,” 16th Pitt-CMU Graduate Conference (Jan.)
- 2013 Comments on John Waterman’s “Skepticism and Semantic Blindsight,” Thirty-Seventh Annual Midsouth Philosophy Conference, Rhodes College, Memphis, Tenn., USA (Feb.)
- Comments on Raney Folland’s “Doxastic Attitudes Governed by a Principle of Coherence,” Tenth Annual Intermountain West Student Philosophy Conference, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA (March)

#### FUNDING

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- 2021–2023 PI: Horizon Postdoctoral Fellowships funding for a postdoc working on the SSHRC project: *Material Consequence as the Foundation of Logic*. CAD 100,000 over two years.
- 2020–2025 PI: SSHRC Insight Grant: *Material Consequence as the Foundation of Logic*. CAD 95,283 over five years.
- 2020–2024 Co-applicant: Czech Science Foundation (EXPRO). *Inferentialism Naturalized: Norms, Meanings and Reasons in the Natural World*. PI: Jaroslav Peregrin (Czech Academy of Sciences); co-applicants: Ladislav Koreň (University of Hradec Králové), Mark Risjord (Emory University). CZK 21,516,000 ≈ CAD 1,232,608 over five years.



- 2019–2021 Co-applicant: SSHRC Insight Development Grant: *Brilliant Thinkers, Empathic Therapists? What Explains the Gender Gap in Philosophy versus Psychology?* PI: Katharina Nieswandt (Concordia University, Philosophy); co-applicants: Kristen Dunfield (Concordia University, Psychology).
- 2019–2020 *Ending early in favor of EXPRO*: Collaborator: research project *Steps Towards the Naturalization of Inferentialism*. PI: Jaroslav Peregrin (Czech Academy of Sciences); co-applicants: Ladislav Koreň (University of Hradec Králové). Funding Agency: University of Hradec Králové.  
CZK 2,000,000 ≈ CAD 114,835
- 2019–2020 PI: *Knowledge in a Digital World: Epistemic Injustice, Bias, and other Challenges in the Age of Artificial Intelligence*. Concordia University: Aid to Research Related Events, Publication, Exhibition and Dissemination Activities (ARRE).  
CAD 3,000
- 2017–2020 PI: *L'acte de raisonner : sa nature et ses règles* (2018-NP-206481). Fonds de recherche du Québec, Société et culture (FRQSC): Soutien à la recherche pour la relève professorale.  
CAD 52,156 over three years.
- 2017–2019 Collaborator: *Man as a Normative Creature*. PI: Jaroslav Peregrin (Czech Academy of Sciences); co-applicants: Ladislav Koreň (University of Hradec Králové). Funding Agency: University of Hradec Králové (funding scheme: excellence in research at UHK).  
CZK 3,600,000 ≈ CAD 209,304 over three years.
- 2016–2017 PI: *Logics of Consequence: Logical Inferentialism, Defeasible Reasoning, and Transitivity*. Concordia University: Aid to Research Related Events, Publication, Exhibition and Dissemination Activities (ARRE).  
CAD 5,000

## Teaching

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### COURSES

At Concordia University:

- 2023–24: PHIL  $\frac{465}{643}$ . Truth  
 PHIL 362. Medieval Philosophy  
 PHIL 265. Introduction to Metaphysics  
 PHIL 201. Problems of Philosophy
- 2021–22: PHIL  $\frac{475}{634}$ . Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* and Its Current Reception  
 PHIL 265. Introduction to Metaphysics  
 PHIL 389. Ethics and Epistemology in the Digital Age

- 2020–21: PHIL  $\frac{414}{652}$ . Philosophy of Logic  
 PHIL 265. Introduction to Metaphysics  
 PHIL 389. Ethics and Epistemology in the Digital Age
- 2019–20: PHIL  $\frac{488}{656}$ . Reasons and Rationality, Theoretical and Practical  
 PHIL 216. Introduction to the Philosophy of Language  
 PHIL 389. Ethics and Epistemology in the Digital Age  
 PHIL 265. Introduction to Metaphysics
- 2018–19: PHIL  $\frac{416}{646}$ . Philosophy of Language: Relativism, Disagreement, and Perspectives  
 PHIL 398. Ethics and Epistemology in the Digital Age  
 PHIL 216. Introduction to the Philosophy of Language  
 PHIL 265. Introduction to Metaphysics
- 2017–18: PHIL 672. Directed Study: Logical Pluralism and Anti-Exceptionalism  
 PHIL 398. Ethics and Epistemology in the Digital Age  
 PHIL 325. Philosophical Psychology  
 PHIL  $\frac{414}{652}$ . Advanced Topics in Logic  
 PHIL 220. Introduction to the Philosophy of Science
- 2016–17: PHIL 201. Problems of Philosophy  
 PHIL 232. Introduction to Ethics  
 PHIL 201. Problems of Philosophy

Elsewhere:

- 2017 *Animal Morality and Revolutionary Virtues* (summer school at the University of Hradec Kralove, Czech Republic)
- 2012 *Introduction to Logic* (teaching assistant, University of Pittsburgh)
- 2011 *Minds and Machines* (teaching assistant, University of Pittsburgh)

POSTDOC SUPERVISION

- 2018-19 Charles Côté-Bouchard, postdoc at *Groupe interuniversitaire sur la normativité* (GRIN)
- 2022-24 Daniel Kaplan, Horizon Postdoctoral Fellowships on the SSHRC project: *Material Consequence as the Foundation of Logic*

DOCTORAL SUPERVISION

- 2020 David Albert DiDomenico, *The Nature and Epistemology of Inference*, University of Miami (outside reader)

2021 Sindre Olaussen Söderstrøm, *Inference and Logical Implication*, University of Bergen (external reader for prospectus seminar)

#### MA SUPERVISION

- Madeline Glowicki, *An Account of Willful Ignorance: Blameworthy Willful Ignorance, Praiseworthy Willful Ignorance, and Self-Deception*, M.A. Research Paper in Philosophy, Concordia University, second reader: Amandine Catala (accepted as is, September 2018).
- George Christopoulos, *A Theory of Epistemic Trust and Testimony: A Hybrid View in the Epistemology of Testimony*, M.A. Research Paper in Philosophy, Concordia University, second reader: Murray Clarke (accepted with minor revisions, April 2019).
- Kenji Lota, *Questions for Uniqueness*, M.A. Research Paper in Philosophy, Concordia University, second reader: Matthew Barker (accepted as is, April 2019).
- Joel Jordan (INDI program), *Respecting the Autonomy to Reflect: Entitlement, Trust, and Computer Testimony*, M.A. Thesis in Concordia's Individualized Program, committee members besides me as adviser: Rilla Khaled (Design and Computation Arts) and David Waddington (Education), (accepted with minor revisions, March 2020). *People's Choice Award* at the Concordia INDI Research Exposition for "Reasoning with Computers."
- Mansooreh Kimiagari, *Scrutinizing Anti-Exceptionalism*, M.A. Research Paper in Philosophy, Concordia University, second reader: Theodore Locke (accepted with minor modifications, December 2020).
- Aditya Guntoori, *Nagarjuna's No-Thesis View: A Defence of Bhavaviveka's Svatantrika Epistemology*, M.A. Research Paper in Philosophy, Concordia University, so-supervisor Antoine Panaioti, second reader: Brendan Gillon (accepted with minor modifications, February 2022).
- Matthew Burley, *Indicative Conditionals and Non-Transitivity*, M.A. Research Paper in Philosophy, Concordia University, second reader: Greg Lavers (accepted with minor modifications, February 2022).
- Viviane Fairbank, *Deconstructing the Adoption Problem; or, the Possibility of Logical Theory Choice*, M.A. Research Paper in Philosophy, Concordia University, so-supervisor: Romina Padró, second reader: Saul Kripke (accepted with minor modifications, July 2022).

#### EXAMINATIONS (OF MAJOR RESEARCH PAPERS AS SECOND READER)

2018 May Laura Gallivan, *An Experiential, Inclusive Approach to Hope*, M.A. Research Paper in Philosophy, Concordia University, supervisors: Matthew Barker and David Morris.

2018 March Sean Boivin, *The Likelihood Principle: Objectivity and the Values and Science Debate*, M.A. Research Paper in Philosophy, Concordia University, supervisor: Matthew Barker.

2017 Sep. Gabrielle Polce, *An Analysis of Time's Involuntariness in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology Through Habits and Their Constructive Interruption*, M.A. Research Paper in Philosophy, Concordia University, supervisors: Emilia Angelova and David Morris.

2016 Dec. Erik Nelson, *Logic without Regress: Fodor, Heidegger, and Inferences without Rules*, M.A. Research Paper in Philosophy, Concordia University, supervisor: Greg Lavers.

CHAIR OF ORAL EXAMINATION, MAJOR RESEARCH PAPERS

2019 Aug. William Richard O'Shea, *The Duplicity of Habit as Mediating Immediate Nows: Hegel's Response to Deleuze's Empiricism*, M.A. Research Paper in Philosophy, Concordia University, supervisors: Emilia Angelova and David Morris.

## Service

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SERVICE TO THE DEPARTMENT AND UNIVERSITY

- Department Hiring Committee, Limited Term Appointment in Logic and Metaphysics (winter term 2022)
- Department Hiring Committee, Tenure Track Hire (winter term 2022)
- Undergraduate Program Director (2021–2022)
- Graduate Program Director (2020–2021)
- Graduate Studies Committee (2019–2022)
- Department Hiring Committee, Limited Term Appointment in Logic (winter term 2019)
- Colloquium Series Organizer (2017–2019)
- Department Hiring Committee, cluster hiring initiative in the area of “Smart, Sustainable and Resilient Communities and Cities” (2017–2018)
- Undergraduate Program Committee (2016–2018)
- Library Liaison (2016–2017)

SERVICE TO THE PROFESSION

REFEREE: Reviews for Journals: more than 100 reviews for many journals, including *Mind*, *Journal of Philosophy*, *Nous*, *Ethics*, *PPR*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Synthese*, *Erkenntnis*, *AJP*, *Analysis*, *JPL*, *Ratio*, *CJP*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *PPQ*, *Minds and Machines*, *Hegel Bulletin* and more. For a verified record see: <https://www.webofscience.com/wos/author/record/172992>

Reviewer for Publishing Houses (book proposals):  
*Routledge*, *Bloomsbury*.

Reviewer for Prizes:  
Member of the 2018 *Res Philosophica* Prize Selection Committee.

CONFERENCES: *How should we (and how did we) choose our logical theories?* (Canadian Society for Epistemology, annual meeting), Université de Montréal, 2021 (together with Aude Bandini; speakers included: Ole Hjortland, Dirk Schlimm, Mathieu Marion, and Greg Lavers).

*Deduction, Dialogue, Discourse* (Canadian Society for Epistemology, annual meeting), Concordia University, 2020 (together with Aude Bandini; speakers included: Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Robert Brandom, Ole Hjortland, Sandra Lapointe, Mathieu Marion, and Florian Steinberger).

*Knowledge in a Digital World: Epistemic Injustice, Bias, and other Challenges in the Age of Artificial Intelligence* (Canadian Society for Epistemology, annual meeting), Concordia University, 2019 (together with Aude Bandini; speakers included: Karen Frost-Arnold and J. Adam Carter).

*Virtue and Moral Reasoning in a World of Oppression*, Concordia University, 2018 (together with Katharina Nieswandt; speakers included: Charlotte Witt, Elijah Millgram, Eric Wiland, Macalester Bell and more).

*Epistemic Agents: Norms, Control and Responsibility in the Theory of Knowledge* (Canadian Society for Epistemology, annual meeting), Université de Montréal, 2017 (together with Aude Bandini).

*Logics of Consequence: Logical Inferentialism, Defeasible Reasoning, and Transitivity*, Concordia University, 2017 (speakers included: Neil Tennant, David Ripley, Robert Brandom, Jaroslav Peregrin, Julien Murzi, Cathrine Hundleby, Marcus Rossberg, Christian Straßer and more).

*What is Reasoning? The Unity and Distinctness of Theoretical and Practical Inference*, University of Leipzig, 2016 (keynotes: Ralph Wedgwood and Julia Tanney).

*A Spirit of Trust: Mediating the Immediate: The Consciousness Chapters of the Phenomenology*, University of Leipzig, 2016 (lecture series and summer school with Robert Brandom).

OTHER: GRIN (*Le groupe de recherche interuniversitaire sur la normativité*)  
Responsable de l'axe normativité et connaissance, 2018–2022